The CTBT and Strategic Relations Between Russia, China, and the United States

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Notes

* The views expressed in this paper do not represent any official views or position of the CTBTO. All opinions, errors, omissions, etc. are solely the responsibility of the author. The author would like to acknowledge the generous support of the Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York in conducting research for this article.

¹ “Clinton Sends CTB Treaty to Senate: Hearing Set to Begin in October,” September 1997, Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/244>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

² Liviu Horovitz, “A Detour Strategy for the Test Ban Treaty”, Washington Quarterly 34, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp. 87–99.

³ Terry Deibel, “The Death of a Treaty”, Foreign Affairs, September–October 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58251/terry-l-deibel/the-death-of-a-treaty>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

⁴ Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradčany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, Embassy of the United States of America in the Czech Republic, <http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

⁵ Transcript of Obama's Speech in Berlin, <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/06/19/transcript-of-obamas-speech-in-berlin/>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

⁶ Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

⁷ Kaegan McGrath, “Verifiability, Reliability, and National Security: The Case for U.S. Ratification of the CTBT,” Nonproliferation Review 16, No. 3 (2009), pp. 407–433.

⁸ A larger focus on Russia rather than China probably to some extent reflects the persisting Cold Wwar mentality, which makes it easier to target a “known enemy” rather than a country on which little confirmed data exists.

⁹ National Institute for Public Policy, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Assessment of the Benefits, Costs, and Risks (National Institute Press, 2011), <http://www.nipp.org/CTBT%203.11.11%20electronic%20version.pdf>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

¹⁰ Interestingly, during the CTBT negotiations, the Russian side pointed that because of the sandy nature of the geological deposits near the Nevada Test Site an IMS seismic station should be located much closer to meet the detection requirements.

¹¹ For more on the CTBT verification regime, see <http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

¹² Interview with a former Russian CTBT negotiator, November 2011.

¹³ “Monitoring Novaya Zemlya,” NORSAR, <http://www.norsar.no/c-84-Regional-Monitoring.aspx>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

¹⁴ “Station Profiles,” CTBTO public website, <http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station-profiles/>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

¹⁵ “Russia reaffirms strong support for the CTBT,” CTBTO press release, October 3, 2011, <http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2011/russia-reaffirms-strong-support-for-the-ctbt/?Fsize=xhczayqbmdyc>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

¹⁶ “CTBTO Head Visits Moscow, Signs Tsunami Warning Agreement”, CTBTO Highlights, October 4, 2013, <http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2013/ctbto-head-visits-moscow-signs-tsunami-warning-agreement/>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

¹⁷ “China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi Reaffirms Commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); Progress on CTBTO Stations in China,” CTBTO Highlights, August 7, 2013, <http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/chinas-foreign-minister-wang-yi-reaffirms-commitment-to-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt-progress-on-ctbto-stations-in-china/>; “Chinese Monitoring Stations are Now Sending Data,” CTBTO Highlights, January 6, 2013, <http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2014/chinese-monitoring-stations-now-sending-data/> (all URLs last accessed August 28, 2014).

¹⁸ See “Station Profiles,” CTBTO public website, <http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station-profiles/>.

¹⁹ Camille Grand, “Nuclear Weapon States and the Transparency Dilemma,” in Nicholas Zarimpas, ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions (SIPRI, 2003), p. 36, <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI03Zarimpas/SIPRI03Zarimpas.pdf>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

²⁰ Camille Grand, “Nuclear Weapon States and the Transparency Dilemma,” in Nicholas Zarimpas, ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions (SIPRI, 2003), p. 40.

²¹ Gregory Kulacki, “Why China Won't Engage the US on Strategic Issues,” All Things Nuclear blog, Union of Concerned Scientists, September 29, 2010, <http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/1210302696/why-china-wont-engage-on-strategic-reassurance>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

²² National Institute for Public Policy, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Assessment of the Benefits, Costs, and Risks (National Institute Press, 2011), <http://www.nipp.org/CTBT%203.11.11%20electronic%20version.pdf>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

²³ Victor Slipchenko, “Russia, Ratification and the CTBT's Entry Into Force,” VERTIC, June 2010, Occasional Paper 3.

²⁴ Victor Litovkin, “Nuclear Test without Nuclear Test,” RIA Novosti, July 24, 2006, <http://ria.ru/analytics/20060724/51743307.html>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

²⁵ Interview with a former Russian CTBT negotiator, November 2011.

²⁶ See for example, Suzanne Jones and Frank von Hippel, “Transparency Measures for Subcritical Experiments Under the CTBT,” Science and Global Security 6 (1997), pp. 291–310.

²⁷ Slipchenko, “Russia, Ratification and the CTBT's Entry Into Force,” VERTIC, June 2010, Occasional Paper 3.

²⁸ Litovkin, “Russia, Ratification and the CTBT's Entry Into Force,” VERTIC, June 2010, Occasional Paper 3.

²⁹ See for example, “Novaya Zemlya,” <http://novajazemlja.narod.ru/nuclear.htm>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

³⁰ Sergei Leskov, “Report from Novaya Zemlya: Life After Nuclear Explosions,” Izvestiya, November 18, 2009, <http://www.izvestia.ru/news/355448>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

³¹ Leskov, “Report from Novaya Zemlya: Life After Nuclear Explosions,” Izvestiya, November 18, 2009, <http://www.izvestia.ru/news/355448>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

³² Nadezhda Shilova, “General Yuri Sokolov Bids Farewell to Novaya Zemlya”, Pravda Severa, February 2, 2010, <http://www.pravdasevera.ru/?id=1051777806>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

³³ Рустем Фаляхов, “За нефть и газ стоит ледовая дружина,” Газета.ru, 10 декабря 2013, [Rustem Falyakhov, “The Ice Brotherhood Stands for Oil and Gas,” Gazeta.ru, December 10, 2013], <http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2013/12/10/5796761.shtml>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

³⁴ Сергей Осипов, “Полигон номер раз. На Новой Земле продолжает работу ядерный объект РФ,” Аргументы и Факты, 11 декабря 2013, [Sergey Osipov, “Explosion site number one. Russia's nuclear object continues its operation at Novaya Zemlya islands,” Argumenty i Fakty, December 11, 2013], <http://www.aif.ru/society/safety/1062347>, last accessed August 28, 2014.

³⁵ Oleg Nekhai and Yelizaveta Isakova, “Russia to Build Laser Nuclear Explosion Simulation Installation,” Voice of Russia, September 30, 2011, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/09/30/57370758.html>, last accessed August 28, 2014.