Unsuccessful Effort of the Superpowers to Settle the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Aftermath of the Six-Day War: The Gromyko-Goldberg Agreement

ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab countries, the Soviets and the Americans were locked in a diplomatic and propaganda battle in the UN over the future of the vast territories that Israel had conquered. Fearing that their Middle-Eastern clients, namely Egypt and Israel, could drag them into a direct clash, the two superpowers maintained secret contacts parallel to their power struggle in the UN in an effort to reach an agreement on principles to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Studies that analyze the diplomatic and political consequences of the Six-Day War tend to belittle or even ignore the tentative agreement reached between Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Arthur Goldberg, the US ambassador to the UN. This article offers a new perspective on the neglected Gromyko-Goldberg agreement and a new interpretation of its indirect role in bringing the two superpowers to support UN Resolution 242 that formed the foundation for future diplomatic efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt signed in March 1979. The article also illustrates the negative impact of the Cold War on the two superpowers’ attempts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

KEYWORDS:

• Arab-Israeli conflict
• Cold War
• Six-Day War
• US-Soviet relations

Introduction

The Six-Day War (June 5–10, 1967) between Israel and three Arab countries – Egypt, Syria, and Jordan – that ended with a crushing victory by Israel presented the US and the Soviet Union with a new challenge at the height of the Cold War. The two superpowers feared that the capture of vast Arab territory by Israel could lead to another war between the Middle-Eastern belligerents, and drag them into direct conflict. The Soviets, who failed to prevent the debacle of their chief clients in the Middle East, Egypt and Syria, strove to bring about a UN resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw its forces from all the Arab territories it had conquered during the war. Moscow feared that without such a resolution, the US, Israel’s patron, would increase its prestige and strengthen its influence not only in the Middle East, but also worldwide. Although the two superpowers conducted rigid competition in the Middle East and tried to diminish the influence and standing of the other powers in the region, when it suited their respective geostrategic interests, they cooperated and even promoted a joint policy.¹

Soviet determination to force Israel to withdraw from the captured territories remained firm in spite of the fact that the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had taken the very steps that eventually led to the Six-Day War without consulting the Soviets, nor even informing them of his intent.² The Kremlin, though, was forced to recognize that in order to get the minimum required votes of the UN members for a resolution on Israeli withdrawal, they needed American cooperation. Washington, for its part, considered Israel’s striking victory an American triumph too, as it represented a defeat by its client of the USSR’s major clients in the Middle East, Egypt and Syria, at a time that the US was wallowing in the mud of Vietnam.³ Like the Soviets, the Americans also wished to bring about a UN resolution on a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but they were determined to prevent a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from all captured territories without first securing Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist and freedom of passage, including through the Suez Canal. President Lyndon B. Johnson, who held a longstanding sympathy toward Israel, was the first American president to decide to sell Israel tanks and Skyhawk aircrafts.⁴ Relations between the US and Egypt, on the other hand, were strained in the years before the war, and further deteriorated after the war following President Nasser’s refusal to retract his accusations of the US participation in the war on the side of Israel – known as the “big lie.”⁵

The UN arena thus became the main diplomatic battlefield, where the two superpowers and their followers conducted firm diplomatic and propaganda campaigns. Still, sharing a common interest to avoid a new flareup in the Middle East, both superpowers conducted secret negotiations in an effort to reach an agreement on terms of a settlement of the Middle-East conflict.⁶ Studies that analyze the diplomatic and political consequences of the Six-Day War tend to belittle or even ignore the tentative agreement known as the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement, reached in July 1967 between the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Arthur Goldberg, the US ambassador to the UN.⁷ Focus is given to UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which Wm. Roger Louis described as a “landmark in the history of the United Nations.” Reflecting this common US-Soviet approach, Moshe Gat further concluded that this resolution “was to become the basis of all future efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.”⁸

The tendency to disregard the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement corresponded with its failure. Yet, the findings of this article conclude that despite the swift collapse of the agreement, it had significant influence on the decision by Washington and Moscow to vote for Resolution 242.⁹ The negotiations further demonstrated to the two superpowers the advantages of conducting direct negotiations on explosive issues that might drag them into direct conflict, and could also be seen as one of the milestones on the road to détente during the Nixon administration that succeeded Johnson.¹⁰ The Gromyko-Goldberg negotiations likewise reveal the substantial influence of the Middle-Eastern clients, particularly Egypt, on the conduct of their respective Big Power patrons. Based on American, British, Soviet, Eastern-European, and Israeli sources, this article traces the secret interactions that led to the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement and the causes of its failure.¹¹ The historical analysis offers a new perspective on the neglected Gromyko-Goldberg agreement and a novel interpretation of its indirect role in bringing the two superpowers to support Resolution 242, as well as the negative impact of the Cold War on the attempts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Soviet initiatives at the UN

On June 13, 1967, three days after the Six-Day War, at the opening of the 1358^th session of the UN General Assembly, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Nikolai F. Fedorenko accused Israel of trying to change the balance of power in the Near East in order to secure advantages for US imperialism and weaken what he called the “progressive regimes” in Egypt, Syria, and other countries. He submitted a Soviet-proposed resolution containing a vigorous condemnation of Israel’s “aggressive” activities, and a demand for the “withdrawal of Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the UAR [Egypt], Jordan, and Syria seized as a result of aggression.”¹² Although Fedorenko knew there was hardly any chance of getting such a resolution accepted, this proposal was part of Moscow’s desperate efforts to demonstrate to the Arabs the USSR’s determination to fight for their cause, and to show members of the Security Council that due to the deadlock on the Israeli-Arab issue in the Council, a special emergency session of the General Assembly was needed. The next day, the Security Council voted on the Soviet draft proposal. Only four member states (Bulgaria, India, Mali, and the Soviet Union) supported the first paragraph condemning “Israel’s aggressive activities,” while the other eleven states abstained. For tactical reasons, the United States preferred to abstain – a negative vote of a permanent member meant veto, unnecessary in view of the Soviet failure to muster the minimum of nine votes. Six states (Ethiopia and Nigeria joined the above four) supported the second paragraph, calling Israel to withdraw beyond the armistice lines.¹³

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko did not wait to see the results of the vote; before it was carried out, he had already called on U Thant, Secretary General of the UN, to convene an immediate emergency special session of the UN General Assembly “to consider the question of liquidating the consequences of Israel’s aggression against Arab states and the immediate withdrawal of Israel behind the armistice lines.”¹⁴ The Soviets hoped that by shifting the scene from the Security Council – where they could not win a vote without Arab compromise – to the Assembly, the Arabs could drum up a respectable number of votes for a resolution endorsing their case.¹⁵ The Soviets knew that unlike the Security Council, which had the authority to take mandatory action, the Assembly could only recommend, not mandate, even if a resolution had passed with the required two-thirds majority. Still, anxious to present themselves as the Arabs’ principal ally and champion, the Soviets opted for this track. They realized that by initiating the convening of an emergency session, they would shift the campaign’s focus to the propaganda arena, which offered them the opportunity to expose the United States’ firm support of Israel while damaging Washington’s stand among the Arabs.¹⁶

In Washington-based discussions over Soviet aims and tactics, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarded the Soviets as adhering to their conviction that their interests in the Middle East were best served by an alignment with radical Arab forces, and were engaged in a noisy campaign to convince both the Arabs and the world at large of their determination to maintain their presence in the region. Likewise the Soviets, the CIA believed, wished to demonstrate that the USSR was the Arabs’ only hope among the great powers. The CIA had no doubt that the Soviets would go along with Arab policies and support Arab refusal to compromise on most issues. At the same time, the CIA believed that the Arabs would have to recognize that the Soviets were determined to avoid direct involvement in active hostilities or any risk of confrontation with the United States.¹⁷ A senior CIA official told Patrick Dean, the British ambassador in Washington, that Soviet efforts to consolidate their position in Egypt and Syria were also aimed at bringing about the overthrow of either the Libyan or Saudi monarchies, consequently making their oil wealth available to the “progressive” Arab states. The Russians, according to the CIA official, knew that the “Israeli problem” could not be solved by aiming to destroy Israel, and therefore it would be more to their advantage to have Israel sealed off from the Arab world, leaving them free to pursue their anti-Western policies in the rest of the region.¹⁸

The importance ascribed by the Soviets to the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly came to the fore when they announced that Premier Alexi Kosygin would lead the Soviet delegation. The prime ministers of Soviet Bloc countries, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, also declared that they would head their respective delegations. President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to follow the Soviet maneuver, and did not plan to attend the special session. Washington expected nothing constructive to come out of the special emergency session, yet there was concern that a Soviet program combining Israeli withdrawal, a return to the Armistice Agreements, and the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba could win broad support. ¹⁹ The Administration thus decided not to leave the diplomatic arena to Kosygin, but rather to take the lead in announcing a plan to terminate the conflict in the Middle East.²⁰

On June 19, 1967, shortly before Kosygin was to deliver his speech at the opening of the special emergency session, Johnson took a preemptive move. In an address to the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, Johnson outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East. (Although not devoted solely to the Middle East, the speech’s focus had been the conflict in the region). The five principles were: the recognized right of national life; justice for the (Palestinian) refugees; “free maritime passage” through international waterways; limitation of the arms race; and finally, political independence and territorial integrity for all. These five principles, Johnson stated, were not new, but taken together “they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace.”²¹ The president also referred indirectly to the Soviet demand for an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4, 1967, and quoted United States Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg, who had said that this was not a prescription for peace, but rather for renewed hostilities. President Johnson believed that troops had to be withdrawn, but spoke of withdrawal in general terms binding it to the fulfillment of the five principles. He concluded his speech with an indirect reference to the Soviet initiative to convene the emergency session when he stated, “This is not a time for malice, but for magnanimity; not for propaganda, but for patience; not for vituperation, but for vision.”²²

Johnson started his speech at 9:31 AM in Washington; at 10:30 AM in New York, Premier Kosygin was to begin his statement at the opening of the UN Emergency Special Session. The proximity of the two addresses left Kosygin no time to react to Johnson’s five principles. The Soviet leader described the Middle East events in the context of what he considered the general aggression on the “Imperialists part,” citing primarily American aggression in Vietnam, but also in Cuba and the Congo. He blamed the United States and the United Kingdom for blocking a Security Council resolution condemning Israel and calling it to withdraw its troops. Neither did he miss the opportunity to attack West Germany, too, arguing that it was seeking revenge for its defeat during World War II. Turning to the Middle East, he went on to relate a history of “constant Israeli aggression against the Arabs” since 1948. Still, he pointed out that the Soviet Union was not against Israel per se, but rather against the “aggressive policies” of its rulers, reminding the Assembly that the Soviet Union had supported the creation of a Jewish state. He then proposed a resolution calling for the “condemnation of Israel’s aggression,” past and present; demanding Israel’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal behind the 1949 Armistice demarcation line; calling for the restitution by Israel of all seized property and compensation for all damage incurred; and finally calling for the Security Council to undertake all effective measures to eliminate the “consequences of the aggression.” Despite the militancy of his speech, Kosygin made clear his government’s wish to solve the Middle East crisis through negotiations, and insisted on the Great Powers’ important role.²³ The CIA considered the speech “harsh toward Israel, but with an effort to appear statesmanlike and generally moderate.” The aim was to pull as many Assembly members as possible toward the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli question. Kosygin, according to the CIA analysis, sought to portray Soviet policy around the world as consonant with the UN’s objective, in contrast to the United States, whose conduct in the Middle East, Vietnam, and elsewhere endangered international stability. Still, the CIA noted that Kosygin’s references to the American role in the Middle East were on the whole “temperate and unprovocative,” and that he came nowhere near alleging that the United States had intervened directly in the hostilities.²⁴ Kosygin’s and Johnson’s speeches demonstrated the reciprocal relations between the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two superpowers considered the Middle East an important theater in their global rivalry.²⁵

Kosygin’s visit to the United Nations offered an opportunity for a tête-à-tête meeting between the Soviet leader and the US president. Although they had not yet met in person, during the Six-Day War the two leaders exchanged twenty “hotline” messages. While both sides recognized the importance of having such a summit conference, the process of organizing it demonstrated how bad relations between the two powers were, as well as the importance ascribed by both sides to propaganda considerations. Much more energy was spent on the question of the location than on the topics to be discussed and the expected results. After much dispute over the symbolism of the location, the meetings ultimately took place in the small college town of Glassboro, New Jersey – near the midpoint between New York (where the Soviet delegation was participating at the Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly) and Washington (geographically representing the US administration).

Johnson-Kosygin summit meetings

The first meeting between Johnson and Kosygin began on June 23. While several important issues awaited discussion, among them Vietnam, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and anti-rocket defense, both leaders agreed to place the Middle East crisis at the center of their talks. As expected, during the first day of the meeting, both sides stuck to their previous positions, yet the two leaders carefully avoided confrontation. Kosygin expressed his belief that all problems between the two nations could be solved were it not for the grave problem in Vietnam, as well as the “new problems” that had arisen in the Middle East. He felt very strongly that Vietnam had destroyed much of the positivity that had developed between the United States and the USSR, and had given China a chance to raise its head, potentially posing great danger for world peace. Both leaders agreed on the negative role the Chinese played in the international arena, as well as on China representing the very greatest danger to both countries. Still, this consent did not bring about any rapprochement on the issue of the treatment of the Middle East crisis.²⁶ In the discussions conducted the next day, the two leaders recognized that no agreement, nor even a moderate breakthrough, could be expected. In an attempt to intimidate Johnson, Kosygin warned of a long and grim war in the Middle East, like the one that had taken place in Algeria, in which millions of people might perish. Johnson pretended to be unimpressed with these threats of a new war. For his part, Johnson raised the issue of Soviet arms supplies to Arab countries and suggested a reduction in weapons’ delivery.²⁷ Kosygin declined Johnson’s request, and in a speech before Soviet-bloc leaders after departing the US, shared with his colleagues his refusal to conduct any discussion on the issue of Soviet weapons deliveries to the Arab countries.²⁸

The Johnson-Kosygin discussions clearly demonstrated the seemingly unbridgeable gap separating the two superpowers. In analyzing Soviet conduct and goals shortly after the meetings, Secretary of State Dean Rusk surmised that the Soviet leader’s trip to the United States was intended to demonstrate USSR support of the Arabs by generating pressure on the Israelis to withdraw. The Soviet decision to move to the General Assembly had been motivated by the need for a forum in which they would have greater flexibility than the Security Council, and could expect the Arabs to be subjected to pressures to temper their demands. Rusk believed that Moscow was willing to sacrifice explicit condemnation in return for a General Assembly resolution calling for withdrawal. The main thrust of the Soviet position remained that withdrawal must precede any other steps toward a resolution of the crisis.²⁹ While the Johnson-Kosygin meetings only reaffirmed the differences between the two powers over the process of solving the Israeli-Arab conflict, the discussions also proved both leaders’ determination to avoid being dragged into direct conflict. NATO’s analysis perhaps best defined the summit; its chief importance was not the content of the discussions, but rather the fact that the meeting took place.³⁰

Meanwhile in the UN, behind the scenes negotiations between the Soviets and the Americans had taken place. Moscow and Washington realized that the time to reach an agreement on a resolution was limited; Assembly President Abdul Rahman Pazhwak of Afghanistan had already set July 17, 1967 as the date the Assembly would be informed about the outcome of consultations on a draft proposal. On the appointed day, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin initiated a meeting with Goldberg, inquiring whether the United States desired a constructive result from the Assembly. Goldberg replied in the affirmative and denied any rumors to the contrary.³¹ The two ambassadors then tried to reach an agreement on the phrasing of a resolution. Very quickly it became clear that Dobrynin’s maneuver space was limited, since the Arab leaders had insisted on Soviet Premier Kosygin’s draft proposal, which was presented in his June 19 speech at the emergency special session.³²

Nevertheless, the Soviets did not abandon their commitment to reaching an agreement with the Americans, and promoted their delegation level when Foreign Minister Gromyko joined the discussions. In his opening remarks, Gromyko made it clear that on the Soviet side there was no question regarding the existence of Israel, for whose creation both powers shared responsibility. Gromyko had no doubt that the United States could influence Israel on the withdrawal of its troops. He criticized American conduct in the General Assembly, which he viewed as having created obstacles on the way to normalizing the situation in the Middle East and thereby hindering Soviet ability to influence extremist tendencies in the Arab world. Gromyko specifically pointed to the failure to find an alternative phrasing for the term “belligerence” that would satisfy both sides. While recognizing the difficulties the Soviets had with the Arab states, Goldberg expected the former to realize that the United States had similar problems with Israel, and that “there were no puppets in the Middle East, on either side.” Very quickly it became clear that no agreement would be reached at this meeting, yet both Gromyko and Goldberg did not abandon hope of finding an agreed-upon formula. While Goldberg did not care whether an agreement would be reached either in the General Assembly or the Security Council, Gromyko preferred the General Assembly, “so we would not clash in the SC.”³³ Goldberg observed that Gromyko had seemed “harassed,” while Walt Rostow, national security adviser to President Johnson, believed “the Soviets would like to find an agreed formula on the Middle East, but they cannot bring around the extreme Arabs.”³⁴

Soviet-Arab disputes

Rostow correctly analyzed the Soviets’ complicated situation. In mid-July, the Soviet leadership had met with Algerian President Houari Boumedienne and Iraqi president Abdel Rahman Aref, both of whom had come to Moscow on behalf of the other “progressive” Arab countries. The tense talks involved angry remarks made by both Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Premier Kosygin, reflecting Moscow’s frustration with Boumedienne’s stand. The Algerian leader had refused any compromise and ignored the Soviet leaders’ requests to consider Moscow’s diplomatic interests. Brezhnev insisted on the need to pass a resolution calling for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the end of the state of war. The Soviet leader reported the conclusion arrived at by international law experts, that ending the state of war did not mean recognizing the Zionist state, and insisted that failure to pass a resolution at the UN served the interests of both the “imperialists” and Israel, as it would enable the latter to remain indefinitely in the occupied territories. In a futile effort to influence the two “progressive” Iraqi and Algerian leaders, Brezhnev warned that, if backed by the “imperialist” countries the Israelis decided to initiate another blow against Egypt and Syria, such a move would bring about not only the downfall of the “progressive Arab regimes,” but worse, could also lead to nuclear war. Unimpressed, Boumedienne countered that ending the state of war essentially meant capitulation, and firmly rejected Kosygin’s urging to convince both Nasser and the Syrian president to support a UN resolution. Boumedienne also refused a proposal suggesting Israeli forces withdrew first, enabling the USSR to link the withdrawal to the issues of ending the state of war, and guaranteeing free navigation through the Suez Canal. Boumedienne blamed the Soviet leaders for insisting, for diplomatic reasons, that a vote be taken on a resolution, any resolution, regardless of whether it called for ending the state of war or not. Failing to convince Boumedienne, Brezhnev angrily stated that the Algerian president’s opinions could lead to a new defeat. The meeting ended with both sides recognizing that no breakthrough was expected.³⁵ A few days earlier, in a meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders in Budapest, Brezhnev had criticized Boumedienne and accused him of aspiring to succeed Nasser as leader of the Arab world.³⁶ Brezhnev’s frustration demonstrated the anomaly when one of the world’s two superpowers could not enforce its position on a leader of a vulnerable Middle-Eastern country. After failing to save Egypt and Syria from a humiliating defeat, Moscow seemed to have lost much of its influence on some of the other Arab leaders presumed to be in the Soviet Orbit.

In his report on the meetings to Nasser, Boumedienne stated that the Soviets wished to pass a UN resolution at any price, irrespective of the provisions it contained concerning the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Boumedienne had no doubt that the Soviets were anxious to avoid a diplomatic defeat and were wary of direct confrontation with the Americans. Furthermore, they were opposed to the destruction of Israel.³⁷ Nasser concurred with Boumedienne’s analysis. Soviet pressure to pass a resolution – any resolution – at the UN worried him, and he shared his concern that the Soviets and the Americans had already come to an agreement. Nasser made it clear that accepting the Soviet stand on ending the state of war would turn Egypt’s one defeat into two.³⁸

Nasser was wrong to assume that the United States and the USSR had reached an agreement. He was correct, however, in his assumption that the Soviets were determined to continue their efforts to reach an agreement with the Americans, and to convince the Arab leaders to support it.³⁹ One day after the Gromyko-Goldberg meeting, on July 21, 1967, Dobrynin showed Goldberg two texts drafted based on his talks with Gromyko. Goldberg noticed some changes, and both ambassadors compared their respective notes of the conversation of the previous day. After redrafting the two texts, Dobrynin confirmed by telephone Gromyko’s approval of the revised wording. According to Goldberg’s report to the State Department, Dobrynin appeared to show the greatest interest in version I, which spoke of withdrawal “without delay” of the forces of the parties from “territories occupied by them;” conversely, Version II did not include the words “without delay,” and stated that “the withdrawal by the parties to the conflict to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967, is expected.” Neither the Americans nor the Soviets had consulted their respective clients on the text. Hence, Dobrynin requested two to three days to enable Egypt’s government to take a decision. Goldberg believed that both proposals would be unacceptable to the Arabs, and that the Soviets would not be willing to break with them. He regarded the constant Soviet requests for delay in adjourning the special session to be merely a bargaining tactic, and thought the General Assembly would end with only procedural resolutions.⁴⁰

Goldberg’s skepticism was well founded. When he met Dobrynin on the morning of July 22, the ambassador told him that although the USSR was prepared to vote for a resolution that the two delegations had worked out, he assumed that some Arabs would vote against it and that the rest would abstain. To Dobrynin’s query, Goldberg replied that Israel would probably also vote negatively. During the conversation, Goldberg discovered that the Soviets generated a new version that spoke about an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories captured during the Six-Day War. Goldberg firmly opposed this alteration, stating that the reference to June 5, 1967 had not been included in the version agreed upon with Dobrynin the day before. This modification reinforced Goldberg’s conviction that the Soviets wished to disengage from substantive text and revert to a procedural ending of the General Assembly.⁴¹ In his memoirs, Dobrynin argued that Goldberg had proposed a compromise draft that seemed reasonable to him, but afterward went back on it. ⁴² For his part, in his memoirs, Egyptian foreign minister Mahmoud Riad also blamed the United States of withdrawing its support of the Gromyko-Goldberg draft resolution forty-eight hours after it had been agreed upon.⁴³ There are no proofs to substantiate these assertions. More likely, the Soviets, knowing Nasser’s views and the pressure of extreme Arab leaders on him not to compromise, chose not to confront the Egyptian leader, and instead unilaterally rephrased the text of the proposed resolution to include the clauses they believed were most important to him, hoping that if he accepted the suggested text, the Americans would concede and pressure Israel to compromise.

While publicly the Soviets were careful not to accuse the Arabs of aborting their efforts to bring about a resolution requiring Israel to withdraw its forces, in a meeting with Soviet bloc leaders, Brezhnev blamed the Arabs for not showing appropriate realism. He particularly criticized Nasser for following the “leftist-extremist elements in Syria and Algeria,” and overlooking the important political opportunity of the July (Gromyko-Goldberg) resolution, which included the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces to pre-June 5, 1967 positions.⁴⁴ East-European leaders followed Moscow’s lead in criticizing the Arab position. At a joint session of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and government on July 31, Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov criticized the Syrian, Iraqi, and Algerian leaders for impeding the acceptance of a resolution in the UN, and for purporting to turn the Middle East into a “second Vietnam.” He warned about dragging the world into a global nuclear war.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, no one in Moscow and none of the Soviet bloc leaders suggested to pressure the Egyptian leader to demonstrate flexibility while taking advantage of Egypt’s total military, economic, and political dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Soviets did hide their differences with several Arab leaders. Dobrynin agreed with Goldberg that the moderate Arab countries had been intimidated by the extreme ones, mainly Syria and Algeria. When told by Goldberg that if the Arabs could have voted secretly on their joint (Gromyko-Goldberg) draft, many would have accepted the agreed formula, the Soviet ambassador interjected, saying, “Yes, eight or nine.”⁴⁶ The Soviet ambassador also shared with Secretary Rusk the USSR’s frustration with the “ultra-extremist Arab circles,” who did not wish to accept even the existence of Israel. Dobrynin blamed Algeria and Syria for wrecking the Soviet government’s hopes of achieving something at the special assembly. According to Dobrynin, Egypt would have been ready to consider a compromise, had it not been for the extremists’ opposition.⁴⁷

The Arabs, however, were not the only ones to oppose the Gromyko-Goldberg draft. Israeli officials considered the Gromyko-Goldberg negotiations to pose the gravest danger to Israeli interests.⁴⁸ Referring to his talks with Goldberg and his team after learning of the Gromyko-Goldberg draft, Israel’s foreign minister Abba Eban wrote in his autobiography that they were “one of the most embarrassing discussions which the United States and Israel had ever held.” Eban told Goldberg he could see no difference between this draft and Kosygin’s call for unconditional withdrawal, and said that if this text was presented and voted on, Israel would find itself in the tragic position of having to flout a joint American-Soviet proposal endorsed by the General Assembly.⁴⁹ In his report to Jerusalem, Ephraim Evron, Minister at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, wrote that the Americans were enthusiastic about reaching an agreement with the Soviets.⁵⁰ Israel’s position disturbed Goldberg, who shared his criticism with the State Department.⁵¹ Goldberg was thrown into a difficult situation, as he was considered by both his colleagues and the Soviets as a firm supporter of Israel’s case, and a Zionist.⁵² In his memoirs, Arkady N. Shevchenko, the deputy head of the USSR’s UN mission, wrote that the Soviet delegation to the UN referred to Goldberg as a “slick Jew who could fool the devil himself.”⁵³

The conclusion of the special emergency session of the General Assembly marked the end of the first phase in Soviet diplomatic campaign on behalf of the Arab cause in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. The Soviets were exceedingly frustrated. Contrary to their plan to turn the special emergency session into a platform for rehabilitating their prestige and standing in the international arena in general and among the Arab countries in particular, the Soviets suffered yet another failure, and their relations with their close allies among the Arab states became more strained. The firm Arab opposition to any compromise absolved the United States from confronting Israel and demanding that it demonstrate more flexibility and accept a variation of Gromyko-Goldberg proposal. In contrast to the Soviets, Washington viewed the emergency session as a major political victory. “Our position,” Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow wrote to Rusk, “has been almost universally acknowledged to be a fair one, even by our adversaries.” The Soviet Union had to come to the United States, and accepted US terms in order to get a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops. The Soviet position during the last days of the Assembly came as a shock to the Arabs who were expecting the USSR to produce a political miracle that could erase the reality of the Israeli victory. Many of the Arab leaders now came to realize that the USSR could not bring about Israeli withdrawals; only the United States could do so.⁵⁴

Efforts to revive the Gromyko-Goldberg draft resolution

The convening of the regular session of the UN on September 19, 1967 offered the foreign ministers of the two superpowers an opportunity to discuss the issues at stake face-to-face. In a private conversation with Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that the Soviet view was based on the tentative draft that had been worked out in July (the Gromyko-Goldberg proposal). Rusk relayed rumors that the Soviets were moving away from that position and leaning toward the proposals of Yugoslav leader Joseph Tito.⁵⁵ Admitting that Tito’s proposals were more acceptable to the Arabs and suited Soviet position, Gromyko simultaneously recognized that such proposals could not produce an answer.⁵⁶ In his report to President Johnson, Rusk noted that while the Soviets would not object to an opening of the Suez Canal to ships sailing under the Israeli flag, Gromyko saw no prospect of Egypt agreeing to that. Rusk therefore doubted that without Arab agreement, the Soviets would publicly support the passage of Israeli ships through Suez. He did, however, draw encouragement from Gromyko’s message that the Soviets were now less concerned with the Syrians and Algerians, and were prepared to work with Nasser and the moderate Arabs toward a solution. The Soviets, according to Rusk, expected the United States to make concessions to the Arab-Soviet side. Rusk also pointed out that he and Gromyko agreed that the state of belligerency between the Arabs and Israel must be removed, but failed to find a formula to achieve this without humiliating the Arabs.⁵⁷

Two weeks after his meeting with Rusk, Gromyko called the American ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson, and told him that although at the time the Arabs had been opposed to the American form of the resolution (the Gromyko-Goldberg draft), now all Arab countries were taking a more realistic position. He suggested that the resolution be adopted “as is.” After stressing the danger of resuming military activities in the region, Gromyko stated his readiness to try and convince Egypt and Jordan to agree to carry out the resolution even before its adoption, on the condition that Israel did so too. Thompson expected the Israelis to ask if this meant the Suez Canal would be open to their ships. Gromyko replied that this question should be discussed on the basis of the resolution, as would the question of Palestinian refugees, and that no progress could be expected if this issue would have to be specifically discussed in advance.⁵⁸

The next day, October 10, 1967, the State Department initiated a meeting between Goldberg and Dobrynin. Goldberg reminded Dobrynin that after they had confirmed two versions of their agreement in July, Dobrynin had presented a third one, which Goldberg promptly returned due to it not reflecting the understanding previously achieved in his discussion with Gromyko. Goldberg inquired what texts the Soviets had made available to the Arabs. Confused, Dobrynin gave an evasive answer that revealed his uneasiness. Still, he probed whether the United States was prepared to go ahead with the Gromyko-Goldberg draft. Goldberg replied that the United States was prepared to accept that draft resolution, subject to consultations by both the United States and the USSR with principal parties, and provided there was a clear understanding as to what the resolution meant, and what was required by way of affirmative acts by parties. It must be clear, he said, that the United States and USSR have a mutual understanding of the resolution, that the language of the resolution meant that Arab states confirmed the end of the state of war and renounced belligerency, and that waterways would be opened to Israeli shipping. Dobrynin conveyed his impression that Egypt’s Foreign Minister Riad was prepared to recognize Israel and renounce belligerency. Goldberg disagreed. Based on his talk with Riad the day before, he said that while the Egyptian foreign minister saw no difficulty in opening waterways as a matter of principle, he had stressed that no Egyptian government would survive if it allowed Israeli vessels to pass through the Suez Canal. Goldberg also informed Dobrynin of his talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, who had told him that no Israeli government could agree to withdraw in circumstances where the Canal was open and ships sailing under an Israeli flag were not permitted there.

Dobrynin queried what kind of confirmation the United States required. Goldberg replied that the deal could not be secret; a plain statement by the resolution’s sponsors as to its meaning was necessary, as were affirmative acts by Arabs acknowledging in some form Israel’s existence and renouncing Arab belligerency. Goldberg said that although he was not insisting on specific reference to the word “belligerency,” in their communication, the Arabs must clearly accept the resolution and undertake to carry it out. Dobrynin argued that Washington’s simultaneous linking of the withdrawal with the opening of the Canal to all vessels confused matters. Goldberg insisted it was his understanding that the two issues were linked. Dobrynin did not rule out that the parties might move toward a final settlement, but was sure the Arabs would not discuss peace with the Israelis directly, and that a final settlement would depend primarily on whether Israeli withdrawal could be achieved.⁵⁹

Goldberg, who found Soviet sincerity suspect, believed the Soviets presented the Arabs with a text different from the one he had agreed on with Gromyko, and that Soviet Ambassador to the UN Nikolai Fedorenko described the Gromyko-Goldberg text as a US draft. Goldberg feared that the Soviets intended to bring about a resolution that each of the sides would eventually interpret differently, and that the Arabs would not execute any of the actions required of their side. He suspected both the Soviets’ and Egypt's real stand regarding the opening of the Suez Canal. Based on his extensive talks with Riad, he concluded that Egypt was unwilling to take any positive step toward the renunciation of belligerency and allowing Israeli ships passage through the Canal. Goldberg thus insisted that the Russians clearly express their interpretation of the resolution and rejected the latter’s intention of making their agreement dependent on Arab acceptance, while conversely a US accord would have to be undertaken without Israeli consent.⁶⁰

Both ambassadors were frustrated by the meeting. According to Yuri N. Tcherniakov, minister counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Dobrynin had been discouraged by his talk with Goldberg; a sentiment heightened by the realization that Goldberg’s position reflected that of the Johnson administration.⁶¹ Following a four-hour meeting with Tcherniakov, Eugene Rostow concluded that the Russians had yet to make up their mind, and that since the opening of the Canal was difficult for them they might opt for a simple resolution, which made no mention of withdrawal and merely provided for the appointment of a mediator and the encouragement of bilateral talks.⁶²

In his report to the president about discussions with the Soviets, Walt Rostow, national security adviser (and Eugene’s brother), wrote that Goldberg and apparently also Dobrynin thought they’d “hit a dead end.” The key question, according to Rostow, was whether the United States should make any concessions in order to revive the Gromyko-Goldberg draft resolution. He acknowledged that the Soviets wanted a loose resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal, while stating Arab obligations vaguely enough that they could be disregarded. But still, he wondered whether there was a halfway position between Goldberg’s “hard line” of insisting that the Arabs renounce belligerency and open the Suez Canal, and that of “most of us,” who felt that the United States ought to try and salvage something from the Gromyko-Goldberg understanding. Rostow admitted that any dilution of the US position would bring the United States into a head-on clash with the Israelis, who were of the opinion that they had already gone too far in committing themselves, in essence, to withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 boundaries.⁶³

The importance the Soviets ascribed to reaching a Soviet-American agreement was clearly displayed when Soviet Premier Kosygin tried to break the deadlock and approached President Johnson directly. The Soviet leader expressed his surprise at the fact that after the opening of the General Assembly’s present session, not only did the Americans not forward in the search of a political settlement in the Near East, but displayed a somewhat different attitude even toward the United States’s own proposals (the Gromyko-Goldberg draft) presented during the General Assembly Emergency Session. Kosygin warned that if the question of the speedy withdrawal of Israeli forces was not solved, there could be no peace in the region, and the explosive situation would introduce further complications into international relations as a whole. He urged speedy adoption, in the Security Council, of a resolution discussed between the two powers in July (Gromyko-Goldberg), which provided for the withdrawal without delay of troops from the occupied territories to pre-June 5, 1967 positions, and at the same time recognized the principle of independent national existence of all states in that area and their right to live in peace and security. Each side, Kosygin stressed, would be bound to observe such a Security Council resolution. The other questions, including free navigation, should be resolved in the interest of all countries on the basis of the aforementioned resolution, if adopted by the Security Council. Kosygin denied that the Arab states were not agreeable to recognizing Israel’s right to independent national existence.⁶⁴ In his report to Soviet bloc leaders, Brezhnev argued that Kosygin’s letter to Johnson was intended to exert pressure on the United States and “to expose the Pharisaic character of their policy.”⁶⁵ Kosygin’s initiative clearly demonstrated Moscow’s grave concern that the assembly dissolved with no resolution on the withdrawal of Israeli forces.⁶⁶

Kosygin’s letter led Goldberg to initiate a meeting with Vasili V. Kuznetsov, first deputy foreign minister, who replaced Gromyko as head of the Soviet delegation. The American ambassador wanted to know why, on October 19, Dobrynin had given the UN Secretary two versions of the Gromyko-Goldberg draft, both containing a June 5 date. Goldberg complained that not only had the Soviets in this way breached the practice of confidential discussions between the two countries, but that they had also presented text that had not yet been agreed upon. The American ambassador warned that the matter must be clarified, otherwise the United States would have to declare that the texts presented were falsified. Kuznetsov insisted that they had checked all the records, and the documents given were genuine versions. He questioned US motives in ascribing such importance to the date, noting that “maybe the United States is seeking to go back on its position.” American insistence on dropping the date, according to Kuznetsov, could generate the opinion that the United States favored a solution not requiring the full liberation of Arab territories and leaving certain territories under Israeli occupation, so that withdrawal would be incomplete.

Goldberg reviewed in detail the discussions he had conducted with Gromyko in July and insisted that at no time during those conversations did the Soviets ever assert a linkage between the opening of the Suez Canal and a solution of the Palestinian refugee question. Goldberg further stated that using the date meant rolling everything back to prewar conditions, including “the unstable conditions of armistice agreements: Canal and Straits can be closed at whim of UAR; armies confront one another on frontiers; and there are no demilitarized zones.” Kuznetsov disagreed, arguing that the date referred only to territory occupied, and not to other problems. He further wondered if the United States favored Israel retaining territory. Goldberg replied that the United States was not in favor of territorial aggrandizement or restoration of old conditions, but questions regarding what positions should military forces withdraw into had to be cleared up in discussions among parties. If no date was included in the resolution, Kuznetsov maintained, Israel might not withdraw from all Arab territories. He insisted that Israeli troops should withdraw to pre-June 5, 1967 positions, and that other problems should be considered in accordance with this resolution.⁶⁷ Years later, Goldberg wrote that “More surprising is the Soviet support of the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. The Soviet Union holds territory in its firm grasp acquired in recent times by war from Finland, Poland, Romania, Japan, and other states.” Even the United States, he continued, had acquired territory by war from Mexico and Spain.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, it became clear that the nonpermanent members of the Security Council failed to reach an agreement on a draft resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on November 3, they reported their failure to the permanent members.⁶⁹ In his report to Johnson on the negotiations with the Soviets, Rusk argued that the Soviet Union and Nasser were moving away from a mutually acceptable resolution, and might put on the Security Council’s table the Indian draft resolution, prepared in fact by the Egyptians.⁷⁰ The Indian draft was unacceptable to the Israelis because it gave priority to a call for withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 5, 1967 positions, and was much less precise on the questions of recognition of Israel and the termination of belligerency. President Johnson was informed that, not wanting to find himself looking negative and defensive in the face of the Indian resolution, Goldberg wished to preempt it by placing a United States’ proposed resolution on the table.⁷¹

On November 7, Goldberg presented the United States’ draft. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov was quick to express Moscow’s dissatisfaction with it, criticizing its ambiguity on withdrawal.⁷² He expected the United States to clearly articulate that it favored the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories to the positions occupied by them before June 5, 1967.⁷³ In a meeting of Soviet bloc leaders, Brezhnev maintained that Goldberg had said to Soviet representatives that the United States’ July draft (i.e., Gromyko-Goldberg) was “a dead horse.” The Soviet leader interpreted Goldberg’s statement as an admission that the United States had abandoned it altogether.⁷⁴

Following Kuznetsov’s reaction, Goldberg came to the conclusion that neither the Soviets nor the Arab states would support his draft resolution. He was forced to agree with the British assessment that under no circumstances would the Soviets support an American draft, given that such support would be interpreted as yet another American success in the international arena.⁷⁵ For their part, the British, wishing to play a role in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict alongside the two superpowers, and to avoid the need to support either American or Soviet draft resolutions, decided to table a draft embodying the British view of what both sides should be able to accept.⁷⁶ Lord Caradon, the British ambassador to the UN, decided to wait until Goldberg decided to give up his draft resolution.⁷⁷ Goldberg not only gave Caradon a green light, but he also joined the British efforts to win support for their draft resolution.⁷⁸ For him, approval of the British draft was second best to an acceptance of an American draft.⁷⁹ At this stage, Goldberg gave up reaching a joint agreement with the Soviets and enforcing it on the Middle Eastern belligerents.

The decision to support resolution 242

The British initiative led Kuznetsov and Riad, the Egyptian foreign minister, to apply pressure on the British to make a few changes, mainly adding a demand that Israel withdraw its forces from “all” territories.⁸⁰ Kuznetsov’s efforts to influence Caradon to change the British draft failed. Yet, the Soviets did not give up, and on November 19, one day before the convening of the Security Council, President Johnson received a letter from Kosygin calling on him to support a new Soviet draft resolution. According to the Soviet premier, this draft was based on the proposals the United States government had itself put forward toward the close of the emergency special session. The Soviet draft fitted Moscow’s version of the Gromyko-Goldberg draft resolution calling Israel to immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967.⁸¹ Johnson immediately declined Kosygin’s request.⁸² He realized that Soviet decision to present a new draft aimed to demonstrate to Arab leaders, particularly Nasser, Moscow’s determination to fight for their cause. And, indeed, Gromyko informed Nasser of Kosygin’s letter to Johnson and the introduction of Moscow’s draft resolution, and made it clear that on the vote on the British draft, the USSR would follow Egypt’s advice.⁸³

When the Security Council met in the afternoon of November 22, all fifteen representatives at the Council, including the Soviet delegate Vasili Kuznetsov, approved the UK draft resolution.⁸⁴ Kuznetsov realized that the Soviet draft had no chance of getting the required votes, and renounced the need to vote on the Soviet draft resolution. Instead, he stressed the Soviet interpretation of the British resolution; namely, that Israel should withdraw from all territories occupied as a result of the June war.⁸⁵ The Soviets recognized that after backing away from the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement, no cooperation with the Americans could be expected in the UN, and therefore only support of the British draft could bring about a UN resolution on withdrawal. They were certainly also aware of Goldberg’s personal frustration, and his distrust of their sincerity. In many respects, the collapse of the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement paved the way for Resolution 242. The Soviets recognized the propaganda advantages of the vote on the British draft Resolution 242 in favor of the West, particularly the US. Yet, when faced with a choice between another failure to bring about a resolution on Israel withdrawal in the UN, and support of the British proposal, they opted for the latter. In an effort to diminish the damage to their prestige, the Soviets joined forces with the Arabs in an effort to win support for their interpretation of the withdrawal clause in the vague Resolution 242.⁸⁶

Conclusion

Soviet failure after the Six-Day War to bring about the adoption of a UN resolution that clearly favored the Arab cause, demanding that Israel immediately withdraw from the captured territories, goaded the two superpowers to try and reach a mutual secret agreement that would prevent a new dangerous flareup between Israel and Egypt, the most powerful Arab country. The two superpowers were close to reaching such an agreement, but Moscow pulled back and gave up on the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement following Nasser’s opposition to its clauses, and without formally confessing the reasons behind its decision. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this formula could have brought Israel to withdraw from most of the occupied territories, and thus provided Moscow with a significant diplomatic achievement, partially rehabilitating its prestige in the Middle East. Instead, the Soviets decided halfheartedly to support a formula (UN Resolution 242), which had been phrased by a Western power rather than the USSR or one of its satellites. The Soviets knew that in the eyes of the world not only had they failed to save the Arabs from a humiliating defeat in the war, but they also had not succeeded in delivering their clients an unambiguous resolution that would ensure the quick return of the conquered territories. Moscow knew full well that a battle over the interpretation of Resolution 242 was to come, and that Israel was not expected to pull back from all the occupied territories. The decision to support Resolution 242 had been an admission of the Kremlin’s inability to deliver a better resolution to their Arab clients nor force Israel to withdraw as had happened after the 1956 Sinai war, when then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower had pressured Israel to withdraw from the captured Sinai Peninsula without a promise of peace. ⁸⁷ In contrast to Eisenhower, President Johnson was determined to prevent a UN resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to June 4, 1967 lines without Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist and free passage, including through the Suez Canal. “This time,” Johnson wrote in his memoirs, “I was convinced we could not afford to repeat the temporary and hasty arrangements of 1957.”⁸⁸

Johnson, who was under growing domestic and international criticism for his policy in Vietnam, recognized the opportunity to beat the Soviets on the diplomatic front and score points in the international arena and in the eyes of the American public. Yet, he did not wish to humiliate the Soviets, fearing that if hostilities resumed in the Middle East, the Soviets could not afford another Arab defeat, and might even get involved in the fighting. If that happened, the US could not stay aloof, and against its best interest could be dragged into the war. Fear of such developments led to the behind-the-scenes talks between the Americans and the Soviets, and to an agreement on the principles to settle the Arab-Israel conflict (the Gromyko-Goldberg formula). Yet, upon learning that the Soviets made a significant changes to the language of the text without notifying Washington, and practically going back on the substance of the agreement, the Americans stood firm against any Soviet effort to bring about a UN resolution that contradicted the principles agreed upon in the Gromyko-Goldberg formula.

The failure of the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement had significant consequences on the two superpowers’ ability to cooperate in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Six-Day War.⁸⁹ The Soviets were forced to realize that Egypt refused to pay a significant price for getting back the captured territories; therefore Moscow’s maneuverability to negotiate a settlement was limited and any compromise on its part will have had to receive Nasser’s prior approval. The Soviets feared that the Americans might exploit any disagreement or tension between them and their Arab clients, thus separating the Arabs from Moscow, and strengthening America’s standing in the Middle East at the height of the Cold War. For their part, the Americans were ready to pressure Israel to withdraw from most of the captured territories, but only in return for Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist and freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.⁹⁰ Both superpowers essentially agreed that Israel should retreat from the Arab captured territories. Still, a breakthrough in the negotiations turned out to be complicated, since it necessitated the superpowers applying pressure on their respective clients causing them to compromise. The Soviets’ retreat, although not formally, from the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement caused the Americans to lose any trust in Moscow’s willingness to adopt an independent policy regardless of Cairo’s wishes. The dispute over the agreed-upon wording of the agreement caused the Johnson administration to lose trust in Soviet sincerity, and in effect relinquished the option of cooperating with the Soviets in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the UN corridors. The two superpowers settled for supporting Resolution 242, which served their wish to bring about a UN resolution that might prevent an immediate escalation and another war between Egypt and Israel.⁹¹ The ambiguity of the British draft resolution enabled both powers to accept its terms and urge their respective clients to support it as well. Resolution 242 did not prevent two more wars between Israel and Egypt – the War of Attrition (March 1969-September 1970) and the October 1973 Yom Kippur war – but later served as the basis for the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt (March 1979) brokered by US president Jimmy Carter, who did not involve the Soviets in the process.⁹²

In many respects, Resolution 242 was made possible due to the failure of the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement, which convinced the two superpowers of their inability to lead together an agreed-upon policy to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and enforce it on their respective reluctant Middle East clients. Yet, the behind the scenes discussions between Soviet and American diplomats strengthened the realization in Washington and Moscow of the advantages of discussing directly and confidentially the most explosive threatening disputes that could lead to direct conflict between the two nuclear superpowers. This understanding could be seen as one of the milestones that led to the détente between the two powers during Nixon’s presidency. For their part, the Middle Eastern belligerents unenthusiastically accepted the ambiguous 242 Resolution, fearing that without a UN resolution, their respective superpower patrons might reach a unilateral agreement on principles for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict as almost occurred in the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement.

The June 1967 Six-Day War created an opportunity for the two superpowers to bring about a breakthrough in the efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The captured Arab territories could have served the US and the Soviet Union as leverage to moderate the policies of their Middle East clients. However, Cold War rivalry and competition over influence in the Middle East and the wish to undermine the other power in the region as well as profound distrust prevented the leadership of the two Big Powers from taking a calculated risk, reaching an agreement, and pressuring their respective clients, Egypt and Israel, to accept a Soviet-American formula. The Gromyko-Goldberg negotiations demonstrated to the superpowers the advantages that could be drawn from direct secret negotiations, but also brought to the fore the difficulties in overcoming the profound mutual lack of trust between them, at the height of the Cold War. The reluctant Middle Eastern belligerents exploited their respective patrons’ anxiety of losing influence in the Middle East to torpedo any unilateral Soviet-American agreement. Two more bloody wars, and a change of leadership in Egypt and Israel, as well as a determined American president (Jimmy Carter), were ultimately “needed” to bring the two sides to sign a peace agreement based on Resolution 242.

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Additional information

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Arieh J. Kochavi

Arieh J. Kochavi is a Professor of Modern History at the University of Haifa, Israel. Among his books in English are Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment; Post Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States and Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948; and Confronting Captivity: Britain, the United States, and their POWs in Nazi Germany.

Notes

¹ See, for example, the decision of both the Soviet Union and the US to vote for a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the partition of Mandatory Palestine into a Jewish state (Israel) and an Arab one (Palestine). Furthermore, some ten years later, the two superpowers demanded that Britain (the US’s chief ally in the Cold War), France, and Israel withdraw their forces from Egypt after they had attacked the Arab country in October 1956. The joint attacks came following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which was owned by British and French shareholders.

Michael Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 199–222; Michael Doran, Ike’s Gamble: America’s Rise to Dominance in the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 2016),186–214; Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945–1962 (London and New York: Leicester University Press, 1996), 140–77; Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967 (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 64–71; Simon C. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-War Decolonization, 1945–1973 (London: Routledge, 2012), 42–66; Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds., The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 156–85; Tore T. Petersen, The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 1–19, 60–92; and Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967: From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six-Day War (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 207–39.

² Nasser’s steps included deployment of Egyptian troops in the Sinai (May 14, 1967), asking UN Secretary General U Thant to withdraw the 4,500 soldiers of the UN emergency force (UNEF) from the soil of the UAR and Gaza Strip, and closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, cutting off Israel’s access to the Red Sea through its port at Eilat (May 22). The Soviets were surprised, despite the fact that the chain of events that led to Nasser’s unilateral actions had begun a few weeks earlier, when Anwar Sadat, speaker of the Egyptian National Assembly, was told by the Soviets that Israel had concentrated between ten and twelve brigades on the Syrian border, ready to cross it sometime between May 16 and 22. The Soviet alarm was false, and the Kremlin knew that and therefore rejected Israel’s suggestion that the Soviet ambassador to Israel Sergei Chuvakhin visit the Israeli-Syrian border area.

Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 61–126; Laura M. James, “Egypt: Dangerous Illusions,” in The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, edited by Wm. Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge, NY, Cambridge University Press, 2012), 56–78; Guy Laron, The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), 243–55; Joseph Heller, The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948–1967 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 241–55; Rami Ginat, “The Soviet Union: The Roots of War and a Reassessment of Historiography,” in The 1967 Arab-Israeli War edited by Louis and Shlaim, 193–218; Boris Morozov, “The Outbreak of the June 1967 War in Light of Soviet Documentation,” in The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six-Day War, edited by Yaacov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 43–64; Fred Wehling, Irresolute Princes: Kremlin Decision Making in Middle East Crises, 1967–1973 (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997), 41–68; Galia Golan, Israeli Peacemaking Since 1967: Factors Behind the Breakthroughs and Failures (London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2015), 3–19; and Kenny Kolander, “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Soviet Policy by Other Means?” Middle Eastern Studies 52, no. 3 (2016): 402–18.

³ For US conduct before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, see Moshe Gat, “Let Someone Else Do the Job: American Policy on the Eve of the Six-Day War,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, no. 1 (2003): 131–58; Peter L. Hahn, “The Cold War and the Six-Day War: US Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Crisis of June 1967,” in The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the superpowers 1967–73, edited by Nigel J. Ashton (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 16–34.

⁴ Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (FRUS): Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 (Washington: the United States Government Printing Office, 2000), XVIII, Department of State to American Embassy in Israel, March 8, 1965; Ibid., Walworth Barbour, American Ambassador to Israel, to Department of State, March 11, 1964; Zach Levey, “The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 2 (April 2004): 255–76. For Johnson’s sympathy to Israel, see Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin Texas (JL), Oral History Collection, interview with Harry McPherson on September 19, 1985, VII, 1–3; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 173–217; David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 140–47; Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 27–79; Olivia Sohns, “The Future Foretold: Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Congressional Support for Israel,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 28, no. 1 (March 2017): 57–84.

⁵ FRUS: 1964–1968: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), XIX, Department of State to the US Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the UAR, October 12, 1967; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and his Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen (New York: Doubleday, 1973), 225–26; Warren I. Cohen, “Balancing American Interests in the Middle East: Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. Gamal Abdul Nasser,” in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World, American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968, edited by Warren Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1994), 279–92; and Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 129–31.

⁶ The fear of direct clash between the two superpowers led Kosygin and Johnson to exchange twenty “hotline” messages during the Six-Day War. American Embassy, Moscow to Dean Rusk, June 5, 1967, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, USA (NACP), RG 59, GRDS, CFF 1967–1969, Political & Defense, Box 1792, POL 1 to POL 27 Arab-Israel 6/6/67, File POL 27 Arab-Israel, 5/6/67; Ibid, Rusk to American Embassies, June 5, 1967; JL, NSF, NSC Histories, ME Crisis, Washington-Moscow “Hot Line” Exchanges, June 10, 1967.

⁷ Gallen Jackson, Lost Peace: Great Power Politics and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1979 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2023), 17–18, 29–32.

⁸ Wm. R. Louis, “Britain: The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242,” in The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, edited by Louis and Shlaim, 220, 234–43; Moshe Gat, In Search of a Peace Settlement: Egypt and Israel Between the Wars, 1967–1973 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 27. See also Charles D. Smith, “The United States and the 1967 War,” in The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, edited by Louis and Shlaim, 185–92; Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 125–61; David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Greater Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 18–30; Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 323–27; Frank Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and Its Aftermath (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 81–91; Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 24–28, 107–25; Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 10–28; Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, 162–63, 180–82; Lord Caradon, et. al., UN Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study In Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, George Town University, 1981).

⁹ Nigel Ashton ascribed the success of bringing about the resolution mainly to British diplomacy. Nigel Ashton, “Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,” The International History Review 38, no. 1 (2016): 24–44.

¹⁰ For the development of the détente, see Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 245–59; Chris Tudda, Cold War Summits: A History, from Potsdam to Malta (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 67–93; Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 19–25; Galen Jackson, “Who Killed Détente? The Super Powers and the Cold War in the Middle East, 1969–1977,” International Security 44, no. 3 (Winter 2019/2020): 129–62.

¹¹ For this article, I relied on the rich primary sources at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland (NAUS); the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (JL); the National Archives of United Kingdom, Kew London (NAUK); and the Israel State Archives, Jerusalem (ISA). In light of the limited access to Soviet archives, I relied on the important collection of V.V. Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Conflict, 1957–67: Dokumenty [The Middle East Conflict, 1957–1967] (Moscow, Russia, 2003) as well as on the virtual archive of the Cold War International History Project at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC (WWICS).

¹² Nicholas Katzenbach, undersecretary of state, to Dean Rusk, June 13, 1967, no. 210844, NAUS, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG), folder Central Foreign Policy File (CFF) 1967–1969, Political & Defense, box no. 1794, file POL 27 Arab-Israel 6/9/67 to POL 27 Arab-Israel 6/9/67; UK mission, New York to FO, nos. 1350, 1345, June 13, 1967, NAUK FCO17/512; Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York, NY, 1968), 94–106.

¹³ Joseph Sisco to the Acting Secretary of State, June 14, 1967, NAUS, GRDS, RG 59, box 16, chronological file, June 1967, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976. On the American Proposal, see Foreign Office to all Delegations, Sep. 19, 1967, ISA, File 10/4087.

¹⁴ Nicholas Katzenbach to Dean Rusk, June 13, 1967, no. 210844, NAUS, RG 59, box no. 1794, file POL 27 Arab-Israel 6/9/67 to POL 27 Arab-Israel 6/9/67, CFF 1967–1969, Political & Defense; Notes of an informal meeting of the NSC Special Committee, June 13, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 280.

¹⁵ UK mission, New York to FO, no. 1350, June 13, 1967, NAUK, FCO 17/512.

¹⁶ Record of conversation between Polish Politburo member Zenon Kliszko and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, June 24, 1967, WWICS, Virtual Archive, Collection: The Cold War in the Middle East. See also Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, 175–79, 186–89, 193–95, 205–10, 218–22; Cohen, “Balancing American Interests in the Middle East,” 279–92; Arlene Lazarowitz, “Different Approaches to a Regional Search for Balance: The Johnson Administration, the State Department, and the Middle East, 1964–1967,” Diplomatic History 32 (January 2008): 25–33, 41–45.

¹⁷ Memorandum prepared in the CIA, July 13, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 355. Fred Halliday, “The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War,” in The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Sayigh and Shlaim, 6–26.

¹⁸ Dean to P.T. Hayman, FO, July 18, 1967, NAUK, FCO28/33.

¹⁹ Memorandum by Sisco for the Acting Secretary of State, June 14, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box no. 16, file chronologic File, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976.

²⁰ Memorandum by Sisco for the Acting Secretary of State, June 14, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box no. 16, File Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976.

²¹ Address by President Johnson on “Principles for Peace in the Middle East,” June 19, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box no. 2231, file Israel-US 1967, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1967–1969, POL Israel-US to POL 17–1 Israel-US.

²² Address by President Johnson on “Principles for Peace in the Middle East,” June 19, 1967, NACP, RG59, GRDS, box 2231, CFPF 1967–1969, POL Israel-US to POL 17–1 Israel-US, File Israel-US 1967. See also Robert D. Johnson, Lyndon Johnson and Israel: The Secret Presidential Recordings (Tel Aviv Israel: Tel Aviv University Press, 2008), 72–74; William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 54–55; W.W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1972), 419.

²³ Summary of Kosygin’s speech to the General Assembly, June 19, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/520; Lall, The UN, 123–29.

²⁴ Memorandum by the CIA, “Soviet Premier’s Kosygin’s UN Speech,” June 20, 1967, JL, NSF, box 35, Files of Sunders. See also Jeremi Suri, “American Perceptions of the Soviet Threat Before and During the Six-Day War,” in Ro’i and Morozov, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six-Day War, 102–21.

²⁵ For the Cold War and the Middle East, see Nathan J. Citino, “The Middle East and the Cold War,” Cold War History 19, no. 3 (April 2019): 441–56; Nigel J. Ashton, “Introduction: The Cold War in the Middle East, 1967–73,” in The Cold War in the Middle East, edited by Ashton, 1–15; Fred Halliday, “The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War,” in ibid., 6–26; Douglas Little, “The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. II, Crises and Détente, 305–26.

²⁶ Memorandum of conversation, June 23, 1967, FRUS, XIV, doc. 232. For Sino-Soviet competition, see Jeremy Friedman, “Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s,” Cold War History 10, no. 2 (May 2010), 247–72.

²⁷ Memorandum of conversation between Johnson and Kosygin, June 25, 1967, FRUS, XIV, doc. 234, 235.

²⁸ Polish record of Soviet-bloc leaders in Budapest, Kosygin’s speech, July 11, 1967, WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, CWME. For Soviet’s arms supply, see also Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007), 211–14.

²⁹ Telegram from Rusk to Battle, “Soviet Role in the Middle East,” June 27, 1967, NAUS, box no. 1796, RG 59, file POL 27 Arab-Israel 28/6/67, folder CCF 1967–1969, Political & Defense.

³⁰ “NATO Expert Working Group on Soviet Policy,” November 2, 1967, NAUK, FCO 28/333. See also John Dumbrell, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 46–59; Dima P. Adamsky, “The ‘Seventh Day’ of the Six-Day War: The Soviet Intervention in the War of Attrition (1969–1970),” in The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six-Day War, edited by Roi and Morozov, 198–250; Laron, The Six-Day War, 219–23; Boris B. Morozov, “The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973: The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict by Ginor and Remez,” Bustan: The Middle East Book Review 10, no. 2 (2019): 182–85.

³¹ Goldberg to the State Department, July 17, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 372. The second paragraph of the revised Latin-American text read as follows: “Affirms the principle that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible in our time and under our Charter and consequently that the withdrawal of Israel’s forces to their original positions is expected.” Paragraph three reads: “Affirms likewise that the principal sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member-States in the Middle East allow them a rightful freedom from threat of war and consequently the termination of a state or claim of belligerency by all such states is expected.” Lall, The UN, 208–09.

³² Summary of Kosygin’s speech to the General Assembly, June 19, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/520; Lall, The UN, 123–29.

³³ Goldberg to the State Department, July 20, 1967, FRUS, XIX. For Goldberg’s career in the UN and his complicated relations with President Johnson that led him to resign from his post in the UN in April 1968, see David L. Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg: New Deal Liberal (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 352–72.

³⁴ Telegram from Rafael to Jerusalem, July 20, 1967, ISA, Foreign Office, file 9/4087.

³⁵ Abdel Magid Farid, Nasser: The Final Years (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1994), 19–40; Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 185–88.

³⁶ WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, The Cold War in the Middle East, Polish Record of Soviet-Bloc Leaders in Budapest, Brezhnev’s speech, July 11, 1967.

³⁷ Farid, Nasser, 43–4.

³⁸ Farid, Nasser, 46–7.

³⁹ Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Conflict, Soviet foreign ministry to Soviet ambassadors in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq, July 20, 1967, nos. 286 and 287.

⁴⁰ Goldberg to the State Department, July 21, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 380.

⁴¹ Goldberg to the State Department, 22 July 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 384.

⁴² Dobrynin, In Confidence, 161.

⁴³ Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, 1981), 38–39.

⁴⁴ WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, “The Cold War in the Middle East” (Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-Bloc Leaders in Moscow, November 9, 1967).

⁴⁵ Jordan Baev, “Eastern Europe and the Six-Day War: The Case of Bulgaria,” in The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six-Day War, edited by Ro’i and Morozov, 189.

⁴⁶ Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin, July 24, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box no.1798, file POL 27 Arab-Israel 24/7/67, CFC 1967–1969, Political & Defense.

⁴⁷ Dean to FO, no. 2465, July 26, 1967, and no. 2480, July 27, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/504.

⁴⁸ Memorandum for the President, July 21, 1967, JL, NSF Files, box no. 13, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC.

⁴⁹ Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), 442–4; Rusk to Embassy in Israel, August 19, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 423.

⁵⁰ Telegram from Rafael to Jerusalem, July 22, 1967, ISA, Foreign Office, file 10/4087.

⁵¹ Rusk to Barbour, August 11, 1967, JL, NSF, box no. 114, Country File ME.

⁵² David L. Stebenne, Arthur J, Goldberg: New Deal Liberal (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 37–41; Korn, Stalemate, 32; Oren, Six Days of War, 199. In an interview conducted in 1983, Goldberg stated that he was proud of his Jewish heritage, “but when I was at the UN or when I was ambassador-at-large, the interests of our country come first, no matter what.” JL, OHC, Arthur J. Goldberg, interview, I, March 23, 1983, 10.

⁵³ Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1985), 134.

⁵⁴ Telegram from Rostow to Rusk, August 21, 1967, NAUS, box no. 4, file EVR Chronology July-August 1967 (Memos & other Miscellaneous Papers), Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Subject Files for the Undersecretary for Political Affairs.

⁵⁵ The Tito proposal comprised four elements: Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since June 4; a Four-Power or Security Council guarantee for the security and June 4 borders of all the states in the area; freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran pending the International Court’s decision; and a subsequent effort to tackle the refugees and Suez Canal problems. Tito to Johnson, August 24, 1967, JL, NSF, box 24 (2 of 2), Files of Saunders; Report on the Conversation between Nikezic and Rusk at the State Department, WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, Yugoslavia in the Cold War.

⁵⁶ Rusk to State Department, September 28, 1967, FRUS, XIV, doc. 247.

⁵⁷ Ibid.; See also memorandum from Walt Rostow to Johnson, October 3, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 455.

⁵⁸ Thompson to Department of State, no. 1388, Octiber 9, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 461.

⁵⁹ Telegram from Sisco to USUN, New York, October 10, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box 16, Chronology File, October 1967, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976.

⁶⁰ Caradon to FO, no. 2614, October 8, 1967, NAUK, FCO 17/528.

⁶¹ Memorandum of conversation between Tcherniakov and Rostow, October 11, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box 1801, file POL 27 Arab-Israel 11/10/67, CFF 1967–1969, Political & Defense. See also Eugene V. Rostow, December 2, 1968, 36, JL, Oral History Collection; Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2004), 51–55.

⁶² Dean to FO, no. 3214, October 12, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/246.

⁶³ Memorandum from Walt Rostow to Johnson, October 12, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 467.

⁶⁴ Kosygin to Johnson, October 20, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 480; Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Conflict, Dobrynin to the Foreign Ministry, October 21, 1967, no. 298.

⁶⁵ Polish record of meeting of Soviet-Bloc leaders in Moscow, November 9, 1967, WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, The Cold War in the Middle East.

⁶⁶ Kosygin to Wilson, October 20, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/530.

⁶⁷ Telegram from Goldberg to Department of State, October 24, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box no. 1843, file POL27–14 Arab-Israel/UN/1/1/67, CFF 1967–1969, Political & Defense. On the Soviet version of the discussions with the Americans over the correct version of the texts, see Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi conflict, Dobrynin to Foreign Ministry, October 22, 1967, no. 300.

⁶⁸ Arthur J. Goldberg, “Negotiating History of Resolution 242,” in UN Security Council Resolution 242, edited by Caradon et. al., 23.

⁶⁹ Minute by J.H. Lambert, November 3, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/514; New York to FO, no. 2991, November 2, 1967, NAUK, PREM13/1624.

⁷⁰ See Caradon to Brown, January 1, 1968, NAUK, FCO17/516. For the text of the Indian draft resolution, see memorandum for Walt Rostow, November 6, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box 1843, file POL27–14 Arab-Israel/UN 1/1/6, CCF 1967–1969 Political & Defense.

⁷¹ Goldberg to the Department of State, November 5, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 502; Walt Rostow to Johnson, November 6, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 510.

⁷² For the US draft resolution, see Lall, The UN, 305–06.

⁷³ Telegram from New York to Jerusalem, November 10, 1967, ISA, file 4/6447, Foreign Office, Code Department 130.09; Lull, The UN, 240–52; See also Riad, The Struggle, 58–66.

⁷⁴ Polish record of meeting of Soviet-Bloc leaders in Moscow, November 9, 1967, WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, The Cold War in the Middle East; Lall, The UN, 134–35, 140–41, 145–46, 305–06.

⁷⁵ New York to FO, no. 3034, November 5, 1967, NAUK, PREM13/1624.

⁷⁶ FO to Washington, no. 11847, November 10, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/514. For an analysis of the British text, see Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1985), 146–56. See also Moshe Gat, “Britain and Israel Before and After the Six Day War, June 1967: From Support to Hostility,” Contemporary British History, 18, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 54–77.

⁷⁷ Caradon to FO, no. 3148, November 10, 1967, NAUK, FO961/24.

⁷⁸ US embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, November 14, 1967, FRUS, XIX, doc. 525; Brenchley, Britain, 84–91.

⁷⁹ See also Ashton, “Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace?” 36–9.

⁸⁰ Kuznetsov and Fedorenko to the Foreign Ministry, November 16, 1967, no. 306, Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Conflict.

⁸¹ Telegram from Kosygin to Johnson, November 19, 1967, NAUS, box no. 1843, file POL27–14 Arab-Israel/UN 1/1/67, CCF 1967–1969 Political & Defense. For the text of the Soviet draft, see telegram from New York to Jerusalem, no. 413, November 20, 1967, ISA, file 6/6447, Foreign Office, Code Department 130.09. See also Lall, The UN, 256–59.

⁸² Telegram from Johnson to Kosygin, November 19, 1967, NAUS, RG 59, box no. 1843, file POL27–14 Arab-Israel/UN 1/1/67, CCF 1967–1969 Political & Defense.

⁸³ Gromyko to Vinogradov, November 21, 1967, no. 307, Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Conflict.

⁸⁴ Note by the Secretary General of the UN, November 23, 1967, NAUK, FCO 17/533. For an analysis of the resolution, see Ruth Lapidoth, “UN Resolution 242,” The Wiener Library Bulletin XXVI, nos. 1 and 2 (1972): 2–9.

⁸⁵ Cadogan to FO, no. 3375, November 22, 1967, NAUK, FCO17/515.

⁸⁶ Report by the Bulgarian foreign minister on the ministerial meeting in Warsaw regarding the situation in the Middle East, December 19–21, 1967, WWIS, CWIHP, Virtual Archive, The Cold War in the Middle East. For a different interpretation of Soviet conduct and motives, see Ashton, “Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace?” 38. See also Arieh J. Kochavi, “The Power Struggle between the Johnson Administration and the Kremlin over a Solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Aftermath of the June 1967,” The International History Review 44, no. 1 (2022): 145–60.

⁸⁷ Eisenhower, who was furious at Britain, his chief ally in the Cold War which refrained from consulting or even advising Washington before the joint attack with France and Israel on Egypt, strongly and publicly criticized the military operation and tabled a draft resolution that was adopted by the General Assembly calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from Egypt. Eisenhower did not consult the Soviets, who at the time were in the midst of suppressing the Hungarian revolt. The Soviets followed the Americans only after the rebellion had been crushed, and threatened a firm reaction if Britain, France, and Israel did not withdraw their forces from Egypt.

Michael Doran, Ike’s Gamble: America’s Rise to Dominance in the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 2016), 186–214; Guy Laron, Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945–1956 (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 136–153; Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967: From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six-Day War (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 41–64.

⁸⁸ Johnson, The Vantage Point, 291, 303; Woods, LBJ, 54–55, 62; Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: the University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 213–16.

⁸⁹ For the failing efforts on part of the two superpowers to reach an agreement during the Nixon’s presidency, see Craig, The Limits of Détente, 37–47; Gat, In Search of a Peace Settlement, 55–66; Jackson, Lost Peace, 34–71.

⁹⁰ Jackson, Lost Peace, 17–21.

⁹¹ Goldberg in fact considered himself as the “principal drafter” of the resolution. See an interview with Goldberg in March 1983. Arthur J. Goldberg, interview, March 23, 1983, 10, JL, OHC. See also Goldberg, “Negotiating History of Resolution 242,” 26–27; Lord Caradon, “Lord Caradon’s ‘Right of Reply” in UN Security Council Resolution 242, edited by Caradon et. al., 51; Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 354–55; Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and Its Aftermath, 87–90; Galen Jackson, “The Johnson Administration and Arab-Israeli Peacemaking after June 1967,” The Middle East Journal 74, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 205–10. Ashton ascribed the success of bringing about the resolution to British diplomacy, particularly to Brown and Caradon. See Ashton, “Searching for Just and Lasting Peace?” 38–9.

⁹² Seth Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2018), 117–36; Anoop Kumar Gupta, “Moscow and the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords,” Israel Affairs 29, no. 2 (2023): 281–89.