Genome Modifying Reproductive Procedures and their Effects on Numerical Identity

Abstract

The advantages and risks of a number of new genome modifying procedures seeking to create healthy or enhanced individuals, such as Maternal Spindle Transfer, Pronuclear Transfer, Cytoplasmic Transfer and Genome Editing, are currently being assessed from an ethical perspective, by national and international policy organizations. One important aspect being examined concerns the effects of these procedures on different kinds of identity. In other words, whether or not a procedure only modifies the qualities or properties of an existing human being, meaning that merely the qualitative identity of this single individual is affected, or whether a procedure results in the creation of a new individual, meaning that a numerically distinct human being would have come into existence. In this article, the different identity arguments proposed, so far, are presented with respect to these novel reproductive procedures. An alternative view is then developed using the Origin Essentialism argument to indicate that any change in the creative conditions of an individual such as in his or her biology but also the moment in time, and the three dimensions of space, will have a numerical identity effect and bring into existence a new individual who would not, otherwise, have existed. Because of this, it is concluded that a form of selection may have taken place in which a preference was expressed for one new possible individual instead of another, based on some frame of reference. This may then mean that a selection between persons has occured  contravening the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights which was ratified in 2000.

KEYWORDS:

• maternal spindle transfer
• pronuclear transfer
• mitochondrial replacement
• gene editing
• numerical identity
• origin essentialism

Notes on contributor

Calum MacKellar is Director of Research of the Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, Edinburgh, and a Visiting Lecturer at St Mary’s University, London, UK.

Notes

1 This is the so-called Non-Identity argument, see Parfit (1984), Boonin (2014), Roberts and Wasserman (2009).

2 For further discussion, see for example Schechtman (1996), Schermer (2011), Foresight Future Identities (2013), 9–10, De Grazia (2012), 70–73.

3 This reflects an ‘animalism’ perspective which was coined by Paul F. Snowdon, see Snowdon 1991. For a discussion see Olson (2003) and Snowdon (2014).

4 This reflects a ‘psychologically interconnected’ perspective. See for example Lewis (1976). Such a psychologically interconnection would not exist, for example, between an early embryo and an adult human being since the latter would not be able to remember being an embryo.

5 Of course, small qualitative biological differences do exist between identical twins.

6 Even conjoined twins can be considered as distinct if they each experience their own specific identity.

7 For a discussion on the ‘Origin Essentialism’ argument, see Forbes (1980), Kripke (1972), Mackie (2006).

8 This will be assumed in the present article though for a critique see Heshenov (2003).

9 This is essentially the ‘Organism View’ discussed by Liao (2006, 2017).

10 For example, even in the rare cases when two early embryos merge to form a new combined embryo, it can be suggested that either (1) both embryos terminate their life trajectories while a new one begins its own or (2) one embryo terminates its life trajectory by being incorporate into the second one who continues its life trajectory. In a similar way, if an early embryo splits in two, it can be suggested that either (1) the original embryo continues its own life trajectory with a new life trajectory splitting off in a new embryo or (2) two new life trajectories begin from the original one which then ends its own trajectory (representing a form of death for this embryo). Thus, no two life trajectories can be considered to exist in the same place and at the same time if the language and concept of personal identity of a whole being is to be used. For a background critique and further discussion relating to such philosophical fission and fusion cases, see for example Parfit (1971, 1984), Lewis (1976), Heshenov (2003).

11 Note: These thought experiments are only illustrations of the reality that when the same or qualitatively identical gametes are used for conception on different dates, distinct individuals are created.

12 Note: These though experiments are only illustrations of the reality that when the same or qualitatively identical gametes are used for conception in different places, distinct individuals are created. Of course, other factors in these thought experiments may also affect elements of identity such as the fact that the American and Russian individuals were created from gametes of different origin (one set was used in America and the other in Russia).

13 This reflects the concept of conventionalism. See Gallois (2017).

14 The significance of the modification may depend, for example, on (1) the development stage of the early embryo, (2) the number of cells in this embryo that are modified, (3) the kinds of cells in this embryo that are modified and (4) the kinds of genetic modification in the cells being considered.

15 For further discussion in relation to MST and PNT, see for example: Appleby (2015), Bredenoord et al. (2011, p. 99), Rulli (2017), Palacios-González (2017), MacKellar (2014).

16 Clustered regularly-interspaced short palindromic repeats with the Cas 9 protein.

17 As already noted, the significance of the modification may depend, for example, on (1) the development stage of the early embryo, (2) the number of cells in this embryo that are modified, (3) the kinds of cells in this embryo that are modified and (4) the kinds of genetic modification in the cells being considered.

18 See for example: MacKellar (2015, 2017, 2018).