Tensions and contradictions in London’s inclusive housing legacy

Abstract

The success of London’s bid is often explained in terms of its uniqueness in promising to deliver a lasting and inclusive legacy to a deprived part of East London. This paper focuses on two dimensions of housing legacy, displacement and legacy housing and argues that there is nothing particularly unique about London’s strategy in this regard and questions whether mega events such as the Olympic Games are the best vehicle for securing long-term housing benefits for deprived populations. The paper explores the changing trajectory of London’s housing legacy plans from 2005 to 2012 arguing that original plans overstated the potential housing legacy using this as a trump card to displace existing populations and win support for the bid. Over time there has been a weakening commitment to the provision of affordable housing legacy and social transformation for existing communities. The shifting political, economic and policy terrain accounts in part for this however, it is argued that housing legacy plans (beyond the Athletes Village) were essentially without foundation and based on the likelihood that private developers would develop schemes and affordable housing would be extracted through planning gain. However, planning gain has become increasingly inadequate in this regard and this paper raises more general questions about the inadequacy of existing tools in realising value from large-scale regeneration projects.

Keywords:

• mega events
• housing legacy
• displacement
• value capture
• social inclusion

Introduction

Over the last three decades, urban regeneration and transformation have been key but not exclusive drivers associated with hosting the Olympic Games. The success of London’s bid is often explained in terms of its uniqueness in promising to deliver a lasting and inclusive legacy to a deprived part of East London ‘for the benefit of all who lived there’. Housing was a key dimension of the anticipated legacy, and given the extent of housing need in East London the prospect of new affordable housing was welcomed. However, there was from the beginning a lack of clarity about how much housing would be built, how much of this would be designated ‘affordable’ and what the mechanisms would be for delivering this housing.

On closer analysis, it is clear that London’s housing legacy is underpinned by a number of tensions and contradictions related to the loss of existing low-cost affordable housing, shortfalls in the provision of affordable housing and increased production of mainly private (market housing) creating the potential for ‘gentrification’ common in the experience of host cities. This paper explores these contradictions by focusing on two dimensions of housing legacy, displacement and the provision of new housing post-Games (legacy housing). The paper traces the changing trajectory of London’s housing legacy plans from 2005 to 2012 arguing that plans overstated the potential housing legacy to win support for the bid and to simultaneously reduce concerns about displacement.

The paper argues that not only is there nothing particularly unique about the transformation of the Athletes Village into housing post-Games, but that over time there has been a weakening commitment to the provision of affordable housing legacy and social transformation for existing communities in plans for legacy beyond the Village. When London won the bid, the economic, political and policy terrain was very different to today and this has created real challenges with regard to meeting these initial commitments. Assumptions about the delivery of affordable housing were based on the likelihood that private developers would develop schemes and affordable housing would be achieved through value capture (planning gain). However, whilst this model did deliver significant proportions of affordable housing up until 2009 this is no longer the case. Planning requirements are increasingly being relaxed on new developments and housing grant is very limited therefore this mechanism for capturing value is increasingly inadequate and raises more general questions about whether mega events such as the Olympic Games and the existing tools to realise value from them are the best vehicle for securing long-term housing benefits for deprived populations.

There is an extensive literature on the legacy dimensions of London 2012. For example, Fussey et al. (2011) have explored surveillance dimensions, Poynter and Macrury (2009) have explored a range of issues including housing and Girginov (2012) has explored dimensions of sports legacy. However, there has been very little focus on housing to date¹ and therefore this paper makes a contribution to this debate.

Host cities, mega events and housing legacy

There is a growing literature on the impact of mega events on housing for low-income groups. This literature has identified a range of problems ranging from displacement, gentrification and land value/house price increases and a more general victimisation of the homeless indicating that over time, as neighbourhoods improve, they become less accessible to local residents (Newman 1999; Carbonell 2005; COHRE 2007; Shin & Li 2012; Bernstock 2013; Watt 2013). Research undertaken by organisations such as the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions in particular have produced far reaching criticisms of mega events and have placed the International Olympic Committee (IOC) under pressure to ensure that those hosting the Games place a greater emphasis on issues both of sustainability and legacy.

In 2001, the IOC introduced a new requirement for host cities to demonstrate that the Games would leave a lasting legacy beyond the event.² However, using the Games to secure urban transformation/regeneration has been a key element to varying degrees from Barcelona onwards. Housing has formed a key element of this including both the reuse of the Athlete’s Village and associated new developments. There have been different approaches taken to the housing element of legacy in different cities particularly in terms of the balance of market and affordable housing and with regard to the respective roles of the public and private sectors in delivering it.

This paper first explores these two sides of the Olympic housing legacy, displacement and legacy housing in other host cities before focussing specifically on the London experience in more depth.

Housing displacement in host cities

Displacement of mainly low-income groups on Olympic or Olympic-related sites is a common feature in many host cities. Displacement is used to refer to two processes including direct displacement as a result of construction/regeneration projects and, indirect displacement over time through the price mechanism (economic), though there is some debate as to whether this indirect displacement is in reality direct displacement.³ There is not space here to explore this debate in detail or the impact of economic changes such as house price trends. However, a number of studies have suggested that the relationship between house prices and the hosting of mega events is complex and problematises the extent to which a direct correlation can be found between hosting the Games and house price increases. The host city with the clearest correlation between house price increases and hosting the Games was Barcelona with increases in the City and at the Athletes Village more generally. However, for other cities, the explanations are more complex. For example, in the pre-games period in Sydney, there was considerable house price inflation, however, this was more marked in areas that were not in close proximity to games. Similarly, London has been experiencing considerable house price inflation in the pre-Games period. However, rates of inflation varies considerably across the Capital, and in those areas closest to the Games such as Stratford and Plaistow this inflation has been at a much lower level than for London as a whole. (Blake et al. 2007; Bernstock 2013; Urban Land Institute 2013).

The experience of host cities ranges from little or no direct displacement where Games venues have been built on previously vacant land, such as Vancouver or Sydney to estimates of large-scale displacement in cities such as Beijing. However, it is not just numbers which is the issue but who is displaced. In Barcelona, the displacement was relatively unproblematic with 624 families displaced due to the construction of the Olympic Park and associated roads and subsequently rehoused and/or compensated. COHRE (2007) notes, however, that a significant proportion of these were of Roma origin living in informal settlements. This pattern was repeated in Athens, though here there was widespread concern about the treatment of the displaced. Both the Greek National Commission on Human Rights and UNCESCR raised concerns about a number of reports of forced eviction of Roma and extra-judicial demolition of dwellings without adequate compensation or provision of alternative housing (United Nations Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights 2004, Para 21). This suggested the removal of marginal and ‘less desirable’ populations to make way for the Games a theme evident in Atlanta.

The Atlanta Games became associated with high levels of displacement linked to the restructuring of public housing in the city under the auspices of an Olympic housing legacy programme and a more general lack of concern for low income mainly black sections of the population.

Atlanta would be showcased to the world. But not all of what it would see was showcase material.... Most daunting to civic leaders was the location of one of the most decrepit and foreboding projects – Techwood/Clarke Homes directly adjacent to the Planned Olympic Village. (Atlanta Housing Authority 2005, p. 5)

The Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) used the opportunity to overhaul much of the public housing which was either replaced with mixed tenure housing or demolished including the replacement of 1195 homes (Techwood/Clark Howell homes) replaced with a mixed tenure scheme ‘Centennial Park’.⁴ The aim in part was to stem/reverse the flow of the middle classes from the city as part of a ‘mixed communities’ agenda. The replacement housing included far fewer affordable housing units and a higher level of resident screening to ensure only residents with middle-class behaviour patterns were accepted (Ambrose & Grigsby, 1999, p. 10). Around 24% of those applying to return to the revitalised neighbourhoods had their applications rejected. The demographic profile of residents at the new development was more ethnically and socially mixed with a significant increase in median income levels (Keating 2000). Rental and property values increased and for some this signalled success, whilst for others the process of area improvement contributed to wider gentrification and secondary displacement (Brice 2003).

In Beijing, as in many cities, it is difficult to identify and isolate displacement related to the Olympic Games as compared to other processes of development which had for some time been leading to a significant displacement of the poor from inner cities to outer suburbs. There is also some debate with regard to the extent of this displacement. For example, COHRE (2007) estimated that 1.5 million were displaced whereas Beijing’s Olympic organising committee argue that the figure was around 6037 households with each of them receiving a compensation package (Beck 2007). Nevertheless, the delivery of the Games was dependent on a range of new infrastructure, such as 22 new stadia, two ring roads, 142 miles of new infrastructure and eight new subway lines, and therefore it is hard to imagine that widespread displacement could have been avoided. Amnesty International and COHRE highlighted the wider context of repression that had impacted on lawyer’s ability/willingness to take on issues of tenants rights, coupled with a lack of freedom of expression which makes it difficult to assess the actual number of residents displaced and the compensation given(Amnesty International 2004; COHRE 2007). Shin and Li (2012) argue that in 2004 the municipality committed to undertaking ‘environmental’ improvements that would involve demolishing 171 villages in the City (VIC) housing more than 33,000 residents. According to Shin, this meant that ‘areas most likely to be visited by Olympic tourists in Beijing would be clear of urban eyesores’ (Shin 2009, p. 134). In reality, progress was much slower and a lower number of VIC’s were demolished and the negative impact was limited as residents were able to secure affordable housing elsewhere. However, they suggest that the process has contributed to a spatial restructuring of Beijing:

It is possible that the slow death of VIC’s in relatively central districts of Beijing in its promotion as a world city would accompany the growth of VIC’s in Outer Suburban districts, thus producing a bifurcated city with spatial segregation. (Shin & Li 2012, p. 20)

Legacy housing

Legacy housing consists of two main elements; the conversion of the Athletes Village into housing after the Games and additional housing through redevelopment of the Olympic Park and associated sites. Again cities have used a variety of strategies. The first permanent Athletes Village was built at the Helsinki Games (1952) and converted into a residential district after the Games. Melbourne (1956) converted its Olympic Village into housing for immigrants and Munich (1972) converted its Athletes Village into housing for low- and middle-income families. In Moscow (1980), the Village was converted into housing for around 14,500 residents after the Games (Baim 2009). In Atlanta, the Village became student housing post-Games.

A key issue is what type of housing is to be provided and how will it be delivered. In many ways, Barcelona set a ‘model’ followed by other cities. The Athletes Village in Barcelona provided a major source of high quality housing and was converted into 2048 apartments, housing around 5783 residents after the Games. The Village was built on derelict land close to the waterfront, developed by two private development companies and sold on the open market with 60% of the housing sold prior to the Games (Carbonell 2005). The Village has become a desirable place to live and house prices have risen. For example, when the Village was first constructed, units were sold for prices similar to the Barcelona average but after 10 years prices had multiplied to between 2.5 and 3 times the Barcelona average and comparable with the most expensive districts in Barcelona. The profiles of residents living at the Village tend to be younger, more educated and more affluent than residents in Barcelona as a whole. A higher proportion of disabled people live at the village attracted by its inclusive design (Carbonell 2005).

Initial plans were to have included a proportion of affordable housing at the Athletes Village; however, it was argued that cost was prohibitive. Affordable housing was provided on three sites originally built to house media and Olympic officials and included a mix of low-cost housing, cooperative housing and housing for social rent (COHRE 2007).

In Sydney, the Athletes Village was converted into housing after the Games, creating a new neighbourhood ‘Newington’. The Games in Sydney were heralded as the green games and this was translated into a high eco-specification for the Athletes Village, however, it failed to include any affordable housing despite the need for it. The Mirvac Village Industry Consortium (including Lend Lease) built the village and converted it to housing for sale after the Games. The village comprised 1900 properties and was financed by a mix of private/public finance with a clause to ensure that if profits reached a certain level there would be a return to the public sector. There has been considerable price inflation at the village (rising at an annual rate of 4.1%) since they were first sold in 2001. The profile of residents living at Newington indicates a higher proportion of managers and professionals and a lower proportion of trades people than for Sydney as a whole (Auburn Council Website 2012). Similarly in Beijing, the Athletes Village was converted into 1800 luxury housing after the Games and renamed Dream World.

Greece is relatively unique in that the Athletes Village was converted into a social housing scheme designed and targeted at low-income workers after the Games. The Workers Housing Organisation (OEK) developed the scheme through the establishment of a separate subsidiary, Olympic Village 2004 S.A., with a brief to build the Athletes Village and convert it into 2292 units housing around 10,000 individuals after the Games. The housing was sold at half market value to members of the OEK and allocated via a lottery in October 2004 to those who met the criteria. More than 17,000 families applied for the housing (Hellenic Republic 2004). It was targeted at public sector workers or pensioners who did not have sufficient income to purchase a property and had worked for a predetermined number of days and a small proportion of units targeted at people living in a particular area. The new district has encountered problems. The strong environmental standards set out in the candidature file were not adhered to and the local authority was not given additional resources or infrastructure to cater for the substantial increase in population arising from this new housing. Clearly, Greece’s problems have become much more significant since this time to the extent that the government has stripped the assets of the Workers Housing Organisation to pay debt and the Olympic Stadium is being used to house increasing numbers of homeless families (Ekathimerini 2012; Nunns 2012).

The experience of Vancouver highlights the difficulties in delivering affordable housing through private/public partnerships. The Athletes Village was built on former industrial land owned by the government along the waterfront and comprises 1100 units. The scheme initially adopted ambitious targets for sustainability and affordable housing units. Whilst it was successful in meeting sustainability objectives, it has been much less successful with regard to the provision of affordable housing. The contract to build the Village was awarded to a private consortium. The original plans included 66% affordable housing spread throughout the development with a significant proportion targeted at those on low incomes. By 2007, the affordable housing element was reduced to 252 (20%) and located in distinct blocks (Markle 2010). This was despite the Vancouver Organising Committee increasing its subsidy towards the cost of affordable housing from $30 million to $110 million. The increasing costs were explained in terms of initial under-estimation of the clean-up costs at the site; an upgrading from LEED Silver to LEED Gold which required much more demanding adherence to green technologies and a slowness in commencing the project which resulted in the need to pay additional overtime to ensure completion (Enchin 2010). In 2010, a debate ensued as to whether it was appropriate to invest this much money into affordable housing when a much larger supply of housing could be built elsewhere.⁵ Eventually, the housing was targeted at better off sections of the poor with a reduction in the number of units for low-income workers as a way of limiting any additional subsidy. In addition, following the downturn in the property market the City of Vancouver had to provide an additional bail out to ensure that the project was completed. It hoped to cover its cost through the sale of the units but, by December 2010, only 30% had been sold and receivers were called in and prices reduced by an average of 30% with many properties converted to luxury rentals pending recovery of the market (CBC News 2011). Essentially, public monies have been used to underwrite luxury waterfront apartments with a relatively negligible proportion of affordable housing units targeted at the better off.

This brief review has revealed a number of tensions in legacy housing between achieving social inclusion and promoting city competitiveness, between addressing local needs and attracting new higher earning populations and between harnessing private investment and securing social gains. These tensions will become more apparent as we explore the London example.

London’s housing legacy

London’s bid prioritised the issue of legacy, arguing that

The most enduring legacy of the Olympics will be the regeneration of an entire community for the direct benefit of everyone that lives there. It will become a model for social inclusion. (London Candidate File 2004, p. 19)

It was initially anticipated that the housing legacy would comprise the conversion of the Athletes Village into a mixed tenure community (much of which would be affordable) and the accelerated regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley. It was anticipated that this would go some way to meeting the needs of the five host boroughs who experienced some of the highest levels of homelessness, overcrowding and housing need in the country. London then from the beginning set out to differentiate itself in terms of wider community benefits and the transformation that would follow. However, beyond these positive statements the legacy plans lacked detail and were broadly similar to those of other cities in terms of converting the Athletes Village into housing after the Games. Moreover, a key intention of the approach was to stimulate a process of revalorisation reliant on substantial public investment and involving the replacement of the old (in the Olympic Park case, largely but not exclusively industrial wasteland) with a new urban infrastructure with the latter stimulating over time a rise in land and property values and creating the potential for a new round of economic competitiveness. This in turn would become the mechanism to deliver affordable housing through the capture of that value in the form of planning gain. This placed a contradiction at the heart of the plans as not only could this potentially negatively impact on low-income neighbourhoods but also since the flat-lining of the economy in 2008, it has become increasingly difficult to extract planning gain. This then raises a key question about the respective roles of the State and market and the challenge of ensuring that benefits from this uplift in land values are derived for low-income groups in East London who are likely to be impacted negatively from increases in land values. This issue of value capture has been recognised as a key issue for policymakers arising from urban regeneration projects, for example, see (Andelson 2000; Barker 2004; Huxley 2009) and has been underlined by the experience of Vancouver outlined in the previous section.

Displacement in London

In London 425 households and 35 traveller families were displaced and there is the possibility that residents living on the Carpenters Estate may also be decanted. The majority of those either displaced or scheduled to move are located within the district of Stratford, though one group of Travellers was located in Hackney. Justification for the displacement was linked to the anticipated legacy and perception of the area as an urban wasteland. Raco and Tunney (2010) argue that planners and policymakers promoted a discourse that reinforced the notion that the area was a blank slate awaiting comprehensive redevelopment on land that was derelict, contaminated or degraded and in the process played down the way that land was being used at the time.

There were three groups of residents decanted between 2005 and 2007 including 425 tenants decanted from the Clays Lane Housing Cooperative (CLHC); 15 English Romany families living on the Clays Lane Travellers site in Newham and 20 Irish Traveller families living in Hackney.

Decanting/displacing residents from the Clays Lane Housing Cooperative

The CLHC was set up in 1984 and housed up to 450 individual tenants organised in 107 separate housing units. The housing included a mix of multi-occupancy housing and individual flats set up to house single young people and provided an important route into housing for those who would not have easily accessed social housing elsewhere. There were 425 residents living on the estate in 2005 when London won the bid (Bernstock 2013). The estate had been run as a tenant managed cooperative up until 2005 when management was transferred to a registered social landlord. Although the quality of the multi-occupancy housing was deemed to be below the below the ‘Decent Homes’⁶ standard the estate was recognised as having strong community networks facilitated through the group living and design of the housing including communal courtyards. The housing was also very affordable with rents averaging £44.00 per week for shared accommodation including utility charges and £58.00 for a self-contained flat (Fluid 2005).

The London Development Agency (LDA) was responsible for compulsorily purchasing and clearing the land along with establishing relocation strategies. They commissioned a range of agencies to work with residents on the two Traveller sites and the CLHC to provide independent advice.

However, CLHC fought against the plans to demolish their estate and the process of decanting them. A number of specific issues emerged with regard to their aspirations including recognition of the unique character of CLHC and the need to retain this, their preference to move as a group or in groups, their desire for a double decant enabling them to return to the park and concern that there had been a shift away from initial commitments made with regard to the quality of replacement housing. They objected to compulsory purchase order (CPO), and a CPO inquiry was set up and residents were awarded legal aid to fight their case (Fluid 2005).

Nevertheless, the promise of legacy effectively acted as a trump card leading the inquiry inspector to acknowledge that ‘their (residents’) loss will be a substantial one’ but that ‘I find the anticipated benefits and the catalytic effect of the Olympic games to be a more forceful factor’ (Rose 2006, Para 6.2.87).

The LDA were keen to expedite the project. The time frame between London winning the bid and the estate being decanted was 2 years. This meant that there were compromises and delays with regard to establishing systems and processes that would maximise resident choice. For example, one key issue that had emerged in resident surveys was that most residents wanted to remain in Newham. This required an agreement with the local authority and this was not established until almost 1 year after London won the bid and would clearly have led to compromises for those anxious about moving.

…Many residents had made a positive choice to live at Clays Lane because of the group/cooperative lifestyle.

Another issue that emerged in resident surveys was a desire by a significant number of residents to move as a group. Progress in facilitating this preference was slow and emerged as a key concern at the CPO inquiry. The LDA assured the inspector that there had been considerable progress in this area. However, for a variety of reasons, none of the options presented were perceived as suitable by residents (Rose 2006). It was suggested by lawyers speaking on behalf of residents at the inquiry that the substantial delays in realising suitable alternative group accommodation in a timely manner had led to ‘a piecemeal relocation of residents who fear for their future and in the process has an erosive effect on the community’ (Rose 2006, Day 40, p. 108.) On the other hand, for those residents who were already on the housing waiting list or who wanted to move into self-contained accommodation, there were clearly some benefits including being awarded decant status which meant that they would be given high priority when bidding for properties.

Overall residents who had moved appeared to be satisfied with their housing both before and after the move (SNU 2008; Bernstock 2013). However, they were confronted with an increase in housing costs. This increase in housing costs was also raised as an issue at the CPO inquiry. The LDA when giving evidence at the Inquiry underestimated the increased costs, estimating that housing costs would increase by between £5 and £7.00 per week. A follow-up survey with residents identified an average increase of £13.00 per week for those who had lived in self-contained flats at Clays Lane and significantly greater increases for those who had been living in shared accommodation (Rose 2006, Para 4.3.214; SNU 2008).

The decant process led to the loss of a relatively unique form of affordable housing available for single people living in East London at a time. Moreover, in addition to the 425 individual tenancies lost through the decant process an additional 327 social rented units were used to rehouse these residents. In other words, then 752 social tenancies were lost to facilitate the Olympic and Paralympic games.

Decanting residents from Newham and Hackney Travellers sites

There were two groups of long-standing Travellers living on what we now know as the Olympic Park. This included 15 English Romany families living on the Clays Lane Travellers site in Newham and 20 Irish Traveller families living in Hackney. One key problem was that relatively large sites were needed to rehouse the Travellers. Identifying sites that were suitable to Travellers and realisable from a planning perspective within the timescales was extremely difficult. As a consequence, a small group of Travellers in Hackney were decanted twice and in the case of the Clays Lane Travellers they were decanted initially with a temporary license which was not made permanent until January 2013.

The LDA commissioned the London Gypsy and Travellers Unit (LGTU) to provide support and advice to the residents. In addition to this the London Borough of Hackney provided a Hackney Homes floating support service which was set up in 2007 and offered support during the final phase of the move. The Travellers’ site at Clays Lane was managed by Newham and there was no specific support service available to Travellers over and above that provided by LGTU. Moreover, it was reported by a number of interviewees that the relationship between the Newham Travellers and the local authority was poor. According to one respondent:

Every-time we went to meetings the council (referring to Newham council) were not there. We had to fight to get a councillor to come out. (Bernstock 2013, p. 50)

Both groups of Travellers objected at the CPO inquiry. Their objections were not against relocation per se, but against the lack of suitable sites that could be utilised before the proposed decant date of July 2007. According to the LDA:

There is no obligation on the LDA to provide relocation sites as a pre-requisite to the confirmation of the CPO. The secretary of state would be entitled to find that a compelling public interest exists, bearing in mind the benefits of the Olympic and legacy proposals, even if he concluded on the evidence that there would be no relocation sites in July 2007. (Rose 2006, Para 4.3.390, my emphasis)

However the inspector, leading the inquiry concluded that appropriate sites should be secured before possession of the land was confirmed in the CPO. In April 2007, residents on both sites appealed again when it was clear that plans to move them off the land were progressing before new sites were secure. However, on this occasion the Judge ruled that the ‘greater benefits of the Olympics outweigh the human rights of the Travellers’ (LGTU 2008).

Relocation of Newham Travellers

The 15 Traveller families in Newham had lived there since 1972. The relocation of this group was problematic. The LDA explored three possible sites and eventually re-housed them onto a site that was not acceptable to them. The site was 400 metres from the Clays Lane site and therefore in one sense would lead to less disruption. However, the area was already in use as a major community facility, including a community centre, children’s play area and multi-use games area. Local residents and Clays Lane Travellers joined forces on a local campaign called ‘save Major Road Park Action Group’ supported by their local MP and ward councillors. They presented a petition and representations to the planning committee in March 2007. The three councillors argued:

Not only does it destroy valuable community, sports and recreational facilities, but it also places the relocated Travellers in a totally inappropriate position. They are to be in a boxed site surrounded by high walls, surrounded by two busy roads in what can only be described as a ghetto. They may be perceived by others as the cause of the loss of facilities and this could do untold damage to their previously good relationship with the resident community. (London Borough of Newham 2007, Para 1, 5, pp. 11–12)

Despite the huge outcry from the local community and Clays Lane Travellers, the relocation was approved by the Mayor of Newham who acknowledged that the loss of community facilities was not desirable but that the need to find an alternative site for the Travellers had become significant.

The perception of Travellers was that the LDA wanted to move them on in order to facilitate the project summed up by one resident:

They were not horrible but they wanted us to move so quickly. The houses were brought in on Lorries. They put the drains in when we had already moved in. It took five months to do the gardens and they promised electric gates and didn’t do that. (Bernstock 2013, p. 57)

At the time of relocation the LDA recognised that the Clays Lane Travellers did not want to move to Major Road and so a commitment was given to the option of a return to the Olympic Park after the Games as part of the Legacy Plans. This commitment was confirmed in writing by Margaret Ford, then Chair of the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) and continues to remain an option at the time of writing (Bernstock 2013).

Relocation of Hackney Travellers

There were 20 Irish families living at Waterden Crescent, Hackney and they had lived there since 1993. There was a general consensus that the Hackney Travellers had been better supported than the Newham Travellers. Consultation meetings were initially held in 2003 and Fluid were appointed to undertake research on preferences for moving. According to Fluid (2004), they did ‘not particularly object to relocation’ if concerns about site planning and location were addressed.

Finding sites that were acceptable to both Travellers and the LDA proved challenging. The Travellers were relocated as three distinctive groups and this separation caused a great deal of pain (Bernstock 2013):

That was the hardest part. I did not know and nobody knew who is going with whom. It was chaos, choosing who is going with whom. (Traveller)

Two groups of Hackney Travellers were relocated to sites within walking distance of the original site. A third group was located to a site that was not acceptable to them as it was located in a built-up area and a local campaign had been organised to object to the relocation of Travellers in the area. Nevertheless, the site was progressed by the LDA but subject to delays and the Travellers experienced a double decant moving temporarily to another site for 1 year. This group of Travellers experienced considerable hostility when they initially moved to the site, however, a range of agencies such as the LGTU the Hackney Learning Trust and the Hackney Homes floating support service worked with them to challenge this and by 2012 these initial problems had disappeared with reports of good relations with local neighbours. Clearly, this group would have experienced a considerable degree of anxiety given that they had expressed a preference not to move there, the extent of local hostility and the time delay.

Anxiety about the need to complete the project on time meant that there was a relatively short time period between London winning the Games and the final decant (2 years). The need to expedite the project meant that all of those displaced had to respond to a very tight and highly pressurised timetable which created added pressure and led to less desirable outcomes. There were clearly elements of good practice, such as the provision of independent advice and resident input into the design of replacement housing/sites. On the other hand, it was clear that decanting the site on time was a greater priority than resident choice resulting in compromises.

The Carpenters Estate

The Carpenters Estate comprises just over 700 properties and is located directly adjacent to the Olympic Site in Stratford when London won the bid in 2005 was the focus of attention with speculation on the potential benefits that London winning the bid would bring for local residents. The Estate was built in the 1960s and over time parts of the estate have fallen into disrepair resulting in the need for significant investment. It was argued that the cost of renovating these properties was prohibitive⁷ and a decant of parts of the Estate had commenced in 2005.

A number of plans had been drawn up for the regeneration of the Carpenters Estate including the Stratford Metropolitan Master plan published in 2011 that anticipated that the area would be upgraded and utilised for mainly residential housing purposes. However, in November 2012, there was a change of direction when plans emerged for University College London (UCL) to purchase the site and develop it as a new campus leading to the demolition of the Estate and the re-housing of the remaining residents.

In 2009, there were 514 occupied social rented tenancies on the estate and, by October 2012, this had declined to 156. Following the agreement, the London borough of Newham began liaising with residents about rehousing options. In May 2013, UCL decided to withdraw from their agreement with Newham and is now pursuing development opportunities elsewhere on the Olympic site. In the meantime, the decant process has been put on hold and the London Borough of Newham has confirmed that they are continuing to pursue plans for redevelopment with other interested parties.

Overall then despite a commitment to a housing legacy in London, the balance sheet in terms of ‘affordable housing’ at the time of writing is negative and more housing has been lost than built. This also raises a more general question about the need to ensure that regeneration projects incorporate existing land uses and protect much needed affordable housing.

London’s Athletes Village

As with other host cities, a key part of London’s housing legacy was the reuse of the Athlete’s Village post-Games. It was anticipated that the scheme would be both private sector financed and delivered (as was the case in other host cities) and would include a mix of private housing for sale, along with a significant proportion of ‘affordable’ housing. When London won the bid, Outline Planning consent had already been granted for 4850 homes as part of a pre-existing development on the site called Stratford City (including the Westfield shopping centre) and this scheme included 30% affordable housing. (This level of affordable housing was below the 50% stipulated in the London Plan at the time but was approved as there was a commitment to re-balancing what was perceived as an oversupply of ‘social housing’ in the area, despite a huge need for it.) It was assumed that legacy housing at the village would be additional to this housing.

Whilst a range of policy documents emphasised the significance of legacy, there was a lack of detail with regard to actual plans. For example, the London Candidate File indicated that 3600 housing units would be built; the subsequent 2004 Olympic, Paralympic and Legacy Transformation Planning applications referred to up to 4600 homes (GLA 2004) and the Revised Planning Applications submitted in 2007 indicated that 4500 homes would be built on the park (ODA 2007). However, neither the London Candidate File nor the subsequent legacy planning applications were accompanied by specific details on the proportion of affordable housing, though was an explicit assumption that this would comprise a significant proportion.

The 2007 Planning applications were significant in that they marked a departure from the previous view that Stratford City and the Athletes Village were two separate developments and integrated the Athletes Village into the Stratford City project enabling them to utilise existing planning consents. Therefore, a significant proportion of the housing planned at Stratford City was developed as part of the conversion of the Athletes Village into housing and the 30% affordable housing stipulated as part of the Stratford City scheme was applied to the Athletes Village.⁸

The integration of these two schemes raised questions about the net gain in terms of housing that could be linked to legacy. According to the Olympic Development Authority (ODA) in response to a freedom of information question with regard to this:

Whilst it is correct to say this housing would have been built anyway, it is called legacy housing because but for the games, this housing would not have been built by 2012 but rather would have taken a much longer time to build. (ODA response to Freedom of Information question August 2008)

The ODA underwent a competitive tendering process to select a developer to construct the Athletes Village in 2007 and the Lend Lease Consortium was awarded the contract.⁹ Lend Lease had expertise in this area as they had constructed the Sydney village and partners East Thames and had a long history of delivering social housing in this area. Construction of the village began in May 2008 and as part of the initial agreement Lend Lease were to provide £450 million in private finance towards the £1 billion project. However, they very quickly reported problems in accessing the necessary finance. According to then chair of the ODA, ‘people were struggling to put an end value to the project because of the uncertainties of the housing market’. Lend Lease and a banking consortium did present a solution. However, according to a press release from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, the government decided to intervene as it felt that the offer was not in the long-term interests of the taxpayer (see Hawkes 2009). The government then bailed out the private developer and provided the finance. Lend Lease became the contractor and any risks associated with the project became public ones. The scheme also included a substantial list of planning obligations, including construction of a school and health centre that would have been the responsibility of Lend Lease. However, these were transferred to the ODA increasing the cost to the public purse even further. According to Tessa Jowell, then Minister for the Olympic and Paralympic games:

By funding the entire project the village will become publicly owned and the public purse will receive substantial returns from sales. (Jowell quoted in Hawkes 2009)

The size of the Athletes Village was also substantially reduced initially to 3300 units and then to 2800 units. Again, it was private element of the scheme that was reduced, with the affordable housing element reducing marginally. Therefore, whilst the actual number of affordable units declined marginally from 1400 to 1379, the proportion of affordable housing increased from 30% to 49%. Initially it had been anticipated that East Thames and First Base would take on the affordable element of the scheme. However, there were concerns here too about potential risks involved. In 2009, it was announced that ‘Triathlon’ homes would be formed and would purchase the affordable element of the scheme through a pre-sales agreement and the inclusion of an additional partner, spreading the risk across three partners. The balance of public and private investment had shifted to include a greater proportion of affordable housing and this clearly has to be understood as a way of ensuring the scheme progressed rather than a commitment to increasing affordable housing at the Site (Bernstock 2013).¹⁰

Another challenge for the ODA was to identify a private sector organisation to take on the private sector part of the scheme. In September 2010, the ODA invited private sector organisations to submit proposals for the long-term management and purchase of the remaining 1439 homes and six further development plots with the potential to build between 2000–2500 homes that were not developed when the size of the Athletes Village was drastically reduced. A short list of nine private sector organisations was announced in December 2010 reduced to three in April 2011. The shortlist included a joint partnership between Delancey and Qatari Diar¹¹; Hutchison Whampoa and the Wellcome Trust (a medical research institution). Delancey and Qatari Diar went on to win the bid. The rejection of the Wellcome Trust was controversial as their proposals for the Village were far reaching, transformative and congruent with legacy plans aimed at fundamental transformation of East London. They included:

Life Sciences Innovation Centre. This would be the anchor to support jobs, create new businesses, and enable us to develop residential accommodation across the Park to provide homes for the workers and others who want to live there. It could become the Silicon Valley of Europe. (Wellcome Trust 2011)

The Trust’s proposal was dependent on them being able to purchase the freehold for the whole Park including the Stadium and the Aquatics Centre (and this had not been put out to tender at that stage) in addition to the Athletes Village for £1 billion. Moreover, Wellcome planned to sell the housing at the Village to capitalise the project and this raised concerns about the emergence of large numbers of individual buy to let investors purchasing properties on the park.

Responses to the Wellcome proposals were mixed; some saw this as a significant undervaluation of assets and a high-risk strategy which would impact on the tendering process already begun at the Athletes Village and others felt that it offered the opportunity to create a substantial legacy which was both economically and architecturally sound. According to one local councillor:

It was a transformative bid. We thought it was a really good idea because it was economics and jobs based... but I think the treasury are in love with having numbers now to feed into spending reviews in three years, six years etc. The Welcome Trust proposals were over a much longer period of time.

In August 2011, it was announced that Qatari Diar and Delancey were the successful bidders and QDD Athletes Village UK Limited was formed. QDD purchased the properties and six additional plots for £557 million and this meant the government had not recouped its £1 billion outlay, even when factoring in the £268 million paid by Triathlon homes or indeed the additional planning gain responsibilities acquired when the project was transferred from Lend Lease to the ODA. The similarities here with Vancouver are evident with significant public sector investment and loss translating into very high per unit costs of each dwelling to the taxpayer. QDD’s plans for the village include the establishment of the UK’s first private Management Investment Fund facilitating more long-term investment in the private rented sector.

After the Games, the Athletes Village was renamed East Village. Triathlon homes owns all of the affordable housing and includes four distinctive ‘affordable housing’ products. Social Rent is housing let at low social rents and ‘Affordable Rents’ are up to 80% of market rents. Contemporary housing legislation favours the latter; however, 49% of housing(675 units) has been funded under the old formula:

This is regularly held out to be the last bastion of social-rented housing in inner London because this was ultimately funded under the former programme and pre-dates the introduction of affordable rent. (Senior Manager, Triathlon homes)

However, the cost of these units will still be higher than the London average for such housing explained in part because of high maintenance costs associated with what is perceived as outstanding public realm (Gardens/open Spaces).^12,13 These residents will also be able to purchase their properties through the ‘right to acquire’. A further 356 (26% of all affordable housing) units will be let as affordable rents and targeted at those residents who may not be eligible for social rented housing but are eligible for this type of housing as a result of earning below a certain level or working in specific occupations. A further 348 (20% of affordable housing) homes are available for Shared ownership (where residents buy a proportion of the property and pay rent on the rest) and it is anticipated that residents will need to earn a minimum of £33,400 and will pay around £857.00 per month in rent and over time it is likely that much of this housing will convert to market housing as residents staircase their share up to 100% (What house 2013). The scheme also includes a small proportion of shared equity housing (79 units) enabling residents to purchase up to 75% of the property. They do not pay rent on the remaining share and the property remains affordable. Overall then we can see that there is a relatively extensive affordable housing offer. However, at least half of the affordable housing units will be targeted at those on higher incomes and overtime may be converted to private housing through staircasing in the case of shared ownership or the ‘right to acquire’.

The QDD and Triathlon apartments are located in specific blocks though they will share large communal courtyard gardens and the intention is that viewed externally the scheme will be tenure blind. However, there is differentiation within the units in terms of specification. A new school is also a central feature of the wider community offer with the intention of acting as a magnet to attract residents across the socio-economic spectrum. Indeed one of the unique features of the Village is the extensive level of provision in terms of transport, shops, healthcare, etc. that will available when residents move in as compared to many new developments where services are slow to follow (Bernstock 2008).

A scheme of this significance and scale has led to a considerable degree of attention to issues of who will live/purchase properties at the Village. There was some concern that if properties were sold to buy to let investors there may be problems with maintenance and transience. According to Andrew Altman, then director of the OPLC:

It has been an issue very much of concern to our board. Because we recognise how important it is going to be for setting the overall tone. It is going to be the first neighbourhood. (Culture Media and Sports Committee 2010: Evidence 9)

QDDs statements that it intends to retain overall management of the site may be one response to this. The attractiveness of the offer and the market will determine who chooses to rent premium market rent housing with QDD. A more complex allocations process will apply to the social rent element of affordable housing. In December 2011, the Allocation Policy for the 675 properties social rented units was confirmed. The London Borough of Newham has allocation rights to 50% or 348 of the Social Rented Properties. Barking and Dagenham, Hackney, Havering, Waltham Forest and Redbridge have allocation rights for 100 homes in total; Triathlon homes will have allocation rights for 150 homes and the GLA will have allocation rights for seventy homes.

There has been a degree of social engineering with regard to the allocation of these affordable properties. A target has been set to ensure that 50% of residents are in employment:

This is an aspirational target and is higher than on our other developments where around 29–30% are in employment. We are going to employ an employment support officer who will work to see if they need sign-posting into a training scheme; undertake a skills’ audit, and generally support people through the employment process. So it’s all around what we can do to achieve that target, rather than saying, ‘you’re not in work, you can’t have on.’ (Manager, Triathlon homes)

In September 2012, Newham revised its allocation policy to ensure that first priority went to military personnel or those who had previously been in the military followed by those in employment with a maximum earning of £60k (Press Release, London Borough of Newham Armed Services and People in employment to be prioritised for social housing, September 28th 2012). The focus on work is in line with Newham’s policy of wanting to reward those perceived as ‘strivers’. Residents being decanted from the Carpenters Estate have been given decant status which gives them high priority when bidding for properties, however, costs are substantially higher and this may be prohibitive.

Triathlon has identified four equal priorities for the allocation of its 152 properties, including military and ex-military personnel, those with decant status, the hidden homeless (living with another household) and over-occupiers who will be giving up a bedroom. The Greater London Authority will allocate seven of its properties to rough sleepers with the rest enabling residents to move from one part of the capital to another. (GLA 2012). The remaining boroughs will allocate their properties through their formally agreed lettings policies and details of opportunities to move to East Village have been widely promoted through the choice based letting system.¹⁴

On the other hand, the housing at the Village is clearly an important source of well designed high quality affordable housing and much of it is designed for families which will make some contribution to reducing overcrowding in Newham which has the highest proportion of overcrowding of any authority in the country. Yet we can see a considerable degree of social engineering has been undertaken to ensure that the properties are allocated to the ‘deserving poor’. More generally, cost itself even for much of the ‘affordable housing’ will effectively exclude many from the scheme.

Other dimensions of London’s housing legacy

There are two other dimensions of London’s housing legacy, the housing planned for the Park and the accelerated development of the Lower Lea Valley.

Housing plans for the Park

One of the first tasks of the newly established OPLC in 2009 was to draw up a master plan for the area setting out a clear direction for the subsequent legacy. This plan placed considerable emphasis on high-quality neighbourhoods, family housing and at this point an indicative 35–40% affordable housing. In 2012, the OPLC produced a revised master plan (Legacy Communities Scheme) setting out the potential to create five new neighbourhoods and up to 6870 homes. The 2012 plan indicated that more ambitious affordable housing targets had been reduced to a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 35% reflecting the fast changing policy context of austerity and housing finance reform and the need to capitalise on the sale of lands to pay back debts. This raises the question of whether London’s bid would have been as compelling if it had indicated that it is affordable housing legacy on the park may be only 20%. (Bernstock & Poynter 2012) demonstrate that minimums can very quickly become maximum levels in what can only be understood as race to the bottom in terms of planning gain and a serious failure to capture value from these developments to ensure that housing conditions are improved for existing residents. Moreover, it has been acknowledged by policymakers that registered social landlords will find it difficult to deliver family housing on the park following the introduction of the affordable rent model as rents may simply be too high. It is therefore possible that beyond the Athletes Village there is a real risk that legacy housing developments elsewhere on the Park will be dominated by private sector development with little real housing legacy in terms of much needed affordable housing. Moreover, the need for affordable housing is as great now as it was in 2005, with Newham having the highest levels of overcrowding in the country and the highest proportion of residents of any authority in England on the housing waiting list (Census 2011).

Accelerated development of the Lower Lea Valley

‘In 2007 Sebastian Coe claimed that the Olympic and Paralympic project would lead to the construction of 30,000–40,000 new homes across the Lower Lea Valley, many of which would be affordable’ (Coe 2007). However, this was not a statement with regard to actual plans but essentially speculative on the basis that there was substantial vacant land with the potential for housing development. A Lower Lea Valley Plan was produced providing a potential blue print for development; however, there was never any budget to realise the plan. It was assumed that the uplift in land values associated with substantial public investment would generate interest from private developers in building in the area with affordable housing levered through the planning gain process.

There is indeed evidence of a considerable degree of development activity taking place. Between 2000 and 2012, Bernstock and Poynter (2012) mapped planning gain agreements along Stratford High Street as a case study of accelerated regeneration. Between 2000 and 2012 there were 2321 units built or near to completion with a further 1753 planned along the High Street. The study identified three development phases; the first between 2000 and 2005 characterised by both limited activity and limited planning gain; the second phase between 2005 and 2009 characterised by high levels of development activity and significant levels of affordable housing provided on new private and RSL led developments funded through Housing Association Grants and the third phase post 2009 coinciding with the recession; cuts to housing grant and the relaxing of planning requirements on new developments all contributing to a significant reduction of affordable housing on new developments. Over time then there has been substantial development activity coupled with a declining commitment to lever affordable housing through planning gain agreements. It would seem that Stratford High Street illustrates the capacity of the private sector to secure the locational advantage afforded by public investment whilst, particularly in the context of the wider economic austerity, reach agreements with public agencies that commit them to the most modest contributions to ‘planning gain’, unlikely to even cover the financial impact of these developments in terms of additional health and educational infrastructure resulting in the need for further public subsidy. Schemes such as the new IKEA development initially anticipated to deliver 35% affordable housing will now only contribute 10% affordable housing and will have little impact on housing need in the legacy boroughs (Bernstock 2013; Bernstock & Poynter 2012).

Conclusion

As we have seen London is not unique with regard to its commitment to deliver a housing legacy or in terms of the tensions and contradictions experienced in trying to deliver this. London 2012 started off with very laudable ambitions with regard to transforming East London for the benefit of all who live there. Over time and for a variety of reasons, commitments to affordable housing have waned both on the Park and in the surrounding area. The Athletes Village (East Village) does provide 49% affordable housing and is therefore a relatively unique ‘mixed community’ that if successful might serve as a demonstration project for schemes across the Park and in other host cities; moreover, the scheme includes much needed accessible and family housing. However, the high level of affordable housing was a result of market failure rather than design and existing planning consents mean that over time as new housing is developed elsewhere at the Village, it is likely to be predominantly market housing. Moreover, what is desperately needed in East London is Social rented housing units and the 675 new social rented units at East Village do not even compensate for the housing lost through legacy-related projects and therefore the current balance sheet is negative, making it even more important to ensure that a strong commitment to meeting the housing need of the legacy boroughs are realised on the Park and surrounding areas. The regeneration of Stratford is clearly at a critical juncture and there are both risks and possibilities. The risks are clearly a declining commitment to affordable housing provision justified by the recession, fiscal austerity and housing finance reforms resulting in compromises where the area is regenerated for a new rather than existing population.

On the other hand, much of the land in Stratford is now owned by the public sector. There is evidence of considerable private sector/third sector interest in developing schemes in the area and therefore it is essential to focus on how we might more effectively capture/lever value for existing populations either through planning gain or other mechanisms. Moreover, the State as landowner could use the Park as a test bed for new affordable housing schemes/models that are desperately needed in London, such as Community Land Trusts or by increasing supply-side subsidies in order to generate genuinely affordable rent schemes linked to ability to pay rather than market value and in the process contributing to welfare dependency.

The lessons of both London and Vancouver suggest that mega events are not the most appropriate vehicle for meeting the housing needs of low-income families. Notwithstanding this, it will be important to ensure that initial commitments that were so crucial to London winning the bid are adhered too and that we learn lessons from London about how we might more effectively lever legacy benefits from mega events to address disadvantage.

Notes

^1. Bernstock (2009) has explored housing legacy dimensions of London 2012 in (Poynter & Macrury 2009), Watt (2013) has explored issues of housing legacy and gentrification on the Carpenters Estate and Kavetsos (2012) has explored property prices.

^2. Rule 2 of Article 14 stresses that the IOC ensure that the host city and country promote a positive legacy with benefits beyond the games. Guidance is provided on how this might be incorporated in the bid. See IOC Factsheet – Legacies of the games updated in July 2012.

^3. Marcuse (1985) refers to economic displacement as a form of direct displacement, whereas Hamnett (2009)  has suggested that changes in housing costs should be understood as a form of indirect rather than direct displacement and this framework of analysis is adopted here.

^4. There had previously been a rule whereby any affordable housing demolished had to be replaced by another affordable unit, however, this rule was amended by congress enabling policymakers to move away from the public provision.

^5. It was estimated that each unit cost 600,000 dollars to produce.

^6. The Decent Homes Standard set a benchmark for improving the quality of public housing based on a range of criteria such as the state of repair and facilities. Significant proportions of public housing were deemed to fall below this standard and subject to renovation. See Department of Communities and Local Government (2006); a Decent Home: Definitions for guidance and implementation – update June 2006 and downloaded at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7812/138355.pdf (first accessed 9th December 2012).

^7. It was estimated that 50 million would be needed to bring the homes up to the ‘Decent Homes’ Standard. The conversion of the Olympic stadium after the games required 60 million in public subsidy along with a range of loans including 40 million from the London Borough of Newham (BBC News 2013).

^8. The Original Stratford City Planning Application has been modified a number of times and, in 2009, was increased to 5769 units overall. Original plans included very limited housing in the regions closest to the shopping centre but over time this was modified and additional housing added, though originally the bulk of housing was to have been provided on the area developed as the Athletes Village.

^9. When Lend Lease won the contract to develop the Athletes Village, it was confirmed that 4200 units would be built at the Athletes Village and converted after the games. See for example, Planning, 5.3.2007, Lend Lease set to win Stratford city Contract).

^10. The initial scheme included 30% affordable housing out of a total of 4200 units equated to 1400 affordable units and the revised scheme included 1379 units.

^11. Delancey is a real estate investment company with a property portfolio in retail, residential and commercial developments, ‘Quatari Diar is a real estate developer owning assets in more than 20 countries’, and Hutchinson Whampoa is a Hong Kong-Listed international conglomerate with a range of interests and Wellcome Trust is a UK Health charity.

^12. The average social rent per week at East Village is anticipated to be £138.00 per week or £598.00 per calendar month. In addition to this residents will pay a service charge of £22.00 per week or £96.00 per calendar month and, at the time of writing, efforts were still being taken to reduce this further. Rents are higher than average in part because a proportion of the service charge has been added into the rent.

^13. The Department of Communities and Local Government provided information on data for large private registered providers in London for March 2012 which indicated that the average rent in London was £103.62. Large private registered providers are registered parents of group structures and/or own at least 1000 bed spaces. Information was also available for average local authority rents in London for 2011–2012. The average local authority social rent was £89.17 per week. Source: Table 701 Rents, Lettings and tenancies: Local Authority Average rents by region, UK, downloaded at Department of Communities and Local government.

^14. Choice-based lettings provide details of available local authority or registered social landlord-owned properties that they can bid for properties which are allocated to those with the highest score on waiting lists.