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ABSTRACT
On 16 January 2024, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) published its Guidelines on Democratic Law-making for Better Laws. The creation of the Guidelines was driven by the acknowledgment that strengthening democratic institutions and processes is essential in the era of democratic and constitutional erosion and decay and the recognition that contemporary law-making displays several weaknesses. Based on its decades of experience in assessing legislation and legislative processes in the OSCE participating states, ODIHR intended to provide an overview of the guiding principles of the law-making process that ensure that both the process and the resulting laws comply with the requirements of democracy, the rule of law and human rights commitments. The Guidelines offer a new and rich source of inspiration for scholars devoted to strengthening democracy. This paper identifies new(er) avenues for research in democratic erosion and revival, institutional protection of the democratic legislative process, constitutional change, and the impact of constitutional rights. Further, based on some non-OSCE participating states related examples, it shows how the potential inspirational reach of the Guidelines and the research paths it potentially encourage might go beyond the geographic scope of the OSCE participating states.
KEYWORDS:
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 Guidelines [9] and Acknowledgment. The Guidelines are available at 558321.pdf (osce.org).
2 Guidelines [3]
3 Guidelines [1]
4 The Guidelines are dedicated solely to democratic law-making for better laws, which distinguishes them from other important checklists and guidelines developed by either ODIHR itself or other institutions, such as the Venice Commission. Consider, for instance, the Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist (2016) <https://www.venice.coe.int/images/SITE%20IMAGES/Publications/Rule_of_Law_Check_List.pdf>.
5 For a selection, see Guidelines, Annexe I, from p. 150.
6 This scholarly interest is explored in Sections 2.3 and 3, as contexts for the purpose of this Article.
7 See also Victor Pinheiro, Review: ODIHR Guidelines on Democratic Lawmaking for Better Laws. The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 1–5.
8 <https://www.osce.org/odihr>; e.g., Paulina Merino, ‘The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ in IFSH (ed), OSCE Yearbook 1998 (Baden-Baden 1999) 383–91.
9 <https://legislationline.org/assessments?q=lang%3Aen%2Csort%3Apublication_date%2Cpage%3A1%2Ctype%3A54>
10 Besides ODIHR, it is noteworthy, that also the Venice Commission gave an opinion on the amendments to the rules of procedures of the Ukrainian parliament (2017) and parliamentary opposition (2016).
11 Guidelines [6]
12 Guidelines [10]
13 Guidelines [20]
14 See also e.g., A Bedner, ‘The Promise of a Thick View’ in C May and A Winchester (eds), Handbook of the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar 2018); T Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011); Ronan Cormacain, The form of legislation and the rule of law (Hart Publishing 2022); Rule of Law Checklist (n 4).
15 Guidelines [20]
16 Guidelines [20]
17 See e.g., the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanisms of the EU.
18 Guidelines [21]
19 Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, ‘Procedural Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty’ (2013) 3 Political Theory 443, 444, 460–62.
20 Julie C Suk, After Misogyny. How the Law Fails Women and what to do about it (University of California Press 2023) 225, 227–28.
21 Guidelines [22]
22 Guidelines, 170-171.
23 Regarding the term ‘gender’, the Guidelines apply binary categories, such as woman and man, girl and boy. Definitions can be found in Guidelines, Annexe II, 171.
24 Guidelines, Annexe I, 150, and following pages.
25 Guidelines [22]–[26]
26 Guidelines [27]
27 Guidelines [28]
28 Guidelines [29]–[30]
29 ‘Additionally, legislation should proactively promote substantive equality, as well as ensure equality of outcomes or results for different groups of society’ [31].
30 Guidelines [31]–[33]
31 Guidelines [34]–[36]
32 See e.g., Maria Mousmouti, Designing Effective Legislation (Edward Elgar 2019) and Helen Xanthaki (eds), Legislation and Legisprudence in Europe. A Comprehensive Guide for Scholars and Legislative Practitioners (Hart Publishing 2017).
33 See e.g., Luzius Mader, ‘Evaluating the Effects – a Contribution to the Quality of Legislation’ (2001) 2 Statute Law Review 191 and Tímea Drinóczi, ‘Concept of Quality in Legislation – revisited: Matter of Perspective and a General Overview’ (2015) 36(3) Statute Law Review 211–27.
34 The word ‘quality’ occurs 176 times in the Guidelines.
35 Patricia Popelier, ‘Management in Legislation’ in Ulrich Karpen and Helen Xanthaki (eds), Legislation and Legisprudence in Europe. A Comprehensive Guide for Scholars and Legislative Practitioners (Hart Publishing 2017).
36 Mousmouti (n 32) 151.
37 Guidelines, Part IV. Fundamental Elements of the Lawmaking Process.
38 Guidelines, Part III. Main Actors Involved in the Lawmaking Process.
39 E.g., Maria Mousmouti, ‘Gender-sensitive Law-making: Concept and Process’ (2022) 3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation (legislative decision-making that takes into account gender concerns is the only way to produce gender-sensitive legislation that positively promotes gender equality and can achieve its aim).
40 See e.g., The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 9:3 (2022) on Illiberal tendencies in lawmaking.
41 David Marrani and Stephen J Turner, ‘The French Charter of the Environment and Standards of the Environmental Protection’ in S Turner, D Shelton, J Razzaque, O McIntyre, and J May (eds), Environmental Rights: The Development of Standards (Cambridge University Press 2019) 320–21 (on decisions of the Constitutional Council from 2021 and 2013).
42 See e.g., The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 9:3 (2022) on Illiberal tendencies in lawmaking, VRÜ | WCL 55 (2022) Symposium: Autocratic legalism.
43 See e.g., Anmol Jain, ‘Political Process Failure in the Indian Parliament. Studying Abuse of Power by the Chair and how it can be Addressed’ (2022) 2 Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Journal.
44 Tímea Drinóczi and Ronan Cormacain, ‘Introduction: Illiberal Tendencies in Law-making’ (2021) 3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation.
45 W Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press 2019).
46 Anmol Jain, ‘Democratic Decay in India: Weaponizing the Constitution to Curb Parliamentary Deliberation’ (2022) 1 National Law School of India Review.
47 Giovanni Piccirilli, ‘Governmental Predominance in Italian Law-making: Undemocratic or Illiberal?’ (2021) 3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 363–85.
48 Thomas Bustamante and Emílio Peluso Neder Meyer, ‘Legislative resistance to illiberalism in a system of coalitional presidentialism: will it work in Brazil?’ (2021) 3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 342–62.
49 E.g., Viktor Zoltán Kazai, ‘The Misuse of the Legislative Process as Part of the Illiberal Toolkit. The Case of Hungary’ (2021) 9(3) The Theory and Practice of Legislation 295–316 and Tímea Drinóczi, ‘Legislation in Hungary’, in Helen Xanthaki and Ulrich Karpen (eds), Legislation in Europe-A Country to Country Guide (Bloomsbury, Hart Publishing 2020).
50 Valentina Rita Scotti, ‘With a Different Name, the Rose is not a Rose Anymore: Legislative Quality and Gender Equality in the AKP’s Turkey’ (2021) 3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 317–41 (diminishing gender equality in legislation).
51 Saru Arifin, ‘Illiberal Tendencies in Indonesian Legislation: The Case of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation’ (2021) 3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 386–403.
52 Miklós Sebők, Bálint György Kubik, Csaba Molnár, István Péter Járay, Anna Székely, ‘Measuring Legislative Stability: A New Approach with Data from Hungary’ (2022) 21 European Political Science 491–521.
53 Constantinos Saravakos and others, ‘Regulatory Quality Index: A Process-oriented Approach to Measure the Quality of Primary Legislation in a Country’ (October 26, 2022). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4271661> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4271661>
54 Melis G Laebens and Anna Lührmann, ‘What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability’ (2021) 5 Democratization 908–28.
55 Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z Huq, How to Save Constitutional Democracy (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 3.
56 Wolfgang Merkel and Anna Lührmann, ‘Introduction. Resilience of Democracies: Responses to Illiberal and Authoritarian Challenges’ in Anna Lührmann and Wolfgang Merkel (eds), Resilience of Democracies: Responses to Illiberal and Authoritarian Challenges (Routledge 2023) 4–5. For an additional layer, see Jeremy Waldron’s Political Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard 2016; on ways in which the configuration of the legislature affects the effectiveness and legitimacy of a constitutional system).
57 S Gardbaum, ‘The Counter-playbook: Resisting the Populist Assault on the Separation of Powers’ (2020) 1 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.
58 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 2 The University of Chicago Law Review, J Corrales, ‘The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela’ (2015) 26 Journal of Democracy 38–43.
59 Fabio de Sa e Silva, ‘Autocratic Legalism 2.0: Insights from a Global Collaborative Research Project’ (2022) 55 VRÜ | WCL 433.
60 The Guidelines, in the Section on ‘The role of Judiciary’ [62]–[69] and the procedural judicial review of legislation, is less attentive to systems with no codified constitution and where such review would be unconstitutional. It explicitly mentions ‘common law states’ only in one section, i.e., [64]. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who draw my attention to this unbalance in the Guideline.
61 Drinóczi (n 49), Kazai (n 49), and Michael L Libonati, ‘State Constitutions and Legislative Process: the Road not Taken’ (2009) 2 Boston University Law review, respectively.
62 As Brazil is used as a case study in Section IV, see, e.g., E.g., Victor Pinheiro, Devido processo legislativo. Elaboração das leis e seu controle judicial na democracia brasileira (GZ Editora, Rio de Janeiro 2024), Marcelo Andrade Cattoni de Oliveira, Devido processo legislativo: uma justificação democrática do controle jurisdicional de constitucionalidade das leis e do processo legislativo, 3ª ed., (Fórum 2016), Bustamante and Godoi Bustamante in: T Bustamante and EN Godoi Bustamante, ‘Jurisdição Constitucional na Era Cunha: entre o Passivismo Procedimental e o Ativismo Substancialista do STF’ (2016) 7(13) Direito & Praxis 346–88, and Leonardo Augusto Andrade Barbosa, Processo legislativo e democracia (Del Rey 2010)).
63 Arts 57. (1) b), 195 (1) e), and 72, (1) a).
64 S Gardbaum, ‘Pushing the Boundaries: Judicial Review of Legislative Procedures in South Africa’ (2019) 9 Constitutional Court Review, 1–18; Chuks Okpaluba, ‘Can a Court Review the Internal Affairs and Processes of the Legislature? Contemporary Developments in South Africa’ (2015) 2 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 183–218.
65 Arts. 71 and 72.
66 Decision of the Mexican Supreme Court on 8 May 2023, 29/2023, <https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/versiones-taquigraficas/documento/2023-05-14/8%20de%20mayo%20de%202023%20-%20Versi%C3%B3n%20definitiva.pdf>. For a short review, see <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-supreme-court-president-overturned-legislation-e58f48b5bfb217c02573f9604c43c2c8>.
67 Ittai Bar Siman Tov, ‘Semiprocedural Judicial Review’ (2012) 3 Legisprudence 272, Here, the question of whether the legislature met certain procedural requirements in the enactment process is the decisive factor determining the permissibility of the infringement. 273. It could extend whether the decision was reached based on evidence (of consultation and data retrieved from also impact assessment exercises).
68 Gardbaum, ‘Comparative Political Process Theory’ (2020) 18 International Journal of Constitutional Law.
69 Anmol Jain, ‘Political Process Failure in the Indian Parliament. Studying Abuse of Power by the Chair and how it can be Addressed’ (2022) 2 Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Journal and Gardbaum (n 64). respectively.
70 E.g., Pinheiro (n 62) 315–414.
71 Victor Kazai, The Equilibrium of Parliamentary Law-Making A comparative case for the constitutional review of the legislative process (Doctoral Thesis, CEU 2023).
72 <https://www.idea.int/our-work/what-we-do/parliaments>. IDEA also supported the development of several manuals on different aspects of democratic lawmaking (Buthan, 2016–2017, Bolivia, until 2016, Peru since 2009) and participated in an international effort to build and maintain a strong working relationship with parliamentary structures (Haiti, Myanmar). The effectiveness of their assistance could also be subject of scholarly interest.
73 E.g., Mark Tushnet, The New Fourth Branch: Institutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy (Cambridge 2021)
74 Elliot Bulmer, Independent regulatory and oversight institutions, International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 19 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2019), <https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Independent-regulatory-and-oversight-fourth-branch-institutions.pdf>
75 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė, ‘The International Socialization of Post-Socialist Countries: The Role of the OSCE and the Council of Europe’ in IFSH (ed), OSCE Yearbook 2003 (Baden-Baden 2004) 365–79; Solveig Richter, ‘How Effective Is the OSCE’s Promotion of Democracy? Analytical Considerations of the Effectiveness of the Long-Term Missions in South-Eastern Europe’ in IFSH (ed), OSCE Yearbook 2008 (Baden-Baden 2009) 191–208.
76 Elaine M. Conkievich, ‘The OSCE’s Support for the Reform Process in Armenia’ in IFSH (ed), OSCE Yearbook 2004 (Baden-Baden 2005) 201.
77 Gianni Buquicchio and Simona Granata-Menghini, ‘The Venice Commission Twenty Years on. Challenge met but Challenges ahead’ in Marjolein van Roosmalen and others (eds), Fundamental Rights and Principles. Liber amicorum Pieter van Dijk (Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia 2013) 249.
78 <https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/followup/default.aspx?lang=EN>. Nevertheless, the Venice Commission usually does not assess the entire legislative process, as ODIHR does; only a dozen of the follow-ups have relevance in this regard.
79 <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/activities/follow-up/special-mechanisms.asp>, <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/activities/follow-up/sCasos.asp>
81 See e.g., Víctor Abramovich, ‘From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and Classic Tensions in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2009) 11 International Journal of Human Rights. <https://sur.conectas.org/en/massive-violations-structural-patterns/> and Par Engstrom, ‘Reconceptualising the Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2017) 2 Rev. Direito e Práx. Rio de Janeiro 1250–85.
82 IACHR, Public Policy with a Human Rights Approach (IACHR 2018).
83 IACHR, Legal Standards Related to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Development and Application (IACHR 2011).
84 Jutta Marx and Jutta Borner, Gender Mainstreaming in Latin American Parliaments: A Work in Progress (IDEA-IPU 2021).
85 IACHR, Situation of Human Rights of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Pan-Amazon Region (IACHR, 2019) and Indigenous and tribal people’s rights over their ancestral lands and natural resources: Norms and jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights system (IACHR 2010).
86 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Norte de Centroamérica y Nicaragua. Derechos económicos, sociales, culturales y ambientales de pueblos indígenas y afrodescendientes tribales (CIDH 2023).
89 E.g., Tobias Jakobi, ‘Regulating regulation? The regulatory policy of the OECD’ <https://regulation.upf.edu/exeter-12-papers/Paper%20263%20-%20Jakobi%202012%20-%20Regulating%20Regulation.pdf> (concluding that the OECD has more and more influence on the regulatory policies of its member states).
91 E.g., Knut Blind, ‘The Influence of Regulations on Innovation: A Quantitative Assessment for OECD countries’ (2012) 2 Research Policy 391–400.
92 E.g., Pedro Ivo Sebba Ramalho, André Vaz Lopes, Rodrigo Abrão Veloso Taveira, ‘Lei geral das agências: a nova reforma regulatória no Brasil’ Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania (16 Dec 2022), Plano Nacional de Política Regulatória, <https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/reg/plano-nacional-de-politica-regulatoria>, OECD, Reforma regolatória no Brasil (2022), <https://www.oecd.org/competition/reforma-regulatoria-no-brasil-f7455d72-pt.htm>.
93 Lei n° 13.848, de 25 de junho de 2019; Lei de Declaração da Atividade Econômica (Lei ° 13.874, de 20 de setembro de 2019
94 Consider, for instance, a judgment of the Brazilian Supreme Court from May 2023. It ruled that a decree (9.806/2019), issued by the then President of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro, was unconstitutional because it disregarded the principle of social participation. The norm reduced the number of directors from 96 to 23 in the National Council for the Environment, thus reducing the representation of environmental entities, states, and municipalities. The ruling argued that the decree had caused a democratic deficit and undermined the exposition of the plurality of opinions. STF, ADPF 623, Pleno, Rel. Min. Rosa Weber, j. 22/05/2023, DJe 18/07/2023.
95 Anne Peters, International organisations as constitution-shapers: lawful but sometimes illegitimate, and often futile, 8 Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law, 61 (2023).
96 See e.g., Swati Jhaveri, ‘Constitutional Desiderata for Idealised Models of Democratic Governance: Protecting Parliamentary Process and Administration’ IACL-AIDC Blog (18 May 2021) <https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/workshop-my-paper/2021/05/16constitutional-desiderata-for-idealised-models-of-democratic-governance-protecting-parliamentary-process-and-administration> and Thomas Christiansen, et al, eds, Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administration (Routledge 2023).
97 Sujit Choudhry, ‘Opposition Rights in Parliamentary Democracies’ <https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Opposition%20Rights%20in%20Parliamentary%20Democracies%20Sept%202020%20draft_0.pdf>
98 Quantinsky v. Knesset case (2017), ‘Justice Noam Sohlberg, who wrote the majority opinion, explained that the legislation process with the Finance Committee was rushed, the discussion took place close to midnight, with Knesset Members claiming they did not have time to properly examine the bill’. Yaniv Roznai, ‘Constitutional Paternalism: The Israeli Supreme Court as Guardian of the Knesset’ (2018) 51 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 422–23.
99 The newer constitutions of the Global South (the South African 1996, and most of the South American constitutions, including the failed draft constitutions of Chile of 2022 and 2023) and the newest amendments to constitutions (Guyana 2001, France 2005, 2008, Brazil 2016) tend to include more provisions guaranteeing democratic legislative process and better legislative quality. See the available different versions of texts of the following constitutions (at Constitute Project, https://constituteproject.org/): Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Czech Republic, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Switzerland, Germany, Greece, France, Portugal, Spain, Canada, United States, South American constitutions (including the Chilean drafts from 2022 and 2023), South Africa, and India. For instance, terms like meaningful consultation (Guyana 2000), effectiveness and efficiency in connection to the exercise of public power, the use of knowledge, and an implied mandate to conduct research and regulatory impact assessment during the decision-making process (the failed Chilean Constitution 2022, Guyana 2001, France 2005: use of knowledge and risk assessment in environmental matters), and an explicit mandate to do so (Swiss Constitution 1999) have also been introduced in the constitutions in the last couple of decades. The Croat constitution (for certainty since 2001) prescribes that sources need to be specified when the implementation of a law requires financial funding. The newest versions of some South American constitutions contain the expression of ‘mainstream’ or ‘mainstreaming’ gender approach ‘in plans and programs’ (Ecuador, 1998, 2008) and that of ‘gender issues’ (Guyana) and disabled persons (Ecuador 2008).
100 Thomas M Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 1 The American Journal of International Law 90; Gregory H Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 539–607.
102 E.g., Vivien Hart, ‘Constitution-making and the Right to Take Part in Public Affairs’ in Laurel E Miller and Louis Aucoin (eds), Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution-making (United States Institute of Peace Press 2010) 20–56. and Nahuel Maisley, ‘The International Right of Rights? Article 25(a) of the ICCPR as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making’ (2017) 1 European Journal of International Law 89–113.
103 Eg, Antoni Abat, Constitutional Crowdsourcing Democratising Original and Derived Constituent Power in the Network Society (Edward Elgar 2021) and Sebastian Soto, ‘Two Drafts, Three Referendums, and Four Lessons for Constitution-making from Chile’ ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 22 December 2023, <https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/two-drafts-three-referendums-and-four-lessons-constitution-making-chile>
104 See e.g., IACtHR, Yatama vs. Nicarauga, 2005 [218]; June 27 2012, Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, Caderno de Jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos No. 11: povos indígenas e tribais / Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. – San José, C.R. : Corte IDH, 2022, pp. 105–16, and Abramovich (n 78) 21.
105 Indigenous people and their involvement is of concern elsewhere, too, like in Canada and Europe. See, e.g., Shireen Morris, Mechanisms for Indigenous Representation, Participation and Consultation in Constitutional Systems. International Examples to Inspire Chile (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2021) 26 and 27.
106 See e.g., IACtHR, Kichwa indigenous people of Sarayaku vs. Ecuador (June 27 2012 <https://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf>).
107 See e.g., the decision issued by the First Chamber of Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice (May 29, 2014) concerned the right to consultation of indigenous peoples in the legislative process. ‘The Cherán Case: The Right to Consultation of Indigenous Peoples in the Legislative Process’ in Constitutional precedent in the Mexican Supreme Court. 50 leading cases (Ciudad de México, México: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 2022) 489–98.
108 N. 64. and Marrani and Turner (n 41), respectively.
109 In the book chapter on the constitutional law of Lithuania (2014), there is no mention of the decision of the Constitutional Court on the right of the local citizens to be heard when the law is about the municipal boundaries, which the Court derived from Article 33 of the Constitution (2001). When describing political rights, the author focuses on only elections and presidential matters (Art 33–36 Constitution). Vaidotas Vaičaitis, ‘The Republic of Lithuania’ in Constitutional law of the EU member states (2014) 1080. This Article, however, eads as follows: ‘citizens have the right to “participate in the governance of their State both directly and through their democratically elected representatives … ’
110 Guaranteeing Indigenous people’s rights in Latin America. Progress in the past decade and remaining challenges (UN, Santiago 2014), 24, <https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/37051/4/S1420782_en.pdf>
111 ‘If undertaken in the wrong way, consultation can create division and conflict within Indigenous communities, particularly when ‘divide and rule’ tactics are used to facilitate’ A Schilling-Vacaflor and J Eichler, ‘The Shady Side of Consultation and Compensation: “Divide-and-rule” Tactics in Bolivia’s Extraction Sector’ (2017) 6 Development and Change.
112 Marx and Borner (n 84).
113 OECD Toolkit for Mainstreaming and Implementing Gender Equality Implementing the 2015 OECD Recommendation on Gender Equality in Public Life, <https://www.oecd.org/gov/toolkit-for-mainstreaming-and-implementing-gender-equality.pdf>
114 OSCE ODIHR, Making Laws Work for Women and Men: A Practical Guide to Gender-Sensitive Legislation (2017), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/327836>
115 Gender sensitising parliaments guidelines: standards and checklists for parliamentary change, <https://www.cpahq.org/media/s20j1lws/cwp-gender-sensitizing-guidelines.pdf>
116 Gender-responsive lawmaking. Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 33 (UN Women and the Inter-Parliamentary Union 2021), <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/handbooks/2021-11/gender-responsive-law-making>
117 IACHR, Public policy with human right approach (OAS, 2018)
118 The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Volume 10, Issue 3 (2022)
120 Lei n.° 4/2018 de 9 de fevereiro, Regime jurídico da avaliação de impacto de género de atos normativos
121 See more, e.g., at <https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/countries/portugal?language_content_entity=en>
122 E.g., Olena Hankivsky, ‘Gender vs. Diversity Mainstreaming: A Preliminary Examination of the Role and Transformative Potential of Feminist Theory’ (2005) 4 Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 977–1001, Judith Squires, ‘Diversity Mainstreaming: Moving Beyond Technocratic and Additive Approaches’ 1 Femina Politika (2007) 45–56.
123 E.g., the freedom of religion, the right to form political parties, the prohibition of torture, the freedom of movement, the rights to healthcare and education, and free speech. Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg, ‘The Effect of Constitutional Gender Equality Clauses’ (October 27, 2021) 7, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3789365>.
124 ibid.
125 Julie C. Suk refers to the article of Chilton and Versteeg (n 123) in Suk (n 20) 213.
126 Chilton and Mila Versteeg (n 123) 7, 29.
127 See, e.g., Susan-Rose-Ackerman, Stefanie Egidy, and James Fowkes, Due Process of Lawmaking (Cambridge 2015).
128 OECD, ‘Stakeholder Engagement’, in Government at a Glance 2023, <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org>.
129 See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Beyond Neglect and Disrespect: Legislatures in Legal Scholarship’ in Cyril Benoît, CNRS Researcher and Olivier Rozenberg (eds), Handbook of Parliamentary Studies (Edward Elgar 2020).
130 Guidelines [6].
131 Bar Siman Tov (n 129) 151.
132 ibid.
133 Libonati explains this through the example of the constitution of Pennsylvania. Libonati (n 61) 867.
134 ‘See, e.g., Tuck v. Blackmon, 798 So. 2d 402, 404 (Miss. 2001) (refusing to enforce a provision of the Mississippi Constitution requiring that any law or statute be read in full before final passage on the basis that it is not the proper role of the courts to oversee the legislature’s internal actions).’ Libonati (n 612) 868.
135 This rule ‘prevents any evidence outside the text of the enrolled bill itself from being introduced as evidence showing constitutional violations of rules governing the process of enactment’. Libonati (n 61) 867.
136 Field, 143 U.S. at 669, Field v. Clark (neither the House nor the Senate voted on a section of a statute). Libonati (n 61). 869.
137 The Court of Justice of the State of São Paulo has a well-established case law regarding the interpretation of Article 144, Article 180, item II, and Article 191 of the State Constitution on public consultation.
138 Tímea Drinóczi and Victor Pinheiro, ‘The Normative Potential of the Principle of Public Participation in Brazil: Example from the São Paulo Court of Justice’ in B Gonçalves Fernandes and others (eds), A Constituição e o Passado. A Constituição e o Futuro. A Constituição e o que não Veio – Em Homenagem aos 35 anos da Constituição Brasileira de 1988 (Editora D’plácido 2023) 545–61.
139 For a discussion, see Heather Gerken, ‘Federalism All the Way Down’ (2010) 124 Harvard Law Review 4–74.
140 E.g., Victor Marcel Pinheiro, Devido processo legislativo: princípios, elaboração das leis ordinárias no Congresso Nacional e controle judicial (Tese de doutorado, São Paulo 2022).
141 documento (senado.leg.br)
142 See e.g., Emilio Meyer and Lucas de Souza Prates, ‘The Constitutional Interpretation of the Demarcation of Indigenous lands in the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court: Time Framework vs Indigeneity Theory’, <https://www.questionegiustizia.it/data/doc/3760/questione-giustizia-article-meyer-prates-eng.pdf>, Dailor Sartori Junior, and Carolina A Vestena, ‘Indigenous Rights and the “Marco Temporal”: Land, Violence, and Identity in front of the Brazilian Supreme Court’ VerfBlog, 2021/10/04, <https://verfassungsblog.de/indigenous-rights-and-the-marco-temporal/>) and Dailor Sartori Junior, ‘Colonialidade e o marco temporal da ocupação de terras indígenas: uma crítica à posição do Supremo Tribunal Federal’ (2016) 7 HENDU 88–100.
143 E.g., Pinheiro (n 63).
144 For a general description, see in e.g., Emílio Meyer, Constitutional Erosion in Brazil (Hart Publishing 2021).
145 S Garfield, ‘Indigenous Policy and Politics in Twentieth-Century Brazil’ (2020) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History <https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-839>.
146 E.g. Felipe de Paula, Legislative Policy in Brazil: limits and possibilities (Meijers Research Institute 2018).
147 See eg, Victor Marcel Pinheiro, Por que a análise de impacto legislativo ainda nãoé realidade no Brasil?, <https://www.conjur.com.br/2022-out-18/fabrica-leis-analise-impacto-legislativo-nao-realidade-pais> and Michelle Holperin and Katia Rocha, E se o Poder Legislativo fizesse como as agências reguladoras? <https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/colunas/mulheres-na-regulacao/e-se-o-poder-legislativo-fizesse-como-as-agencias-reguladoras-28022023>.
148 Art. 58, § 2°, item II.
149 See, e. g., Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade n° 5.683, Rel. Min. Roberto Barroso, j. 22/04/2022, 19.
150 Drinóczi and Pinheiro (n 138).
151 This constitutional amendment also created a debt ceiling that purported to prohibit any increase in public expenses for the period of 20 years. This part of the amendment is considered controversial and even unconstitutional among scholars, see e.g., Yaniv Roznai and Letícia Reggina Camargo Kreuz, ‘Conventionality control and Amendment 95/2016: A Brazilian case of unconstitutional constitutional amendment’ (2018) 2 Revista de Investigações Constitucionais 35–56.
152 E.g., Diego Werneck Arguelhes and Leandro Molhano Ribeiro, ‘Courts as the First and Only Legislative Chambers? The Brazilian Supreme Court and the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage’ (2017) 3 Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 281–99.
153 Andréa Marcondes de Freitas, ‘Unboxing the Active Role of the Legislative Power in Brazil’ (2016) 2 Brazilian Political Science Review.
154 See the arguments before the Commission on the Constitution and Justice on deciding on the Bill on Marco Temporal before the STF delivers its decision. <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2023/09/20/ccj-do-senado-adia-votacao-do-marco-temporal-para-a-proxima-semana> (20 September 2023)
155 STF – Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade: Adi 5683 RJ Xxxxx-49.2017.1.00.0000 | Jurisprudência (jusbrasil.com.br)
156 Drinóczi and Pinheiro (n 138) 545–61.
157 PORTARIA No 534, DE 13 DE ABRIL DE 2005 DOU 15-04-2005 Microsoft Word – E6D4B141.htm (sogi.com.br)
158 DECRETO DE 15 DE ABRIL DE 2005
159 STF, Emb .Dcl. Pet 3.388-RO, Pleno, Rel. Min. Roberto Barroso, j.23/10/2013
160 STF, RMS 29087, Segunda Turma, Rel. Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, j. 16/09/2014
161 Portal da Câmara dos Deputados (camara.leg.br)
162 This was noticed by the Defensora Publica-Geral on 25 May 2023. PDF 08038.015654/2021-55 (poder360.com.br), 14.
163 prop_mostrarintegra (camara.leg.br)
164 Rosa Weber anuncia retomada de julgamento sobre marco temporal de terras indígenas em 7 de junho | Política | G1 (globo.com)
165 STF derruba tese do marco temporal para a demarcação de terras indígenas, Supremo Tribunal Federal (stf.jus.br)
167 ‘A participação indígena foi tolhida na sessão. Houve a liberação de apenas 10 indígenas para acompanhar. Ou seja, querem tirar os nossos territórios e não querem que participemos da discussão sobre os nossos direitos.’ [Indigenous participation was curtailed in the session. Only 10 indigenous people were allowed to take part. In other words, they want to take away our territories and they don't want us to participate in the discussion about our rights.] (Maurício Terena), <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2023/09/20/ccj-do-senado-adia-votacao-do-marco-temporal-para-a-proxima-semana> (20 September 2023)
168 <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2023/09/20/ccj-do-senado-adia-votacao-do-marco-temporal-para-a-proxima-semana> (20 September 2023)
170 Agenda das Casas Legislativas – 28/11/2023 – Agenda do Congresso, Senado e Câmara – Congresso Nacional
171 Pinheiro (n 62).
172 ibid.
173 Drinóczi and Pinheiro (n 138).
174 We know little about the legislative process in the Americas. Scholars from the region will gather in Madrid (8–10 July 2024) at the annual Congress of the International Society of Public Law (ICON S) to discuss the challenges some selected states face when drafting, discussing, and adopting legislation. <https://www.icon-society.org/icon-s-annual-conference/>
175 E.g. Cattoni (n 62), Barbosa (n 62), and Pinheiro (n 62).