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ABSTRACT
At first sight, the work of the German legal philosopher and constitutional theorist, Robert Alexy, appears to offer a welcome counter-example to the general insulation of Anglo-American jurisprudence from continental European influences. Over the last 30 years, his ideas and writings have become increasingly available in English, and they have stimulated a growing engagement in response. However, this immediate impression masks an unevenness in the reception of his work. In this article I trace the history and extent of this reception, contrasting its variability with the internally systemic and coherent quality of Alexy’s entire oeuvre. I suggest that the causes for this variability are to be found in the intellectual climate of modern anglophone jurisprudence, in which work in the Kantian legal-philosophical tradition is unfamiliar or viewed with caution. A deeper theoretical development needs to take place if his work is to be appreciated holistically. However, there are signs that such a development is taking place, and it is possible that in time the reception of Alexy’s work will be seen to be part of that longer-term process.
Notes
1 This paper was first presented at a conference in the University of Heidelberg Modern German Non-Positivism – From Radbruch to Alexy on 14–15 September 2016. I am grateful to participants at that event, to my colleague Patrick Capps, and to the anonymous reviewer for Jurisprudence, for their insightful comments and suggestions.
2 John Bell, ‘Wolfgang Friedmann (1907–1972), with an Excursus on Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949)’ in J Beatson and R Zimmermann (eds), Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain (Oxford University Press 2004) 532.
3 See Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller (Bloomsbury 2012) 72–73. On Radbruch’s stay in Oxford, see Carola Vulpius, Gustav Radbruch in Oxford (C.F. Müller Verlag 1995).
4 A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trs Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (Oxford University Press 1989); A Theory of Constitutional Rights (tr Julian Rivers) (Oxford University Press 2002) and The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism (trs Stanley L Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson) (Clarendon Press 2002).
5 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574 at 595; George Pavlakos, ‘Introduction’ in George Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007); Martin Borowski, ‘Discourse, Principles, and the Problem of Law and Morality: Robert Alexy’s Three Main Works’ (2011) 2(2) Jurisprudence 575–95; Matthias Klatt, ‘Robert Alexy’s Philosophy of Law as System’ in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012).
6 The Argument from Injustice (n 5), 127.
7 Robert Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’ (2010) 23(2) Ratio Juris 167–82. For a recent piece on the dual nature of law which emphasises the systemic character of his entire project, see Robert Alexy, ‘The Ideal Dimension of Law’ in George Duke and Robert P George (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press 2017).
8 Suhrkamp 1978.
9 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005), 17 fn. 10.
10 Neil MacCormick, ‘What is Wrong with Deceit?’, a public lecture given in Sydney in July 1981 and published in (1983) 10 Sydney Law Review 5–19.
11 Neil MacCormick, ‘Legal Reasoning and Practical Reason’ (1982) 7 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 271–86.
12 Neil MacCormick, ‘Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Rediscovery of Practical Reason’ (1983) 10 Journal of Law and Society 1–18.
13 ibid 6.
14 (1985) 33 American Journal of Comparative Law 541–3.
15 Dennis Lloyd and MDA Freeman (eds), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1985), 398.
16 Neil MacCormick, ‘Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A response to CLS’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 539–58 at 554 fn 34.
17 (1989) 48(3) Cambridge Law Journal 522–5.
18 ibid 524.
19 (1990) 10 Legal Studies 116–22.
20 ibid 120 and 117, respectively.
21 (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 569–70.
22 (1990) 41 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 199–201.
23 (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 304–17.
24 ibid 305.
25 ibid 316.
26 Juha-Pekka Rentto, ‘Aquinas and Alexy: A Perennial View to Discursive Ethics’ (1991) 36 American Journal of Jurisprudence 157–76, 168.
27 Eg Lawrence B Solum, ‘Virtues and Voices’ (1990) 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 111–40, 126; Frederick Schauer, ‘Reflections on the Value of Truth’ (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 699–724, 705.
28 Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Role of Equity in International Law’ (1992) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 54–81, 70–71.
29 Ota Weinberger, ‘Conflicting Views on Practical Reason: Against Pseudo-Arguments in practical Philosophy’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 252–68.
30 Bev Clucas, ‘The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti-Positivism’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 230–44.
31 See, eg Kaarlo Tuori, ‘Discourse Ethics and the Legitimacy of Law’ (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 125–43; Manuel Atienza, ‘Practical Reason and Legislation’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 269–87; Stuart Toddington, ‘The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217–29; Antonino Rotolo and Corrado Roversi, ‘Norm Enactment and Performative Contradictions’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 455–82.
32 Ingrid Dwars, ‘Application Discourse and the Special Case-Thesis’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 67–78; Klaus Günther, ‘Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy’s “Special-Case Thesis”’(1993) 6 Ratio Juris 143–56; Georgios Pavlakos, ‘The Special Case Thesis: An Assessment of R. Alexy’s Discursive Theory of Law’ (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 126–54; Emmanuel Melissaris, ‘The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse’ (2005) 18 Ratio Juris 464–83.
33 For an exception, see Hannu Tapani Klami, ‘Legal Argument and Decision’ (1992) 37 American Journal of Jurisprudence 171–84.
34 Ioannis Natsinas, ‘Discursive Justification and the Interpretive Attitude’ [2004] UCL Jurisprudence Review 328–56.
35 ibid 354.
36 George Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007).
37 Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012). Klatt’s own extensive engagement with Alexy’s theory can be found in Matthias Klatt, Making the Law Explicit: The Normativity of Legal Argumentation (Hart Publishing 2008), which is a translation of an earlier study in German.
38 Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: legal theory and the space for legal pluralism (Ashgate 2009); Russell Sandberg, ‘The Failure of Legal Pluralism’ (2016) 18 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 137–57.
39 Stefano Bertea, ‘The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 369–91.
40 Kluwe 1999.
41 Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts (Routledge 2007), Part II.
42 Gerald J Postema, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Springer 2011).
43 Alexander Somek, ‘German Legal Philosophy and Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’ in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell 1996).
44 ibid 352.
45 Cristobal Orrego, ‘Gains and Losses in Jurisprudence since H.L.A. Hart’ (2014) 59 American Journal of Jurisprudence 111–32, 126.
46 Robert Alexy, ‘In Defence of Radbruch’s Formula’ in D Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 1999).
47 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593–629; Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – a Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630–72.
48 See, already, HO Pappe, ‘On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era’ (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 260–74.
49 MDA Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2001), vi.
50 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (1946) (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1–12. See also ‘Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy’ (1945) (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13–16; Stanley L Paulson, ‘On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch’s Post-War Papers’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17–40.
51 See n 42 above.
52 See also, for example, Giovannangelo de Francesco, ‘Radbruch Formula and Criminal Law’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 728–36.
53 Leslie Green, ‘General Jurisprudence: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 565–80.
54 Adrian Kuenzler, ‘Judicial Legitimacy and the Role of Courts: Explaining the Transitional Context of the German Border Guard Cases’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 349–82. This was also the incentive for my own reflections on the Hart-Fuller debate and subsequent jurisprudential developments. See Julian Rivers, ‘The Interpretation and Invalidity of Unjust Laws’ in D Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 1999) 40–65.
55 Brian Bix, ‘Robert Alexy, Radbruch’s Formula and the Nature of Legal Theory’ (2006) 37 Rechtstheorie 139–49. See also Brian Bix, ‘Global Error and Legal Truth’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 535–48, and Brian Bix, ‘Radbruch’s Formula and Conceptual Analysis’ (2011) 56 American Journal of Jurisprudence 45–58.
56 Robert Alexy, ‘Legal Certainty and Correctness’ (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 441–51.
57 Brian Bix, ‘Alexy’s Anti-Positivism’ JOTWELL (11 May 2016).
58 (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 342–6; (2004) 24 Legal Studies 480–4.
59 [2003] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 302–10; Danny Priel, ‘Alexy on the Connection between Law and Morality’ (2004) 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 140–59.
60 Maris Kopcke Tinture, ‘Law Does Things Differently’ (Reviewing Stefano Bertea, The Normative Claim of Law) (2009) 55 American Journal of Jurisprudence 201–24, 217.
61 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press 1979) 28–33.
62 Philip Soper, ‘Law’s Normative Claims’ in R George (ed), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford University Press 1996).
63 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Thirty Years On’ (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1655–88; Neil MacCormick, ‘Why Law Makes No Claims’ in G Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007).
64 Neil MacCormick, ‘Why Law Makes No Claims’ n 63, 65.
65 John Gardner, ‘How Law Claims, What Law Claims’ in M Klatt (ed), Institutionalised Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012).
66 ibid 42.
67 Of course, Alexy is not a completely ‘weak’ natural lawyer like Finnis, since he (Alexy) accepts that there are good normative arguments for adopting limited institutional consequences in response to unjust laws.
68 Bas van der Vossen, ‘Assessing Law’s Claim to Authority’ (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 481–501.
69 Joseph Raz, ‘The Argument from Injustice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ in G Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007).
70 Robert Alexy, ‘An Answer to Joseph Raz’ in G Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007).
71 Dennis Patterson, ‘Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 47–58.
72 John Finnis, ‘Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s Ideal Dimension’ (2014) 59 American Journal of Jurisprudence 85–109.
73 Mark C Murphy, ‘Defect and Deviance in Natural Law Jurisprudence’ in M Klatt (ed), Institutionalised Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012), 45.
74 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980), ch. 12; John Finnis, ‘Law as Fact and Law as Reason’ (n 72).
75 See also, Mark C Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press 2006), ch 2.
76 Jonathan Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (2011) 2 Jurisprudence 293–308. Crowe later laments the fact that in her otherwise excellent work on Fuller, Kristen Rundle fails to engage with Alexy’s thesis of the dual nature of law, which has illuminating parallels with some of Fuller’s work. See Jonathan Crowe, ‘Beyond Morality and Efficacy: Reclaiming the Natural Law Theory of Lon Fuller’ (2014) 5 Jurisprudence 109–18.
77 Andrei Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 683–704, 689.
78 Kevin Walton, ‘Legal Philosophy and the Social Sciences: The Potential for Complementarity’ (2005) 6 Jurisprudence 231–51, 245.
79 Mark C Murphy, ‘Two Unhappy Dilemmas for Natural Law Jurisprudence’ (2015) 60 American Journal of Jurisprudence 121–42, 122.
80 Although note the references to A Theory of Legal Argumentation by Trstenjak AG in Quelle AG v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände Case C-404/06 (17 April 2008).
81 Lorenzo Zucca in (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 247; Philippos C Vasiloyannis in (2004) 55 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 206–8; William Ewald, ‘The Conceptual Jurisprudence of the German Constitution’ (2004) 21 Constitutional Commentary 591–601; Neil Walker (2004) 24 Legal Studies 480–484; Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574–96; Gerhard van der Schyff (2004) 4 Journal of South African Law 770–1; Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Constitutional Law: Implications for the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 10 European Public Law 161–77.
82 Antje Pedain, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of the Diane Pretty Case’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 181–206.
83 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, ‘Ronald Dworkin’s Principle based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point of View’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 621–50; Kai Ambos, ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 655–75.
84 Octavio L Ferraz, ‘Poverty and Human Rights’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 585–604; David Bilchitz, ‘Socio-economic rights, economic crisis, and legal doctrine: a rejoinder to Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 747–50.
85 Eva Brems, ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’ (2009) 9(3) Human Rights Law Review 349–72; Patricia Popelier and Catherine van de Heyning, ‘Procedural rationality: giving teeth to the proportionality analysis’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 230–62.
86 Nicholas Croquet, ‘The Right to Self-representation under the European Convention on Human Rights: What Role for Limitation Analysis?’ (2012) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 292–308.
87 Ingrid Leijten, ‘From Stec to Valkov: Possessions and Margins in the Social Security Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 309–50.
88 Madis Ernits, ‘The Principle of Equality in the Estonian Constitution: A Systematic Perspective’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 444–80.
89 Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘“Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut”: Less Restrictive Means in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 139–68.
90 Cora Chan, ‘A Preliminary Framework for Measuring Deference in Rights Reasoning’ (2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 851–82.
91 Rafael Domingo, ‘The Constitutional Justification of Religion’ (2016) 18 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14–35.
92 Julian Rivers, ‘Introduction’, in: Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (tr Julian Rivers) (Oxford University Press 2002); Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174–207; Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Discretion in international and European law’, in N. Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2007) 107–31; Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing’, in G. Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007), 167–88; Julian Rivers, ‘Constitutional Rights and Statutory Limitations’, in M. Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012), 248–71; Julian Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 409–33.
93 Alan DP Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act: An Institutionally Sensitive Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012).
94 Charles-Maxime Panaccio, ‘In Defence of Two-Step Balancing and Proportionality in Rights-Balancing’ (2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 109–28, 118. Of course, it is questionable whether a rational doctrine can really have a ‘father’.
95 Cambridge University Press 2009.
96 Cambridge University Press 2012.
97 Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2012).
98 David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2004).
99 Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468–93; Mahav Khosla, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights? A Reply’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 298–306, and subsequent rejoinders; Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, ‘Proportionality – a Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the I*CON controversy’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 687–708.
100 This is the tendency of the otherwise helpful work of Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat. See ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263–86, and at greater length, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge University Press 2013).
101 Sir WD Ross, The Right and the Good (Clarendon Press 1930), 19.
102 See Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality in Practice: the British Experience’ in Martin Borowski, Stanley L. Paulson and Jan-Reinard Sieckmann (eds), Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie: Festschrift für Robert Alexy (Mohr Siebeck 2017).
103 ‘In Defence of Two-Step Balancing’ (n 94 above).
104 Julian Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 409–33.
105 David Kenny, ‘Proportionality, the Burden of Proof, and Some Signs of Reconsideration’ (2014) 52 Irish Jurist 141–52.
106 This point is well made by Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (Oxford University Press 2012) 51–56. See also Matthias Klatt, ‘The Rule of Dual-Natured Law’ in ET Feteris and others (eds): Legal Argumentation and the Rule of Law (Eleven International Publishing 2016), 27–46.
107 Francisco Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 575–605.
108 George Pavlakos, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and the Structure of Autonomy’ (2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 129–54, 130 n 2.
109 Aldo Schiavello, ‘Neil MacCormick’s Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory: A Defence of the Original View’ (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 140–55.
110 ‘Review of A Theory of Constitutional Rights’ (2004) 24 Legal Studies 480–4, 484.
111 Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 2007), 303.
112 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005).
113 Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (Oxford University Press 2008).
114 ibid 94.
115 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment (Sweet & Maxwell 1986). See also Bev Clucas, ‘The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti-Positivism’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 230–44.
116 Nicolas A Alfonsi, ‘Dworkin’s Anti-Archimedean Jurisprudence’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, January 2017).
117 See, above all, Arthur Ripstein, Force and freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press 2009); S Kisilevsky and MJ Stone (eds), Freedom and Force: Essays on Kant’s Legal Philosophy (Hart Publishing 2017).
118 See Patrick Capps and Julian Rivers, ‘Kant’s Concept of International Law’ (2010) 16(4) Legal Theory 229–57; Patrick Capps and Julian Rivers, ‘Kant’s Concept of Law’ (2018) 63(2) American Journal of Jurisprudence, forthcoming.
119 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 29 n 28.