Introduction

Abstract

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’

Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group

‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’

Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations

‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’

Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, Taiwan

Taiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.

While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

After decades of relative stability, tensions are again building over Taiwan. This book argues that these mark the beginnings of a major strategic crisis. A crisis could erupt suddenly, sparked by an episode of inadvertent escalation – such as the collision of military ships or aircraft operating in the Taiwan Strait. Or pressure could build gradually in the coming months and years, as Beijing and Washington descend deeper into what some strategic commentators are branding a new cold war.¹ Either way, a new crisis over Taiwan would likely be a significantly more serious affair than earlier such episodes in the mid-1950s and mid-1990s. The fate of Taiwan’s 23.5 million inhabitants could hang in the balance. Indeed, life as we know it could change dramatically if the coming Taiwan crisis is not prudently managed.

It has become commonplace to lay the blame for growing tensions over Taiwan squarely with Beijing. China’s strongman leader, Xi Jinping, has put the island front and centre in his signature ‘China Dream’ – a vision for making the Middle Kingdom wealthy and powerful again. In a January 2019 address commemorating the 40th anniversary of China’s ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’, Xi delivered a stark message: Taiwan must accept Beijing’s preferred ‘one country, two systems’ model for reunification, or face the military consequences.² But China’s coercive tactics are part of a larger, more complex picture. Beijing is also reacting to changes on Taiwan, where the passage of seven decades since the Chinese Civil War of 1945–49 has left the island’s inhabitants feeling increasingly estranged from the mainland. Taiwan’s leader, Tsai Ing-wen, asserts that Xi must ‘face the reality’ of Taiwan’s existence as a free and democratic society.³ Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s erratic policies toward both China and Taiwan contribute an additional layer of unpredictability.

In fact, Beijing, Taipei and Washington are each challenging the cross-strait ‘status quo’ which until now has, for the most part, kept the peace. That this status quo is unravelling is due to shifts in the underlying balance of military power among them. As the strongest side of this triangle, Washington has traditionally been able to deter Beijing from using force against the island while simultaneously dissuading Taiwan from issuing a formal declaration of independence. But the significant leaps forward that China’s military has taken since the mid-1990s have altered that equation. Taiwan could once arguably have held its own in a fight with its much larger neighbour, but the cross-strait military balance is now decisively in China’s favour. Meanwhile, although the US would still almost certainly prevail in a conflict with China over Taiwan today – albeit with significantly greater cost and risk than was previously the case – this book argues that its ability to do so is rapidly eroding and will probably be gone within a decade.

As the window on Washington’s ability to come to Taiwan’s defence closes, the chances of major crisis will intensify. This book identifies several scenarios where Beijing, Taipei and Washington could find themselves climbing the ladder of military escalation. As pragmatic as the Taiwanese have traditionally been, Taipei could inadvertently cross Beijing’s often ambiguous ‘red lines’ and provoke a military response. Military ships and aircraft operating in the increasingly crowded skies and waters around the island could collide or engage in combat. The island could gain renewed strategic significance against the backdrop of deepening Sino-American rivalry, placing Taiwan at the centre of a superpower crisis, just as it was during the 1950s. A crisis over Taiwan could also rapidly escalate, as parties succumb to powerful military-technical incentives to move early.

The policy options for addressing growing tensions over Taiwan are not promising. Wu Den-yih, chairman of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), created controversy in February 2019 by suggesting that his party would pursue a peace treaty with the mainland if returned to power in the island’s January 2020 elections. But given the widening gulf between Beijing and Taipei, the diplomatic resolution of Taiwan’s disputed status remains a long way off. China’s preferred ‘one country, two systems’ formula, for instance, has been resoundingly rejected by both sides of Taiwanese politics, who have witnessed with trepidation Beijing’s heavy-handed application of this approach in Hong Kong. A larger US–China deal, where Taiwan ends up as a bargaining chip, remains a possibility. But this too is an unlikely prospect given the increasing strains between Beijing and Washington.

With the growing possibility that these strains might develop into a cold war, calls for the US to deepen ties and to enhance its commitment to Taiwan have grown louder. Options ranging from a more visible US military presence in the waters around Taiwan, through to the sale of more advanced weaponry and the forging of a formal alliance of the kind in place at the height of the Cold War, have all been mooted by commentators and analysts. Tying these options together is the well-intentioned belief that they will enhance deterrence against Chinese coercion or a military attack targeting Taiwan. Yet effective deterrence ultimately rests upon whether Washington can convince Beijing that it is both willing and able to defend the island. With a president who espouses an ‘America First’ policy in the White House, one could forgive China’s leaders for doubting that Washington would really be willing to accept the costs and risks of coming to Taiwan’s aid. Even if it were, the ability of the US to do so is diminishing, as argued in Chapter Two.

Given the stakes and sensitivities involved, Beijing is unlikely to back down, even in the face of enhanced US deterrence. Indeed, this book argues that China’s leaders are most likely to respond in kind, thus exacerbating an already worsening Sino-American security dilemma. History tells us that such dynamics often escalate into full-blown conflict. The costs of such a conflict over Taiwan should not be underestimated. As the final chapter of this book details, China’s economy would go into freefall – with significant spillover effects for its major trading partners. Chinese cyber attacks alone could cost the US between US$70 billion and US$900bn. This is not to mention the massive loss of human life, especially were conflict to escalate to the nuclear level.

Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want conflict, not least because of the prohibitive costs involved. But rationality does not always prevail in decisions for war. Indeed, as Chapter Three of the book discusses, inadvertent escalation over Taiwan poses the greatest risk to peace during the coming ‘dangerous decade’. Unfortunately, continuing political stalemate across the strait inhibits the kinds of crisis-avoidance measures that were discussed so optimistically by scholars and policymakers alike in relation to Taiwan more than a decade ago. Acknowledging this constraint, the book suggests instead the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

Writing almost half a century ago, the Australian scholar Coral Bell sagely observed that ‘to concede the existence of a conflict is the essential first step to managing the crises to which it gives rise’.⁴ This book’s primary contention is that the prospects for a Taiwan conflict are real and intensifying. However, they are not yet being treated with the seriousness nor the urgency that they deserve. Unless and until they are, the robust management mechanisms needed to ensure that the next Taiwan crisis does not escalate into catastrophic conflict will not be put in place. While the primary responsibility for doing so rests with Beijing, Taipei and Washington, this is and should be a matter of international concern – for a full-blown Taiwan conflict would have far-reaching ramifications.

Notes

1 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘A New Cold War Has Begun’, Foreign Policy, 7 January 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/amp.

2 Derek Grossman, ‘No Smiles Across the Taiwan Strait’, Foreign Policy, 7 January 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/no-smiles-across-the-taiwan-strait.

3 Gerrit van der Wees, ‘How President Xi Jinping is Misreading Taiwan’, Diplomat, 3 January 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/howpresident-xi-jinping-is-misreadingtaiwan.

4 Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971), p. 21.