Responses

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Notes

1 ‘Stress Relief from Laughter? It’s No Joke,’ (September 2023) <https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/stress-management/in-depth/stress-relief/art-20044456> accessed 29 January 2024.

2 Hilary Nye, ‘Moral Decision-Making in the Name of Society (Without Expertise)’ (2024) Jurisprudence 133.

3 ibid 127.

4 Conor Crumey and George Pavlakos, ‘Not a Set of Norms or a Set of Practices’ (2024) Jurisprudence 142.

5 ibid 144.

6 Ronald Dworkin, Law Empire (Belknap Press 1986) 93.

7 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Havard University Press 2011) 406.

8 Mark Greenberg, ‘The Moral Impact Theory of Law’ (2014) 123 Yale Law Journal 1290, 1321–1323.

9 See Scott Hershovitz, ‘The Role of Authority’ (2011) 11 Philosophers’ Imprint 7.

10 Nicolaos Stavropoulos, ‘Too Many Rules’ (2024) Jurisprudence 158.

11 ibid.

12 ibid.

13 Stavropoulos might want to relax his claim – to make it about institutions rather than law. Schools, clubs, and sports teams all qualify. But so do families, where people occupy distinct roles structured, in part, by rights and responsibilities. That said, I doubt that justified rulemaking is limited to institutional settings. (Thanks to Steve Schaus for noting this possibility.)

14 Nicolaos Stavropoulos, ‘Too Many Rules’ (2024) Jurisprudence 159.

15 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2008) 223.

16 ibid.

17 ibid.

18 ibid.

19 Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘The Nature of Human Practices and the Importance of Practical Reason: Why Law Cannot Be a Moral Practice Only’ (2024) Jurisprudence 176.

20 ibid 178.

21 An analogy: Many metaethicists aim to explain how morality works without taking substantive views on contested moral questions. I doubt that project is fully possible, for reasons roughly like the ones Dworkin explained in Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’ (1996) 25 Philosophy & Public Affairs 87. And the same goes for law. The moral practice picture has implications for substantive legal disputes, as it takes a stand on what legal questions are (moral questions) and on what’s involved in answering them (the methods suited to moral inquiry). But these implications are quite abstract, leaving lots to be contested by lawyers doing their everyday work. I think that’s all we should expect from general jurisprudence. (Again, thanks to Steve Schaus for observing the connection.)

22 Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘The Nature of Human Practices and the Importance of Practical Reason: Why Law Cannot Be a Moral Practice Only’ (2024) Jurisprudence 174.

23 Samuele Chilovi, ‘Normative Monism and Radical Deflationism’ (2024) Jurisprudence, 186.

24 ibid 188.

25 Joseph Raz, ‘Incorporation by Law’ (2004) 10 Legal Theory 1, 6.

26 Samuele Chilovi, ‘Normative Monism and Radical Deflationism’ (2024) Jurisprudence, 184.