The Moral Inadequacy of Cremation

Abstract

Cremation has substantial practical benefits. Not only is it much cheaper than traditional burial, but it also comes without its ecological burden. Despite this, we argue that cremation is an inadequate way of disposing of the dead because it entails the destruction of community memory, and, by extension, community and individual identity. It deprives the living of these benefits, while also treating the dead in way which goes against common intuitions about personhood, anthropology and respect for the will of the deceased. Death is perhaps one of the most important subjects in philosophy, and by marginalising it through cremation and related practices, we deprive ourselves of its didactic and social uses. The case we make against cremation is not absolute, but we hope it succeeds in casting doubt on the presumed neutrality of cremation. Our essay is under three heads: (1) we consider the practical benefits of cremation; (2) we reconsider the value of cremation in light of what it deprives individuals and communities of and; (3) we analyse the significance of the corpse in regard to cremation.

Keywords:

• death
• cremation
• ethics
• corpse
• memory
• bioethics

Notes on contributor

Toni C. Saad is a final year medical student at Cardiff University, UK. He holds an MA in Bioethics and Medical Law.

Notes

1 Though it might be that the conclusions of this essay raise further questions which only theology can answer.

2 For the sake of simplicity, we limit ourselves to contrasting cremation with traditional burial, though further alternatives exist (see Rumble et al. 2014). Nevertheless, our argument is applicable to multiple emerging death rites other than cremation.

3 This would align our practice to that of many other countries, including France.

4 A large review concurs (Smith et al. 2012).

5 In the latter study, none of the interviewees preferred cremation over burial (n = 17).

6 It is possible to bury the ashes of the deceased, a point which can overcome some but not all of the following arguments.

7 This section was going to include a glib remark to the effect that it is not possible to write poetry about cremation, in contrast to a cemetery or a burial. But it has been done— skilfully—by Rosenblatt (2004, p. 94), the author's surprise.

8 Of course, choice is not necessarily bad. We argue that burial is a better choice. It has been suggested, however, that the choice between cremation and burial is nothing but a phantasmal attempt at posthumous sovereignty. By opting for cremation, we try to re-assert our personal sovereignty—even after death—by making use of an option which previously was not available (cremation). It is chosen simply because it is available. Clearly it makes no sense to seek this sovereignty, for the simple reason that a dead person has no agency or means of communicating from beyond the grave. We instinctively know that death robs us of our personal sovereignty so we try to get some back by choosing an alternative to burial. This represents a phantasm by we try to exercise sovereignty from beyond the grave. Furthermore, the choice is somewhat irrelevant because it will hardly matter once death has come – the dead cannot lodge a complaint if their wishes are ignored. Michael Nass (2012) has written a lengthy paper on this subject in connection with the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, from which this footnote is derived.

9 Which is not to say human essence.

10 For a ghoulish (though not directly medical) illustration of this see Rumble et al. (2014, p. 248). They describe how Redditch Borough Council recycled heat from the local crematorium to heat its public swimming pool.