Competing with China in the Southwest Pacific

Abstract

A major shift in the paradigm undergirding relations between Australia and China has become clear in the early 2020s, with geopolitical concerns trumping economic considerations. Canberra has implemented a range of new policies in response to the risks it perceives in Australia’s economic relations with China, the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to exert political influence in Australia, the expanding capabilities and presence of the People’s Liberation Army, and Beijing’s economic and diplomatic gains in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. China’s policies towards Australia have become more coercive in economic as well as diplomatic terms. However, Australia has withstood Beijing’s punitive trade measures without suffering significant economic damage. China’s more assertive regional posture has prompted far-reaching changes to Australia’s defence- and alliance-policy settings, including new capability acquisitions and strategic initiatives such as AUKUS. In this Adelphi book, Euan Graham argues that Australia has provided an imperfect but nevertheless useful exemplar of how governments may respond effectively to multifarious security challenges from China. In particular, the Australian case shows how measures to address domestic vulnerabilities may serve as the foundation for a successful China policy at the international level.

Notes

1 Seth Robson, ‘Pacific Island Nation of Palau Offers to Host US Military Bases, Report Says’, Stars and Stripes, 9 September 2020, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/pacific-island-nation-of-palau-offers-to-host-us-military-bases-report-says-1.644342.

2 Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942 (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2021), p. 266.

3 David Feeney, ‘“The Ostrich Sticks Its Head in the Sand and Thinks Itself Safe”: Australia’s Need for a Grand Strategy’, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific Centre of Gravity, December 2018, p. 9, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2018-12/cog_46.pdf.

4 Fumi Matsumoto, ‘Australian Leader Embarks on Pacific Trip to Regain “Backyard”’, Nikkei Asia, 17 January 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Australian-leader-embarks-on-Pacific-trip-to-regain-backyard.

5 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Stepping Up Australia’s Engagement with Our Pacific Family’, September 2019, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/stepping-up-australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-family.pdf.

6 ‘Australia – the Indispensable Power in a Congested Sea’, speech delivered by Jenny Hayward-Jones to the Royal United Services Institute’s 2nd International Defence and Security Dialogue, 26 February 2013, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-indispensable-power-congested-sea: ‘External interest in the Pacific Islands region can be broadly sorted into four categories: (1) traditional powers – Australia, New Zealand, the United States, France, the European Union and Japan, (2) ascendant or resurgent states – China, India, Russia, and the Republic of Korea, (3) vote buyers and marginalised states – Cuba, Taiwan, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Georgia, and (4) investors – Malaysia and Indonesia.’

7 Graeme Dobell, ‘The Pacific “Arc of Instability”’, Correspondents Report, ABC Radio National, 20 August 2006, https://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2006/s1719019.htm.

8 Chengxin Pan, Matthew Clarke and Sophie Loy-Wilson, ‘Australia’s Pivot to the Pacific’, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 14 November 2018, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australias-pivot-to-the-pacific/.

9 Thom Woodroofe, ‘Australia Has Neglected Its Relationship with the Pacific – but That Can Change’, Guardian, 25 April 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/25/australia-has-neglected-its-relationship-with-the-pacific-but-that-can-change.

10 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942, p. 272.

11 Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee, ‘Minute of Decision: The Pacific Reset: The First Year’, New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 December 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/R-R-The-Pacific-reset-The-First-Year.PDF.

12 ‘An Address by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’, speech delivered by Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand’s prime minister, at the Lowy Institute, Sydney, 7 July 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-new-zealand-prime-minister-jacinda-ardern.

13 Quoted in Feeney, ‘“The Ostrich Sticks Its Head in the Sand and Thinks Itself Safe”: Australia’s Need for a Grand Strategy’, p. 9. See also Andrew Tillett, ‘Australia Fails to Lead in the Pacific: Labor’s Richard Marles’, Australian Financial Review, 21 November 2017, https://www.afr.com/politics/australia-fails-to-lead-in-the-pacific-labors-richard-marles-20171120-gzp0m3.

14 ‘Address – “Australia and the Pacific: A New Chapter”’, speech delivered by Scott Morrison, Australia’s prime minister, 8 November 2018, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-41938.

15 Graeme Dobell, ‘China Challenges Australia in the South Pacific’, ASPI Strategist, 2 October 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-challenges-australia-in-the-south-pacific/.

16 Denghua Zhang and Shivani, ‘Fiji’s Balancing Act on Foreign Interests in the Pacific’, East Asia Forum, 3 September 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/03/fijis-balancing-act-on-foreign-interests-in-the-pacific/.

17 ‘China to Fund Renovation of Vanuatu PM’s Offices’, Radio New Zealand, 16 May 2016, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/304024/china-to-fund-renovation-of-vanuatu-pm’s-offices.

18 Melanesian Spearhead Group, ‘MSG Secretariat and People’s Republic of China Discusses [sic] Possible Partnership Arrangement’, 9 December 2020, https://msgsec.info/msg-secretariat-and-peoples-republic-of-china-discusses-possible-partnership-arrangement/; and ‘MSG Secretariat Building Handed Over to Vanuatu Government’, Radio New Zealand, 6 November 2007, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/173745/msg-secretariat-building-handed-over-to-vanuatu-government.

19 Jamie Tahana, ‘Beijing Tries to Whip Up Support for South China Sea Claims’, Radio New Zealand, 1 June 2016, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/305309/beijing-tries-to-whip-up-support-for-south-china-sea-claims.

20 Charlotte Greenfield, ‘Vanuatu to Seek More Belt and Road Assistance from Beijing: PM’, Reuters, 22 May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pacific-china-vanuatu-idUSKCN1SS0R7.

21 Gordon Peake and Graeme Smith, ‘Solomon Islands: Cops Bearing Gifts’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 25 January 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/solomon-islands-cops-bearing-gifts.

22 ‘China Supports Defence Force with K17.5 Million Gift’, National, 7 November 2017, https://www.thenational.com.pg/china-supports-defence-force-k17-5-million-gift/.

23 ‘China-aided Hydrographic Survey Vessel Handed Over to Fijian Navy’, Xinhua, 21 December 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/21/c_137689720.htm.

24 ‘Dozens of Fraud Suspects Repatriated to China from Fiji’, Reuters, 6 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-crime-idUKKBN1AM0GR.

25 Andrew Greene, ‘Chinese Police Begin Work in Solomon Islands to Maintain Law and Order, as Australian Officials Watch Closely’, ABC News, 23 February 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-24/chinese-police-land-in-solomon-islands-month-after-riots/100855948.

26 ‘Samoa PM Turns First Sod on New Police Academy’, Radio New Zealand, 26 October 2022, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/477396/samoa-pm-turns-first-sod-on-new-police-academy.

27 Ma Feng, ‘The South Pacific and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 23 May 2017, https://web.archive. org/web/20210716101033/http:/www.cssn.cn/jjx/jjx_gzf/201705/t20170523_3528652.shtml.

28 US Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018’, 2018, p. 111, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

29 ‘Xi Pledges to Join PNG for Community with Shared Future for China, Pacific Island Nations’, Xinhua, 26 October 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2021-10/26/c_1310269889.htm.

30 See, for example, World Bank, ‘Solomon Islands Roads and Aviation Project’, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/procurement-detail/OP00109845; Government of Samoa, ‘Faleolo International Airport Upgrade’, 30 November 2016, http://www.samoagovt.ws/2016/11/faleolo-international-airport-upgrade/; Asian Development Bank, ‘PNG: Civil Aviation Development Investment Program – Tranche 2 & 3’, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/43141/43141-043-43141-044-emr-en_2.pdf; and International Monetary Fund, ‘Vanuatu’, IMF Country Report no. 15/149, June 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15149.pdf.

31 Yang Zhen and Fang Xiaozhi, ‘Strategic Choices for China’s Sea Power and Navy Buildup: A Maritime Security Perspective’, Global Review, vol. 4, 2015, pp. 85–101, https://cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?filename = GJZW201504007&dbcode = CJFD&dbname = CJFD2015.

32 Feeney, ‘“The Ostrich Sticks Its Head in the Sand and Thinks Itself Safe”: Australia’s Need for a Grand Strategy’, p. 9.

33 Peter Wood, with Alex Stone and Taylor A. Lee, ‘China’s Ground Segment: Building the Pillars of a Great Space Power’, China Aerospace Institute, p. 70, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2021-03-01%20Chinas%20Ground%20Segment.pdf?ver = z4ogY_MrxaDurwVt-R9J6w%3d%3d; and Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, ‘China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad’, Adelphi 451 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, May 2015).

34 Some are surveyed in Denghua Zhang, ‘China’s Military Engagement with Pacific Island Countries’, Asia & the Pacific Policy Society, 17 August 2020, https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-military-engagement-with-pacific-island-countries/.

35 Qin Sheng, ‘The South Pacific Offensive of the “Indo-Pacific” Strategy: Status Quo, Motive Forces and Prospects’, Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs, June 2019, http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-YFZH201906006.htm.

36 Greg Torode and Philip Wen, ‘Explainer: Possible Chinese Military Base in S. Pacific Fills Gap, Sends Strong Message to U.S. and Allies’, Reuters, 10 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-vanuatu-base-explainer-idUSKBN1HH1B4.

37 Chen Xulong, ‘The Importance and Role of Pacific Island Countries to China’s National Security’, China Institute of International Studies, 2 June 2015, https://www.ciis.org.cn/yjcg/xslw/202007/t20200710_1218.html.

38 H.I. Sutton, ‘Satellite Images Show that Chinese Navy Is Expanding Overseas Base’, Forbes, 10 May 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/05/10/satellite-images-show-chinese-navy-is-expanding-overseas-base/?sh = ca80ae368691.

39 See, for example, Michael O’Keefe, ‘Response to Rumours of a Chinese Military Base in Vanuatu Speaks Volumes About Australian Foreign Policy’, Conversation, 11 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/response-to-rumours-of-a-chinese-military-base-in-vanuatu-speaks-volumes-about-australian-foreign-policy-94813.

40 ‘Australia’s Vaccine Diplomacy in Pacific Islands Wards Off Beijing, Prime Minister Says’, Reuters, 13 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australias-vaccine-diplomacy-pacific-islands-wards-off-beijing-pm-morrison-2022-03-13/.

41 Nick Warner, ‘Australia Must End Its Pacific Stupor Before It’s Too Late’, Cipher Brief, 2 May 2022, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/australia-must-end-its-pacific-stupor-before-its-too-late. Nick Warner is the former director general of Australia’s Office of National Intelligence.

42 Liu Zhen, ‘China Confirms Signing of Solomon Islands Security Pact as US Warns of Regional Instability’, South China Morning Post, 19 April 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3174811/china-confirms-signing-controversial-solomon-islands-security.

43 Kirsty Needham and Martin Quin Pollard, ‘U.S. Concerned After China Says It Signs Security Pact with Solomon Islands’, Reuters, 19 April 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-officials-travel-solomon-islands-sign-agreements-parliament-told-2022-04-19/.

44 The meaning of ‘transition’ here is ambiguous, but hints at a desire to project naval forces into a broader area of the Southwest Pacific; Damien Cave, ‘China and Solomon Islands Draft Secret Security Pact, Raising Alarm in the Pacific’, New York Times, 24 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/asia/china-solomon-islands-security-pact.html.

45 Damien Cave, ‘China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked’, New York Times, 17 October 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/world/australia/china-tulagi-solomon-islands-pacific.html.

46 David Wroe, ‘China Eyes Vanuatu Military Base in Plan with Global Ramifications’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 April 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html.

47 David Wroe, ‘The Great Wharf from China, Raising Eyebrows Across the Pacific’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-great-wharf-from-china-raising-eyebrows-across-the-pacific-20180411-p4z8yu.html.

48 Government of Vanuatu, Finance and Treasury, ‘Economic Assessment for Luganville Main Wharf Renovation and Extension Project’, December 2013, https://doft.gov.vu/index.php/economy/luganville-main-wharf-project.

49 Gao Wensheng, ‘The Value, Risks and China’s Countermeasures of the South Pacific Energy Strategy Channel’, World Regional Studies, vol. 26, no. 6, December 2017, pp. 1–10, http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJDJ201706001.htm.

50 Graeme Smith, ‘China’s Guide to Investment Cooperation in Papua New Guinea’, Australian National University, Department of Pacific Affairs, In Brief, 2019/25, https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2019-12/ib2019-25_smith.pdf.

51 Luke Kama, ‘Airport Job Contract Signed’, National, 20 December 2016, https://www.thenational.com.pg/airport-job-contract-signed/.

52 Asian Development Bank, ‘Papua New Guinea: Lae Port Development Project’, Completion Report, April 2017, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/40037/40037-013-pcr-en.pdf.

53 Ben Packham, ‘Move to Head Off China with Australian Base in PNG’, Australian, 20 September 2018, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/foreign-affairs/move-to-head-off-china-with-australian-base-in-png/news-story/fa4d3f407ffa73dd8240071e03ba7828.

54 Angus Livingston, ‘Australia to Upgrade Papua New Guinea’s Ports for $580 Million’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 January 2022, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-to-upgrade-papua-new-guinea-s-ports-for-580-million-20220121-p59q79.html.

55 Jeffrey Wall, ‘China to Build $200 Million Fishery Project on Australia’s Doorstep’, ASPI Strategist, 8 December 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-to-build-200-million-fishery-project-on-australias-doorstep/.

56 Kristy Sexton-McGrath, ‘Torres Strait Islanders’ Fear Over $200 m Chinese Fishery Handshake with PNG’, ABC News, 16 December 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-12-16/china-fishery-fears-for-torres-strait-islanders/12988998.

57 Primrose Riordan, ‘Australia Beats China to Funding Fiji Base’, Australian, 7 September 2018, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/australia-beats-china-to-funding-fiji-base/news-story/60d05ca8eb2bec629080c2c844255bbd; and Republic of Fiji Military Forces, ‘Blackrock Officially Opens’, https://rfmf.mil.fj/blackrock-officially-opens.

58 Rosi Doviverata, ‘China Happy to Help Fiji Set Up a New Navy Base’, Fiji Sun, 6 November 2015, https://fijisun.com.fj/2015/11/06/china-happy-to-help-fiji-set-up-a-new-navy-base/.

59 Jonathan Barrett, ‘Kiribati Says China-backed Pacific Airstrip Project for Civilian Use’, Reuters, 13 May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kiribati-says-china-backed-pacific-airstrip-project-civilian-use-2021-05-13/; and Phil Mercer, ‘Plan to Upgrade WWII-era Pacific Ocean Airstrip Sparks Unease’, Voice of America, 10 June 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_plan-upgrade-wwii-era-pacific-ocean-airstrip-sparks-unease/6206844.html.

60 Barbara Dreaver, ‘Fears Over China’s Involvement in Kiribati’s Ditching of Marine Reserve’, 1News, 11 November 2021, https://www.1news.co.nz/2021/11/11/fears-over-chinas-involvement-in-kiribatis-ditching-of-marine-reserve/.

61 Wood, Stone and Lee, ‘China’s Ground Segment: Building the Pillars of a Great Space Power’.

62 ‘Fijian PM Clarifies Chinese Ship’s Docking in Suva Port’, Xinhua, 13 June 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/13/c_137251825.htm.

63 Liu Zhen, ‘Could Ties with Kiribati Be a Boost to China’s Space Ambitions?’, South China Morning Post, 21 September 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3029812/could-ties-kiribati-be-boost-chinas-space-ambitions.

64 Reuters, ‘Samoa’s Disputed Leader Promises Chinese-backed Port at $132 m, a Third of Proposed Cost’, Straits Times, 10 June 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/samoas-disputed-leader-promises-chinese-backed-port-at-a-third-of-the-cost.

65 Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, ‘Investments’, https://www.aiffp.gov.au/investments.

66 Japan Bank for International Cooperation, ‘Buyer’s Credit for State-owned Submarine Cable Corporation of Palau’, 14 January 2021, https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2020/0114-014143.html.

67 Tom Westbrook, ‘PNG Upholds Deal with Huawei to Lay Internet Cable, Derides Counter-offer’, Reuters, 26 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papua-huawei-tech-idUSKCN1NV0DR.

68 Amy Remeikis, ‘Australia Supplants China to Build Undersea Cable for Solomon Islands’, Guardian, 13 June 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/13/australia-supplants-china-to-build-undersea-cable-for-solomon-islands.

69 Colin Packham and Paulina Duran, ‘Telstra in Talks to Buy Digicel Pacific in Australian Govt-backed Bid’, Reuters, 19 July 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/telstra-talks-buy-digicel-pacific-with-australian-government-help-2021-07-18/; and Stephen Dziedzic, ‘US, Japan Back Australia’s Digicel Pacific Purchase with $150 Million in Credit Guarantees’, ABC News, 16 November 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-17/us-japan-back-australias-digicel-pacific-telco-purchase/101662258.

70 Joanne Wallis et al., ‘Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands – Research Report’, Department of Pacific Affairs, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific, 2021, p. 12, https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/8060/mapping-security-cooperation-pacific-islands-research-report.

71 Jenny Hayward-Jones, ‘Australia’s Costly Investment in Solomon Islands: The Lessons of RAMSI’, Lowy Institute, 8 May 2014, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/high-price-ramsi-australia-s-lessons-solomon-islands.

72 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Australia-led Combined Task Force Concludes Role with RAMSI’, 2 July 2013, https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australia-led-combined-task-force-concludes-role-ramsi.

73 Max Walden, Stephen Dziedzic and Evan Wasuka, ‘Here’s What’s Behind the Violent Protests in the Solomon Islands Capital, Honiara’, ABC News, 25 November 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-25/solomon-islands-protests-explainer-china-taiwan/100648086.

74 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Solomon Islands Concerning the Basis for Deployment of Police, Armed Forces, and Other Personnel to Solomon Islands’, 14 August 2017, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2018/14.html.

75 James Batley, former Australian High Commissioner to Solomon Islands, quoted in Emily Jane Smith, ‘Pacific Puzzle: How China and Australia Fit in to Solomon Islands Protests’, Dateline, SBS News, 3 December 2021, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/pacific-puzzle-how-china-and-australia-fit-in-to-solomon-islands-protests.

76 Kirsty Needham, ‘Solomon Islands Government Seeks to Delay Election to Host Games’, Reuters, 9 August 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/solomon-islands-government-seeks-delay-election-host-games-2022-08-09/; and Michael Miller, ‘Solomon Islands’ Pro-China Leader Wins Bid to Delay Elections’, Washington Post, 8 September 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/08/solomon-islands-elections-china-parliament/.

77 Karl Claxton, ‘No Exit: Next Steps to Help Promote South Pacific Peace and Prosperity’, ASPI Strategic Insights, April 2015, https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/import/SI87_No_exit.pdf?VersionId = JVdJo4MOqzWFq7OdqedfegUgsd1bjt.

78 ‘Helping Our Neighbours’, speech delivered by Malcolm Turnbull, Australia’s prime minister, 8 September 2016, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-40437.

79 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Office of the Pacific’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/office-of-the-pacific.

80 Lowy Institute, Pacific Aid Map, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/.

81 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Stepping Up Australia’s Engagement with Our Pacific Family’.

82 Shane McLeod, ‘Plugging in PNG: Electricity, Partners and Politics’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 10 April 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/plugging-png-electricity-partners-and-politics.

83 ‘Chinese Government Aid to Pacific Region Fell by a Third Before Pandemic, Lowy Report Finds’, ABC News, 28 September 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-29/pacific-lowy-institute-aid-development-china-influence/100498518.

84 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement of China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’, 21 October 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202110/t20211021_9604831.html.

85 Jonathan Pryke and Alexandre Dayant, ‘China’s Declining Pacific Aid Presence’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 30 September 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-declining-pacific-aid-presence.

86 Ben Doherty, ‘Experts Dispel Claims of China Debt-trap Diplomacy in Pacific but Risks Remain’, Guardian, 20 October 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/chinese-loans-expose-pacific-islands-to-risk-of-unsustainable-debt-report-finds.

87 Graeme Smith, ‘Ain’t No Sunshine When Xi’s Gone: What’s Behind China’s Declining Aid to the Pacific’, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, In Brief, vol. 31, 12 November 2021, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/251756.

88 Pryke and Dayant, ‘China’s Declining Pacific Aid Presence’.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Jonathan Pryke, ‘The Risks of China’s Ambitions in the South Pacific’, Brookings, 20 July 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-risks-of-chinas-ambitions-in-the-south-pacific/.

92 Edward Cavanough, ‘China and Taiwan Offered Us Huge Bribes, Say Solomon Islands MPs’, Guardian, 7 December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/08/china-and-taiwan-offered-us-huge-bribes-say-solomon-islands-mps.

93 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Australia, China and Papua New Guinea Pilot Cooperation on Malaria Control Project Independent Mid-term Review and Joint Management Response’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/australia-china-png-pilot-cooperation-on-the-trilateral-malaria-project-independent-mtr-and-jmr.

94 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Pacific Regional – Climate Change and Resilience’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/development-assistance/climate-change-and-resilience.

95 Daniel Hurst, ‘Australia to Stand with Pacific Islands on Climate Crisis and “Respect” Region, Penny Wong Says’, Guardian, 23 May 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/may/23/australia-to-stand-with-pacific-islands-on-climate-crisis-and-respect-region-penny-wong-says.

96 Euan Graham, ‘Mind the Gap: Views of Security in the Pacific’, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 11 October 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/mind-gap-views-security-pacific.

97 ‘Nauru Demands China Apologize for “Disrespect” at Pacific Forum’, Reuters, 6 September 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pacific-forum-china-idUSKCN1LM0HM.

98 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, ‘Boe Declaration on Regional Security’, September 2018, https://www.forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/.

99 Kirsty Needham, ‘China, Pacific Islands Unable to Reach Consensus on Regional Pact’, Reuters, 30 May 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-hosts-pacific-islands-meeting-fiji-security-ties-focus-2022-05-30/.

100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement of China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’.

101 Ben Packham, ‘Australia Sets Up Force for Pacific Neighbours’, Australian, 23 July 2019, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/australia-sets-up-force-for-pacific-neighbours/news-story/e873c7605543f18ba653c990249edcbc; and Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘ADF Presence’, https://www.defence.gov.au/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/adf-presence.

102 Wallis et al., ‘Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands – Research Report’, p. 5.

103 The Pacific Maritime Security Program is funded by Australia’s Department of Defence to the tune of A$2bn over 30 years. It delivers capacity to Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste in three areas: through the provision of patrol boats, an aerial-surveillance programme and ‘enhancements to regional coordination’; Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Pacific Maritime Security Program’, https://www.defence.gov.au/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/maritime-capability#:~:text = The%20PMSP%20is%20a%20comprehensive,Island%20nations%20and%20Timor%2DLest%C3%A9.

104 Ibid.

105 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Commencement of Aerial Surveillance – Pacific Maritime Security Program’, 28 January 2018, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/commencement-aerial-surveillance-pacific-maritime-security; and Philip Smart, ‘Locals Overlooked for Pacific Surveillance Contract’, Australian Defence Magazine, 8 February 2018, https://www.australiandefence.com.au/business/locals-overlooked-for-pacific-surveillance-contract.

106 Andrew Tillett, ‘Defence Facing a Recruitment “Crisis”: Marles’, Australian Financial Review, 14 November 2022, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/defence-facing-a-recruitment-crisis-marles-20221114-p5by1p.

107 Andrew Greene, ‘Australian Special Forces to Protect World Leaders at APEC Meeting in Papua New Guinea’, ABC News, 11 September 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-12/special-forces-to-png/10234058; and Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Defence Supports PNG Security Effort for APEC 2018’, 12 October 2018, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/cpyne/media-releases/defence-supports-png-security-effort-apec-2018.

108 Agence France-Presse, ‘PNG to Deploy Fighter Jets and Foreign Military as It Plans Major Security Operation for Apec Summit’, South China Morning Post, 17 October 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2168888/png-deploy-fighter-jets-and-foreign-military-it-plans-major; and Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Defence Supports PNG Security Effort for APEC 2018’.

109 Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Australian Navy Arrives in Port Moresby for APEC 2018’, 2 November 2018, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/cpyne/media-releases/australian-navy-arrives-port-moresby-apec-2018; and Boeing, ‘Australia Takes New Boeing Communications System to APEC’, 13 December 2018, https://www.boeing.com.au/featured-content/boeing-communications-system-to-apec.page.

110 ‘Australian Submarine Makes Emergency Stop in Solomon Islands’, Radio New Zealand, 15 June 2019, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/392083/australian-submarine-makes-emergency-stop-in-solomon-islands.

111 Australian National University, ‘New College to Strengthen Pacific Security’, 12 August 2019, https://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/new-college-to-strengthen-pacific-security.

112 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Women, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, ‘Australia to Support New Pacific Fusion Centre’, 5 September 2018, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australia-support-new-pacific-fusion-centre; and Pacific Fusion Centre, https://www.pacificfusioncentre.org/.

113 ‘Australia, Vanuatu Sign Pacific Fusion Center MOU’, Daily Post, 9 April 2022, https://www.dailypost.vu/news/australia-vanuatu-sign-pacific-fusion-center-mou/article_2736f810-83ae-5c0b-b573-e9dd3692e376.html.

114 Marian Faa, ‘Australian Defence Force to Fund $175 Million Major Upgrade for Papua New Guinea’s Naval Base on Manus Island’, ABC News, 15 June 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-15/major-naval-base-on-png-manus-island-lombrum-adf/100216040.

115 US Embassy to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, ‘U.S. Secretary of the Navy Visits Papua New Guinea’, 1 November 2021, https://pg.usembassy.gov/u-s-secretary-of-the-navy-visits-papua-new-guinea/.

116 Tim Fish, ‘Australia, U.S. Set to Expand Papua New Guinea Naval Base’, USNI News, 23 November 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/11/23/australia-u-s-set-expand-papa-new-guinea-naval-base; and Peter Jennings, ‘Air Power Critical for Manus Expansion Plan’, ASPI Strategist, 20 November 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/air-power-critical-for-manus-expansion-plan/.

117 Royal Navy, ‘Patrol Ships Bid Farewell to Portsmouth as They Begin Indo-Pacific Deployment’, 7 September 2021, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2021/september/07/210907-spey-and-tamar-deploy.