The Chabahar Transit Project: Transition from Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics

ABSTRACT

The Chabahar Transit Project is a multimodal network linking India, Iran, Afghanistan, and, recently, Uzbekistan, through maritime, rail, and road routes. The project results from a complex combination of interests and goals of the member countries and is a clear example of the transition from geo-politics to geo-economics. Iran looks at the Chabahar part as the only ocean port of the cautery and golden gate to landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia to increase Iran’s capacity in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India looks at the Chabahar transit project as a part of the “Diamond Necklace Strategy” against China’s “String of Pearls” Strategy and also bypassing the traditional rival, Pakistan, especially to counter China’s massive investment in the development of Pakistan’s Gwadar port, as well as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Finally, the Russo-Ukraine war and the block of east-west transit corridors traversing Russian territory into Europe have increased the role of the Chabahar transit project in the INSTC. However, the possible failure of negotiations to revive the JCPOA and the re-imposition of UN Chapter 7 sanctions against Iran is the most crucial challenge for the Chabahar transit project and the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan quadrilateral agreement.

KEYWORDS:

• Geo-economics
• INSTC
• Iran
• India
• Afghanistan
• Chabahar
• Makran
• Gwadar

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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[5] Ibid.

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[30] For further details see: Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East, Simon and Schuster, 2011. and, Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence, B. Taurus & Co. Limited, 2015.

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, ‘Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region’, Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, Journal of Iranian Studies, Year 1 issue 1-Dec. 2016, pp. 92–93.

[41] Lu Hai Liang, ‘Sri Lanka hands over port to China to pay off debt’, The National News, September 11, 2018. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/sri-lanka-hands-over-port-to-china-to-pay-off-debt-1.684606 (Accessed November 20, 2022).

[42] Vali Kaleji, ‘The Taliban Takeover of Kabul and Implications for the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Transit Corridor’, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume. 18, Issue. 147, September 28, 2021. https://jamestown.org/program/the-taliban-takeover-of-kabul-and-implications-for-the-india-iran-afghanistan-uzbekistan-transit-corridor/ (Accessed October 3, 2022).

[43] Kallol Bhattacherjee, ‘India ships wheat to Afghanistan via Chabahar’, The Hindu, October 29, 2017. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-ships-wheat-to-afghanistan-via-chabahar/article19945498.ece (Accessed October 3, 2022).

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[45] Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, ‘Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region’, Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, Journal of Iranian Studies, Year 1 (1)-Dec. 2016, p. 94.

[46] ‘India Wants Chabahar Port to be a Conduit for Trade to Central Asia, Russia’, India Briefing, August 10, 2022. https://www.india-briefing.com/news/india-wants-chabahar-port-to-be-a-conduit-for-trade-to-central-asia-russia-25666.html/ (Accessed October 3, 2022).

[47] Ibid.

[48] ‘India calls on central Asian countries to expand trade through Chabahar’, Tehran Times, September 18, 2021. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/465181/India-calls-on-central-Asian-countries-to-expand-trade-through (Accessed October 3, 2022).

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[60] ‘12 m Tons of Russian Goods to Transit via Iran to India’, Financial Tribune, November 29, 2022. https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/116198/12m-tons-of-russian-goods-to-transit-via-iran-to-india (Accessed December 20, 2022).

[61] Vali Kaleji, ‘With Russian Route Blocked, Uzbekistan Looks to Indian-Iranian-Afghan Chabahar Port Project’, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19(155), April 18, 2022. https://jamestown.org/program/with-russian-route-blocked-uzbekistan-looks-to-indian-iranian-afghan-chabahar-port-project/ (Accessed December 20, 2022).

[62] Ibid.

[63] Mohammad Monsan, ‘The difference between the performance of the Chinese in Gwadar and the Indians in Chabahar; From the ground to the sky!’, TIN News, September 9, 2022. https://www.tinn.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C–49/246820 (Accessed February 5, 2023).

[64] ‘Chabahar Port: Iran’s Fading Strategic Dream’, The Emirates Policy Center (EPC), August 22, 2022. https://epc.ae/en/details/scenario/chabahar-port-iran-s-fading-strategic-dream (Accessed October 25, 2022).

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Vali Kaleji, ‘The SCO Summit in Samarkand: Reviving Iran and Uzbekistan relations on an oil and transit axis’, The Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., November 1, 2022. https://www.mei.edu/publications/sco-summit-samarkand-reviving-iran-and-uzbekistan-relations-oil-and-transit-axis (Accessed December 20, 2022).

[68] ‘Methods of Payment: Letter of Credit’, The International Trade Administration, United States, https://www.trade.gov/letter-credit (Accessed October 30, 2022).

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[70] ‘Chabahar Port: Iran’s Fading Strategic Dream’, The Emirates Policy Center (EPC), August 22, 2022. https://epc.ae/en/details/scenario/chabahar-port-iran-s-fading-strategic-dream (Accessed October 25, 2022).

[71] ‘Iran opens first section of railway link to Chabahar port’, Press TV, November 11, 2022. https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/11/11/692547/Iran-opens-first-section-of-railway-link-to-Chabahar-port (Accessed 30 December 2022).

[72] ‘Uzbekistan stops freight trains to Afghanistan over Taliban’s “breach of contract”, Amu TV, February 1, 2023. https://amu.tv/en/34516/ (Accessed February 5, 2023).

[73] Ali Omidi and Gauri Noolkar-Oak, ‘Geopolitics of Chabahar Port for Iran, India and Afghanistan’, South Asia Research, 42(1), November, 2021, p. 32.