Towards a framework for human judgements of quantitative information: the numerical judgement process, NJP model

ABSTRACT

This contribution presents a review and a theoretical process framework for human intuitive numerical judgments based on numerical information, The NJP model. The model is descriptive and includes one or several of the following stages, each consisting of information processing and solution strategies (1) problem readings (2) recognitions, (3) associations, (4) similarity assessments, (5) problem interpretations, (6) computations, (7) marker nominations, (8) start value selections and (9) adjustments. three main types of strategies are used separately, in sequence or simultaneously with others in and across stages: (i) Associative strategies, e.g., an answer is retrieved immediately, (ii) Computational strategies, different algorithms are applied to the information and (iii) Analogue strategies, visual analogue representations, e.g., anchoring and adjustment. The paper concludes that a generic model of intuitive judgments will inspire further studies of the psychological processes activated when a judge makes an intuitive numerical judgment.

KEYWORDS:

• Numerical judgement
• cognitive processes
• analogue processes
• anchoring
• adjustment

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Henry Montgomery, Robert Ranyard, Mats Nilsson and Peter Juslin and Timo Mäntylä with research teams and two inspiring reviewers for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 In the present context, we will focus on already quantified information.

2 This dichotomy has been criticised (Hastie, 2001; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004) on different grounds, such as, the difficulty of finding criteria for a clear separation of the two systems. Evans (2008) pointed out that a number of authors have suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying dual-process models:

However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making. (Evans, 2008 p. 255)

In the present study, we consider the mental operations in a judgement process to be a blend of System 1 and System 2 processes.

3 The start value for an adjustment strategy is mostly called anchor in modern anchoring and adjustment studies. It is the initial reference value on the response continuum that is revised and adjusted depending on the available information until a final judgement has been reached. We prefer to call it start value and not anchor in this paper. The term anchor also seems to imply that judgements are adjusted too little from the anchor, which is true in many cases (but see Harvey, 2011).

4 Aru and Bachmann (2015) discuss recent issues related to the concept of consciousness.

5 Peter Juslin suggested this criterion.

6 In that respect it is similar to, for example, Diff Con theory for decision processes (Svenson, 2003).

Additional information

Funding

The study was supported by a grant from the Swedish Research Council to the author [grant number 421-2010-1363].