Turkey’s Evolving Political Terrain: A Study of Post-2016 Coup Relations Involving Religious and Sociopolitical Movements

ABSTRACT

This article undertakes an examination of the pro-government İsmailağa movement and the Adnan Oktar movement in Turkey, delving into the nuances of their affiliations with the AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) and, specifically, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan following the coup attempt in 2016. It seeks to address the following questions: How did the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey impact the dynamics shaping the AK Party government’s interactions with religious movements such as İsmailağa and the Adnan Oktar movement, and what factors contributed to the intricacies and shifts observed in power dynamics within this framework? Furthermore, what potential ramifications do these transformations entail for political and religious influence within the nation? The thesis posits that despite Erdoğan’s reliance on religious movements as a voting bloc and a critical element in efforts to fill the void left by the exclusion of the Fethullah Gülen movement from governmental positions, religious movements do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy as they did prior to the coup attempt. Moreover, Erdoğan has adopted a more circumspect and distrustful stance, not only toward dissenting movements but also toward pro-AK Party movements. By concentrating on İsmailağa and the Adnan Oktar movement, we can discern Erdoğan’s disposition toward religious movements and the shift that has manifested in the relationship between the government and religious movements. This article draws upon a diverse array of sources, including deliberations from Turkey’s Grand Assembly, to glean insights into the interactions between the government and religious movements.

KEYWORDS:

• AK Party
• Erdoğan
• İ̇smailağa
• Kuytul
• religious movements

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Religious movements represent the basic social form of interaction between religion and society. Religious movements, which constitute a special form of social movements, differ structurally from other movements in terms of their content and function. Sociologically, the concept of religious groups refers to religious formations that differ within a society. See İsmail Kaya, “Tarikatların Dini Gruplar Tupolojisindeki yeri ve sosyal,” Danişname 1 (2020): 56.

² Esen Kirdiş, “Same Context, Different Political Paths: Two Islamic Movements in Turkey,” International Area Studies Review 19, no. 3 (2016): 255.

³ Ibid., 259.

⁴ Ceren Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AK PARTY (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 277.

⁵ Süleymancılık, is a Turkish-based Naqshbandi-oriented community whose name is drawn from Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, whom the community describes as “master.” In the early 1990s, the group included an estimated two million members in Turkey. The Suleymanists are presently divided under the leadership of two brothers, both of whom are Suleyman’s grandsons: Ahmet Arif Denizolgun, a former minister in the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) administration, and Mehmet Beyazit Denizolgun, an AK Party founder. The Suleymanists also have branches in the United States and Germany. On the Süleymancilar see Mehmet A. Kirman, Süleymancılık, ortaya çikişi, gelişim evreleri ve günümüzdeki durumu [Süleymancılık, its emergence, stages of development and current situation], Demokrasi Platformu [Democracy’s platform] (Spring 2006); Ferda Balancar, Türkiye’de Tarikatlar ve Siyaset [Politics and religious orders in Turkey] (London: Democratic Progress Institute 2019), 89–92; İsmail Çağlar, “Tevarüs edilmemiş gelenek: Süleymancilik” [Inherited tradition: Süleymancılık]. Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi 2, no. 2 (2016): 1–9.

⁶ A pro-Iranian group also known as “Meşalenciler,” which is closely connected to the Turkish intelligence agency MİT, has been stealthily penetrating the security and foreign policy apparatus of the Turkish government, shaping policies that nurture jihadist views and are transforming Turkey into a rogue nation. Members of this group have been planted in key positions in the government and wield considerable influence with regard to shaping policies and promoting radical views. They are also active in Europe, and Beşir Atalay, a former interior minister who has been identified as the senior pro-Iranian figure in the Turkish government, is a very close friend of Şengöz, the leader of the group. See “Radical Malatyalılar Group Wields Considerable Influence in Turkey’s Governance,” https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/01/radical-stealthy-group-the-malatyalilar-wields-influence-in-turkeys-governance/ (accessed August 12, 2021).

⁷ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği 27, Dönem 4, Yasama yılı 105, Birleşim 17 Temmuz 2021 Cumartesi, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=23621&P5=H&PAGE1=134&PAGE2=&web_user_id=20244616 (accessed September 22, 2021).

⁸ Ahmet E. Öztürk, “An Alternative Reading of Religion and Authoritarianism: The New Logic Between Religion and State in the AK Party’s New Turkey,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 90.

⁹ Şeriban Alkış, “Ayşe Çavdar ile söyleşi,” Sol Siyasi Dergi, Kış, 2021, https://www.yolsiyasidergi.org/ayse-cavdar-ile-soylesi-tarikatlarin-verdigi-zarar-siyasallasmalarindan-degil-bu-siyasallasmayi-denetleyecek-mekanizmalarin-var-olmamasindan-kaynaklaniyor-bu-mekanizmaya-dair-zihni-hazirlik (accessed August 18, 2021).

¹⁰ According to Oya Ersoy, the Menzil community’s members fill this gap in the Ministries of Justice, Health and the Interior: Türkiye Büyük Mıllet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı 27. Dönem 4. Yasama Yılı 105. Birleşim 17 Temmuz 2021 Cumartesi, 134. https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=23621&P5=H&PAGE1=134&PAGE2=&web_user_id=20244616 (accessed September 22, 2021).

¹¹ Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey, 271.

¹² “Dini sosyal teşekküller geleneksel dini kültürel oluşumlar ve yeni dini yonelişler” [Religious Social Organizations, Traditional Religious Cultural Formations and New Religious Trends], Diyanet. https://mk0medyascopetblqooo.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/diyanet-rapor-1–1.pdf (accessed October 10, 2022).

¹³ For more on these various religious groups and AK Party, see “İçişleri, adalet ve sağlik bakanliklari Menzil Tarikatinin elinde” [The Ministries of Interior, Justice and Health are in the hands of the Menzil Tariqa], Sözcü, May 27, 2021, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/icisleri-adalet-ve-saglik-bakanliklari-menzil-tarikatinin-elinde-1946504/ (accessed October 10, 2022).

¹⁴ Öztürk, “An Alternative Reading of Religion and Authoritarianism,” 93.

¹⁵ Through their research, Gürses, Fox, and Öztürk have empirically demonstrated that the rule of the AK Party has been a pivotal factor in fostering the consolidation of the religious segment of Turkish society in alignment with the AK Party, while concurrently prompting the secular sections to coalesce around opposition factions. As a result, a marked polarization has emerged within the nation. This phenomenon derives from a foundational assumption wherein hegemonic religious policies exhibit crosscutting effects that paradoxically amplify and diminish levels of religiosity. See: Mehmet Gurses, Jonathan Fox and A. Erdi Ozturk, “State and Faith: The Supply-Side Theory of Religion and the Case of Turkey,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2023): 1–21, doi: 10.1080/14683857.2023.2187130.

16 In the limited academic literature on Adnan Oktar’s movement, a discourse has emerged concerning its appropriate classification, which involves the question of whether it should be characterized as an enterprise (Solberg, “The Mahdi Wears Armani”), a cult (Çetin, 2016, 116–32; White, 2012), or a core constituent of the spectrum of new religious movements (NRM) (Tiryaki, 2021). The attributes and traits of NRM have been extensively scrutinized in works such as Lewis (2008) and “The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements” (2008). Based on the framework of NRM classification, I am inclined to identify this movement as a “religious movement.” In the context of the Turkish media, Oktar and his adherents are frequently portrayed as a religious community under the guidance of Adnan Oktar, especially in the first years after the movement’s establishment. Conversations with his adherents in the past have made it clear that he is viewed as the leader of a religious movement. He has always been referred as “Hoca,” covertly implying that he is the Mahdi (the Messiah in Islam).

¹⁷ Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve slogan: Türkiye’de İslami oluşumlar (Istanbul: Metis Kitap, 1990), 254.

¹⁸ Efrat Aviv, “Erdoğan and Religious Movements after the 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey: The Case of Adnan Oktar,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 1 (2022): 84–5.

¹⁹ Anne R. Solberg, The Mahdi Wears Armani: An Analysis of the Harun Yahya Enterprise (Stockholm: Södertörns University Press, 2013), 15.

²⁰ Yusuf S. İnanç, “From Survival to Revival: Transformation of Khalidi Community in Turkey (1925–1970)” (MA thesis, Central European University, 2023), 85.

²¹ İnanç, “From Survival to Revival,” 84.

²² Regarding the role of women in the İsmaişağa, see Fatma Z. Özyağli, “Examining the Formation of Women’s Identity in a Naqshi Community: The Case of İsmailağa” (MA thesis, Humanities and Social Sciences of Istanbul Şehir University, 2018).

²³ İnanç, “From Survival to Revival,” 81.

²⁴ Ibid., 83.

²⁵ Kristin Fabbe and Efe M. Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall: Religious Groups and Loyalty-Signaling in Erdoğan’s Turkey,” in Enemies Within: The Global Politics of Fifth Columns, edited by Harris Mylonas and Scott Radnitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 260.

²⁶ In the 1990s, under the pseudonym Harun Yahya, Adnan Oktar published numerous antisemitic books as well as an antisemitic journal, Rönesans [Renaissance], which was published between 1991 and 1992, and an antisemitic newspaper, Son Mesaj [Last Message]. Oktar made a name for himself by penning antisemitic, anti-Freemasonry, anti-Communist tracts laden with conspiracy theories, which culminated in his 1987 book Yahudilik ve Masonluk [Judaism and Freemasonry]. This book asserted that Jews and Freemasons had surreptitiously permeated state institutions in Turkey with the intention of undermining the spiritual, religious, and ethical principles held by the Turkish populace and the ultimate objective of degrading them to a state resembling that of animals. Nearly 100,000 copies of the book were printed, but soon after the book’s appearance, Oktar was prosecuted in Turkey on charges of promoting a theocratic revolution. In 1995, BAV130 distributed its first book, which was entitled Soykırım Yalanı [The Holocaust Lie] and sparked controversy; however, this book is still available in Turkey. Essentially, this book endeavors to “disprove” the occurrence of the Holocaust and the tragic deaths of six million Jews. As articulated by Bali, the book, which was disseminated in Germany, espouses an ideology reminiscent of the viewpoints propagated by neo-Nazi entities in Europe. See Rıfat N. Bali, Model Citizens of the State: The Jews of Turkey during the Multi-Party Period (Lanham, MD: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2012), 129.

²⁷ Refah Partisi, which was founded by Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan in 1983, was one among the political entities established during that time. However, it faced closure by the military junta in 1998. Subsequently, in the same year, it resurfaced under the new name of Fazilet Partisi. Regrettably, it ceased operations once again in 2001. On Oktar’s relations with the Welfare Party, see Rusen Cakir, “İbretlik bir olay: Adnan Oktar davası,” https://medyascope.tv/2021/01/11/ibretlik-bir-olay-adnan-oktar-davasi/ (accessed August 1, 2023).

²⁸ Aviv, “Erdoğan and Religious Movements after the 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey,” 89–90.

²⁹ Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall,” 259.

³⁰ Aviv, “Erdoğan and Religious Movements after the 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey,” 90.

³¹ Gündem Haberleri, “Adnan Hoca’nın kitabina vali emri,” https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/adnan-hoca-nin-kitabina-vali-emri-5886011 (accessed June 12, 2023).

³² Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 88’inci Birleşim, 12 Nisan 2007 Perşembe, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/Tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c153/tbmm22153088.pdf (accessed June 12, 2023).

³³ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_Tutanaklari.goruntule?pTutanakId=1454 (accessed June 12, 2023).

³⁴ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Dönem 22, Cilt 119, Yasama yılı 4, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 99’uncu Birleşim, 9 Mayıs 2006, Salı,” https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/Tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c119/tbmm22119099.pdf (accessed June 12, 2023).

³⁵ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Tutanak Dergisi, 99’uncu, Birleşim, 9, Dönem 22, Cilt 119, Yasama yılı 4, Mayıs 2006, Salı, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/Tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c119/tbmm22119099.pdf (accessed June 12, 2023).

³⁶ Gündem Haberleri, “Adnan Hoca’nın kitabina vali emri,” https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/adnan-hoca-nin-kitabina-vali-emri-5886011 (accessed June 12, 2023).

³⁷ Mahmut Hamsici, “Adnan Oktar davası: Duruşmanın ilk günü neler yaşandı, Oktar savunmasında neler söyledi?” BBC, September 17, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-49725234.

³⁸ İhsan Yılmaz, Erdoğan Shipoli and Mustafa Demir, “Securitization of Islamic Groups and Parties,” in Securitization and Authoritarianism (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 98.

³⁹ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi,34’üncü Birleşim, 12 Aralık 2021, Pazar, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/Tutanak/donem27/yil5/ham/b03401h.htm (accessed July 1, 2023).

⁴⁰ “Oktarcı çıkmış bakanlığa atanmıştı: Murat Atik hakkında yeni gelişme,” https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/oktarci-cikmis-bakanliga-atanmisti-murat-atik-hakkinda-yeni-gelisme-1897913 (accessed July 1, 2023).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Efrat Aviv, “The İsmailağa Community and its Relationship with the AK Party,” Democracy and Security 14, no. 3 (2018): 281.

⁴³ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği 27, Dönem 4, Yasama, yılı 3, Birleşim 7 Ekim 2019, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=80894 (accessed July 1, 2023).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği, 27, Dönem 1, Yasama Yılı 9, Birleşim 24 Temmuz 2018, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d27/c001/tbmm27001009gnd.pdf (accessed July 1, 2023).

⁴⁶ 0https://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/adnan-oktardan-dikkat-ceken-Erdoğan-hamlesi-226950 (accessed July 1, 2023). More examples of tweets appear in “Adnan Oktar’ın Kediciklerinden İlginç Paylaşımlar,” Gerçek Taraf, January 30, 2018, https://www.gercektaraf.com/gundem/adnan-oktarinkediciklerinden-ilginc-paylasimlar-h4928.html (accessed July 1, 2023). More photos of Erdoğan and his wife were published even before Oktar’s arrest. See https://www.turkiyeninkocyigitleri.com/adnan-oktarin-arkadaslarinin-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogana-hukumetimize-olan-destegi/ (accessed July 1, 2023).

⁴⁷ Sohbelter, “Adnan Oktar: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ı ölümüne destekledik,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3gLa8zmJmE (accessed July 1, 2023).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ “Adnan Oktar savunma yaptı: Tayyip Bey’i yatımızda gezdirdik,” Birgün, September 17, 2019, https://www.birgun.net/haber/adnan-oktar-savunma-yapti-tayyip-bey-i-yatimizdagezdirdik −268,902.

⁵² http://www.devletimizyayindayiz.com/capsler (accessed July 1, 2021).

⁵³ https://www.turkiyeninkocyigitleri.com/adnan-oktarin-arkadaslarinin-sayin-receptayyip-erdogana-hukumetimize-olan-destegi/ (accessed July 1, 2021).

⁵⁴ See http://www.İsmailağacamii.com/cumhurbaskanimizi-tebrik-ve-dua-ediyoruz (accessed November 24, 2015).

⁵⁵ For example, Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, Minister of Transportation Adil Karaismailoğlu, Minister of Industry and Technology Mustafa Varank, AK Party Deputy Chairman Numan Kurtulmuş, Future Party [Gelecek Partisi] Chairman Ahmet Davutoğlu, Great Unity Party [Büyük Birlik Partisi] Chairman Mustafa Destici, Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gül, President Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdoğan and others were among those who attended the funeral. See https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye −61,921,303 (accessed July 2, 2022)

⁵⁶ “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu’na o sözlerle veda etti,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 0I9mE9wC9FQ, 0:38 (accessed July 2, 2022).

⁵⁷ Aviv, “The İsmailağa Community,” 286.

⁵⁸ Nevertheless, within the İsmailağa community, disagreements concerning the community’s ties with Erdoğan, and the AK Party have split the community. Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü seems to be anti-Erdoğan, while others, such as Hasan Kılıç, support him. Praise has been provided by supporters at the local level; on December 2, 2014, Adem Şener, the community representative in Sakarya, thanked the AK Party for its assistance with local development: “Thanks to the AK Party these obstacles were removed. They made our area flourish … we assisted this government, which eased things on us with our prayers. As long as this government keeps on this path, I will keep my prayers as a man and as a hoca.” In contrast, in the September 2014 issue of the Marifet magazine, a monthly science and culture publication produced by the Marifet Association (Marifet Derneği), which is related to Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü, a story titled “Whose New Turkey Is It?” harshly criticized senior members of the AK Party government. The article was written by Muhammed Keskin, who is the chairperson of the Marifet Association and the son-in-law of Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu as well as an influential leader in the community. Keskin is known for his critical attitude toward the AK Party government, especially regarding policies regarding the Kurdish issue. In other cases, anti-AK Party or anti-Erdoğan incidents have occurred within İsmailağa. The AK Party itself did not respond to the article as Marifet’s readership is limited, and the article reflected an internal rift between two parts of the community that AK Party members preferred to avoid. Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü criticized the AK Party’s use of Mahmut Ustanosmanoğlu before the 2015 election and requested that the party cease exploiting the name, picture, and messages of Mahmut Efendi for political purposes. Criticism had also been directed toward the AK Party by Saadettin Ustaosmanoğlu, who charged in a televised interview for CNN Türk in 2010 that the AK Party was hypocritical since it failed to reveal its real desire for Sharia rule publicly, despite the fact that the AK Party was indebted to İsmailağa’s voters and the community’s help. The article in Marifet was later published and used against the AK Party in Gülen publications and subsequently shared by secular media outlets as well, thus conveying Keskin’s criticism beyond conservative readership in Turkey. Aviv, “The İsmailağa Community,” 287–8.

⁵⁹ The political ideology and movement founded by Erbakan, Millî Görüş (National View), has called for the strengthening of Islamic values in Turkey and turning away from what Erbakan perceived to be the negative influence of the Western world in favor of closer relations with Muslim countries. Erbakan’s political views have led to conflict with the core principle of secularism in Turkey, culminating in his removal from office. Based on this Millî Görüş ideology, Erbakan was the founder and leader of several prominent Islamic political parties in Turkey from the 1960s to the 2010s, namely, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) (1970–1971), the Millî Selâmet Partisi (National Salvation Party) (1972–1980), the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) (1983–1998), the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) (1998–2001), and the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) (2001–). On Millî Görüş, see Hakan Yavuz, Modernleşen müslümanlar: Nurcular, Nakşiler, Milli Görüş ve AK Parti (İstanbul: kitapyayınevi, 2003).

⁶⁰ Türkiye Büyük Mıllet Meclisi genel kurul tutanaği 27. Dönem 4. Yasama Yılı 105. Birleşim 17/Temmuz/2021 Cumartesi, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=23621&P5=H&PAGE1=134&PAGE2=&web_user_id=20244616 (accessed July 2, 2022).

⁶¹ Esra Çanlı, “CHP’li Belediyeye “bağış” yasak ama cemaatlere değil! https://canakkalegundem.net/2020/04/05/chpli-erkekten-cifte-standart-tepkisi-chpli-belediyeye-bagis-yasak-ama-cemaatlere-degil/ (accessed July 2, 2022).

⁶² Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği 27, Dönem 3, Yasama yılı 81, Birleşim, 10 Nisan 2020 Cuma, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4 = 23439&P5=H&PAGE1 = 70&PAGE2=&web_user_id = 20244616 (accessed July 2, 2022).

⁶³ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği 27, Dönem 5, Yasama yılı 89, Birleşim 11 Mayıs 2022 Çarşamba, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4 = 23735&P5=H&page1 = 55&page2 = 55&web_user_id = 20244600 (accessed July 2, 2022).

⁶⁴ Türkiye Büyük Mıllet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği 27, Dönem 4, Yasama yılı 40, Birleşim 26 Aralık 2020 Cumartesi, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4 = 23533&P5=H&PAGE1 = 104&PAGE2=&web_user_id = 20244616 (accessed July 2, 2022).

⁶⁵ Purçu refers to the incident in which Yusuf Ziya Gümüşel, the founder of the Hiranur Vakfı and one of the leaders of İsmailağa community, was accused of marrying his six-year-old daughter to a 29-year-old man from the İsmailağa community in 2004. See https://www.evrensel.net/haber/476137/İsmailağa-cemaatine-bagli-hiranur-vakfi-kurucusu-yusuf-ziya-gumusele-cinsel-istismar-suclamasi (accessed July 27, 2023).

⁶⁶ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanaği, Yasama yılı 6, Birleşim 32, 8 Aralık 2022 Perşembe, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid = 111784 (accessed July 27, 2023).

⁶⁷ Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall,” 257.

⁶⁸ “Tbmm genel kurulu toplandi,” https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Haber/Detay?Id=217b613a-0a6e-4b97-be81-01874c77aa36 (accessed July 31, 2023).

⁶⁹ “FETÖ Letter to the International Charity Organizations,” https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Haber/HaberArsiviDetay/2979 (accessed July 31, 2023).

⁷⁰ Mehmet A. Büyükkara, “Dinî grup yapilarinda dine ilişkin muhtemel anlama ve temsil sorunlari,” https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/153807.

⁷¹ On Furkan Vakfı, see Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall,” 261–2; and Efrat Aviv “Critically Assessing the Contours of Relations between the AK Party and Islamic Movements after the July 15 Coup Attempt: The Furkan Vakfi Case,” Middle Eastern Studies 59, no. 4 (2023): 582–96.

⁷² Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall,” 259.

⁷³ Yılmaz, Shipoli and Demir, “Securitization of Islamic Groups and Parties,” 97.

⁷⁴ Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall,” 260.

⁷⁵ Yılmaz, Shipoli and Demir, “Securitization of Islamic Groups and Parties,” 109; and Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, “When Fifth Columns Fall,” 258.

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Notes on contributors

Efrat Aviv

Efrat Aviv is an Associate professor in the Department of General History at Israel’s Bar Ilan University. Her postdoctoral research was conducted at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA where she is currently a research fellow). She was a fellow at the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism from 2012 to 2015. She is an expert in Turkish religious movements, but she also writes about Israeli-Turkish relations, Antisemitism in Turkey, and Ottoman-Turkish Jewry.