Nussbaum's Capability Approach and Future Generations

Abstract

In her Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum leaves the problem of future generations to one side, on the back of the assertion that Rawls' theory can be extended to give plausible answers to it. Neither a discussion of the merits of Rawls' solution and how it fits in with her theory, nor of how the inclusion of future generations impacts on her own theory is provided. Following an examination of Rawls' solution to future generations, this article contends that it is unclear how (and whether) Nussbaum is able to accept Rawls' (so-called) solution given fundamental differences in their theories. More importantly, this article demonstrates that Nussbaum overlooks the problem of future generations at significant cost. In leaving this problem to one side, Nussbaum underplays the significance of future generations and overlooks the way this problem bears on her theory. This article shows that future generations place pressure on fundamental elements in Nussbaum's capability theory—including, for instance, the capability for bodily integrity, the threshold level of dignity and the (partial) incompleteness. In highlighting these shortfalls, this article concludes with an account of some of the challenges to consider in constructing a capability theory able to deal with future generations.

Keywords:

• Future generations
• Martha Nussbaum
• Justice
• Capability approach
• Just savings
• John Rawls

Acknowledgements

This article was developed from my doctoral thesis for publication whilst a Te Wheke a Toi Postdoctoral Fellow at the James Henare Maori Research Centre, University of Auckland. I wish to acknowledge the amazing working environment at the centre, as well as two anonymous referees for very helpful comments.

Notes

There are important questions around how best Rawls' approach to questions of justice might apply to future generations. There are questions around how we ought to imagine those situated behind the veil of ignorance, as well as questions about which principles ought to apply (whether the difference principle, or a modified version of it, would be a better candidate than the just savings principle). I focus on Rawls' approach to future generations as it is outlined and developed in his major works (Rawls, 1971, 1993, 1999, 2001). I limit my discussion simply because I interpret Nussbaum's acceptance of Rawls' solution to affirm the solution he develops and outlines in these major works.

Although Nussbaum blocks addressing conflicts between capabilities within the human community, she admits the ‘in-eliminability residue of tragedy in the relationships between humans and animals’ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 404) and allows that the use of animals for food and research may be necessary. It is unclear how future generations will be treated here.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Krushil Watene

Krushil Watene is Te Wheke a Toi Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Henare Research Centre, University of Auckland, New Zealand