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Abstract
Combining the Capability Approach (CA) with Sustainable Development (SD) is a promising project that has gained much attention. Recently, scholars from both perspectives have worked on narrowing gaps between these development approaches, with a focus on the connection between the CA as a partial justice theory and SD as a concept embracing justice and ecological fragility and relative scarcity. We argue that to base an SD conception on the CA, the CA must be further developed. To provide the rationale for this claim, we begin by clarifying how we look upon the relation between SD and the CA and how we understand SD (1). We then argue for an integration of the natural dimension in the CA (2). By analyzing similarities of recent contributions integrating the natural dimension, we identify how the CA structure may be developed to include the recursive relation between the human and natural dimensions and especially to include the circumstances of justice relevant to SD (3). Finally, we argue that a new recursive and dynamic CA structure is related to the debate on criteria for ‘valuable’ in the term ‘valuable functionings’ and that this points to an expansion of the CA's evaluative space (4).
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions for improving the article.
Notes
The core purpose of moral philosophy may be to determine the legitimacy of moral claims. However, actors in decision-making roles can and do rely on moral claims and use them for the legitimization of their decisions. Hence, moral philosophy can be understood as offering information (i.e. legitimate moral claims) for decision-making processes.
We understand descriptive statements as explanatory (describing the way something is and can be analyzed in terms of truth and falsity) and normative statements as evaluative and/or prescriptive (they can only be analyzed in terms of reasoning).
Our use of the term ‘circumstances of justice’ is in reference specifically to the natural dimension, and not the human. We acknowledge there are social circumstances of justice, but our focus is on the integration of the natural dimension and we do not discuss the societal circumstances (see note 4).
We understand the human dimension as equally important for SD, but we focus on the natural dimension as this is the critical part for an SD-fitting interpretation of the CA. The SD assumptions are theoretical reconstructions of what is behind the concept of SD in regards to the natural dimension. We do not posit that they are fully agreed upon within SD science but take them as our conceptual investment.
Using the CA as an informational focus for justice considerations yields other commitments, such as a commitment to moral individualism (i.e. has a morally individualistic perspective), to the importance of individual's ability to choose and to the importance of deliberative processes. These considerations lead us to interpret Sen's CA as a partial justice theory as well.
Sen and Nussbaum differ in their definitions of the terms ‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’. However, we do not see the differences as impacting our argument as we focus on the shared claims of Sen and Nussbaum that (1) the evaluation of human lives should focus on capabilities and (2) capabilities are conceptualized as depending upon access to resources and conversion factors (i.e. social and environmental conditions and personal heterogeneities). We therefore follow Leßmann's Citation(2011) definition of capabilities and functionings: ‘Functionings are doings and beings, they are constitutive of well-being […]. The capability set consists of all combinations of functionings feasible for a person […]. The person can choose among these options’ (Leßmann, Citation2011, p. 44).
An additional element within SD is risk and uncertainty and risk management. However, dealing adequately with this goes beyond the scope of this article.
Nussbaum's version does not include dynamic temporality as it is (mainly) about identifying a just or more just state of affairs. Sen's version includes an implicit dynamic temporality, as to move from a less to a more just state of affairs includes passage of time. However, such an implicit inclusion of temporality does not take effects of actions through time into account.
In normative theories, assumptions can be included, excluded or idealized. To idealize an assumption is to include a falsity whereas to abstract away from one is to exclude a truth (O'Neill, Citation1987, p. 56).
Absolute abundance is the hypothetical state of affairs with no scarcity of resources in relation to demands (i.e. no conflicts arising based upon claim making and no need for cooperation). Absolute scarcity is the hypothetical state of affairs where there are not enough resources for any making claims (i.e. only conflict and cooperation is of no use). In neither of these hypothetical situations are questions of how best to distribute ‘goods’ relevant—in one there is no need and in the other there is no possibility.
The use of ESS is primarily related to the input side of the CA structure, allowing for a determination of specific ecosystem services and natural goods as necessary capability inputs. The use of CNC, EF and EMR focuses more on the output side of the CA structure. The assumption of fragility and scarcity is included in EMR through the expression of general rules for framing reasonable action space human beings should consider in their actions and in EF and CNC with the stated categorical carrying capacities, and in ESS by pointing to external costs and systemic relations through resource use. Discussing merits of differing depictions of the natural dimension in these contributions exceeds the scope of this article (see Hopton et al., Citation2010 for a critical discussion of different types of environmental assessment tools).
There are two ways to understand what a functioning is. We take the capability of being nourished to exemplify this. First, if capabilities are derivative from functionings, then by banning functionings, the capability itself is constrained; restricting an excessive meat-based diet would amount to restricting capabilities. Or second, if we focus on functionings (such as to be adequately nourished) and the different ways to achieve this encompass inter alia eaing a lot of animal proteins (i.e. less sustainable) or eating only a little animal protein (i.e. more sustainable), then we do not constrain functionings but rather the way in which the functioning is achieved. Thus, the capability is not diminished. It is the second understanding that we have.