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Abstract
This paper will begin with an explication of the central tenets of Nussbaum's capabilities theory. The next section examines Nussabum's two-fold justification of capabilities; namely, the substantive good approach (or intuitionism), which serves as the primary justification, and a version of Kantian proceduralism, which provides ancillary support. The following section focuses on Jaggar's critique of Nussbaum. Here, I will discuss three criteria of adequacy for a global ethic and their importance, why we should accept them and how both of Nussbaum's justification strategies fail to satisfy them. In the fifth section, I propose a version of discourse ethics as an alternative justification for capabilities that can satisfy the adequacy discerned from Jaggar's critique. This account of discourse ethics reveals that intersubjective dialogue under certain conditions is more likely to provide adequate justification of capabilities, and those engaged in dialogue are also likely to develop practical reason and affiliation. So this method of justification does not merely ground the capabilities, but helps people realize them. Finally, the sixth section presents an example from the Self-Employed Women's Association as a real-life case illustrating how this version of discourse ethics can be manifested.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I am also especially grateful to Theresa Tobin who provided critical feedback and guidance throughout this process.
Notes
To capture the intuitive power of ‘dignity,’ Nussbaum asks us to consider our responses to a ‘tragic character.’ She claims: ‘we see a human being as having worth as an end, an awe-inspiring something that makes it horrible to see this person beaten down by the currents of chance—and wonderful … to witness the way in which chance has not completely eclipsed the humanity of the person’ (2000, p. 73). In other words, she uses the term ‘dignity’ in the Kantian sense of treating others as an end, in addition to the Marxist and Aristotelian sense of proving the opportunity to live a life ‘worthy of a human being’ (2000, p.73; original emphasis).
This is often referred to as ‘arrogant perception.’ For further discussion see Lugones Citation(1987).
A similar critique can be found in the human rights literature. For example, Theresa Tobin Citation(2009) argues that we need to pay close attention to the methodological criteria used in human rights discourse in order to best theorize about women's oppression.
I realize the criterion of being self-critical appears to be very similar to the previous methodological criterion of revisability, but the former differs from the latter in so far as the former asks us to be critical of ourselves as opposed to the theory writ large, although in being self-critical we may have a more critical eye towards the theory.
For further discussion on the empirical investigation of the capability approach, see Clark Citation(2003), Ibrahim Citation(2011), Biggeri and Libanora Citation(2011) and Wolff and De-Shalit Citation(2007).
It is not my goal in this paper to explore the problems and possible solutions to ‘incommensurability.’ However, Schutte suggests ‘decentering’ the self as a possible solution to the problem; that is, ‘acknowledging the positive, potentially ethical dimensions of such decentering for interpersonal relations’ (1998, p. 54).
Even though Jaggar concerns herself with globalizing gender-specific interests, we can see the implications beyond western and non-western women. That is, westerners in general can ‘promote … strategic interests’ for non-westerners in general. This is not meant to diminish the importance of promoting gender-specific goals; however, I am pointing out its wider implications.
For further discussion on SEWA, see Bhatt Citation(2006).