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Notes
1 US sanctions announced in June 2023 on the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank appear to have had a significant effect on the junta’s ability to conduct commerce in foreign currencies. But these were announced nearly two and a half years after the coup. See Hunter Martson, ‘Many Sanctions, Few Friends: Junta Grapples with its Grip on Power’, Stimson Center, 11 October 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/many-sanctions-few-friends-junta-grapples-with-its-grip-on-power/.
2 See, for example, ‘Inside the Armed Burmese Resistance’, The Economist, 8 June 2023; Sanjay Pulipaka, ‘A Painful Stalemate in Myanmar’, Asia Times, 31 January 2022; and David Scott Mathieson, ‘Myanmar’s Anniversary of Stalemate and Shame’, Asia Times, 1 February 2023.
3 In writing this epilogue, we draw from off-the-record conversations and observations of international, multilateral and bilateral forums.
4 Ye Myo Hein and Lucas Myers, ‘The Closing Window Problem Facing Myanmar’s Pro-democracy Forces’, 2 March 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/closing-window-problem-facing-myanmars-pro-democracy-forces.
5 In February 2024, the junta activated a decade-old conscription law for the first time. The plan is slated to be implemented from April. See ‘Myanmar Junta’s Conscription Plan Lays Bare Toll of Fighting Rebels’, Reuters, 16 February 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-juntas-conscription-plan-lays-bare-toll-fighting-rebels-2024-02-16/. The military has been more successful in the countryside than in urban areas, with the exception of some towns. See ‘Taking Towns: A Turning Point in Myanmar’s War?’, Frontier Myanmar, 20 December 2023, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/taking-towns-a-turning-point-in-myanmars-war/.
6 Anthony Davis, ‘Myanmar’s Junta in a Serious but Not Desperate Fight’, Asia Times, 31 August 2022.
7 D. Brenner, Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2019).
8 ‘Myanmar Junta Opposes ASEAN Engagement with NUG Shadow Government’, Radio Free Asia, 12 January 2023.
9 ‘Myanmar Junta Chief Vows No Talks with Opposition “Terrorists”’, Reuters, 27 March 2022. See also ‘Myanmar’s Civilian Govt Says No Talks with Junta Until It Stops Killing Civilians, Quits Politics’, Irrawaddy, 2 December 2022.
10 Power dynamics within the junta are largely opaque, although in September 2023, a military-linked newspaper announced a reshuffling of the State Administration Council and Cabinet. A few weeks prior, two members of the council had been sacked. These prompted speculation about internal tensions. See ‘Myanmar Coup Leader Fires Two Members of Junta’s Highest Body for Corruption’, Irrawaddy, 26 September 2023. As for the resistance, there are concerns that the NUG has made only tokenistic efforts to include ethnic minorities, women and youth. See International Crisis Group, ‘Breaking Gender and Age Barriers amid Myanmar’s Spring Revolution’, 16 February 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b174-breaking-gender-and-age-barriers-amid-myanmars-spring-revolution.
11 Emily Fishbein, ‘“Still My People”: Myanmar Diaspora Supports Democracy Struggle Back Home’, Al-Jazeera, 25 September 2023.
12 International Crisis Group, ‘Crowdfunding a War: The Money Behind Myanmar’s Resistance’, 20 December 2022.
13 ‘Myanmar Military Extends Emergency, Postpones Election’, Al-Jazeera, 1 August 2023.
14 Priscilla A. Clapp and Ye Myo Hein, ‘In Myanmar, Sham Elections Aren’t the Path to Stability’, United States Institute of Peace, 27 October 2022.
15 A. Connelly and S. Loong, ‘Conflict in Myanmar and the International Response’, in Tim Huxley and Lynn Kuok (eds), Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023), pp. 138–59.
16 See, for example, Ye Myo Hein and Lucas Myers, ‘Action on Ukraine, Quiescence on Myanmar’, Wilson Center, April 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/2022-04_ActionOnUkraineQuiescenceOnMyanmar_Hein_Myers.pdf.
17 Sydney Tucker, ‘The Burma Act of 2022: Promises and Pitfalls’, Stimson Center, 17 August 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-burma-act-of-2022-promises-and-pitfalls/.
18 After the 2021 coup, all communication companies came under military control. Since then, the junta has cut off or restricted internet access in 45 conflict-affected townships, mostly in Sagaing Region. It has also temporarily shut down phone-line services in some areas. See Athan, ‘Disconnections and Vanishing Rights: Research Report’, Progressive Voice Myanmar, March 2023, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Disconnection-and-Vanishing-Rights_Eng2.1.pdf.
19 In July 2023, Thailand’s outgoing foreign minister held a secret meeting with coup-maker Min Aung Hlaing and visited Aung San Suu Kyi. However, few details of the meeting are available and those that exist have not been corroborated. See ‘Thai Foreign Minister Met Aung San Suu Kyi on Secret Myanmar Trip’, Al-Jazeera, 12 July 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/12/thai-foreign-minister-met-aung-san-suu-kyi-on-secret-myanmar-trip.
20 Confidential interviews, Jakarta, March 2023, and Singapore, May 2023.
21 Confidential interview, Jakarta, September 2023.
22 ‘Indonesia Says “Positive” Signs from Myanmar’s Warring Camps on Dialogue Effort’, Reuters, 24 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-says-positive-signs-myanmars-warring-camps-dialogue-effort-2023-11-24/.
23 Confidential interview, Jakarta, May 2023; and Saw Reh, ‘NUG Issued Stance on China as “Riposte to Myanmar Junta Propaganda”’, Irrawaddy, 8 January 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/nug-issued-stance-on-china-as-riposte-to-myanmar-junta-propaganda.html.
24 Morgan Michaels, ‘Junta Tactics Shift in Myanmar’s War-torn Dry Zone’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2023, https://myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2023-07.
25 Estimates suggest that at least 8,000 soldiers have defected or deserted the Tatmadaw since the coup, and that the military has suffered approximately 13,000 battlefield deaths. Leaked documents and defector interviews indicate that the military has struggled to recruit new soldiers to compensate for these losses. See Ye Myo Hein, ‘Myanmar’s Military Is Smaller Than Commonly Thought – and Shrinking Fast’, United States Institute of Peace, 4 May 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/myanmars-military-smaller-commonly-thought-and-shrinking-fast.
26 For some challenges facing the NUG, see ‘Can the NUG Reform Itself?’, Frontier Myanmar, 9 August 2023, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/can-the-nug-reform-itself/.
27 Ye Myo Hein, ‘Understanding the People’s Defense Forces in Myanmar’, United States Institute of Peace, 3 November 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar.
28 Ibid.
29 Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, ‘Is Myanmar’s Civil War Pushing the Country Toward Fragmentation?’, Diplomat, 12 December 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/is-myanmars-civil-war-pushing-the-country-toward-fragmentation/.
30 A. Ong, Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China–Myanmar Border (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2023).
31 For instance, local humanitarian groups have delivered aid from across the Thai border, into southeast Myanmar, for the past three decades. Since the coup, these organisations have sought to expand their reach further inland, into the Dry Zone, although they have been hampered by the Tatmadaw’s military operations along major transport routes. There has also been some aid passing from India into Chin State, although this channel is nascent. See ‘Dancing with Devils: The Humanitarian Dilemma in Myanmar’, Frontier Myanmar, 22 November 2022, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/dancing-with-dictators-the-humanitarian-dilemma-in-myanmar/. For a detailed history of cross-border aid across the Thai border, see A. Décobert, Politics of Aid to Myanmar: A Humanitarian Struggle on the Thai–Burmese Border (New York: Routledge, 2016).
32 Police forces and courts have been set up in resistance strongholds, including parts of the Dry Zone (in collaboration with the NUG) and Karenni areas (in collaboration with armed groups in the area). See ‘The Struggle to Bring Justice to Myanmar’, Frontier Myanmar, 30 June 2022, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-struggle-to-bring-justice-to-myanmar/; and ‘“Better Than Those Barbarians”: Resistance Police Force Takes Shape’, Frontier Myanmar, 29 September 2023, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/better-than-those-barbarians-resistance-police-force-takes-shape/.
33 The World Bank has reported that since the coup, only approximately 20% of eligible students have been enrolled in formal secondary education. See ‘Myanmar’s Education System in “Crisis” as Rebellion Rages On, Says World Bank’, Reuters, 19 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-education-system-crisis-rebellion-rages-says-world-bank-2023-07-19/. However, alternatives have been set up by the NUG and civil-society groups. For example, more than 17,000 students have been enrolled in Spring University Myanmar, an organisation established after the coup which now has partnerships with academic institutions in Thailand, Australia and the United States. See ‘Who We Are? About Spring University Myanmar’, Spring University Myanmar, n.d., https://www.springuniversitymm.com/about-us.
34 See, for example, ‘UN Urged to “Cut Ties” with Myanmar Coup Leaders After Griffiths Visit’, Al-Jazeera, 23 August 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/23/un-urged-to-cut-ties-with-myanmar-coup-leaders-after-griffiths-visit; and Adelina Kamal, ‘Myanmar Crisis: A Humanitarian Stalemate or Fresh Opportunities?’, Fulcrum, 16 February 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-crisis-a-humanitarian-stalemate-or-fresh-opportunities/.