Notes
There is no unified discussion of Sen's capability approach in Nussbaum's book, although her bibliography does include a special section summarizing a selection of Sen's writings. Nussbaum does spend time comparing her theory with human rights approaches.
For example, Nussbaum claims that Sen drops the distinction between well-being and agency freedom in his most recent work (2011, p. 198), which is not the case (Sen, Citation2009, esp. pp. 286–290).
See also the remarks in Nussbaum (Citation2011, pp. 24 and 149–52).
For example, Nussbaum argues that the development of artificial meat (synthesized from stem cells) ‘can be a large contributor to a more just world’ (2011, p. 163).
The term ‘dignity’ only appears once in Nussbaum Citation(1995) with reference to women rather than her list of functional capabilities. There is no discussion of the concept of human dignity.
David Crocker's (Citation2006, pp. 187–190) discussion of the types of skills and virtues deliberators ought to possess implies many poor people would be excluded from discussions.
There are two possible exceptions. The emphasis on the development of human emotions is partly attributed to Melanie Klein and Catherine Lutz. Erik Allardt receives much of the credit for recognizing the importance of animals (as ends in themselves) and the natural environment (Nussbaum, Citation1990, n. 59 and n. 61).
An exact comparison of the 2000 and 2011 lists reveals some extremely minor descriptive changes to some categories: bodily integrity (slightly abridged description), sense, imagination and thought (reference to ‘being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life’ deleted), emotions (minor abbreviation, ‘traumatic events’ are subsumed under anxiety), affiliation (emphasis on justice and friendship dropped), control over one's environment, and material (meaningful relationships at work added).
In defending her approach Nussbaum also refers to the paradox of inquiry found in Plato's Meno: ‘if you don't have any idea of what you're looking for, you won't ever find it’ (2011, p. 14). This contrasts sharply with the experience of many anthropologist and development practitioners (for example, Chambers, Citation2002, pp. 153–155). In Polly Hill's (Citation1984, p. 3) words: ‘it is the affairs of which one had no inkling before one went to the field that really matter’. In fairness, Nussbaum recognizes that some mid-point between these extremes is likely to be fruitful.
Later on Nussbaum remarks that ‘arguments for the [capabilities] approach do not rely simply on stories and examples: they use abstract notions (the idea of human dignity, the idea capability) and abstract philosophical arguments … to defend capabilities that Vasanti might not have defended …’ (2011, p. 80).
Nussbaum (Citation2000, pp. 78–80) vaguely refers to ‘changes made as a result of my discussions with people in India’ with reference to ‘bodily integrity’ (n. 82). Other explicit references are to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (namely, reproduction) and the Indian Constitution (namely, protection against discrimination) (n. 83 and n. 84).
Many of these issues are discussed at greater length by Jaggar Citation(2006). For a defence of Nussbaum's methodology, see Kleist (forthcoming, 2013).
These are all valid points, but only in some contexts. Family is a highly valued institution in poorer countries, even if personal relationships are sometimes fraught.
This suggests that Nussbaum's capabilities approach may be back to square one, as far as the entitlements of disabled and mentally ill people are concerned.
Nussbaum (Citation2004, pp. 201–202) also points out that she has tried to include references to leading Indian Feminist scholar-activists in her work in order to allow these women's voices to be heard.
See also http://go.worldbank.org/H1N8746X10.
See Clark (Citation2012, esp. pp. 9–14) for a review of the available evidence and corresponding references.
A term originally coined by Clark (Citation2002, p. 4).