Tipping points

Abstract

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’

Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group

‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’

Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations

‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’

Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, Taiwan

Taiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.

While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

Notes

1 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 2000).

2 Josh Rogin, ‘China threatens U.S. Congress for crossing its “red line” on Taiwan’, Washington Post, 12 October 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/john-rogin/wp/2017/10/12/china-threatens-u-s-congress-for-crossing-its-red-line-on-taiwan.

3 Cited in Kirsty Needham, ‘China’s live fire drill a “red line” in Taiwan Strait’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-s-live-fire-drill-a-red-line-in-taiwan-strait-20180418-p4zacf.html.

4 William Kazer, ‘China Sets “Red Line” for U.S. Ceremony in Taiwan’, Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sets-red-line-for-u-s-ceremony-in-taiwan-1528632003?emailToken=6352c475f6dc80ec4edabaf23f142f7bnnVxyO9WcMGn1OcZsNecw4C023gOID02Ewd6+2kBklPAq5d8lDixoOkxo+kIquq/u0o7zSFMAy5FN8x0QN3+0/H3k2rMuy86C988hr5L20w%3D&reflink=article_email_share.

5 Scott L. Kastner, ‘Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan’, International Security, vol. 40, no. 3, Winter 2015/2016, p. 60.

6 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, ‘Anti-Secession Law’, http://www.chinaembassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm.

7 Cited in Ching-hsin Yu, ‘The centrality of maintaining the status quo in Taiwan elections’, Brookings, 15 March 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-centrality-of-maintaining-the-status-quo-in-taiwan-elections.

8 Ibid.

9 Steve Tsang, ‘Drivers Behind the Use of Force’, in Steve Tsang, ed., If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 1.

10 Steven Lee Myers, ‘With Xi’s Power Grab, China Joins New Era of Strongmen’, New York Times, 26 February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-authoritarianism.html.

11 William H. Overholt, ‘The West is getting China wrong’, East Asia Forum, 11 August 2018, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/08/11/the-west-is-getting-china-wrong/

12 For further reading, see Linda Jakobson, ‘What does China want?’, Australian Foreign Affairs, no. 1, October 2017, pp. 50–68.

13 Kastner, ‘Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point?’, p. 61.

14 For further reading, see Huang and Li, Inseparable Separation.

15 For further reading, see Dennis C. Blair and David V. Bonfili, ‘The April 2011 EP-3 Incident: The U.S. Point of View’, in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds, Managing Sino-American Crises (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 377–90.

16 See Jane Perlez and Steven Lee Myers, ‘US and China Are Playing “Game of Chicken” in South China Sea’, New York Times, 8 November 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/world/asia/south-china-sea-risks.html. For a more sanguine assessment, see James Goldrick, ‘The new normal: a close naval encounter in the South China Sea’, Interpreter, 9 November 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-normal-close-naval-encounter-south-china-sea.

17 Martin Fackler, ‘Japan Says China Aimed Military Radar at Ship’, New York Times, 5 February 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/asia/japan-china-islnds-dispute.html.

18 Chen Chao-fu and Flor Wang, ‘Officer receives reduced sentence in accidental missile launch appeal’, Focus Taiwan, 7 June 2018, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201806070018.aspx.

19 Lawrence Chung and Liu Zhen, ‘Taiwan will forcefully expel PLA warplanes next time: Tsai Ing-wen’, South China Morning Post, 2 April 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3004119/chinese-jets-incursion-across-taiwan-strait-beijings-way.

20 See, for example, ‘Taiwanese aircraft tail Chinese bombers on flight around island’, South China Morning Post, 26 May 2018, https://sc.mp/2IJ6wKJ.

21 Kristin Huang, ‘Taiwanese pilot “mistakenly fired decoy projectile” in encounter with PLA warplane’, South China Morning Post, 30 April 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3008320/taiwanese-pilot-mistakenly-fired-decoy-projectile-encouter-pla.

22 Kenneth W. Allen, ‘Air Force Deterrence and Escalation Calculations for a Taiwan Strait Conflict: China, Taiwan, and the United States’, in Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang and Evan S. Medeiros, eds, Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan's Security (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 169–70.

23 See Cole, ‘China’s New Air Routes Near Taiwan: Why Now? To What End?’.

24 Allen, ‘Air Force Deterrence and Escalation Calculations’, p. 170.

25 Liu Chien-pang et al., ‘Chinese warship allegedly rams Taiwan cargo vessel off Kinmen’, Focus Taiwan, 1 August 2019, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201908010013.aspx.

26 Jesse Johnson, ‘Taiwan shadows China carrier through narrow strait after warning by Xi: report’, Japan Times, 21 March 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/21/asia-pacific/china-dispatches-aircraft-carrier-taiwan-strait-warning-xi-report.

27 Bernard D. Cole, ‘The Military Instrument of Statecraft at Sea: Naval Options in an Escalatory Scenario Involving Taiwan: 2007-2016′, in Swaine, Yang and Medeiros, Assessing the Threat, pp. 185–209.

28 James Holmes, ‘Yes, China Could Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier. But Don’t Bet on It’, National Interest, 11 January 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/yes-china-could-sink-us-navy-aircraft-carrier-don't-bet-it-41227.

29 Ibid.

30 Barton Gellman, ‘U.S. and China nearly came to blows in 96′, Washington Post, 21 June 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-china-nearly-came-to-blows-in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-9995-90984f86a613.

31 Avery Goldstein, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations’, International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, p. 65.

32 Steven Stashwick, ‘South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and “Miscalculation” Myths’, Diplomat, 25 September 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths.

33 Tsang, ‘Drivers Behind the Use of Force’, p. 3.

34 See Western Pacific Naval Symposium, ‘Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea’, 22 April 2014, available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/CUES_2014.pdf.

35 Kyodo, ‘Japan and China launch defense communication mechanism to prevent air and sea clashes’, Japan Times, 8 June 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/08/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-china-launch-defense-communication-mechanism-prevent-air-sea-clashes.

36 Richard Sokolsky, ‘North and South Korea Take Important Steps to Demilitarize the Korean Peninsula’, 38North, 19 September 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/09/rsokolsky091918.

37 Song Jung-a, ‘Korean leaders establish phone hotline ahead of summit’, Financial Times, 20 April 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/df5204a0-4482-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b.

38 ‘Taiwan, China launch hotline after historic summit’, Straits Times, 30 December 2015, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-china-launch-hotline-after-historic-summit.

39 IISS, ‘Turbulence in the Taiwan Strait’, Strategic Comments, August 2016, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait.

40 Allen, ‘Air Force Deterrence and Escalation Calculations for a Taiwan Strait Conflict’, pp. 170–71.

41 See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Competing with China’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 7–64; and Robert D. Kaplan, ‘A New Cold War Has Begun’, Foreign Policy, 7 January 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/amp.

42 Jane Perlez, ‘Pence’s China Speech Seen as Portent of “New Cold War”’, New York Times, 5 October 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/world/asia/pence-china-speech-cold-war.html.

43 ‘Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China’, Hudson Institute, 4 October 2018, https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018.

44 Chris Horton, Lauly Li and Cheng Ting-fang, ‘Trade war traps Taiwan between two superpowers’, Nikkei Asian Review, 5 December 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Trade-war-traps-Taiwan-between-two-superpowers.

45 Richard C. Bush, ‘What Taiwan can take from Mike Pence’s speech on China’, Brookings Institution, 12 October 2018, http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/12/what-taiwan-can-take-from-mike-pences-speech-on-china.

46 For further reading, see Suettinger, ‘U.S. “Management” of Three Taiwan Strait “Crises”’, pp. 251–76.

47 For further reading, see Iain Donald Henry, Reliability and Alliance Politics: Interdependence and America's Asian Alliance System, PhD Dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 2017.

48 Ankit Panda, ‘Obama: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security Treaty’, Diplomat, 24 April 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty.

49 Ayako Mie, ‘Mattis clarifies U.S. defense pledge, stays mum on host-nation support’, Japan Times, 4 February 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/mattis-clarifies-u-s-defense-pledge-stays-mum-host-nation-support.

50 See, for example, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, Fall 2011, pp. 32–33.

51 For further reading, see Suettinger, ‘U.S. “Management” of Three Taiwan Strait “Crises”’, pp. 276–86.

52 Cited in James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 94.

53 Roy, Taiwan, p. 108.

54 See, for instance, Seth Cropsey, ‘Taiwan is key to US power in Pacific’, The Hill, 17 August 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/402286-Taiwan-is-key-to-US-power-in-Pacific.

55 Roy, Return of the Dragon, p. 209.

56 Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Cost-Imposing Strategies: A Brief Primer’, Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, November 2014, p. 6, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Maritime4_Mahnken.pdf?mtime=20160906081628.

57 Henry Kissinger, On China (London: Allen Lane, 2011), p. 153.

58 David Spencer, ‘Taiwan has other deterrence options besides costly and controversial nuclear weapons’, Taiwan News, April 2019, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3673904.

59 David C. Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks’, International Security, vol. 27, no. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 57–85.

60 James Curran, ‘Australia cannot afford to be distracted by the cold war talk’, Australian, 24 November 2018, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/australia-cannot-afford-to-be-distracted-by-the-cold-war-talk/news-story/2421bbdd112d0db7629514c46d2 3cd90.

61 Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security, vol. 41, no. 4, Spring 2017, p. 76.

62 Goldstein, ‘First Things First’, pp. 69–70.

63 Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’, p. 75.

64 Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option’, Foreign Affairs, 15 October 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option.

65 Dennis C. Blair, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’, Foreign Affairs, 11 December 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/would-china-go-nuclear.

66 Ibid.

67 United States, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘China Military Power: Mod-ernizing a Force to Fight and Win’, 2019, p. 40, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf.

68 Goldstein, ‘First Things First’, p. 67.

69 For further reading, see David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 56, no. 4, August– September 2014, pp. 7–22.

70 Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, ‘Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, p. 153.

71 For further reading, see James R. Holmes, ‘The Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012′, Foreign Policy, 20 August 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/20/the-sino-japanese-naval-war-of-2012.

72 See, for example, ‘Military tensions on the rise in the Taiwan Strait’, Japan Times, 7 April 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/04/07/editorials/military-tensions-rise-taiwan-strait.

73 For further reading, see Jeffrey W. Hornung, ‘Strong but constrained Japan-Taiwan ties’, Brookings Institution, 13 March 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strong-but-constrained-japan-taiwan-ties.