ABSTRACT
This article explores the significance of popular religious agents in Iran, focusing on the maddāḥān (eulogists) and their role in the Ashura processions, in the context of Iran’s ethnic minorities, looking into the unique case-study of Khuzestan. To comprehend the contemporary relevance of Ashura, this study utilizes social media, employing a hermeneutical approach to videography. The maddāḥān played a pivotal role in promoting a unifying Shiʿi and revolutionary ethos through their meticulously crafted videos and their widespread dissemination, fostering a sense of solidarity with the Islamic republic and its message of resilience. Their contribution was significant among ethnic minorities, given their numerous grievances toward the regime. The maddāḥān also played a vital role in creating space for local expressions of mourning, enhancing a unique Khuzestani identity deeply tied to its Arab tradition, but also open to multiple influences. Their emotionally charged sessions and direct engagement with the people contributed to a strong sense of connections between the maddāḥān and their extensive online audience. This popular appeal complements the established clerical authority structure but also poses a significant challenge to the formal religious hierarchy, as the maddāḥān’s approach resonates more closely with the lived experiences and cultural realities of their followers.
Introduction
In the month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar, the markets in the Arab cities of Khuzestan province, like other areas in Iran, feature black clothing and black fabrics. During the Ashura processions, which mark the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn in the Battle of Karbala (680), the participants stand side by side, adorning a keffiyeh on their waists or necks, raising their hands, and dancing in the local style known as “chelab.” The mourners gather in a semi-circle leaning forward, while moving the right hand like a pendulum from down to up, hitting the palm of the right hand on the chest when standing and moving the right leg toward the right side in a clockwise direction.Footnote1
In Khuzestan and throughout Iran, the maddāḥān (eulogists and praisers) who lead the commemoration sessions play a significant role in reviving the narrative of Karbala. They embody the continuity of popular religious practices in Shiʿa Islam while also serving as potential agents for propagating a revolutionary interpretation of Ashura based on an activist understanding of Imam Husayn’s ethos of sacrifice. Through their elaborate performances, which include vocal and occasionally instrumental eulogies, the maddāḥān assume a crucial role in advancing Husayn’s legacy, fostering both its traditional and contemporary interpretations.Footnote2 Their powerful and engaging presentations resonate deeply with the faithful, contributing to the perpetuation of the Karbala narrative and its relevance in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic has actively promoted and expanded mourning rituals, extending beyond the traditional observances during Muharram and Ramadan. It has introduced additional ceremonies honoring the Imams, along with regular weekly mourning programs conducted in schools, universities and government institutions.Footnote3 Moreover, the regime has capitalized on the social importance of eulogists within Shiʿi popular culture to imbue a contemporary revolutionary interpretation of the Shiʿi ethos of endurance and self-sacrifice.Footnote4 Despite not being officially recognized within the established religious authority, these religious singers are integral to popular Shiʿi Islam, operating within and outside formal structures.Footnote5
Wael B. Hallaq described “the contemporary dislocation” between two concepts of authority, one emanating from the state and the other represented by Islamic jurists, in their position as interpreters of the law of God.Footnote6 Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke noted the use of new channels for religious expression, as intellectuals and political activists lay claim to religious authority.Footnote7 In the case of Iran, the question of who speaks for Islam is even more perplexing, due to the inter-connectivity between the political and religious realms and the unique place of the lower levels of religious protagonists that are tied to the state but also derive their authority from the people. Scholarly debate over the relationship between higher and lower culture holds important ramifications for this study due to the interconnectivity between religious hierarchy, society stratification, and cultural expression. Existing studies on the question of leadership and authority during Iran’s Islamic revolution focused on the top revolutionary figures and their ideological contribution.Footnote8 Carrying this research into the Islamic Republic, scholars discussed the position of the Supreme Leader and the roles of the revolutionary institutions.Footnote9 This continued a similar scholarly interest on the significance of the mujtahids in Iran and in the Twelver Shiʿi communities in the transition to the modern era.Footnote10
Within this growing interest in popular Islam there are only few studies that focus on informal or popular religious agents in Iran, including the maddāḥān, and that explore their relationship with “the people.” This included Saeid Golkar’s research, which discusses the bureaucratization of the seminary system under the Islamic Republic, expanding on the Basij and its role in propagating the revolutionary ideals and suppressing dissent. Nikola B. Schahgaldian’s study outlines the regime’s religious organs, as well as its vast network of clerics, providing an overview of the hierarchy of the clerical establishment until the mid-1980s, including its lower levels. A more in-depth discussion on non-establishment voices exists in scholarship on the reformist movement. Azam Torrab’s Performing Islam is also significant for the current study not only in its focus on gender and popular practices, but in providing an understanding to the broader question of rituals under the Islamic republic, which became a site for disputation and exchange among the individual, society, and the political-religious sphere.Footnote11 Unraveling the complex relationship between diverse Islamic voices within Iran becomes even more intricate when examining ethnic minorities, due to their complex notion of identity.
For the people of Khuzestan Shiʿa Islam, with its beliefs, rituals, and clerical leadership created an important common basis with the broader Iranian society, that is predominantly Shiʿi (about 90% of the population). The revolution and the creation of the Islamic republic provided further impetus for defining relations between Iran’s multi-ethnic society on a religious basis. Iran was only a starting point for a pan-Islamic revolution that would incorporate the entire Muslim world and mitigate sectarian and ethnic boundaries. Consequently, Shiʿi ethnic minorities were potentially more inclined to identify with the Islamic republic than other ethnic groups of Sunni origins. Nevertheless, Khuzestan with its majority Arab population, its distinct history, and marginalized position raised questions over relations with the Islamic state, with its tightly controlled authoritarian nature.
This article explores the transmission of religious notions within the Islamic Republic, to the people and from the people, departing from the prevailing elitist approach to the study of authority in the Shiʿi world. The study focuses on the role of maddāḥān in disseminating Shiʿa and revolutionary ideals but also in expressing some level of agency, looking into the case-study of Khuzestan. To what extent did eulogists in Khuzestan reflect local voices of their region and what was the broader significance of their role in the context of the Islamic republic’s relation with its Arab minority?
To examine the contemporary cultural manifestations of Ashura, this study relies on social media as a primary source for documenting, distributing, manipulating, and enhancing these practices.Footnote12 One of the main sources for this project are YouTube videos and the popular Iranian video-sharing service, known as Aparat. The videos documented these popular practices, but also became a new tool in themselves, transcending the physical and geographical boundaries of the maddāḥān. Expanding the impact of the eulogists who traditionally represented a very local existence, these videos succeeded in bringing the voice of the maddāḥān to a growing Iranian and even international audience. The maddāḥān created a perceived reality by adding effects and images and by framing the videos to advance their agenda. Many have their own Instagram pages.
The present study focuses on prominent maddāḥān in Khuzestan, who have a clear media profile. These eulogists possess a substantial viewership and demonstrate distinctive attributes related to style and indigenous cultural elements. The study also selected videos that reflect a synthesis of cultural influences from Iran, the surrounding region, and a more global context. The methodology incorporates a multidimensional approach to navigate the realm of videography in the context of religious rituals. The analytical process entails examining sequential patterns and the interplay between different elements within a specific composition. An additional challenge lies in deciphering the underlying intentions behind the actions of the eulogists as they lead the ceremony and capture the video footage.Footnote13 The study sheds light on the intricate relationship between videography and religious rituals, unraveling the nuances of their interaction and providing a comprehensive understanding of this emerging field. Videography enables the researcher to view the ritual multiple times and to focus on a particular component. It also provides accessibility to numerous rituals in contrast with fieldwork which tends to be limited to minimal locations. However, video data is not an identical image of reality but a particular reproduction and transformation of the ritual which provides a segment of the occurrence within a particular setting. Utilizing a hermeneutical approach to video analysis, the article uncovers the interpretations and adaptations of these rituals that occur in the process of creating and producing the videos.Footnote14
In April 2014, commemorating the birthday of Fatima al-Zahra, the wife of Imam ʿAli, the first cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and the most revered figure in Shiʿi Islam, Supreme Leader ʿAli Khamenei dedicated his speech to the maddāḥān and to the Islamic propagandists (mobaleghīn), speaking about their grave responsibility in the present time.Footnote15 Khamenei was well-aware of the value of the maddāḥān, their numbers estimated at several thousands, in propagating the messages of the regime to the masses. Yet he was worried about “losing this opportunity and getting it wrong” as these religious agents may undertake their own course in advancing the revolutionary message to the masses. This gap between popular and official religion existed in different faiths throughout history. Yet, the case of the Islamic Republic is unique due to the revolutionary take on the question of authority, the regime’s centralist nature, the existence of multiple religious actors, and the continuous debate over the fusion between popular Islam and Persian culture.
The people of Khuzestan
For the people of Khuzestan Shiʿa Islam, with its beliefs, rituals, and clerical leadership created an important common basis with the broader Iranian society. Yet, Iran’s dominant Persian legacy challenged the revolution’s Islamic universal message and played a part in the Islamic republic’s relations with its ethnic minorities. Moreover, alongside its cross-sectarian ethos, the revolution itself was also rooted in Shiʿi Islam, within a new reading to questions of authority, governance, and traditional rituals. Consequently, Shiʿi ethnic minorities, particularly in Khuzestan and in the Azeri areas of Iran known as Iranian Azerbaijan, were potentially more inclined to identify with the Islamic republic than other ethnic minorities of Sunni origins. Nevertheless, the ethnic makeup of Khuzestan, its distinct history, and marginalized position raised questions over relations with the Islamic state, with its tightly controlled authoritarian nature.
While the “father” of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, sought to mitigate Iran’s Persian identity linked to its pre-Islamic past, the enduring cultural heritage of Iran proved resilient. Since the 1990s, Iran witnessed a revival of Persian culture evident in various forms such as art, music, literature, and festivals, raising questions over the place of ethnic minorities within Iran’s dominant culture and national discourse.Footnote16 In an effort to reconcile Iran’s Islamic and Persian identities, Mansour Arzi, one of Iran’s renowned eulogists, endorsed the Nowruz, linking the Persian New Year to Fatima’s legacy.Footnote17 Additionally, Ayatollah Khamenei himself conferred legitimacy upon Nowruz, proclaiming: “Islam took NowRuz and gave it human, Islamic, and spiritual content.”Footnote18
Iran’s strong affinity with its Persian culture continued to play a part in the Islamic republic’s relations with its ethnic minorities. While Khuzestan shares Iran’s Shiʿi ethos, the region’s complex relationship with the state is shaped by the regime’s fluid alignment with Islamic, Shiʿi, Persian, or broader Iranian identities. This interplay between evolving concepts of collective identity at the state level, within Iranian society, and within this multi-ethnic province, contributes to the intricacy of Khuzestan’s association with the state. This dynamic will be further examined in the subsequent discussion.
Bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf, Khuzestan, located in the southwest of Iran, is an area rich in oil and agricultural products. It is inhabited by several ethnic groups, including indigenous Persians, Iranian Arab tribes, the Bakhtiari, Behbahani, and Luri, as well as the Qashqai and Afshari tribes, many of whom are Shiʿi. Within the province, there is a significant presence of an Iranian Arab population, particularly in the province’s major cities. Khuzestan, land of the Khuzi people, was governed for short periods by local rulers including the Shiʿi dynasty of the Mushaʿshaʿ, established by Sayyid Muhammad b. Fallah during the fifteenth century.Footnote19 The rise of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) with its strong centralized state put an end to the Mushaʿshaʿ’s independence. Shah Ismaʿil (1501–1524), founder of the Safavid dynasty, did not eliminate the Mushaʿshaʿ entity, but subdued its local leaders who became vassals under the control of the Safavid state.Footnote20
Khuzestan became known as Arabistan from the sixteenth century until 1925, due to the migration of several Arab tribes from Ottoman lands to the province. Nevertheless, despite its unique ethnic makeup, Khuzestan was under Iranian imperial control and Persian cultural influence over centuries. The influx of Arab tribes who converted to Shiʿism enhanced the Arab identity of part of the province, while other areas where Iranian and Turkish tribes were present maintained their own language and group membership. In the late nineteenth century, Shaykh Khazʿal from the Arab Kaʿb tribe established his rule in Khuzestan (1897–1924). He received British support and challenged the declining Qajar dynasty, with the growth of British involvement in Iran and the location of Khuzestan as a transit zone for international trade. In 1924 Reza Khan, then the Prime Minister of Iran, occupied Khuzestan, deposing Shaykh Khazʿal and putting an end to the independence of Arabistan.Footnote21
After seizing full control over Iran, Reza Khan, now the new king, began implementing his agenda of modernization from above, through a tightly controlled state. The regime began industrializing parts of the province, providing Persian names to the cities, and developing Khuzestan’s oil industry. The expansion of the modernization project since the 1960s under Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–1979), was a mixed blessing for Khuzestan. His White Revolution provided land rights for the peasants and agricultural credit through its cooperative program. The regime also began developing irrigation projects, with the involvement of agribusinesses, bringing vast rural areas under state control. This shift toward large-scale farming led to the displacement of large numbers of peasants and to the deterioration in income and living conditions in areas of Khuzestan.Footnote22
Following the revolution, unrest erupted in several ethnic regions including Khuzestan. During the 8 years of the Iran–Iraq war, the province endured massive Iraqi attacks along this long frontier zone, causing large-scale displacement. Following the war, impressive memorial sites resembling Shiʿi shrines were erected along the border-zone of Khuzestan. Nevertheless, anti-regime demonstrations continued sporadically over the years, triggered by high levels of poverty, allocations of resources, environmental issues, and the question of ethnic identity. Khuzestan, which holds about 80% of Iran’s oil reserves and produces the most grain and legumes in the country, suffers from underdevelopment, including the lack of sufficient housing, health care and educational facilities.Footnote23
Over the years, maddāḥān from Khuzestan and other regions have visited the area, expressing solidarity with the local population amidst their profound suffering due to inadequate living conditions, and in the aftermath of natural disasters. In July 2021, a group of prominent maddāḥān decided to convene their seasonal meeting in Khuzestan to demonstrate their support for the local community during a period of significant flooding. Sadiq Ahangaran, a renowned Iranian eulogist originally hailing from Khuzestan, urged preachers and maddāḥān to voice the province’s grievances to the authorities. Ahangaran noted that “Khuzestan province has faced crises and challenges since the [Iran–Iraq] war. This province has witnessed the sacrifices of many martyrs, rendering it sacred ground. It is unjust for this province to endure further hardships such as floods or negligence regarding water scarcity.”Footnote24 Similarly, a critical stance was articulated by Majid Babakhani, Director General of the Islamic Propagation Organization, who remarked that “The people of Mahshahr and Bandar Imam encounter numerous difficulties. If not for the floods, their poverty and financial struggles would have been severe, but the flood exacerbated their plight.”Footnote25 Maytham Motei, another esteemed Iranian eulogist from Tehran, opted to cancel street celebrations for Eid Ghadir, marking the Prophet’s designation of Imam ʿAli to leadership, in order “to advocate for the rights of the oppressed people of Khuzestan.” “Today,” he noted, “our focus is on Khuzestan. To honor Ghadir, we are heading to Khuzestan with the Ahl al-Bayt chanters to advocate for the demands of the people.”Footnote26
Since the 1990s, a noticeable shift in the Iranian government’s approach toward the ethnic question was observed, particularly among the Arabs of Khuzestan and other ethnic groups in different regions. This transformation coincided with the ascendancy of President Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and was further accentuated during Khatami’s presidency (1997–2005).Footnote27 Rafsanjani’s focus on economic development and Khatami’s advocacy for political reform paved the way for an emerging debate on individual rights, which also encompassed the rights of ethnic minorities. Notably, one significant indicator of this shift in orientation was the substantial increase in the number of publications in ethnic languages within Iran since the 1990s. Salehi-Amiri, an influential voice representing Khatami’s reformist camp, contributed to this discourse by advocating for “vahdat dar kesrat,” which is to say “unity in diversity,” as a means to address the minority question. In his understanding, this model provides for the universal Islamic ideal of the revolution but also for the multi-ethnic nature of the Iranian nation. On the other hand, some nationalists staunchly emphasized the superiority of the Iranian nation, asserting that it transcends any claims based on ethnic identity, thereby advocating for a more unified and singular notion of Iranian identity.Footnote28
The presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) marked a turning point with his combination of revolutionary fervor and belligerent nationalism, leading to heightened tensions with Iran’s minority communities. This period witnessed a series of ethnic unrests also among Shiʿis in Iran, yet of non-Persian origins in the areas of Khuzestan and Azerbaijan, as well as in Sunni regions such as Kurdistan and Baluchistan. The government responded with a heavy-handed approach, dismissing these uprisings as “violent acts of bandits, instigated by foreign agents.”Footnote29 These protests were deemed as threats to the unity of the religious community and the territorial integrity of Iran. State officials sought to minimize the impact and significance of ethnic grievances. They relegated ethnic unrest to a small segment of society, described as opportunists (forṣat-ṭalab) and gangs (bandhā), that do not represent “the people” who are loyal to the Islamic system and to the territorial unity of the Iranian nation.Footnote30 The rise of President Hassan Rohani (2013–2021), with his pragmatic outlook, heralded a return to a more inclusive approach toward Iran’s minorities. An interesting development took place in 2019, as the representative of the Supreme Leader in Khuzestan began providing Ashura services in Arabic throughout the province and brining in Iraqi eulogists to lead the rituals. Footnote31
The Maddāḥan of Khuzestan: The Iraqi connection
ʿAmar al-Kenany from Maysan Governorate (ʿAmara) in southern Iraq (b. 1982), was among the most celebrated Iraqi eulogists who established connection with the Arab-speaking community in Khuzestan.Footnote32 His videos gained widespread distribution in the region, serving as a bridge between Khuzestan and the Shiʿi-Arab community in Iraq. Additionally, certain videos were featured on the local Ahvaz Voice channel and shared via Aparat. ʿAmar al-Kenany even visited the city of Khorramshahr in Khuzestan to conduct commemoration services during the month of Muharram 1449/2018.
Historically, there have been strong scholarly connections between the Shiʿi communities in both countries, which developed around the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala that served as important centers of Shiʿi learning for the broader Shiʿi milieu. Following the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, 15 years after the bloody Iran–Iran war (1980–1988), a dramatic improvement occurred in the relationship between the two nations, catalyzed by the empowerment of the Shiʿi community in Iraq.Footnote33 The warming of relations between Iran and Iraq in the political and economic domains significantly fostered the expansion of religious bonds between the two countries. A notable manifestation of this phenomenon is the increasing number of Iranian pilgrims visiting the sacred shrines of Najaf and Karbala during the commemoration of Ashura beginning in 2003.Footnote34 The substantial shift in bilateral relations also facilitated deeper cultural ties between Shiʿi-Arab Khuzestan and the religious landscape of Shiʿi Iraq, exemplified by the dissemination of ʿAmar al-Kenany’s videos. The emergence of new media platforms, particularly the development of Aparat in 2010, played a pivotal role in facilitating and amplifying these connections. The cultural exchanges with Iraq not only helped alleviate the sense of marginalization experienced by the inhabitants of Khuzestan within Iran but also provided a platform for the expression and preservation of the local Arab heritage of the province, fostering a greater sense of cultural autonomy and freedom of expression.
Yet, the Shiʿi-led regime in Iraq also represented a different political model than the Islamic republic. Iraq initiated a transition toward democratization following the removal of the Baʿth dictatorship, with newly established Shiʿi parties engaging with the US, a primary adversary of Iran. The 2005 constitution of Iraq delineated the nation as a republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic entity, with Islam designated as its official religion.Footnote35 Notably, the constitution stipulated that no legislation could contravene Islamic precepts while also affirming that no law could violate democratic principles. Within this complex relationship between religion and state, the new regime provided an ambiguous space for Islam within the legal system, refraining from advocating for the full implementation of Shariʿa.
Moreover, Grand Ayatollah ʿAli al-Sistani, the most revered Shiʿi cleric in Iraq did not embrace Khomeini’s model of velāyat-e faqīh (the rule of the supreme jurist), demonstrating some level of continuity in the historical rivalry between the Shiʿi centers of Najaf and Qom.Footnote36 Sistani who established a vast social organization expressed support for representation, yet continued to uphold a traditional Shiʿi perception of authority in which the main role of the clerics was to advise the believers and not to obtain power.Footnote37 Furthermore, there are indications of anti-Iranian sentiments spreading among the Iraqi population, including the Shiʿi south, due to the dire socio-economic situation in the country and the lack of personal security, associated with Iran’s growing influence in Iraq.Footnote38 The cases of ʿAmar al-Kenany, Muhammad Junami, and Basem Karbalaʾi, and their participation in transnational eulogies serve as illustrative examples of the intricate dynamics characterizing the relationship between Iran and Iraq since 2003.
At a service led in 2019 by ʿAmar al-Kenany in Baghdad and placed on Aparat, hundreds gathered in a large hall wearing black, with some donning a green scarf on their shoulders symbolizing the color of Islam, to participate in the eulogy Majnūnak (You Drive Me Crazy).Footnote39 ʿAmar al-Kenany was attired in an Arab style black robe. The participants were seated on their knees, repeating the lines of the maddāḥ, and engaging in coordinated movements, raising their hands, and beating their chests. This service was more formal than those held in various provinces of Iran, including Khuzestan, with ʿAmar al-Kenany delivering the sermon while standing atop a large, ornate lit-up stage. Furthermore, there was an open space between the stage and the participants, distancing ʿAmar al-Kenany from the audience, while a flag-bearer waved a large red flag. At the same time, ʿAmar al-Kenany is very enthusiastic and engaging. His body movements, powerful voice, charismatic delivery, and the repeated phrase of “You Drive Me Crazy” (majnūnak) create an entrancing atmosphere (see Verse Sample 1 below).
The delivery of this passionate eulogy showcases the profound and unwavering love for Imam Husayn as expressed by his followers over centuries. It is intriguing to observe the intersection of religious and secular elements in music, as exemplified in Majnūnak. By omitting certain lines, such as “My heart is yearning to Ninevah” and “leave me a prisoner to Mawla Husayn,” the eulogy takes on the characteristics of a popular love song from the latest hit parade. The recurring chorus expresses a longing to be with the beloved, and can be interchangeable with any other desired object of affection. While the musical elements of Majnūnak may not differ significantly from other Arab love songs, singing it during Muharram and associating the lyrics with Husayn and Allah, imbues the text with a contextual significance, reclaiming it from a secular interpretation. Consequently, the music serves as a catalyst, igniting strong emotions within the participants of the Ashura processions.
The fusion of musical esthetics commonly found in Arab love songs, along with the traditional Maqam Kurd composition, intensifies the emotional impact of the performance and creates a powerful atmosphere for the audience.Footnote40 Makam Kurd is a musical mode or system used in traditional Middle Eastern music. It is commonly used in Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, and Persian music. The Makam Kurd is characterized by a unique set of intervals and melodic patterns, and it has a distinct emotional and expressive quality. In the Turkish and Kurdish music, the Makam Kurd is often associated with a feeling of melancholy or longing. Overall, the Makam Kurd is a rich and complex musical mode with a long history and cultural significance in the Middle East. It is an important part of the region’s musical heritage and is still widely used in traditional and contemporary music today. Overall, ʿAmar al-Kenany’s captivating performance, composed in Maqam Kurd and showcasing his virtuosic vocal abilities, elevates the atmosphere to its highest level and captivates the audience with its emotional resonance.
While ʿAmar al-Kenany, rose to prominence notably in Khuzestan, Muhammad al-Junami exemplified a bi-directional cultural exchange, being a distinguished eulogist originally from Ahvaz, Khuzestan province, but residing in Iraq. His notable media exposure within Iran underscores the burgeoning interconnectedness between Iranian and Iraqi cultural spheres. Furthermore, this highlights the pivotal role of Khuzestan, with its dual Shiʿi-Arab heritage, as a conduit bridging both nations.
In a manner akin to ʿAmar al-Kenany, al-Junami demonstrated profound and emotive performances, as exemplified in his eulogy “Ya Husayn, Ya Husayn” (see Verse Sample 2 below).Footnote41 The video of this eulogy garnered considerable attention, amassing 34,000 views as of June 2023. It opened with a striking display of loud, dramatic music accompanied by drumbeats. A visually obscured figure clad in a dark robe emerges in the background, later revealed to be the revered Imam Husayn. Subsequently, the focal point shifts to a depiction of the maddāḥ himself, Muhammad al-Junami, before transitioning to a long-shot portrayal of Imam Husayn. Symbolically, a prominent wooden door is showcased, followed by a scene featuring al-Junami seated on a couch with hand-held notes, intertwined with intermittent visions of the youthful Imam Husayn. Through the symbolic representation of a gate, al-Junami accentuates the maddāḥ’s role in facilitating access to the profound legacy of the revered Imam. The eulogist’s words echo this sentiment, expressing his dependence on the Imam and beseeching guidance to his esteemed presence: “My death and my life depend on you, make me forget all people and guide me to your door.” The video does not capture a customary ritual with a live audience, but rather represents a singular performance by Muhammad al-Junami himself who produced this video to disseminate the timeless ideals of Imam Husayn to a broader online audience.
The maddāḥ in his role as a eulogist provides a hatch to the life of the Imam. This is exemplified in the recurring phrase of the eulogy, “I carry your picture in my eyes,” which resonates throughout the performance. With the initial delivery of these words, a large white-lettered calligraphy of “Ya Husayn, Ya Husayn” flashes into the center, juxtaposed against a dark background picture of the maddāḥ. This visual representation underscores the significance of the eulogist in connecting the audience with the spiritual presence of Imam Husayn. The video then shifts from images of Muhammad al-Junami meditating and staring into space to visions of what appears to be the Imam as a young boy carrying a black flag decorated with the golden dome of Karbala and encountering other children. Imam Husayn who was born in the fourth year Hijri (626 AD) and died in Karbala in the year 61/680 at the age of 54 is portrayed in this video in his youth, further emphasizing the Imam’s image as moral and pure, like a child.
The composition of Muhammad al-Junami incorporates a superior level of music production, manifested through the quality of sound and execution of the musical piece. The lyrics of the composition are structured in Maqam Husaynī, which is often viewed by performers as part of the Maqam Bayyatī family. These modes, Maqam Husayni and Maqam Bayyātī, are common in Arab music.Footnote42 While Maqam Husaynī is prevalent in the Arab and Turkish repertoire, it is also discernible in Persian music, albeit distinguished by its distinct playing style. Invariably, Maqam Husaynī commences in the upper part of the Maqam, namely in the upper tetrachord, on the fifth note of the Maqam and then descending to the first note of Maqam Bayyātī. Moreover, al-Junami’s singing features an extensive use of ornamentation, which is a prominent characteristic in Arabic singing. The stylistic element of transitioning from singing in the higher range of the Maqam to its lower range is also shared by many classical Arabic songs.
The interlude commences with a powerful and up-beat rhythm produced by electronic drums, amplifying the emotional impact of the song. A group of singers responds to al-Junami’s vocalizations, repeatedly chanting the name of Husayn in between the lines of the song, accentuating their fervent devotion and passionate love for the Imam. Al-Junami’s rendition of the lines “life would be dark if you were not the light of my days,” and “I had a dream to visit you, but I have forgotten my dreams,” reaches a climactic point, heightened by the upper range of the upper tetrachord, thereby imparting a more profound emotional resonance to the lyrics. As the following line, “your pain is like a laughter of a child that will never erase my pains” is sung, another peak is reached in the higher octave of G, descending through the lowering notes in the Maqam and returning to its lower tetrachord in Maqam Bayat.
Alongside Muhammad Junami’s who performed in Iraq, and the celebrated figures of ʿAmar al-Kenany, Basem Karbalaʾi was another Iraqi eulogist with significant presence in both Arab and Iranian social media scene.Footnote43 Basem Karbalaʾi has garnered attention in Iran through his Aparat channel, which includes Persian subtitles for his work. He also maintained a Persian Instagram page where he shared his subtitled materials in Persian.Footnote44
In November 2013, Nasr TV reported that on the fifth night of Muharram Basem Karbalaʾi insulted Supreme Leader ʿAli Khamenei, ridiculing his right-hand disability. The report received 37,460 viewers (May 2023). Footnote45 What follows are the words of Basem Karbalaʾi’s eulogy, which were reportedly a mockery of Khamenei’s disability:
Comments pertaining to the video content encompassed three primary responses. First, there were individuals who expressed support and encouragement for Basem Karbalaʾi, commending his actions and position. Second, a significant number of individuals questioned the credibility of the video, asserting that the Iraqi maddāḥ had not engaged in any form of insult. A report from Aparat argued that Basem Karbalaʾi had no intention to insult the Supreme Leader or any other religious scholar in Iran. Aparat attributed the dissemination of false information regarding Basem Karbalaʾi’s intentions to Sunni Takfiri groups.Footnote47 A further response was to vehemently condemn those who dared to offend the Supreme Leader, as well as those who espoused anti-revolutionary sentiments. Within this latter category, the following comment exhibited a strong racial attack, not only targeting Basem Karbalaʾi but also encompassing the Arabs as a whole:
Curse you … and all the Arabs who sit and eat lizards, who have led the world to chaos and crime for 1,400 years! I don’t think that the leaders and prophets of your clan have done any service to humanity.Footnote48
These varied comments to the video exemplify the multiplicity of views expressed by Iranians on social media platforms, which occasionally also include criticisms directed toward the regime and its leadership. There are also at times expressions that deviate from the official pan-Islamic approach of the Iranian government and may include anti-Sunni or anti-Arab sentiments. However, the enforcement agencies of the state face limitations in effectively controlling and policing social media due to its vastness and decentralized nature. As a result, popular sentiments that diverge from the regime’s official line at times find an outlet in online platforms. The diversity of opinions expressed on social media reflects the complex social and political landscape in Iran. While the state aims to maintain its authority and control over the flow of information, social media platforms enable Iranians to voice their diverse views and participate in conversations that may deviate from the official line.
These three cases of ʿAmar al-Kenany, Muhammad Junami and Basem Karbalaʾi are indicative of the intricate relationship that emerged between Iran and Iraq since 2003. Concurrently, Basem Karbalaʾi’s denigration of the Supreme Leader is also indicative of the divergent political models that have emerged in Iran and post-2003 Iraq over the concept of Shiʿi authority, in its multiple perspectives.Footnote49
Due to its strategic geographic location and its diverse social composition, Khuzestan has played a pivotal role as a cultural channel, facilitating interaction between the Arab and Persian heritages of the region. The advent of social media platforms has enabled Iraqi eulogists to gain recognition within Khuzestan, and in some instances, their renown has transcended borders, reaching a broader Iranian audience. Concurrently, Khuzestan has itself contributed to this cultural exchange by producing eulogies that reflect a synthesis of Persian, Arab, and various other cultural influences.
Eulogists of Khuzestan: Localism and a blend of cultures
Haj Mahdi Tadini embodied a more traditional and localized style of eulogy. His performances reflected the cultural heritage of Khuzestan, with distinctive elements that highlight the region’s traditions. Tadini’s attire, such as the Arab-style black and white scarf, and the participation of the audience in the chelab dance, showcase the traditional local features of his eulogies, connecting the audience to their cultural roots and creating a sense of unity and belonging. Yet, Tadini incorporated a merger of diverse cultures present in Khuzestan, drawing influences from Arab, Turkish, and Persian cultures. His performance also included contemporary elements in the music employed in the ritual and in the video remake, including lighting and shooting angles. This fusion creates a dynamic and engaging atmosphere, allowing the online audience to connect with the eulogy while embracing modern musical styles, creating a unique and vibrant experience.
In the eulogy, “The name of God, the name of Husayn,” Haj Mahdi Tadini leads a traditional-style ritual in Persian, characterized by a specific arrangement of the audience (see Verse Sample 3 below).Footnote50 The participants are organized in two rows facing each other, with the front rows sitting on their knees and the back rows standing. The maddāḥ is sitting in the center among the crowd, while two participants kneel on a carpeted aisle between the rows, stirring up the audience’s emotions. The setting for the ritual is a small and crowded hall decorated in an Arab-Islamic style, featuring geometrical wall-hangings. Haj Mahdi Tadini is dressed in black and wears an Arab-style black and white scarf on his shoulders. He sings in Persian, using hand-held notes. Tadini, like many other participants, also adorns a red Shiʿi customary mourning headband dedicated to Imam Husayn.
The crowd was enthusiastically engaged in the eulogy, singing, chanting, and beating their chests in coordinated movements. Most of them are young. The text of the eulogy is short, with simple phrases and a catchy beat. Lines are repetitively recited, and the eulogy itself is sung multiple times, reinforcing the emotional connection with the content. It is notable that Haj Mahdi Tadini’s performance does not exhibit virtuosic qualities, and his semi-competency is evident throughout the eulogy. He relies on a small booklet with various song lists instead of memorizing the sung text. Despite this, his singing is sufficient to fulfill the requisite function within the context of religious practice, as the focus lies more on the collective experience and the spiritual significance of the eulogy rather than individual performance skills.
The audience provided a rhythmic accompaniment by chest beating and the maddāḥ’s hand-marking at certain intervals. This synchronization represented the power of the ritual, as the community and lead singer united in mourning Husayn. Who is leading the service? The community or the maddāḥan? Particularly in this case, the answer is that they are all working together to create a unified and solid unit akin to a military march, identifying together with the pain of Husayn. Approximately a minute into the eulogy, the audience shouted Husayn’s name in unison, providing an additional rhythmic layer to the melodic lines. As the eulogy continued, the chest-beating increased in tempo and an ecstatic feeling resulted from the circularity of the performance, as the maddāḥ and the audience repeated praise and the name Husayn.
Similarly, in the eulogy “Hearing the Voice of the Orphans,” the ritual style employed by Haj Mahdi Tadini reflects the communal traditions of Khuzestan. The ritual took place in a crowded hall in the city of Dezful, Khuzestan, showcasing the full engagement of the participants. The hall itself featured a prominent tapestry hanging on the wall, serving as a center piece, with the following admonition written in Persian: “Do not Exchange Your Religion for the Realm of Yazid” (دین خود را نفروشید به دنیای یزید). The attendees actively participated throughout the ritual, engaging in coordinated chants, movements, and motions.Footnote51
Dezful is the capital of Dezful County, situated approximately 150 km from the provincial capital of Ahvaz. The city has a diverse population composed of Persians, Kurds, Lors, and Arabs, adding to the multicultural fabric of the community.Footnote52 This diversity is reflected in the eulogy itself, as it was sung in Turkish with Persian subtitles, highlighting the blend of cultural influences in the region. The participants engage in the chelab dance, forming a semi-circle, in which each person holding the shoulder of the person next to them and with their other hand raised. The entire crowd is dressed in traditional black clothing, including the maddāḥ, who also wears a black headband. Haj Mahdi Tadini stands in the center aisle on an elevated stool, while the participants move slowly around him in synchronized motions. The movements and formation of the crowd contribute to the immersive and communal nature of the ritual, emphasizing the shared experience and the importance of the eulogy’s message.
The video employs a red-light effect to conjure a sense of a battlefield and death, demonstrating the gravity of the situation. Furthermore, camera techniques such as close-ups on the maddāḥ and broad shots of the audience further emphasize the importance of the eulogist as well as the power, impact, and enthusiasm of the participants. The eulogy focuses on the heroic role of ʿAbbas ibn ʿAli, Imam Husayn’s half-brother, in the battle of Karbala. He was ordered by Husayn to bring water to the thirsty children from te Euphrates but succeeded in only filling a few water-skins. ʿAbbas lost his two arms before falling in battle.Footnote53 The eulogy predominantly employed a first-person narrative, thereby facilitating a revival of the battle in a contemporary setting and deepening the audience’s connection to the figure of ʿAbbas ibn ʿAli, renowned for his courage, devotion, sincerity, and selflessness. The collective participation of the crowd during the service conducted by Mahdi Tadini, further solidified the affinity between the audience and ʿAbbas, who had died in Karbala while defending his half-brother, Imam Husayn.
The eulogy begins with the crowd singing in unison until the maddāḥ, Haj Mahdi Tadini, starts his eulogy 15 s later. When the maddāḥ sings, the participants remain silent as they perform the chelab dance; a dance that also dictates the tempo throughout the ritual. After Tadini finishes the first line of the eulogy, he calls out shabāb (the young), a common gesture among Arabic-speaking communities, galvanizing the audience to sing in response. Repeating the maddāḥ’s verses, the crowd maintains the melodic lines sung in Maqam Saba, known for its unique dense-dissonant texture because of its diminished fourth. In Maqam Saba, when playing a perfect fourth above a tonic, one must create an interval of two and a half semitones, thus creating a consonant pause. Maqam Saba is most common in the Arabic music repertoire and in Turkish music, but very rare in Persian music. This sonic performance illustrates how diverse ethnic groups in Iran are distinguished from one another by sounds and a music repertoire that represents the group’s orientation while projecting a unified Shiʿi message through the Muharram ritual and the text of the eulogy.
Employing a first-person narrative, the second stanza describes ʿAbbas’s virtues: “he is the head leader, the strongest, and Imam Husayn’s brother who is always by his side.” Consequently, there is a shift in the Maqam from Maqam Sabah to Maqam Sikah, which is in a higher pitch than the previous one, as the lyrics focus on ʿAbbas’s strength and profound abilities. The stanzas sung in Maqam Sabah differ thematically as they describe scenarios of suffering, agony, and the cry of the orphans that Abbas hears and cannot bear. Ascending to a higher range raises the tension and creates a tension-resolve dynamic. The focus on Abbas’s virtues resolves the tension with the shift to the rhythm of Maqam Sikah. We find here a split between the emotions related to Abbas’s honorable attributions versus the scenario outlining the anxiety expressed by both lyrics and melody. As we reach the eulogy’s last line, we hear Maqam Sabah once again when the maddāḥ sings, “Forgive me since ʿAli is always on my lips.” This search for forgiveness links the terrifying descriptions sung in Maqam Sabah under the unified emotion of suffering (see Verse Sample 4 below).
Among the more local maddāḥan of Khuzestan, Hasan Khanchi from the port city of Bandar Imam Khomeini, is among the distinguished eulogists of the province, and has gained recognition for his exceptional talent and contributions to the field. He has achieved first prizes in singing competitions throughout Iran, showcasing his remarkable skills as a eulogist. What sets Khanchi apart is his ability to sing in multiple languages, incorporating diverse cultural influences into his performances. Khanchi’s repertoire reflects a fusion of traditional and contemporary aspects. In addition to his musical talents, Khanchi has made notable contributions to the profession of maddāḥan by acquiring the rights to material for eulogists.Footnote54 His composition, Wāḥed al-Dūnyā [The first/most unique in the world], serves as an excellent example of his diverse musical style that showcases his artistic versatility but also adds a distinctive flavor to his eulogies.Footnote55
Wāḥed al-Dūnyā is a professionally produced contemporary video in praise of Imam ʿAli, tailored for a young and affluent audience. This video clip was not filmed in front of a live audience, and, in comparison to other similar videos, does not feature large numbers of extras. It is aimed at an exclusive demographic comprising young people and the middle class. The video clip opens with a string of lights on a dark background and then moves to the scene of a hip art studio. Throughout the video, there are contrasting images of light and darkness, black and white that illustrate the words of the eulogy in its glorification of ʿAli’s figure who had shone in a period of darkness:
Several figures slowly enter the scene, the artist, the maddāḥ, and the camera man, alongside an orchestra that is gradually revealed to the audience. The artist and cinematographer are both young and dressed in local, embroidered tops, exhibiting an artistic flair. On the other hand, the maddāḥ is wearing a traditional gulf-style white robe with a solid white Arab shemāgh head-scarf and a black iqqāl cord wrapped around. The scene of the artist’s bright and contemporary apartment, which is full of plants and art supplies, is juxtaposed with the landscape of the orchestra. The orchestra’s performance is held in a barren desert area, framed with mountains in the background and a darkening sky. The orchestra includes both male and female performers. Men are dressed in open black suits with button-down white shirts. The women are fully covered with black dresses and white hijabs that are fastened on top, by a twisted black and white tie.
Throughout the video, the camera pans back and forth from the scene of the artist painting to the orchestra, with closeups on the artist, the musicians, the cameraman, the maddāḥ. There are further scenes of the maddāḥ, walking alone in the desert, singing emotionally, with his eyes shut, as the sun sets, and the sky darkens. The characters gradually leave the scene and the video ends by presenting the completed paintings that appear to depict a crowd gathering to see the Prophet Muhammad and his chosen brother, Imam ʿAli. An image of light radiated from their figures to the sky, in a moment of revelation and redemption. The painting corresponds to the closing words of the eulogy:
The video seeks to move the audience through the combination of art and music and the contrasts of light and darkness, abundance and scarcity while connecting the words of the song to a contemporary young imagery.
This composition fuses together traditional Turkish-classical music and contemporary music. It incorporates aspects of the Turkish microtonal system, which divides the tone into nine commas, unlike the Western diatonic system, which divides the tone into two semitones. The piece also features the clarinet, a central instrument in Turkish music. However, the inclusion of non-traditional instruments such as classical guitar, synthesizer and electronic drums provides a contemporary-western musical arrangement to the piece. Ornamentation, which is characteristic of diverse Middle Eastern music styles, is also extensively used in the composition and the style of performance.Footnote57 In addition, there is also an extensive use of glissando (a glide from one pitch to another), and portamento (a pitch sliding from as the orchestra plays together in unison). These Turkish influences reflect the interaction between Persian and Turkish cultures over centuries of Iranian history. Yet, it also reflects the unique multi-ethnic composition of Khuzestan which includes a significant number of Arabs but also pockets of Turkish-speaking populations, in remote areas. The fusion between classical Turkish elements and contemporary music demonstrates the power of globalization, wherein composers can draw on a variety of musical styles not necessarily present in their immediate areas. Nevertheless, the structure of the song and the harmonic progressions arranged for the melody exhibits the orientation and stylization of the composition toward popular music listeners rather than traditional music consumers.
The feelings of allegiance and identification with Imam Husayn are conveyed through the lead vocalist. Throughout the piece, there is a frequent modulation – or change – from one tonal structure to another, which occurs when one Maqam is replaced by another. As mentioned earlier, Maqam (Ar. “dwelling place” or “position”) as understood in the context of music, is a concept that denotes the hierarchical structure of a fixed sound constellation, accompanied by stylistic melodic movements.Footnote58 The performance begins with Maqam Kurd and then shifts to other modulations.
The shift to diverse modulations heightens emotions and enrich the sonic range of the piece. The singing reaches the highest range of the Maqam at the conclusion of the text, as the eulogy transitions to the Day of Judgement, in which the individual stands before the Creator. The intensity increases: “There is no one to have mercy on me on the Day of Judgment.” The melody returns to the original Maqam, Maqam Kurd, when the Savior appears, providing a sense of comfort from the inner struggle represented by the numerous modulations.
Hasan Khanchi’s multi-cultural outlook is even more outstanding in his Raḥmat (Mercy), produced in Turkey, sung in Arabic with Persian subtitles.Footnote59 The shooting in Istanbul was geared toward a wider Muslim-Arab public, including both Sunnis and Shiʿis, and particularly the young and affluent, in Iran and beyond, connecting with the Islamic Republic’s pan-Islamic outlook. In this clip, Khanchi is dressed in a smart-casual style, wearing a checkered shirt. Throughout the video (uploaded in 2017), background music is played rather than a live singing of the maddāḥ. In contrast to many eulogies produced in Iran, the video begins with credits in both Persian and English, superimposed on a backdrop of twinkling stars. Subsequently, five young individuals including the maddāḥ, Hasan Khanchi, are seen looking through a telescope outside a home. Khanchi makes a phone call to an elderly woman, and they are both delighted when they meet. Then, Khanchi is seen walking the streets of the city which is eventually revealed to be Istanbul, as evident through its mosques and the façades of its streets.
As Khanchi walked the streets of Istanbul, he provided his eternal reverence to ‘“the best leader” who “brought us the best judgment that God gave.” Raising his gaze to the marvels of God’s creation, he then proceeded to lead his audience toward “the right path,” exemplifying in his behavior the moral message of Islam and the significance of good deeds. Through his pleasant voice, his appearance, and his soft demeanor, Khanchi sought to portray the beauty of Islam, its human orientation, and its contemporary relevance, going beyond a Shiʿi-Iranian audience.
Khanchi’s composition reflects Khuzestan’s social diversity, while blending both traditional and contemporary elements. The song begins with programmed sounds, followed by string and Darbuka, a commonly used percussion instrument in Arabic Classical music. The Darbuka player performs a rhythm called Sāʿidī, a 4/4 m with a down beat (“doum” sound) on the one and two down beats in the middle, which is typical of Arabic and Turkish music. Modern electronic sounds are then introduced, reflecting the technological reality depicted in the music video. Finally, Khanchi takes his audience to a more traditional-oriented sound space, incorporating the Turkish music instrument Saz, which is commonly found in areas with Arab or Turkish influence.
The expressive role of strings and the Saz is now complemented by the Nai, a wind instrument composed of a hollow reed and air openings, intended to produce microtonal music. This auditory and visual constellation carries the audience to a space with specific Arab and Turkish influences. Khanchi then sings in Khuzestani Arabic for more than 2 minutes before transitioning to Khuzestani Farsi dialect and back to Arabic until the end of the piece. The composer guides the listener through various soundscapes, dissipating the boundaries between the contemporary and the traditional, the Persian and the Arab world, thereby constructing a multifaceted “Grace” for the Messenger of God.
Conclusion
Over the past decade, Ashura videos disseminated in Khuzestan have distinctly captured the province’s unique geographical location and diverse social makeup, acting as a bridge between the Arab and Persian worlds. The emergence of social media platforms and the pervasive force of globalization have further heightened this cultural fusion, which at times even featured contemporary Western influences, as evidenced in Hasan Khanchi’s performances through his choice of settings and musical arrangements. Inspired by myriad cultural elements, these gatherings resonate deeply with Khuzestan’s rich multi-ethnic fabric, serving as a wellspring of creative inspiration. The regime’s partial accommodation of cultural diversity since the 1990s has also played a significant role in nurturing the emergence of these innovative blends. Khuzestan’s predominant Arab population found a dominant voice within the commemoration services, evident in eulogies sung in Arabic, and cultural ties with Iraqi maddāḥān, as well as the participants’ attire. The Arab heritage was notably displayed through the extensive use of ornamentation and reliance on Maqam Kurd and Maqam Saba. Some of the videos explored earlier showcase a fascinating blend of Arab, Persian, and Turkish influences.
In this diverse landscape of eulogies, each maddāḥ displays their personal style, evident in their clothing, emotional connection with the audience, vocal skills, video composition, shooting techniques, and added effects. As a result, some videos showcase virtuosic qualities, while others exhibit only semi-competency. Despite the Iranian regime’s attempts to regulate the work of the maddāḥān, complete control over this field remains elusive due to the vast numbers of eulogists dispersed throughout Iran. Moreover, the unmediated connection between the maddāḥān and the local population serves the regime’s desire to disseminate its ideals directly to the people, contributing to the relative freedom of the eulogists. While many local maddāḥān adhere to the traditional reading of Karbala’s legacy, some embrace a more contemporary understanding, emphasizing themes of love rather than suffering. Muhammad al-Junami’s poignant eulogy, “Ya Husayn, Ya Husayn,” exemplifies the revolutionary potential of the maddāḥān, resonating with the following words:
The role of the maddāḥān promoting a unifying religious and revolutionary ethos holds particular significance among ethnic minorities, given their multiple grievances toward the regime. Through their eulogies, the maddāḥān foster a sense of collective identification with Imam Husayn’s legacy and its revolutionary interpretation. Even eulogies adhering to traditional themes of suffering and injustice serve to reinforce the regime’s Shiʿi identity while addressing contemporary challenges facing the Islamic republic, instilling a sense of resilience and determination. Concurrently, the maddāḥān play a crucial role in facilitating local expressions of mourning, enhancing a unique Khuzestani identity deeply rooted in its Arab tradition yet receptive to multiple cultural influences in the region and beyond. Their emotionally charged sessions and direct engagement with the populace and their cultural heritage, create a strong emotional bond between the maddāḥān, the participants in the ritual, and their broad online audience.
Iranian eulogists have articulated their solidarity with the plight of the people of Khuzestan, underscoring their grassroots connection and popular appeal. Some eulogists have even vaguely criticized “the authorities” for the dire socio-economic conditions in the region, albeit without directly implicating the Islamic system or the Supreme leader. However, their primary contribution lies not in addressing Khuzestan’s profound socio-economic challenges, but rather in mitigating the region’s sense of marginalization through cultural expression. They have provided a platform for Khuzestan’s rich cultural heritage, portraying it not as an insular tradition but as a dynamic legacy open to various influences, including Persian and even Western elements. The maddāḥān’s informal contact with the people complements the more established structure of clerical authority in the Islamic republic, with its political and legal manifestations. However, the rise of the maddāḥān also presents a significant challenge to the clerical establishment, as their approach resonates more closely with the lived experiences and cultural realities of their followers.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Yaron Cherniak for his significant contribution to the musical analysis of the eulogies. Mr. Cherniak is a PhD student in Ethnomusicology at UCLA. He is a multi-instrumentalist and an expert in Middle Eastern and maqam-based music with an MA in musicology from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I also wish to express my appreciation to my dedicated research assistant, Nazanin Saedian, for her highly professional work in translations from Persian.
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Notes on contributors
Elisheva Machlis
Dr. Elisheva Machlis is a senior lecturer at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel. Her book Shiʿi Sectarianism in the Middle East: Modernisation and the Quest for Islamic Universalism (I.B. Tauris, 2014), deals with Shiʿi reformist thought in Iraq and Lebanon in the first half of the twentieth century. It explores a new Shiʿi debate on Islam and modern change, and demonstrates its impact on later developments among revolutionaries in Iran. She continued to develop this theme in numerous publications that discussed Shiʿi clerical debates on questions of theology, historiography, and law in a contemporary perspective, focusing on religion and state relations in Iran and Iraq.
Notes
1 عصر ایران, “نگاهی به عزاداری محرم در میان مردم عرب خوزستان,” Text,Image, fa (عصر ایران, ۱۳۹۳/۰۸/۱۱ - ۱۰:۴۷), World, https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/363894/نگاهی-به-عزاداری-محرم-در-میان-مردم-عرب-خوزستان. “آداب و رسوم مردم خوزستان در ماه محرم,” کارناوال راهنمای سفر | karnaval. https://www.karnaval.ir/blog/customs-people-khuzestan-month-muharram (accessed June 5, 2023).
2 The significance of the maddāḥān can be traced to the rich history of Persian poetry in its evolvement from the pre-Islamic period until the current era. This included the centuries-old Persian literary tradition which incorporated luminaries such as Hafiz and Sa‘di and the mystical poetry of Attar and Rumi. The place of eulogy within the Shiʿi commemoration services for the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, can be further traced to the place of poetry within Arab tribal culture in pre-Islamic Arabia, as an expression of both mourning and joy. See for example, Annemarie Schimmel, A Two-Colored Brocade: The Imagery of Persian Poetry (North Carolina: UNC Press Books, 2014). See also, Nathalie Khankan, “Reperceiving the Pre-Islamic ‘Nasīb’,” Journal of Arabic Literature 33, no. 1 (2002): 1–23.
3 See, Saeid Golkar, “Manipulated Society: Paralyzing the Masses in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 29, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 135–55, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-015-9208-0.
4 See, Roxanne Varzi, Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 44–75. David Thurfjell, “The Heyʾati Movement: Charismatic Preachers, Politics and Youth Culture,” in Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements, ed. Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carole M. Cusack (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2021), 305–28, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.19.
5 Moṣṭafā Ṣāber Khorāsānī, the head of Kānūn-e Maddāḥān; (the eulogists’ and praisers union) claimed that there were 56,400 male maddāḥān in the country.“Why Religious Singers Are Gaining Power in Iran – Al-Monitor: Independent, Trusted Coverage of the Middle East,” October 20, 2016, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/10/iran-eulogists-religious-singers-madah-arzi-karimi.html.
6 Wael B. Hallaq, “Juristic Authority vs. State Power: The Legal Crises of Modern Islam,” Journal of Law and Religion 19, no. 2 (January 2004): 243–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/3649176.
7 Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, eds., “Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies,” in Speaking for Islam (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2006), https://brill.com/edcollbook/title/11516.
8 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Hamid Dabashi, The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Theology of Discontent (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006); Rasoul Namazi, “Ayatollah Khomeini: From Islamic Government to Sovereign State,” Iranian Studies 52, no. 1–2 (2019): 111–31; and Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce, The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khamenei: Out of the Mouth of the Supreme Leader of Iran (London & New York: Routledge, 2016).
9 Saïid Amir Arjomand: After Khomeini: Iran under his Successors (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Saïid Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Mehdi Khalaji, “Iran’s Regime of Religion,” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (Fall 2011), 131–47.
10 Meir Litvak, Shiʿi Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq; Elisheva Machlis, Shiʿi Sectarianism in the Middle East: Modernisation and the Quest for Islamic Universalism (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014); See also Linda S. Walbridge ed., The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institution of Marjaʿ Taqlid (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Robert Gleave, “Political Aspects of Modern Shiʿi Legal Discussions: Khumayni and Khu’i on ijtihâd and qada,’” Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 3 (2002): 96–116
11 See, Saeid Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” Cont Islam 11 (2017): 215–35. Nikola B. Schahgaldian, “The Clerical Establishment in Iran” (RAND Corporation, January 1, 1989), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3788.html; and Azam Torab, Performing Islam Gender and Ritual in Iran (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
12 Denis J. Bekkering, “Studying Religion and YouTube,” in Studying Religion and YouTube (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 49–66, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110497892–003; “‘Looking at, through, and with YouTube’ by Paul A. Soukup,” https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/comm/102/ (accessed May 17, 2023); Mirzabagherbarzi Seyedeh Nika, Salehinezhad Mohammad Hossein, and Rezaeian Kuchesfehan Fateme, “Video Sharing Network’ s Popularity Detection (Aparat),” January 1, 621, https://www.sid.ir/paper/949621/fa.
13 Heidi A. Campbell, “Understanding the Relationship between Religion Online and Offline in a Networked Society,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 80, no. 1 (2012): 64–93.
14 Hubert Knoblauch and Bernt Schnettler, “Videography: Analysing Video Data as a ‘Focused’ Ethnographic and Hermeneutical Exercise,” Qualitative Research 12, no. 3 (June 2012): 334–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794111436147; Hubert Knoblauch and Meike Haken, “‘Videography.’ In Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler (Eds.) (London & New York: Routledge, 2022 Edition), 497–509,” in The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion, ed. Luc Pauwels and Dawn Mannay (London & New York: Routledge, 2022), 497–509; and See also, Tim Hutchings, “Emotion, Ritual and Rules of Feeling in the Study of Digital Religion,” in The Digital Social: Religion and Belief (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 110–28.
15 See Khamenei.ir, “بیانات در دیدار جمعی از مداحان اهل بیت علیهمالسلام,” text (www.khamenei.ir, April 20, 2014), https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=26171.
16 See, Alam Saleh and James Worrall, “Between Darius and Khomeini: Exploring Iran’s National Identity Problematique,” National Identities 17, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 73–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2014.930426; Fereshteh Davaran, Continuity in Iranian Identity: Resilience of a Cultural Heritage (New York: Routledge, Iranian Studies, 2010). See also, Ameneh Youssefzadeh, “The Situation of Music in Iran since the Revolution: The Role of Official Organizations,” British Journal of Ethnomusicology 9, no. 2 (2000): 35–61.
17 “رباعي حاج منصور درباره نوروز و فاطميه,” March 10, 2013, http://Rajanews.com/news/135520.
18 See, “نوروز باستانی در آیینه «دین اسلام»,” ایسنا (خبرگزاری ایسنا | صفحه اصلی | ISNA News Agency, March 19, 2020), https://www.isna.ir/news/98122922413/نوروز-باستانی-در-آیینه-دین-اسلام.
19 See, Willem Floor, “The Rise and Fall of the Banu Ka‘ab. A Borderer State in Southern Khuzestan”, Iran 44, no. 1 (2006), 277–315.
20 Svat Soucek, “Arabistan or Khuzestan,” Iranian Studies 17, no. 2–3 (ed 1984): 195–213, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210868408701628; R. M. Savory, “Khūzistān,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill, April 24, 2012), https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-of-islam-2/Khuzestan-SIM_4355?lang=en; Bettina Leitner, “Khuzestan Arabic,” in Arabic and Contact-Induced Change (Berlin: Language Science Press, 2019), 115–34, https://www.academia.edu/43316569/Khuzestan_Arabic; “Iranian Provinces: Khuzestan,” https://www.iranchamber.com/provinces/15_khuzestan/15_khuzestan.php (accessed June 5, 2023); “Iran’s Troubled Provinces: Khuzestan,” The Iran Primer, July 29, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jul/29/iran%E2%80%99s-challenges-converge-khuzestan; and Elling, Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini, 2013th edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 36–8.
21 Soucek, “Arabistan or Khuzistan”
22 Grace E. Goodell, The Elementary Structures of Political Life: Rural Development in Pahlavi Iran (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), https://www.amazon.com/Elementary-Structures-Political-Life-Development/dp/0195040317; F. R. C. Bagley, “A Bright Future after Oil: Dams and Agro-Industry in Khuzistan,” Middle East Journal 30, no. 1 (1976): 25–35.
23 John R. Bradley, “Iran’s Ethnic Tinderbox,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 181–90, https://doi.org/10.1162/wash.2006–07.30.1.181; Chad E. Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam’s Decision to Invade Iran,” The Middle East Journal 72, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 246–66, https://doi.org/10.3751/72.2.14. Bijan Baharan, “The Hidden Side of Iran: Discrimination against Ethnic and Religious Minorities” (LDDHI – FIDH, October 2010).13–27. “Iran’s Troubled Provinces.” Younes Saramifar, “The South Side of Heaven: A Journey along the Iranian Collective Memory in Iran-Iraq War Memorial Sites,” Anthropology of the Middle East 14, no. 1 (June 1, 2019): 125–41, https://doi.org/10.3167/ame.2019.140108.
24 farhikhtegandaily, “مداحان و منبریها صدای مظلومیت خوزستان را به مسئولین و مردم برسانند,” فرهیختگان آنلاین, https://farhikhtegandaily.com/news/58044/مداحان-و-منبریها-صدای-مظلومیت-خوزستان-را-به-مسئولین-و-مردم-برسانند/ (accessed March 12, 2024).
25 خبرگزاری باشگاه خبرنگاران | آخرین اخبار ایران و جهان | YJC, “مداحانی که به کمک مردم خوزستان شتافتند +تصاویر,” Text,Image, fa (خبرگزاری باشگاه خبرنگاران | آخرین اخبار ایران و جهان | YJC, ۱۳۹۹/۰۹/۱۵ - ۲۱:۰۸), World, https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/7584121/مداحانی-که-به-کمک-مردم-خوزستان-شتافتند-تصاویر.
26 خبرگزاری رسا | تازه ترین اخبار حوزه های علمیه, “مداحان اهل بیت مطالبهگر حقوق خوزستان,” Text,Image, fa (خبرگزاری رسا | تازه ترین اخبار حوزه های علمیه, ۱۴۰۰/۰۴/۲۹ - ۱۲:۵۸), World, http://rasanews.ir/fa/news/685091.
27 Touraj Atabaki, “Chapter 11 Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity and the Construction of New Histories in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Chapter 11 Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity and the Construction of New Histories in the Islamic Republic of Iran (University of Texas Press, 2014), 219–32, https://doi.org/10.7560/757493–012; and R. Elling, Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini (New York, Heidelberg, Basingstoke: Springer, 2013): 83–155.
28 See Hamid Ahmadi, “Unity within Diversity: Foundations and Dynamics of National Identity in Iran,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 1 (March 2005): 127–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/10669920500057229; and Atabaki, “Chapter 11 Contesting Marginality.” R. Elling, Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini (Springer, 2013): 83–155.
29 “ولایتی : دشمنان سعی دارند هویت ایرانی را از بین ببرند,” IRNA, اردیبهشت ۴, ۱۳۸۴.
30 See for example, “فرصت طلبان، اعتراض مردم تبریز را به تشنج کشاندند,” كيهان, خرداد ۳ ۱۳۸۵.
31 “خبرگزاری فارس - مراسم مداحی ملا باسم کربلایی در مصلای آبادان,” خبرگزاری فارس (خبرگزاری فارس | Fars News Agency, November 5, 2011), https://www.farsnews.ir/news/13900814000821/مراسم-مداحی-ملا-باسم-کربلایی-در-مصلای-آبادان. https://www.sedayeabadan.ir/abadan/671-1390-08-14-16-03-05.html, منتشر شده در شنبه, 14 آبان 1390.
32 “(13) عمار الكناني/Ammar Al Kenany – YouTube,” https://www.youtube.com/@ammarkenany/about (accessed June 5, 2023).
33 Ranj Alaaldin, “The Origins and Ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiite Militias,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 22 (November 1, 2017): 143–59; Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary, “Cooperating with Iran to Combat ISIS in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 129–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1370338.
34 Mariam Pirzadeh, “Exclusive: From Tehran to Najaf, a Pilgrimage Fraught with Danger,” November 20, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171120-video-exclusive-reporters-tehran-najaf-karbala-shiite-pilgrimage-danger. “Over 3 Million Iranian Pilgrims Entered Iraq for Arbaeen: Official,” rudaw.net, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/14092022 (accessed June 5, 2023).
35 See, “دستور جمهورية العراق,” January 1, 2005, https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/irq128541.pdf.
36 See for example, Zackery M. Heern, “One Thousand Years of Islamic Education in Najaf: Myth and History of the Shiʿi Ḥawza,” Iranian Studies 50, no. 3 (May 2017): 415–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2017.1285486; “The-Making-of-a-Marjaʿ-Sīstānī-and-Shiʿi-Religious-Authority-in-the-Contemporary-Age.Pdf,” http://ijtihadnet.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Making-of-a-Marja%CA%BF-S%C4%ABst%C4%81n%C4%AB-and-Shi%CA%BFi-Religious-Authority-in-the-Contemporary-Age.pdf (accessed March 5, 2024); Devin J. Stewart, “The Portrayal of an Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964–78,” in The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (Oxford University Press, 2001), 0, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137996.003.0014.
37 See, Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, “The ‘Formal’ Marjaʿ: Shiʿi Clerical Authority and the State in Post-2003 Iraq,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 3 (May 27, 2019): 481–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2018.1429988; and Babak Rahimi, “Ayatollah Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Ba‘athist Iraq,” United States Institute of Peace, n.d., 1–24.
38 Fanar Haddad, “How Deep Is Anti-Iranian Sentiment in Iraq?” Carnegie Middle East Center, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80313 (accessed March 6, 2024); “Protests in Iraq: Against Domestic Corruption and Iranian Influence | The Washington Institute,” https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/protests-iraq-against-domestic-corruption-and-iranian-influence (accessed March 6, 2024).
39 “مجنونک | ملا عمار الکنانی,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/B9tfR (accessed June 5, 2023); Robert Gleave, “Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shiʿism Baqir al-Hakim, Ha’iri and Sistani on Ijtihad, Taqlid and Marja’iyya,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 59–78.
40 For a more general overview on the musical system of Maqam see, Seyit YÖRE, “MAQAM IN MUSIC AS A CONCEPT, SCALE AND PHENOMENON,” Zeitschrift Für Die Welt Der Türken Journal of World of Turk, ZfWT 4, no. 3 (2012).
41 “مداحی زیبای عربی محمد الجنامی پیشواز محرم 1442 - شبکه جهانی بیت العباس علیه السلام,” video, سایت اشتراک ویدئو تماشا (شبکه جهانی بیت العباس علیه السلام), accessed November 12, 2023, https://tamasha.com/v/8BegE.
42 Scott Marcus, “The Eastern Arab System of Melodic Modes in Theory and Practice: A Case Study of Maqām Bayyātī,” in Garland Encyclopedia of World Music, vol. 6: The Middle East (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 33–44.
43 “اولین گفتگوی یک رسانه ایرانی با ملا باسم کربلایی,” accessed June 18, 2023, https://rasekhoon.net/news/show/699662. “«ملا باسم کربلایی» به ایران آمد,” accessed June 19, 2023. See also, https://tinyurl.com/y6ettd44.
44 “Basim Karbalaei باسم الكربلائي (@bk_staff) • Instagram Photos and Videos,” accessed June 18, 2023, https://www.instagram.com/bk_staff/. “(4) Basim Karbalaei/باسم الكربلائي - YouTube,” https://www.youtube.com/@BasimKarbalaei (accessed June 18, 2023); “باسم الكربلائي (@BasimKarbalaei)/Twitter,” Twitter, June 17, 2023, https://twitter.com/BasimKarbalaei. “آپارات | بی کی فارسی مرجع ترجمه تخصصی مداحی,” آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/bk_sub_farsi. “باسم فارسی Basim Farsi (@basim_farsi) • Instagram Photos and Videos,” https://www.instagram.com/basim_farsi/ (accessed June 18, 2023).
45 حمله به یک مداح به خاطر «توهین» به خامنهای, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DeUDsSx2O0g. Nasr TV is the formal channel of the first internet TV of the Islamic republic.
46 حمله به یک مداح به خاطر «توهین» به خامنهای.
47 “باسم کربلایی و ادعای توهین وی به رهبری,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/KIsPG (accessed June 1, 2023); A similar content also appears in the following video: “توهین باسم کربلائی و نظر علمای شیعه!,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/Dzp41 (accessed June 4, 2023).
48 حمله به یک مداح به خاطر «توهین» به خامنهای.
49 Sasha Ingber, “Angered Protesters In Basra Torch Iranian Consulate,” NPR, September 7, 2018, sec. Middle East, https://www.npr.org/2018/09/07/645620765/angered-protesters-in-basra-torch-iranian-consulate; Tamer El-Ghobashy, “Chanting ‘Iran, out!’ Iraqi Protesters Torch Iranian Consulate in Basra,” Washington Post, September 8, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chanting-iran-out-iraqi-protesters-torch-iranian-consulate-in-basra/2018/09/07/2caa89b8-b2bd-11e8-8b53-50116768e499_story.html.
50 “مداحی حاج مهدی تدینی,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/JPTIw (accessed June 11, 2023).
51 “چلاب دزفولی | صدا یتیمون بورده امونم | حاج مهدی تدینی,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/elqYB (accessed June 11, 2023).
52 Massoud Kheirabadi, Colin MacKinnon, and Mohammad Hossein Nejatian, “DEZFUL,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica Online (Brill, August 20, 2020), https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-iranica-online/dezful-COM_11693.
53 Ali Bahramian, Ali A. Bulookbashi, and Translated by Farzin Negahban, “Al-ʿAbbās b. ʿAlī,” in Encyclopaedia Islamica (Brill, October 16, 2015), https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-islamica/al-abbas-b-ali-COM_0009; L. Veccia Vaglieri, “(Al-)Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/ys6mtav6.
54 “بیوگرافی استاد حاج حسن خانچی,” http://banifatemesari.blogfa.com/post/51 (accessed June 7, 2023).
55 “ویدیو کلیپ ‘ واحد الدنیا ’ | حسن خانچی,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/ZbFlT (accessed June 7, 2023).
56 “ویدیو کلیپ " واحد الدنیا " | حسن خانچی.”
57 Johnny Farraj and Sami Abu Shumays, Inside Arabic Music: Arabic Maqam Performance and Theory in the 20th Century, Illustrated edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 76–86.
58 The maqam regulates the selection pitches and their hierarchy, cadential patterns, melodic formulae, melodic contour, and the overall directionality of entire compositions, including scales, melody types, rhythmic cycles, musical genres, performance practices and reception. In its simplest form, Maqam refers to a specific scale. In its broader understanding, Maqam also refers to the alternative directional notes, to accidentals, to a specific tetrachordal structure [tetrachord is an ascending series comprised of four notes], to a specific path for performance etc. Essica Marks, “Music, History, and Culture in Sephardi Jewish Prayer Chanting,” Religions 12, no. 9 (September 2021): 700, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12090700. “Mode,” Grove Music Online, https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/display/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo−9,781,561,592,630-e−0,000,043,718 (accessed April 16, 2023); Mark Kligman, “The Bible, Prayer, and Maqām: Extra-Musical Associations of Syrian Jews,” Ethnomusicology 45, no. 3 (2001): 443–79, https://doi.org/10.2307/852866. Farraj and Shumays, Inside Arabic Music 4–5.
59 “رحمت - حسن خانچی,” video, آپارات - سرویس اشتراک ویدیو, https://www.aparat.com/v/nT2FH (accessed June 7, 2023).
60 “مداحی زیبای عربی محمد الجنامی پیشواز محرم 1442 - شبکه جهانی بیت العباس علیه السلام”