Civil Dialogue on Abortion

Though civil and productive dialogue on the divisive and controversial issue of abortion is scarce, this exchange between two philosophers who are also friends easily lives up to its title. Bertha Manninen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University, USA, while Jack Mulder, Jr. is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Hope College, USA. In this volume, each seeks to explain and defend their different perspectives on abortion. They respond to each other’s arguments, and finally endeavour to explore common ground.

Manninen, who has published extensively in reproductive ethics, opens by explicating her pro-choice position. She takes the view that entities must possess interests for any level of moral status, and this requires sentience: nonconscious objects cannot suffer or benefit from anything done to them. Manninen also believes personal identity begins when we become sentient, holding to Jeff McMahan’s Embodied Mind Account of Personal Identity (EMAPI). Once a fetus can be identified with a future person, it can have an interest in its continued existence, but this implies that prior to this point, a fetus has no moral status. Interestingly, Manninen sees this final implication as doubtful, and is not prepared to affirm that early-term fetuses have no moral significance. In fact, she thinks the fetus deserves ‘profound respect’, a perspective in tension with her views on interests and personal identity.

Manninen, however, does not see the complex issue of fetal personhood as one that can be definitively resolved. For her, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument for bodily autonomy in ‘A Defense of Abortion’ trumps any concerns about the moral status of fetuses. She thinks Thomson gets it right: pregnancy is such a complete occupation of a woman’s body that she cannot be forced to continue a pregnancy against her will. Manninen addresses the main objections to Thomson, drawing primarily on David Boonin’s work. She raises the interesting case of Robert McFall, who attempted to use legal means to force his cousin to provide him with bone marrow for a transfusion. This failed, and the court noted there was no legal compulsion for one person’s body can be used to save the life of another. Manninen sees this as an analogous case to the Thomson’s violinist that provides support to her position.

Mulder is a Catholic scholar who has interests in philosophy of religion, Søren Kierkegaard, and sexual and reproductive ethics. He opposes abortion both for religious and philosophical reasons, though here he is concerned only with the latter. Mulder sees two important aims for pro-life philosophers: firstly, arguing that the fetus is a person possessing a right to life, and secondly, arguing that this right is sufficiently strong enough to rule out the permissibility withdrawing life support. Rather than performance views that require a being to function in a certain way to be considered a person, such as the possession of interests or desires, he prefers an endowment view of human persons, animalism, in which human beings have inherent moral worth because of the kind of being they are. Mulder argues there is less metaphysical baggage associated with such a view compared to the body-self dualism of performance accounts.

As expected, Mulder also addresses Thomson’s argument. Because of the disanalogy of rape, he dismisses the responsibility objection, which claims women must care for their fetuses because they assumed responsibility by engaging in sexual intercourse, which can foreseeably result in pregnancy. Mulder believes that how the fetus came into existence should have no bearing on how it is treated. He notes that in many life or death scenarios, we give preference to the vulnerable, even if this involves significant sacrifice. Mulder also criticizes the use of the McFall case as an analogy to abortion, pointing out that withholding bone marrow does not act directly against someone, and it is more significant to take a positive action (such as killing) against a vulnerable party. In fact, Mulder believes in some circumstances it could be morally expected to remain plugged into Thomson’s violinist – if, for instance, you are the only person who can provide aid, and disconnection would directly result in the violinist’s death. In summary, Mulder considers that in a just society sometimes we are obliged to supply people’s needs if the situation is grave enough, contrary to Thomson and Manninen’s view – and this means we should not be permitted to take direct action against the life of the fetus.

Manninen responds first by critiquing animalism, noting it too has its metaphysical difficulties. She also attacks the substance view, claiming it merely asserts its key premise that being a metaphysical person at one stage of life entails being a metaphysical person at all stages.

With regard to Mulder’s discussion of Thomson, Manninen finds much to agree with, particularly his point that a fetus’s origins should not negatively impact its moral status. She is also sympathetic to his view that some people’s needs are grave enough that others are morally obliged to act to meet them, and admits Mulder challenged her views on positive rights for welfare when she is not willing to provide these to embryos and fetuses. She has similar concerns about late-term abortions, but notes these are rare and mostly due to health complications of the mother or fetus.

Mulder’s response is directed at Manninen’s opening arguments rather than her reply. Referring to Thomson’s argument once more, he points out that from the pro-life perspective, it is not only the woman’s bodily autonomy being outweighed by an embryos’ right to life: an abortion involves a violation of the embryo’s autonomy as well. Mulder also rejects the notion that denying a pregnant woman an abortion is compelling a woman to gestate, as she is already gestating.

Mulder has some criticisms concerning Manninen’s EMAPI view of persons. He recalls that Manninen requires interests for moral status, and these in turn require sentience: interests are based on the experiential dimension of mental life, such as the capacity to feel pain. But, Mulder claims, patients in temporary comas can suffer a setback in their interests, or harm, by being sexually assaulted, even though they are never aware this occurred. If people who lack sentience, even temporarily, do not lack interests, then an explanation is required to assert that fetuses that lack sentience lack interests. EMAPI theorists must explain why resuming mental life has morally relevant differences to initiating mental life.

The book concludes with a jointly written chapter exploring the differences and convergences in its authors’ views. Both emphasize that neither likes abortion, and both wish it were far less prevalent. They agree a range of social conditions contribute to the difficult circumstances in which most decisions to abort are made, and see social justice as an important way to address this. Mulder expresses particular concern for the high rates of poverty in African-American and Latino communities in the United States, and sees anti-discrimination as an important component of the pro-life view.

Sexual ethics also receive a mention, appropriately so for such a topic. Mulder naturally holds to the Catholic position on sexual ethics, but Manninen is likewise heavily in favour of sexual monogamy in committed and loving relationships. Both agree that abstinence should be encouraged for adolescents. Importantly, contraception is addressed, and Manninen notes research indicating a link between availability of contraception and abortion rates. Mulder, as a Catholic, makes clear his opposition to contraception, but he considers that if people are already engaging in sexual activity which he regards as morally impermissible, there is a case for permitting action that will mitigate risks to others (including embryos and fetuses). Mulder is, however, doubtful that contraception invariably results in lower abortion rates and safer sex.

Civil Dialogue on Abortion is an encouraging and informative read for those interested in reproductive ethics. Philosophically, there is little original material to be found here; the intention is, rather, to offer scholarly debate on many of the most important issues in abortion literature from opposing viewpoints. Mulder and Manninen articulate their arguments clearly, comprehensively and respectfully, and even manage to find areas of agreement. It is a model for how philosophers holding very different positions on a complex philosophical issue can find common ground to move the discussion forward.

ORCID

Bruce Philip Blackshaw http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9115-582X