Whose ‘reality’? Discourses and hydropolitics along the Yarmouk River

ABSTRACT

This article investigates Jordanian and Syrian hydropolitical discourses around the bilateral relations along the Yarmouk River, with a focus on the decreased flow of the Yarmouk River reaching the Wahda Dam. The article examines the bilateral agreements, the hydropolitical discourses they generate, and the competing solutions they open. By situating the analysis in the broader Jordanian–Syrian relations and considerations of power asymmetries, the empirical case study of the Yarmouk River Basin contributes to both hydropolitics and environmental discourse theory literatures.

KEYWORDS:

• Hydropolitics
• Yarmouk River
• Jordan
• Syria
• discourses
• water politics

Acknowledgements

My gratitude is due to the Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL) who granted me a travel award to conduct data collection for this research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Dr Hussam Hussein is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut (AUB) since 2017. Hussam’s research focuses on hydropolitics in the cases of Jordan and of Lebanon, exploring the role of discourses in shaping water policies. He is also member of the Water Security Research Centre and of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at the University of East Anglia (UEA) since 2012, he is currently a Visiting Fellow and External Research Associate of the School of International Development at UEA.

ORCID

Hussam Hussein http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1238-1715

Notes

1 The Yarmouk River also forms part of the borders between Jordan and Israel.

2 This is in comparison to the Hasbani (springing in Lebanon with historic annual discharge of 157 MCM), the Banyas (springing in Syria at 125 MCM per annum) and the Dan (springing inside Israel at 258 MCM per annum).

3 The five main tributaries of the Yarmouk River in Syria are al-Zaidi, Abu al-Dhahab, al-Harir, al-Alan and al-Raqad (EtanaFiles 2015, p. 7). The sixth, al-Shallaleh, is inside Jordan.

4 The canal also receives water from the other wadis, rivers and tributaries of the Jordan River (Nortcliff et al. 2011, p. 406). Built at the beginning of the 1960s, the King Abdullah Canal, known as the East Ghor Main Canal until 1987, is the largest irrigation canal system in Jordan and runs for 110.5 km in the Jordan Valley close to the foothills and parallel to the Jordan River (FAO 2009).

5 Water use in the two countries is very different. In 2011, for example, the total agricultural water use in Jordan amounted to 58% of total water use, around 500 MCM a year. In that same year, the municipal sector used around 37% of the total water used, almost 350 MCM, and industrial use accounted for 5%, about 37 MCM. It is noteworthy that direct agriculture is responsible for around 3% of the national GDP (but is magnified by sectors dependent on it, adding up to 27% of GDP), industry for around 30%, and services, including tourism, for around 67% (IFC 2012, p. 5). In Syria, on the other hand, in 2008 agriculture consumed about 87% of the water supply, the domestic sector about 9%, and industries about 4% (Salman and Mualla 2008). Agriculture in Syria played an important role in the national economy, particularly due to Syria's approach to food security through food sufficiency. Nevertheless, agriculture in Syria has been strongly criticised for not being efficient, and for its mismanagement of water resources (Barnes 2009, ARK 2016).

6 According to the 1994 Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty, Israel is entitled to 25 MCM of Yarmouk waters per year: 12 MCM to be received between May 15–October 15, and 13 MCM during the rest of the year. The balance of the flow at Adassiya is used by Jordan. Additionally, Jordan is entitled to 10 MCM per year in exchange for the water that Israel is allowed to pump from the wadi bed in Wadi Araba. Jordan is also entitled to 50 MCM per year under the clause ‘Additional Water’ of the Peace Treaty – although it is unclear who is responsible to cover the costs for producing this additional water. In addition, Jordan is allowed to store in Lake Tiberias whatever winter flow Jordan does not divert into its King Abdullah Canal. The amount stored will thus be delivered to Jordan on request (during the dry months).

7 I do not focus on the non-mainstream, emerging counter-discourses by NGOs and international organisations, but rather on the official Jordanian, governmentally sanctioned and dominant one. This is because, as shown by Hussein (2016: chapter 7), these non-mainstream ones do not influence the implementation of policies.

8 This is because the Yarmouk River is part of the Jordan River Basin.

9 From a geopolitical perspective, the Syrian government perceives the Jordanian government to be working outside of Syria's geopolitical alliances. In fact, in the past decades, the Jordanian government has been a close ally of the US and signed a peace agreement with Israel, while the Syrian government has been closer to the Russian and Iranian governments. This geopolitical division has fed into the conflictive relationship over water cooperation between the two countries.