The China factor in Australia’s defence strategy and alliance posture

Abstract

A major shift in the paradigm undergirding relations between Australia and China has become clear in the early 2020s, with geopolitical concerns trumping economic considerations. Canberra has implemented a range of new policies in response to the risks it perceives in Australia’s economic relations with China, the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to exert political influence in Australia, the expanding capabilities and presence of the People’s Liberation Army, and Beijing’s economic and diplomatic gains in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. China’s policies towards Australia have become more coercive in economic as well as diplomatic terms. However, Australia has withstood Beijing’s punitive trade measures without suffering significant economic damage. China’s more assertive regional posture has prompted far-reaching changes to Australia’s defence- and alliance-policy settings, including new capability acquisitions and strategic initiatives such as AUKUS. In this Adelphi book, Euan Graham argues that Australia has provided an imperfect but nevertheless useful exemplar of how governments may respond effectively to multifarious security challenges from China. In particular, the Australian case shows how measures to address domestic vulnerabilities may serve as the foundation for a successful China policy at the international level.

Notes

1 Reuters, ‘Chinese Troops, Frigate Join Australia’s Largest Maritime Drill for First Time’, South China Morning Post, 9 September 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2163419/chinese-troops-frigate-join-australias-largest-maritime-drill.

2 See, for example, Ben Blanchard, ‘Indian, Australian Warships Arrive in China for Naval Parade’, Reuters, 21 April 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-anniversary-idUSKCN1RX04W.

3 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Exercise KOWARI Starts in North Queensland’, 28 August 2019, https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/exercise-kowari-starts-north-queensland.

4 Andrew Greene, ‘Second Chinese Spy Ship Approaches Australia to Monitor Military Exercises After Being “on Our Radar for Some Time”’, ABC News, 17 July 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-18/second-chinese-spy-ship-australia-monitor-military-exercises/100302198.

5 See, for example, a debate in the American journal Foreign Affairs by two American scholars who previously held government posts: Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘An Answer to Aggression: How to Push Back Against Beijing’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-08-11/ccp-answer-aggression; and Ryan Hass, ‘China Is Not Ten Feet Tall: How Alarmism Undermines American Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-03/china-not-ten-feet-tall.

6 IISS, Strategic Survey 2020: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (London: Routledge for the IISS, 2020), pp. 118–19.

7 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘China Island Tracker’, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/; and Minnie Chan, ‘Major Development Plan for Woody Island Unveiled’, South China Morning Post, 4 November 2012, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1074996/major-development-plan-woody-island-unveiled.

8 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘Comparing Aerial and Satellite Images of China’s Spratly Outposts’, 16 February 2018, https://amti.csis.org/comparing-aerial-satellite-images-chinas-spratly-outposts/; and J. Michael Dahm, ‘Beyond “Conventional Wisdom”: Evaluating the PLA’s South China Sea Bases in Operational Context’, War on the Rocks, 17 March 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/beyond-conventional-wisdom-evaluating-the-plas-south-china-sea-bases-in-operational-context/.

9 Dahm, ‘Beyond “Conventional Wisdom”: Evaluating the PLA’s South China Sea Bases in Operational Context’.

10 Erika Gehlen, ‘Stop China from Winning Without Fighting’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 148/2/1/1,429, February 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/february/stop-china-winning-without-fighting; and Lyle J. Morris et al., ‘Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War’, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.html.

11 United States, Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, Annual Report to Congress, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.

12 Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘China’s Navy Deploys New H-6J Anti-ship Cruise Missile-carrying Bombers’, Diplomat, 12 October 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/chinas-navy-deploys-new-h-6j-anti-ship-cruise-missile-carrying-bombers/; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’.

13 David Lague, ‘China Expands Its Amphibious Forces in Challenge to U.S. Supremacy Beyond Asia’, Special Report, Reuters, 20 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-military-amphibious/.

14 David Feeney, ‘“The Ostrich Sticks Its Head in the Sand and Thinks Itself Safe”: Australia’s Need for a Grand Strategy’, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific Centre of Gravity, December 2018, p. 3, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2018-12/cog_46.pdf.

15 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘2017 Foreign Policy White Paper’, p. 18, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf.

16 Matthew Doran and Bill Birtles, ‘“It Would Be [a] Shame if a Plane Fell from the Sky”: China’s Warning to RAAF Over South China Sea Flights’, ABC News, 16 December 2015, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-16/chinese-editorial-warns-raaf-planes-could-be-shot-down/7034664.

17 Correspondence between a senior official in Australia’s Department of Defence and this book’s author, August 2021.

18 Reuters, ‘Australia Says Chinese Fighter Jet Intercepted Australian Surveillance Aircraft’, VOA, 5 June 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/australia-says-chinese-fighter-jet-intercepted-australian-surveillance-aircraft-/6603915.html.

19 Malcolm Turnbull, A Bigger Picture (Melbourne: Hardie Grant Books, 2020), pp. 421–2.

20 Stephen Kuper, ‘RAN, US Navy Join Forces for South China Sea Patrol’, Defence Connect, 24 April 2020, https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/maritime-antisub/5972-ran-us-navy-join-forces-for-south-china-sea-patrol.

21 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

22 Euan Graham, ‘Laser Incident Near Australia Paints China in a Bad Light’, IISS Analysis, 25 February 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/02/laser-incident-near-australia-paints-china-in-a-bad-light.

23 Euan Graham, ‘Black Swan 2020: China’s NEO that Goes Geo’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 25 July 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/black-swan-2020-china-s-neo-goes-geo.

24 Jim Molan, ‘War-gaming Tomorrow: “It’s Possible This Will End in an All-out Invasion”’, Australian, 11 September 2021, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/wargaming-tomorrow-its-possible-to-envision-this-ending-in-an-allout-invasion/news-story/4229ad3877a242 dfc91e7ec3c954b7cd.

25 Thomas Shugart, ‘Australia and the Growing Reach of China’s Military’, Lowy Institute, 9 August 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-and-growing-reach-china-s-military.

26 Daljit Singh, ‘The “Indo-Pacific” Is Here to Stay’, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Fulcrum, 22 December 2020, https://fulcrum.sg/the-indo-pacific-is-here-to-stay/.

27 Graham, ‘Laser Incident Near Australia Paints China in a Bad Light’.

28 IISS, The Military Balance 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022), pp. 248–9, 257–8.

29 Ibid., p. 251; and H.I. Sutton, ‘Chinese Increasing Nuclear Submarine Shipyard Capacity’, US Naval Institute News, 12 October 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/10/12/chinese-increasing-nuclear-submarine-shipyard-capacity.

30 David Wroe, ‘Chinese Naval Ships Close to Australia? “Get Used to It”, Experts Warn’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 March 2017, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/chinese-naval-ships-close-to-australia-get-used-to-it-experts-warn-20170309-guunxi.html.

31 Jérôme Henry, ‘China’s Military Deployments in the Gulf of Aden: Anti-piracy and Beyond’, Asie.Visions, no. 89, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, November 2016, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf.

32 James Goldrick, ‘Australia’s Essential Need: Not Seaborne Trade but Seaborne Supply’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 3 September 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-essential-need-not-seaborne-trade-seaborne-supply.

33 Ellen McCutchan, ‘Fact Check: Does Australia Have 3 Weeks of Petrol in Reserve?’, ABC News, 23 May 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-23/fact-check-jim-molan-fuel-security/9687606; and United Nations, ‘Agreement on an International Energy Program’, 18 November 1974, p. 273, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201040/volume-1040-A-15664-English.pdf.

34 Euan Graham, ‘The Lion and the Kangaroo: Australia’s Strategic Partnership with Singapore’, Lowy Institute, 16 May 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lion-and-kangaroo-australia-s-strategic-partnership-singapore.

35 James Goldrick, ‘Australia’s Naval Presence in the South China Sea Is Nothing New’, ASPI Strategist, 5 February 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-naval-presence-in-the-south-china-sea-is-nothing-new/.

36 Anthony Bergin and Tony Press, ‘We Can’t Just Go with the Floe in Antarctica’, ASPI, 27 April 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/we-cant-just-go-floe-antarctica.

37 Elizabeth Buchanan, ‘The (Other) Continent We Can’t Defend’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 13 August 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/other-continent-we-can-t-defend.

38 Xu Keyue, ‘Japan–Australia Pact Shows “Willingness to Be US Pawns”, While Risking Regional Peace’, Global Times, 24 October 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1277785.shtml.

39 Euan Graham, ‘The Future for US Marines in Darwin’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 31 August 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/future-us-marines-darwin.

40 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘United States Force Posture Initiatives’, https://www.defence.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI/.

41 Greg Hadley, ‘Two More B-2 Bombers Arrive in Australia to Train with RAAF’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 14 July 2022, https://www.airforcemag.com/two-more-b-2-bombers-arrive-in-australia-to-train-with-raaf/.

42 Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper and Iskander Rehman, ‘Gateway to the Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of the Australia–U.S. Alliance’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 9 November 2013, pp. 13–21, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/gateway-to-the-indo-pacific-australian-defense-strategy-and-the-future-of-t/publication/1.

43 C. Todd Lopez, ‘U.S. Withdraws from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty’, US Department of Defense, 2 August 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty/.

44 James Holmes, ‘It’s Time for a Massive U.S. Navy Base in Australia’, National Interest, 17 November 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/its-time-massive-us-navy-base-australia-97051; and Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment’, August 2012, p. 19, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf.

45 Brendan Nicholson, ‘No US Military Bases Here, Says Smith, but Washington Confirms Plan as Part of Asia-Pacific Pivot’, Australian, 3 August 2012, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/no-us-military-bases-here-says-smith-but-washington-confirms-plan-as-part-of-asia-pacific-pivot/news-story/fe82b3962114f5a686c5c01d876c34f7.

46 US Navy, ‘Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support Holds Hearing on Navy and Marine Corps Readiness’, 2 December 2020, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Testimony/display-testimony/Article/2433784/senate-armed-services-subcommittee-on-readiness-and-management-support-holds-he.

47 Ken Moriyasu, ‘US Navy Chief Wants Indian Ocean “1st Fleet,” Possibly in Singapore’, Nikkei Asia, 19 November 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/US-Navy-chief-wants-Indian-Ocean-1st-Fleet-possibly-in-Singapore.

48 Andrew Tillett and Philip Coorey, ‘Dutton Signals More US Troops in Australia’, Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2021, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/dutton-flags-more-us-troops-in-australia-20210610-p5800r.

49 Colin Clark, ‘Aussie PM Says “Extended” Visits for US, UK Nuke Subs Likely at Western Port’, Breaking Defense, 15 March 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/aussie-pm-says-extended-visits-for-us-uk-nuke-subs-likely-at-western-port/.

50 Andrew Greene, ‘PM Says No Nuclear Submarine Decision Before Election, as New Subs Base Planned for Australia’s East Coast’, ABC News, 6 March 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-07/nuclear-submarine-base-shortlist-brisbane-newcastle-port-kembla/100887204.

51 US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021’, 16 September 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-australia-u-s-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2021/.

52 Brendan Thomas-Noone, ‘Ebbing Opportunity: Australia and the US National Technology and Industrial Base’, United States Studies Centre, 25 November 2019, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-and-the-us-national-technology-and-industrial-base.

53 Julie Hare, ‘Australian Universities Have Expertise to Support AUKUS Security Pact’, Australian Financial Review, 16 September 2021, https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/australian-universities-have-expertise-to-support-aukus-security-pact-20210916-p58s62.

54 John Blaxland, ‘Defence Update: In an Increasingly Dangerous Neighbourhood, Australia Needs a Stronger Security System’, Conversation, 1 July 2020, https://theconversation.com/defence-update-in-an-increasingly-dangerous-neighbourhood-australia-needs-a-stronger-security-system-141771.

55 For a doctrinal view from Australia’s navy, see Justin Jones (ed.), A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia: Perspectives, Sea Power Series 1 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, Australia, 2013).

56 James Goldrick, ‘Australia’s Essential Need: Not Seaborne Trade but Seaborne Supply’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 15 June 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-essential-need-not-seaborne-trade-seaborne-supply.

57 Angelique Donnellan, ‘Australia’s Attack Class Submarine Project Faces Criticism Over Rising Costs and Milestone Delays’, ABC News, 20 January 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-20/australia-attack-class-submarines-project-costs-delays-criticism/13074440.

58 IISS, The Military Balance 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021), pp. 241–3.

59 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, 1 July 2020, p. 3, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update.

60 Rod McGuirk, ‘Australia Plans $190 Billion Defense Boost Over Decade’, Associated Press, 1 July 2020, https://apnews.com/article/9a1fffde814f3d5d0d2c32d1758fba65; and ‘Speech – Australian Strategic Policy Institute’, speech delivered by Linda Reynolds, Australia’s Minister for Defence, 2 July 2020, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/speeches/speech-australian-strategic-policy-institute.

61 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, p. 4.

62 Ibid., p. 12

63 Mallory Shelbourne, ‘Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan in “Next Six Years”’, US Naval Institute News, 9 March 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years.

64 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, p. 29.

65 Ibid., p. 27.

66 Stephan Fruehling, ‘Does the AUKUS Submarine Deal Compromise Australia’s Sovereignty?’, ASPI Strategist, 1 October 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/does-the-aukus-submarine-deal-compromise-australias-sovereignty/.

67 Donald Greenlees, ‘ANZUS at 70: Konfrontasi and East Timor— America’s Indonesian Balancing Act’, ASPI Strategist, 23 August 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/anzus-at-70-konfrontasi-and-east-timor-americas-indonesian-balancing-act/.

68 Matthew Doran, ‘Criminals Exploited Microsoft Exchange After China “Propped Open the Door”, Intelligence Agency Says’, ABC News, 29 July 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-29/china-microsoft-exchange-hack-criminals-weakness-propped-open/100335008.

69 Colin Packham, ‘Australia Concluded China Was Behind Hack on Parliament, Political Parties – Sources’, Reuters, 15 September 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-china-cyber-exclusive-idUSKBN1W00VF.

70 Jade Macmillan and Andrew Greene, ‘Australia to Spend $270b Building Larger Military to Prepare for “Poorer, More Dangerous” World and Rise of China’, ABC News, 1 July 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-30/australia-unveils-10-year-defence-strategy/12408232.

71 IISS, The Military Balance 2021, p. 224.

72 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Defence Workforce to Grow Above 100,000’, 10 March 2022, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2022-03-10/defence-workforce-grow-above-100000.

73 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, p. 27.

74 Kym Bergmann, ‘Army to Get Long-range Missile Capability’, Australian, 31 October 2020, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/defence/army-to-acquire-longrange-missile-capability/news-story/25640827c9c242e6d9670b124936c271; and Fabian Hoffman, ‘Australia Seeks Improved Missile Capabilities’, IISS Analysis, 16 November 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/11/australia-seeks-improved-missile-capabilities.

75 William Leben, ‘What’s the Plan for “Sovereign” Munitions for the ADF?’, ASPI Strategist, 3 November 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/whats-the-plan-for-sovereign-munitions-for-the-adf/.

76 John R. Hoehn, ‘Precision-guided Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 11 June 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45996.pdf.

77 Natasha Turak, ‘The U.S. and Europe Are Running Out of Weapons to Send to Ukraine’, CNBC News, 28 September 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/28/the-us-and-europe-are-running-out-of-weapons-to-send-to-ukraine.html.

78 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Australia and US Partner to Spearhead Precision Strike Missile Capability’, 12 August 2021, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/media-releases/australia-and-us-partner-spearhead-precision-strike-missile.

79 Peter Hunter, ‘More of the Same Isn’t the Answer to Australia’s Security Challenges’, ASPI Strategist, 7 August 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/more-of-the-same-isnt-the-answer-to-australias-security-challenges/.

80 Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2019).

81 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, p. 26.

82 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Joint Statement – Defence Strategic Review’, 3 August 2022, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/statements/joint-statement-defence-strategic-review.

83 Aaron Mehta, ‘Australia Cleared to Buy $185 Million in Aegis Equipment’, Defense News, 27 June 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/06/27/australia-cleared-to-buy-185-million-in-aegis-equipment/; and Marcus Hellyer, ‘In for the Long Haul (Part 2): Can the Anzacs Remain Relevant?’, ASPI Strategist, 4 April 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/in-for-the-long-haul-part-2-can-the-anzacs-remain-relevant/.

84 Marcus Hellyer, ‘Delivering a Stronger Navy, Faster’, ASPI, 2 November 2021, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/delivering-stronger-navy-faster.

85 Andrew Tillett, ‘Navy Ships May Be Delayed’, Australian Financial Review, 1 February 2022, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/navy-ships-may-be-delayed-20220201-p59sye.

86 Andrew Tillett, ‘Design Issues Weigh Down $45b Frigate Program’, Australian Financial Review, 31 May 2021, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/45-billion-frigate-problem-weighed-down-by-design-issues-20210531-p57wmv.

87 Dinakar Peri, ‘India, Australia Are Guardians of the Flanks of the Indian Ocean: Australian Navy Office’, Hindu, 2 November 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-australia-are-guardians-of-the-flanks-of-the-indian-ocean-australian-navy-officer/article66083029.ece.

88 Andrew Brown, ‘The History of the Radford–Collins Agreement’, Royal Australian Navy, https://www.navy. gov.au/history/feature-histories/history-radford-collins-agreement.

89 Nick Childs, ‘US and Allies Test Aircraft Carrier Options’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 15 October 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/10/us-and-allies-test-aircraft-carrier-options.

90 Marcus Hellyer, ‘What Exactly Is the Collins Life-of-type Extension? Part 2—A Mindset’, ASPI Strategist, 20 November 2018, aspistrategist.org. au/what-exactly-is-the-collins-life-of-type-extension-part-2-a-mindset/; and Xavier Vavasseur, ‘Australia Confirms Life-of-type Extension for Collins-class Submarines’, Naval News, 19 September 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/australia-confirms-life-of-type-extension-for-collins-class-submarines/.

91 Mathieu Duchâtel, ‘Australia and the Future of Deterrence Against China’, Institut Montaigne, 22 September 2021, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/australia-and-future-deterrence-against-china.

92 Matthew P. Funaiole, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr and Brian Hart, ‘A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 August 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines.

93 Henry Boyd and Joseph Dempsey, ‘Beyond JL-2: China’s Development of a Successor SLBM Continues’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 7 August 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/08/china-successor-slbm.

94 Duchâtel, ‘Australia and the Future of Deterrence Against China’.

95 According to the Defence Strategic Update, ‘the Government will also prioritise the acquisition of strike weapons to increase the ADF’s maritime deterrence and long-range land strike capabilities’; Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defense Strategic Update’, p. 37.

96 Marcus Hellyer, ‘Can Australia Get Second-hand Nuclear Submarines? The US Option’, ASPI Strategist, 15 October 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/can-australia-get-second-hand-nuclear-submarines-the-us-option/.

97 Duchâtel, ‘Australia and the Future of Deterrence Against China’.

98 US Marine Corps, ‘A Concept for Stand-in Forces’, December 2021, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Users/183/35/4535/211201_A%20Concept%20for%20Stand-In%20Forces.pdf?ver = EIdvoO4fwI2OaJDSB5gDDA%3d%3d.

99 Bergmann, ‘Army to Get Long-range Missile Capability’.

100 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Women, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, ‘Australia to Pursue Nuclear-powered Submarines Through New Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership’, 16 September 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security-partnership.

101 White, How to Defend Australia, p. 234.

102 Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942 (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2021), p. 150; and Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australia (London: IISS, 2009), p. 168.

103 Katharine Murphy, ‘Essential Poll: Majority of Australians Back Aukus Submarine Pact, but Fear It Will Inflame Tensions with China’, Guardian, 27 September 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/28/essential-poll-majority-of-australians-back-aukus-submarine-pact-but-fear-it-will-inflame-tensions-with-china.

104 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, p. 27.

105 Rod Lyon, ‘Should Australia Build Its Own Nuclear Arsenal?’, ASPI Strategist, 24 October 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/should-australia-build-its-own-nuclear-arsenal/.

106 White, How to Defend Australia, p. 245.