Geopolitics, statehood, violence and space compression in Gilgit-Baltistan

ABSTRACT

Existent literature about Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) has made remarkable contributions in furthering the understanding about this region which is unique for its ambiguous constitutional status and multicultural society. This article aims to complement the existing works specifically in the theoretical domain of statehood and governance. It argues that the single most important factor, which crucially accounts for the prevailing woes of GB and its inhabitants, is the compression of its multidimensional spatial fabric, which can be explained by applying the epistemology of public space. Resultantly, a more meaningful and cohesive delineation of the complex landscape of GB can be engendered, while in the process introducing also a novel theoretical lens to be applied by future research for studies done in similar settings. Specifically, a set of three variables – geopolitics, liminal statehood, organized violence – is interrogated from this distinctive framework. Among other findings including the need to revisit the assumptions by some scholars construing the Pakistani state as colonial, the space to enlarge the scope of integration and participation emerges in particular. The conclusion reflects on the reasons underlying the persistence of conditions produced by the spatial compression and discusses some among the broad policy implications that affect law and governance in GB.

KEYWORDS:

• Gilgit-Baltistan
• public space
• geopolitics
• liminal statehood
• organized violence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, 60–61; and Dani, History of Northern Areas, 400.

2. Ibid.

3. Khalid, Pakistan in the Pamir, 15, 25–30.

4. Durand, The Making of Frontier, 2–3, 41–3.

5. Hussain, Kashmir Question, 3.

6. Ibid.

7. See Bansal, “Gilgit-Baltistan,” 81–101.

8. E.g. Khaled Ahmed, Andreas Rieck, Mariam Zahab, Ashok Behuria, Georg Stöber, Farhan Siddiqi, Seema Shekkawat, Muhammad Feyyaz, Izhar Hunzai, Karan Sawhny, Nidhi Narain, etc.

9. Bouzas, “The Kashmir space”; Ali, “Spaces of Nature”; and Kreutzmann, “Linguistic Diversity in Space and Time.”

10. See, Mustafa, Katherine and Tillotson, “Antipode to Terror.”

11. Organized violence includes state-based, non-state and one-sided violence. See Organized Violence, Human security report project http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/security-stats/Organized-Violence.aspx; and Shah, “Conceptual and theoretical frameworks,” 97–106.

12. Mustafa and Brown, “The Taliban, Public Space, ”497.

13. Ali, “Spaces of Nature,” 115.

14. Inspired by Shah, “Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks.”

15. Mustafa, “Terrorism and Public Place”.

16. Ibid.

17. Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” 49.

18. Gregory et al., Dictionary of Human Geography, 584-85.

19. Nordquist, “Public Sphere.”

20. Kreutzmann, “Linguistic Diversity in Space and Time.”

21. Visweswaran, Everyday Occupations, 3.

22. Kliot and Charney, “The Geography of Suicide,” 355.

23. Elden, “There is a Politics,” 107.

24. See note 13 above.

25. Hong, “Law and Liminality,” 73.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Zain, “A Socio-Political Study,” 183.

30. Sökefeld, “From Colonialism to Postcolonial,” 945.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu, 1.

34. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 13.

35. Sökefeld, “Anthropology of Gilgit-Baltistan,” 13.

36. Kalis and Dar, “Geo-Political Significance,” 115.

37. Anwar Hussain, China & Pakistan, 82.

38. Ankit, “Kashmir.”

39. Feyyaz, Pakistan-Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 12; Mahmud, “The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms.”

40. Feyyaz, “P-5 members and UN, 117”; and History of UNMOGIP.

41. FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation) was an incentive-punishment imbued legal structure in place since 1901, introduced by the British originally to control the violent tribes dwelling along Durand Line – boundary drawn between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1893. For FCR see, A Bad Law Nobody.

42. Hussain, The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms.

43. Discord in Pakistan’s Northern, 8.

44. Ali, “Outrageous State,” 3.

45. See note 43 above.

46. E.g. from Northern Areas of J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) to Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) to Northern Areas to Northern Areas of Pakistan and lately GB. Discord in Pakistan’s Northern, 8, 20; and Raman, Unrest.

47. Hong, “Liminality and Resistance.”

48. Ibid.

49. “An Order to Provide Greater.”

50. Hong, “Liminality and Resistance,” 7.

51. Ibid., 8.

52. Stöber, “Religious Identities Provoked,” 404–5; and Zahab, “Regional Dimension of Sectarian,” 115–16.

53. This observation is based on the writer’s personal experience during two years’ stay in GB from 2003 to 2005.

54. See note 24 above.

55. See, e.g. PM announces development package for GB, The Nation, 30 September 2009; see note 45 above, 14.

56. See note 48 above.

57. Ibid.

58. Hopkirk, The Great Game, 446–9.

59. Ibid., 52.

60. Ibid., 451–53.

61. Tarar, Lahore, 161–64.

62. Roberts, “Land of Borderlands,” 217.

63. Rahman, Sinicization Beyond the Great, 60; and See note 62 above, 217–18.

64. See notes 72–74 in Stöber, “Religious Identities Provoked.”

65. Jettmar, “Norther Areas of Pakistan,” 71–4.

66. See note 34 above, 230.

67. Ibid., 269–70.

68. Kizilbash, “Legislative Participation and Foreign,” 87–8.

69. Yunus, Reflections on China, 131.

70. Ibid., 134–35.

71. Haider, “Sino-Pakistan Relations.”

72. Ibid.

73. Zahab, “Regional Dimension of Sectarian,” 115.

74. Fiaz, “Policy Intervention in FATA,” 49–62.

75. Suba. “CPEC fears.”

76. See note 34 above, 202.

77. See note 35 above, 10–11.

78. Ibid., 11.

79. Husain, “FATA,” 18–63.

80. A Bad Law Nobody.

81. See notes 31 and 35 above.

82. See note 30 above, 954.

83. Ibid., 953.

84. Ibid.

85. Bouzas, “The Kashmir space.”

86. See note 43 above (executive summary).

87. See details of debates at the UN by the two countries, see note 34 above, 97–117.

88. For details on Amritsar Treaty see Dani, History of Northern Areas,  272–275.

89. See note 43 above, 16.

90. See note 43 above, 14.

91. Shigri, “Time for change.”

92. Ibid., 42.

93. See note 30 above.

94. Ibid., 959–60.

95. See note 35, 15.

96. See note 30 above, 964.

97. See note 30 above, 964; Sering, “Talibanization of Baltistan.”

98. See note 42 above, 5.

99. See note 35 above, 15.

100. See note 85 above.

101. Martin, “Balawaristan and Other ImagiNations,” 350–368; Mahmud, “The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms.”

102. Ibid.

103. See note 25 above, 73.

104. See note 35, 11.

105. Waqas and Taqi, “Unheard voices.”

106. Singh, “Gilgit Baltistan”; see note 44 above.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. Ali, Naqash and Nagri, “‘Almost’ Pakistan.”

110. See note 35 above, 16.

111. See note 43 above, 14–15.

112. Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 19.

113. Walter, “Changing Gilgit-Baltistan,” 42.

114. “Remarks of AJK premier.”

115. Imran, “True Culture”; and Mange, Muslim diversity, 60.

116. Roy, “A Brief History.”

117. Sarwar, “Peaceful milieu.”

118. Varley, “Exclusionary Infrastructures Crisis.”

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid, “Inhospitable Hospitals”.

121. Hunzai, Conflict dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan, 2.

122. Parwana, “Truth can never be,” Barooshal Times, 7 July 2014; “Nationalists Demand Revival,” Pamir Times, 25 November 2013.

123. See note 97 above.

124. Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, 67.

125. See note 20 above.

126. Malik, The Woes of Gilgit-Baltistan, 20; and see note 125 above, 67.

127. N.Khan, “Mosque Construction or the Violence,” 488–89.

128. Ewing, “Anthropology and the Pakistani National,” 534–35.

129. Toor, The state of Islam, 81–82, 132–33; and see note 125 above.

130. Sawhyny and Narain, “Fratricidal Conflict between Pakistani,” 470.

131. See note 44 above, 8.

132. See note 125 above, 64.

133. Murphy and Tamana, “State Terrorism and the Military,” 57.

134. Siddiqa, “Red Hot Chili Peppers,” 12, 25; and Behuria, “Sunni-Shia Relations in Pakistan.”

135. Stöber, ‘Religious Identities Provoked,’ 401.

136. Dad, “The sectarian specter in Gilgit-Baltistan”; Majid yar, The Shi’ites of Pakistan, 3; and Shekhawat, “Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan.”

137. Ibid.

138. Ahmed, Sectarian War, 189–90.

139. Khan, “Tourism Downfall”, 158.

140. See note 24 above.

141. Ibid.

142. See note 45 above, 3.

143. See notes 45 and 53 above.

144. See note 45 above.

145. Mir, “Gunmen kill 9 foreign.”

146. See Foreign Tourist Inflow.

147. “Attacks on Schools.”

148. Sering, “Terror Outfits Build Presence.”