Why Indo-Pacific deterrence matters

Abstract

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’.

In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Notes

1 ‘Closer than Ever: It Is 100 Seconds to Midnight’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2020, https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/2020-doomsday-clock-statement/.

2 ‘A Moment of Historic Danger: It Is Still 90 Seconds to Midnight’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2024, https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/.

3 Aaron Blake, ‘Why Biden and the White House Keep Talking about World War III’, Washington Post, 17 March 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/17/why-biden-white-house-keep-talking-about-world-war-iii/.

4 President Joe Biden, ‘Comments to the House Democratic Caucus Issues Conference’, Philadelphia, 13 March 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2022-03-13/world-war-iii-won-t-be-fought-in-ukraine-biden-says-video?sref=A6h4yyDS.

5 For the texts of the US–China Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979 and 1982, as well as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 ‘Six Assurances’ to Taiwan, see ‘Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.– China Communiques, and the “Six Assurances”’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 21 May 1998, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19980521_96-246F_a5b0e9334d4b4028eeb7dcb41626bddef3dc2c9a.pdf.

6 The convention of ‘strategic ambiguity’ has not been strictly adhered to by all presidents: in 2001, George W. Bush also pledged to do ‘whatever it takes’ to help Taiwan defend itself. See Kelly Wallace, ‘Bush Pledges Whatever It Takes to Defend Taiwan’, CNN, 25 April 2001, https://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/. But President Biden’s four statements have been the clearest and most sustained breach of that convention to date.

7 President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development’, 4 February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.

8 Cited in Alan D. Romberg, ‘Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and US–PRC Relations’, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, https://www.stimson.org/2001/rein-brink-precipice-american-policy-toward-taiwan-and-us-prc-relations/.

9 Yimou Lee, Sarah Wu and Greg Torode, ‘China’s Freeze on Taiwan Contact Fuels Worry as Tensions Build’, Reuters, 17 November 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-freeze-taiwan-contact-fuels-worry-tensions-build-2022-11-17/.

10 Russell Hsiao, ‘Taiwanese Perceptions of Cross-strait Relations after the 20th CCP Congress’, Global Taiwan Brief, vol. 7, no. 22, 16 November 2022, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/11/taiwanese-perceptions-of-cross-strait-relations-after-the-20th-ccp-congress/.

11 Joel Guinto, ‘How China Is Fighting in the Grey Zone against Taiwan’, BBC News, 4 October 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66851118.

12 David Sacks and Ivan Kanapathy, ‘What It Will Take to Deter China in the Taiwan Strait’, Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/what-it-will-take-deter-china-taiwan-strait.

13 Mallory Shelbourne, ‘Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan in “Next Six Years”’, US Naval Institute, 9 March 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years.

14 Romberg, ‘Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice’.

15 This old phrase predates President Xi Jinping, having first been used by president Jiang Zemin in 2001, but Xi has given it new emphasis and force.

16 For a crisp summary of the history of Chinese rule, see Rana Mitter, Modern China: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 90–3. For ‘inalienable part of China’, see ‘Explainer: Why Taiwan Is an Inalienable Part of China’, CGTN, 5 August 2022, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-08-05/Explainer-Why-Taiwan-is-an-inalienable-part-of-China-1cfD2fT39e0/index.html.

17 Kathryn Hille, ‘Becoming Taiwan: In China’s Shadow, an Island Asserts Its Identity’, Financial Times, 6 January 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/6e9a0243-87f2-445e-b563-e8f67082b3da.

18 See Mitter, Modern China. The Qing Dynasty lasted from 1644 to 1912.

19 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), p. 86.

20 This is not a new argument in Chinese circles, but it has only recently gained prominence in Western thinking. See Mitch Williamson, ‘Strategic Geography of Chinese Sea Power II’, Weapons and Warfare, 15 October 2020, https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2020/10/15/strategic-geography-of-chinese-sea-power-ii/.

21 Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific, pp. 86–7.

22 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘China Island Tracker’, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/.

23 For a PRC report on the standard map, see Ma Zhenhuan, ‘2023 Edition of China Map Released’, China Daily, 28 August 2023, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202308/28/WS64ec91c2a31035260b81ea5b.html. For an American report, see Jennifer Jett, ‘China’s New Map Outrages Its Neighbors’, NBC News, 1 September 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-new-map-anger-india-south-china-sea-border-disputes-rcna102921.

24 Abe Shinzo, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog.

25 Bilahari Kausikan, ‘Navigating the New Era of Great-power Competition’, Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-great-power-competition-russia-guide.

26 President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development’.

27 Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China (New York: Public Affairs, 2022).

28 See Rudd, The Avoidable War: in chapter 16 he writes that ‘if the US declined to use nuclear weapons in Korea, Vietnam and the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s when there was negligible risk of any form of nuclear retaliation, the US would not do so over Taiwan in the 2020s, when the escalation risks are much greater’. Yet this is to compare apples with oranges: eschewing nuclear use in wars with non-nuclear powers is rather different from leaving nuclear weapons aside when in a major war with a superpower that is your rival for global leadership, and in which you clearly hold a strong nuclear advantage.

29 ‘A Conversation with Ambassador Kevin Rudd, Australia’s New Ambassador to the United States’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 6 June 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/conversation-ambassador-kevin-rudd-australias-new-ambassador-united-states.

30 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

31 See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘Peak China?’, Project Syndicate, 3 January 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/peak-china-debate-calls-for-careful-assessment-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-01.