Transnational Identity and Foreign Policy: Tribal Identity and the Gulf Crisis

Abstract

The 2017 Gulf crisis has been largely framed as a diplomatic and economic one. However, the involvement of tribal identity in the foreign policy responses of Gulf states also made it a socio-political crisis. This paper adopts role identity theory as a framework for analysing how domestic politics and culture shaped international relations among GCC states during the crisis. According to this framework, tribal identity becomes operative in foreign policy when states can present themselves as fulfilling roles that distinguish them within a regional or international state system. Gulf states adopted new role identities defined in terms of tribe and tribal identity that then shaped the formulation and implementation of their diplomatic policies. During the crisis, Saudi Arabia adopted the role identity of tribe protector to undermine sovereign boundaries. The Qatari government on the other hand adopted the role of national unifier, rejecting tribal identity and ideologies. The implications of mobilising tribes are examined from the regime survival perspective, particularly scrutinising the gradual consolidation of the Qatari national identity to reduce risks posed to the regime.

Keywords:

• Qatar
• Saudi Arabia
• KSA
• GCC
• tribes
• foreign policy
• role theory
• transnational identity

1 Introduction

The 2017 Gulf crisis has largely been framed as a diplomatic and economic one. However, socio-political factors have also been at play, revealing the underlying importance of tribal identities to Gulf politics and international relations. This paper studies the leveraging of collective tribal identity in foreign policy by Gulf State actors during the 2017 Gulf crisis. This article argues that foreign policy formulation by elites within Gulf states has been shaped by how they understand their state’s purpose and function in the international arena –– they conceive of their nation’s role in particular ways. The study argues that Gulf State foreign policy has been rooted in National Role Conceptions (NRC) that define state identity in terms of attitudes towards tribes and tribal identities. It explores the sources of these identities in both the domestic and international spheres. Although the NRCs adopted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states during the crisis were tied to a set of cultural norms unique to the Arab world, it acknowledges how this identity has been shaped by interactions between states at a regional and international level.

The paper begins by discussing role theory as formulated by Kal Holsti, and its application to Foreign Policy Analysis. Following this, the discussion progresses to a detailed exposition of tribal identity in the Arab Peninsula and the Middle East. This paper critically analyses how tribal identity has been engaged in the mobilisation of tribes during the crisis against Qatar. The implications of mobilising tribal identities are then examined from a regime survival perspective, by examining the gradual consolidation of a Qatari national identity as a consequence of the identity re-configurations associated with the crisis.

2 Role theory

According to Realist International Relations theory, state behaviour is determined largely by the anarchic character of the international system –– the fact that no overarching authority governs state relations. The anarchic international order sets up a situation where state actors are largely interchangeable, autonomous units in a perpetual state of competition to access material resources. Realists understand material resources such as military, territorial, and economic assets to be the foundations of power at the inter-state level. Interests and foreign policy are therefore defined for all states as the acquisition and retention of such resources.¹

By contrast, Constructivism accounts for the causative effect of non-material factors. One non-material factor that shapes state behaviour is state identity.² Constructivist Wendt defined identity as “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about the self”, acquired through intersubjective understandings that emerge out of interactions between states.³ As state identity changes depending on the character of these state interactions, what a state will define to be in its interests will also change. State interests are not always and everywhere the same, nor are they defined by the rational calculation of material goals as proposed by realists.

Of particular salience to the Gulf Crisis is a subset of state identities that define what role a given state sees itself as playing in the international system. Role theory offers a framework for analysing how role identities adopted by states influence the formulation and implementation of their foreign policy. Originally developed within sociology and psychology to examine and analyse individual perceptions of their social roles, role theory explores the “shared normative expectations that prescribe and explain people’s behaviour as they occupy social positions”, and hence reflect “patterned behaviours attached to social positions in society”.⁴ When applied to Foreign Policy Analysis, role theory underlines that states subscribe to an NRC. Each NRC comes with certain normative expectations that prescribe what the state should do under particular circumstances.

NRCs are useful for analysing how states define their interests. This is because how a state will perceive its interests will depend upon where a state draws the boundaries between itself and external actors, particularly in terms of the role they see themselves as occupying in the international system. The link between state identities and state perceptions of interest is relevant in explaining Qatar’s actions during the Gulf Crisis. Qatar’s actions cannot be explained solely with recourse to a uniform, realist understanding of state interests as the perpetual pursuit of material advantages over other states.

Role theory also offers a powerful lens on how exactly non-material phenomenon emphasised by constructivism, such as state identity, produces actual policy behaviours. Holsti proposes that the identity categories adopted by a state translate into actual foreign policy behaviour via a process he terms “role performance”. To be recognised by other players in the international order as occupying a particular role status, states must understand how to meet the norms and expectations attached to it. This is useful in understanding diplomatic measures taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its bloc allies against Qatar during the Gulf crisis. Much of what made the Gulf Crisis so unique was the use of transnational tribal networks by the Saudi government and its allies to coerce the Qatari regime into capitulating to their demands. This mode of statecraft is not easily accounted for by realist theories which conceptualise states as black boxes: unitary, sovereign units that acts in line with competitive pressures emanating from the anarchic character of the international system rather than entities that harbour internal differences. However, their actions are readily comprehensible if we see that the crisis triggered the KSA to adopt and enact a national role of the tribal protector: a hegemon responsible for upholding regional unity founded upon a social institution specific to the Arab cultural world: the traditional kinship ties of tribes across the GCC states.

NRCs do not emerge from the domestic sphere alone. State governments never have complete autonomy over which roles they will adopt and how they enact them. Both domestic governments and cultural current within their own borders are constantly exposed to the pressures of the international system. This paper acknowledges both the domestic and international sources of NRCs. It does so by drawing on two strands of role theory that differ in their understanding of how NRCs originate. First-generation role theorists, such as Wish⁵ and Hollis and Smith⁶ who focused on the origins of state role identities in the international system. For example, role performance depends on a state first distinguishing between “self” and “alter”. This is only achieved when the state actor interacts with at least one other state. Any such interaction implies the presence of an international order.⁷ Roles come into being thanks to the uneven distribution of power through any given group of states. For example, the role of bloc leader, bloc follower, or balancer ­­–– a range of identities that entail different state diplomatic attitudes toward world issues –– will be assigned to states depending on their capabilities relative to other members of the international system.⁸

A new generation of role scholars has emphasised the importance of agents or decision-makers in their adoption of particular role identities as well as the external structure which they inhabit.⁹ They argued that the process by which states will determine their NRCs is shaped by a trade-off between the state’s own self-identity based upon narratives of their national cultural heritage and the state’s perceptions of their power position within the international system.¹⁰ In negotiating this compromise between external and internal sources of their role, “actors fashion their role in the international system, navigating between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as possible the obstacles imposed by their position in the international structure.”¹¹

By applying Holsti’s notion of role performance to understand how NRCs translate into foreign policy in the Gulf region, this study extends the role identity literature. Current role theory focuses primarily on Western powers.¹² Holsti focused on major states with sufficient resources to be able to affect the balance of power within the international system at large, such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Developing states and smaller actors were not accounted for. Second-generation theorists were right to look at both the domestic and systemic origins of NRCs but overlooked non-democratic states. This omission seems to be motivated by the assumption that non-democratic regimes do not have a vibrant enough civil society in which competing interest groups try to influence government policy. As such, they do not warrant the sort of analysis that accounts for domestic sources of NRCs. Yet non-democratic states are also non-unitary actors characterised by internal groups that influence policy.¹³

This paper argues domestic cultural factors drove foreign policy during the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Diplomatic interactions between the GCC states during the crisis expressed sociocultural factors unique to the Gulf region: namely, their embeddedness within tribal forms, their reliance on tribal networks that often extend beyond state borders, and the continuing adherence to tribal identities among broad sectors of society. NRCs adopted by policy-making elites were defined in relation to this culturally and regionally specific social institution and identity of the tribe.

While internal and domestic analysis is crucial, the paper utilises the insights of second-generation role theorists by arguing that tribal identities are not static, ahistorical, or insular. Tribal identities have been in constant evolution in response to factors external to the states and regions in which they are found. Tribes of the contemporary Gulf are not identical to the pre-colonial, pre-state social formations that GCC states rhetorically evoke in their national narratives. The contemporary tribe, and hence the identities and NRCs based around them, have been shaped by the structure of the international system and changes within it over time. These primarily include contact with the West, first through colonialism and then through post-colonial economic and political relationships. The primary effects of these have been the social dislocations produced by Western demand for oil, resultant oil wealth, and the modernisation of Gulf state structures that occurred alongside these economic processes often encouraged and supported by Western interests. Inter-regional dynamics are also a salient factor in the tribal form and identity, most especially relations between the KSA and its neighbours.

3 Tribalism in the Gulf: ideology or identity?

During the 2017 Gulf crisis, diplomatic actions by the KSA and its allies transformed tribal identities into tribal ideologies. This served their geopolitical purposes by motivating influential tribal actors to destabilise the Qatari government. Conversely, Qatar attempted to undercut this policy of destabilisation by neutralising tribal identities within their own borders and subsuming them under a national identity around the Amir. Thus, while the KSA and its allies encouraged ideologically motivated actions based on the precepts of tribal identity such as honour, group solidarity, and the mutual obligations demanded by kinship ties. Qatar attempted to defuse the ideological potential of tribal identities by dissipating the tribe as a unit of belonging altogether.

Sociologists define a tribe as a hierarchy based around a nuclear and extended family that stretches back generations. Several lineages make up a clan, and several clans make up a tribe.¹⁴ Arab tribes are well-structured, each tribe or clan having a leader or shaikh who would traditionally legitimate his group authority by dispensing wisdom and materially providing for his fellow tribe members. Originally, tribes were the mechanism by which nomads organised their societies around modes of production suited to the geographical and climatic features of their territory. In the Arabian Peninsula, tribes adapted to the landscapes of either sandy desert, coast, or mountain.¹⁵ The mode of production most associated with the origins of the tribe was nomadic pastoralism, a lifestyle motivated by the need to seek out seasonal water sources. Some territories with major oases were inhabited by sedentary tribes who practiced terraced agriculture.¹⁶

It is important to make a clear distinction between tribal identities and ideology. Identity refers to individuals’ self-perceptions and sense of belonging in relation to groups defined in terms of their religious, national, or ethnic makeup. Gulf states still contain tribal identity, despite artificially imposed colonial boundaries that defined the new Arab nation-states.¹⁷ Arab tribal identity amounts to an ideology of belonging and solidarity that builds around lines of genealogical descent. A sense of pride is connected to the purity of these blood ties and the history of the tribe.¹⁸ An ideology on the other hand is a system of normative ideas that a group of people share, and which shapes their worldview and understanding of their relations with others and among themselves.¹⁹ Furthermore, ideologies can forward emotive and even incendiary ideas that can shape individuals’ behaviour. They can be used to encourage value-laden perceptual frames to motivate particular political actions.

While the concepts of identity and ideology are distinct, identities can have ideological purchase, a fact that the KSA and its allies exploited during the crisis. For example, tribal identity is conceived of as the sharing of a common cultural heritage that can be used to motivate and justify a tribe’s socio-political goals.²⁰ Tribal identity underpins an ideology of descent which creates a discursive context of common values that unifies the tribe and governs group behaviour.²¹ There is the idea that all members are responsible for enhancing and maintaining social solidarity to ensure the security of the tribe, its social status and the flow of state-offered privileges. Within the Gulf crisis, these mutual obligations for security, social status and privileges underlay the KSA’s diplomatic strategy to undermine Qatar.

The Gulf Region is unique for its particularly close connection between the modern 20th-century state and pre-modern tribal formations and identities. Traditional tribal frameworks of power and their organisational logics were the germinal antecedents for the state apparatuses found in contemporary Gulf nations. The federative structure of the UAE makes this acutely apparent to the extent that the country’s identity strains at the limits of what can be comfortably classed as a modern nation-state. The seven emirates of the UAE are headed by ruling families with affiliations to particular tribes: the Al Nahyan (Bani Yas) in Abu Dhabi, the Al Maktoum (Bani Yas) in Dubai, the Qawasim in both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, the Al-Mualla in Ajman, the Al-Nuaimi family (from the Al-Naim) in Umm al-Quwain, and the Al-Sharqi family (Sharqiyin) in Fujairah.²² The particular tribal formations that now comprise the Gulf leadership are the families of ruling tribes that won out in pre-independence conflicts for power and status.²³ For example, Abdulaziz Al Saud managed to establish the KSA after the fall of two Saudi states by gathering the various tribes under the umbrella of the Kingdom in 1932.²⁴ After World War I, Emir Abdulla I of Jordan formed personal networks that ensured security for the Bedouin tribes of Transjordan in return for their loyalty to the monarchy. These examples show how new leaders gave rise to a very peculiar form of nationalism defined by loyalty to the overarching authority of the monarch and the need to defend tribal honour.²⁵

All states in the Gulf, as well as the wider Middle East, have close connections to the pre-state tribal formations of the region. Yet they can be differentiated according to the degree to which any given state has extended its authority into traditionally tribal regions, the extent to which political ministries and parties are defined by tribal cohesion, and the types of strategies deployed by states to manage the potential tensions and opportunities afforded by the tribe form. While in Oman, tribes have lost much of their presence in modern public discourse, noble tribal families have been co-opted into the modern economic structure and enjoy considerable benefits. The nephew of the last Imam owns a powerful business group, Al Taher, founded in 1973 that contracts food, drink, and petroleum distribution in the country.²⁶ Yemen has a particularly weak state and strong tribalism, particularly in the Northern region. Since the state military draws heavily on tribal groups, it relies on the goodwill of tribal factions that undermine its authority.²⁷

The presence of tribes in the modern Gulf as well as the diversity of relationships that can hold between states and tribes contradicts Gellner’s claim that tribes and states cannot easily co-exist because they are fundamentally at odds.²⁸ Indeed, tribes nor cultural allegiances to the tribe were never subsumed by the state form and were not even necessarily in conflict with the state, something borne out by the historical record of state-building in the 20th-century Gulf.²⁹ States in the Arab Peninsula emerged during the early to mid-twentieth century in the aftermath of colonial rule. Most have either co-opted tribal members into their apparatuses or have constructed a state apparatus that resembles the older tribal hierarchies.

Conversely, tribes did not always challenge states during their formation. State elites were able to accommodate important elements of the tribal framework into the new political system. Tribes tried to adapt in order to accrue benefits.³⁰ Tribal shaikhs enjoy many privileges that governments offer (to buy tribal loyalties), such as financial payoffs,³¹ multi-citizenships and lands. Consequently, tribal leaders have acquired highly sensitive positions in the military and intelligence, thereby becoming closer to the elites.³² When Al Khalifa came to power in Bahrain on the back of a British-led transition to the modern state, tribal chiefs became officials while independent Sunni tribes were absorbed into the new state’s defence forces.³³

Elites also created “layers of control” where intermediaries fill the gaps that sustain the vertical structure of loyalties.³⁴ To achieve this, they used older forms of tribal power structures to form neo-patrimonial networks. Patrons secure the loyalty and support of clients from whom they derive their legitimacy. In Bahrain for example, the Al Khalifa tribal dynasty maintained pre-state social divisions based on tribal tributaries when undergoing its British-led transition to the state form during the 1920s. Agents for obtaining these tributaries were drawn from the non-tribal Shia minority. This created a class of elite Shiites dependent upon and loyal to the Sunni elites. This strategy left intact the wider social and political inequality between Sunnis and Shias in Bahrain, the latter excluded from most senior government positions and the national imaginary. This exclusion has been maintained largely on the basis of the Shia’s non-tribal heritage and the historical animosity between tribal and non-tribal demographics.³⁵

Tribes and tribal identities are adaptive, “constantly in a state of change,” where the “formation of new tribes” or the “disintegration of an existing tribe” is “not unusual”.³⁶ In the UAE, a confederation of previously separate tribes –– the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi –– has followed the leadership of one of the tribes’ shaikhs.³⁷ In Abu Dhabi in the late 1960s, the Zaab tribe transferred their allegiance away from the Ras al-Khaimah emirate ruled by a section of the al-Qassimi tribe to the Al Nahyan tribal alliance. This resulted in many Zaab taking up foreign ministry jobs.³⁸ A sub-tribe could become dominant over the main tribe, so that the latter adopts the former sub-tribe’s name. This was the case with the Al Bu Shamis that came to predominate over the Al-Naim in the UAE.³⁹ Tribal governance often exhibits a greater degree of flexibility and adaptation than bureaucratic state structures.

The resilience of tribalism into the contemporary period is due to this adaptability, alongside its capacity to concentrate strong bonds of solidarity. These features make tribalism a useful tool of statecraft. Further, tribal groups are useful vehicles of statecraft because their cross-border connections can be used as conduits of extended political influence –– they give states a means to claim a legitimate sphere of influence far beyond their borders. Tribes have kinship connections to counterparts in other parts of the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East thanks to borders drawn by European powers in the wake of imperial independence. For example, the Saudi Arabian monarchy shares tribal kinship ties with tribes and tribal confederations located in Syria: the Shammar, Al-Jabbar, and Unaiza, the tribal confederation to which the ruling family belongs.⁴⁰

While tribes and tribalism are evidently not in conflict with either state-building or forms of transnational statecraft, they can be in tension with the presence of a unified national identity, patriotism, and sovereign integrity. Both nation and tribe demand strong ties of allegiance. Yet at the same time, the unifying logic of nationhood and the norm of sovereign integrity are at odds with the diversity entailed by tribal affiliations. Tribes split the national population into factions and open sectors of the populace to political influences external to the state’s sovereign territory.⁴¹ Because tribalism and nationhood are often in competition as forms of identity, ruling elites will tend to privilege either sub-state identities or national identities in their narratives of self-understanding depending on political expedience. Differences in state policy can therefore be strongly correlated with whether a state adheres to a role identity based on tribal or national ties. This cleavage between policy agendas founded upon tribal and then national state role identities was evident during the Gulf Crisis. It was a major differentiating factor in the policy responses of Qatar and those of the remainder of the bloc.

4 The Gulf crisis

On 5 June 2017, a bloc of countries comprising the KSA, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain cut off relations with Qatar. The bloc closed seaports to Qatari vessels, banned Qatari imports, and introducing a list of thirteen conditions that Qatar had to meet to resolve the crisis.⁴² The demands “which, if ceded to, would arguably violate Qatar's sovereignty” were designed to bring Qatar in line with the position of the opposing three countries. The reasons for these diplomatic measures against a fellow GCC member were that Qatar had become overly friendly with Iran, played a role in financing terrorist groups such as the Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra Front) in Syria, and that Qatar had intervened in their internal affairs.⁴³ Qatar was also accused of playing a role in a ransom deal to free Qataris kidnapped in Iraq by a local militia known as Kataeb Hizbollah in April 2017.⁴⁴

The intra-GCC policy disagreements that underpinned the crisis had been in place for over a decade.⁴⁵ Qatar had long attempted to reconstruct itself as an independent global agent as opposed to a small player in a Gulf bloc comprised of larger states with greater status. For example, it embraced post-Arab Spring transition governments, lending support to democracy in an obvious overture toward the West, such as the 2012 election of Morsi as Egypt’s president.⁴⁶ By contrast, the KSA and Bahrain had cooperated to clamp down on political dissidents within their borders, lending mutual support to the embattled authoritarian regimes in the region. To these actors, Qatar’s overtures to democratisation were a security threat for them and the region.

GCC relations have also been tenuous since the 2014 diplomatic crisis, during which the KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in response to a Qatari policy that appeared to contravene a regional security agreement stipulating non-interference in the affairs of GCC members. This move was unprecedented and threatened the disintegration of the GCC as a regional bloc.⁴⁷ The UAE was particularly threatened by Qatari independence, as it was also seeking to position itself as the largest financial hub in the Gulf region. These underlying factors had been placing pressure on the long-term security and political alliances of the GCC.

5 June 2017 was also a unique moment in Gulf modern history in another key respect. The anti-Qatar bloc members instructed their citizens to leave Doha within 14 days.⁴⁸ When GCC countries had previously had disagreements, they appealed only to heads of states and government officials, a strategy used during the 1996 failed coup d’état in Qatar. This involvement of citizens in 2017 not only indicated the severity of the crisis but that the diplomatic battleground now extended beyond the inter-state arena and into the transnational sphere.

The transnational nature of the Gulf Crisis is indicated not only by this involvement of citizens in general but sub-state, cross-border tribal affiliations in particular. Tribal formation and tribal ideologies that defied state boundaries came to define state diplomatic responses throughout the crisis. The state role identities that were adopted by opposing sides of the crisis were defined in relation to tribal identity: either as protectors of traditional tribal formations in the case of KSA and its allies or as upholders of the modern nation-state that rejected tribal divisiveness in the case of Qatar. State foreign policy decisions consisted of either subduing tribal affiliations or by mobilising them politically. In the next section, the state role of tribal protector is discussed to show how the tribal dimension was mobilised during the crisis.

4.1 The role of “tribal protector”

Saudi policymakers adopted the role of tribal protector during the crisis. They did so by leveraging historical, social, and cultural connections between tribes residing across the KSA and Qatar both rhetorically and in practice. The KSA focused their efforts on the two major tribes indigenous to the Arab Peninsula: Al-Murrah and the Bani Hajer.⁴⁹ The Al-Murrah tribe is one of the largest tribes across the KSA and Qatar.⁵⁰ With the emergence of oil and the Gulf region becoming incorporated into the global system, members of this tribe can now be found in Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and the KSA.

The strategic value of adopting the role of tribal protector was clear. It had two functions: first, it was intended to destabilise the Qatari regime and prevent it from further pursuing an independent foreign policy. Second, the tribal campaign sought to reinforce the regional identity of the Gulf and through it, the norm of inter-state collaboration institutionalised by the GCC. The following describes how tribal identities were adopted into the NRC of the Saudi State, and how this was mobilised to delegitimate and destabilise Qatar. It details how the KSA enacted its role identity through role performance, describing the kinds of diplomatic practices undertaken by the Kingdom in order to have its newly adopted tribal protector NRC recognised as legitimate by other states. It then discusses how tribal ideology reinforced the notion of regional collaboration in a pushback against the disruption caused by Qatari foreign policy.

Tribes offered a convenient vehicle for organising domestic opposition against the Qatari regime from a distance. Tribal groups could voice criticisms of the Qatari government, pressuring them to capitulate to GCC demands whilst undermining its popular legitimacy. The Al-Murrah and Bani Hajer were useful in this regard as they were extremely politically influential in Qatar thanks to their size.⁵¹ They have areas of Qatar named after them due to their closeness to Qatari elites. The head of the Amiri Guard, Commander Major General Hazza bin Khalil Al-Shahwani is from the Bani Hajer tribe, for example. Mobilising their loyalties of groups so close to the Qatari establishment would have been a major foreign policy victory for the KSA and its allies. Further, the Al-Murrah mainly inhabit the boundaries of Qatar and the KSA. Straddling the border, they were located in a strategically valuable position where they could be directed by the Saudi regime to destabilise the Qatari regime from within its own borders.⁵² Saudi tribes responded positively to the mobilisation efforts, vocally aligning themselves with the KSA over Qatar on crucial foreign policy points that had sparked the Gulf Crisis. In November 2017, the Bani Hajer shaikhs in the KSA issued a letter during a tribal ceremony in Riyadh. Around 500,000 Bani Hajer members attended and called for fellow tribe members in Qatar to follow the righteous path and denounce Qatari terrorism-related funding.⁵³

The KSA performed the role of tribal protector by meeting some tribes and lending public shows of support for their anti-regime cause. In June 2017, when Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) received Shaikh of Al-Murrah, Taleb Bin Shraim, and several tribe members, the Al-Murrah criticised the Amir of Qatar and accused him of being illegitimate.⁵⁴ Those comments were secretly caught on tape and released in the media. As a result, the Qatari government stripped Shaikh Taleb Bin Shraim and his family of citizenship, which resulted in tribal protests close to the Qatari-Saudi borders. In November 2017, major Al-Murrah clans had a tribal meeting in Al-Ahsa in the eastern province of the KSA to support the right of their shaikh to citizenship. Moreover, some members of the Al-Ghufran clan of Al-Murrah appeared in London for a Qatari opposition conference held in September 2017 to bring global attention to the cause of regime change in Qatar.⁵⁵ The conference included some Qataris, such as Khalid Al-Hail who is the self-appointed leader of the Qatari opposition group known as the Qatar National Democratic Party (QNDP). Furthermore, in September 2018, members of Al-Ghufran also visited the United Nations Human Rights Office demanding their rights to Qatari citizenship after being stripped of these for a failed coup d’état in 1996 against the former Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani.⁵⁶ The Saudi government was widely perceived as a supporter of the London conference and the demands of the Al-Ghafran clan.⁵⁷

The KSA’s direct mobilising of tribal sentiments as part of the conflict occurred through mass media. The Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya network presented a video of Sultan bin Suhaim, son of Qatar’s former Foreign Minister, addressing thousands of the Bani Hajer members. The audience however gave a lukewarm response to his call for a purge in Qatar, and his urging of MBS to safeguard Qatar from militant activity.⁵⁸ This broadcast should be understood as part of a Gulf propaganda war being sustained by both sides. It further illustrates, as Herb has previously found, members of ruling families usually bandwagon with authority instead of balancing with other members, to save the family from internal divisions and maintain their interests.⁵⁹ Therefore, Sultan’s message to the Qatari ruling family was not successful. The mobilisation process also appealed to tribal sentiments through social media. This opened up a virtual space to mobilise and direct tribes to convince their fellow tribesmen in Qatar to bring down the regime. It is worth noting that certain tribes have already begun to actively engage with virtual platforms as a means of disseminating news and providing regular updates to their members.⁶⁰

The NRC of tribe protector was rhetorically useful for the KSA and its allies because it appeals to the notion of kinship obligations between tribal counterparts across state borders, enabling the KSA to intervene in the political affairs of a nation beyond its state jurisdiction. Tribal identity emphasises inter-group obligations founded on a shared history and origin as an established lineage rather than on territorial boundaries. Since the Al-Murrah and the Bani Hajer tribes originate from the Arabian Peninsula and partly still reside in Saudi territory, the KSA could claim that they are morally deserving of KSA protection. Conversely, the nation-state and the norm of sovereign integrity could be portrayed as more recent and artificial incursions into the regional culture and hence held weaker normative claims to Arab loyalty. The state’s role identity of tribal protector played on kinship ties because the targeted tribes already have relatives in the KSA including their tribal shaikhs. Using this role, the KSA could potentially bring demographically and politically important Qatari tribal groups within its sphere of influence.

The NRC of tribe protector also reinforced the norm of regional collaboration between GCC states dominated by the KSA. GCC regional collaboration is often couched in the language of the Khaleeji identity: a recognition among Gulf citizens that they share a heritage, culture, religion, and kinship ties across national boundaries. In enacting the NRC of tribe protector, the KSA positioned itself as the Gulf hegemon willing to uphold the Khaleeji cultural identity and heal the fractured Gulf consensus. In doing so, the KSA asserted itself as an actor that upheld both the cultural integrity of the region as much as its security interests. However, the fact that Oman and Kuwait did not share the Saudi tactics and aims, and that there was little to no support for the use of transnational tribal identity against Qatar, highlights the failure of Saudi attempts to appeal to the supposed integrated Gulf view.

It is misleading to characterise an NRC in terms of tribal affiliations as an internal domestic phenomenon generated by GCC states. First, though specific tribes are often associated with particular Gulf nation-states, particularly the dominant ruling families of these states, post-colonial borders did not pay heed to tribal groupings. As a result, tribes in the Gulf, as well as the wider Middle East, are spread across state territories. Tribal identities cannot be neatly categorised as internal factors that then shape external relations between states. This is because the intensity of tribal feeling cultivated by states as well as the salience of tribal ideology to their foreign policy depends on regional relations between states and thus power distributions in the structure of the international system.

Moreover, individual Gulf governments did not have sole agency over their definitions of NRC. Nor were tribal identities underpinning the NRC of Qatar and the opposing states during the Gulf Crisis static premodern hangovers. They are also the products of decades of inter-state dynamics. While the increasing dependence by the KSA on Western security eroded tribal independence and led to the migration of tribal norms upwards into the structures of the state, the onset of oil wealth and the development of a national labour market once again drew tribal identities into the consciousness of Saudi people. In an economy that dispersed individuals throughout the country often into anonymous urban settings, genealogical research became a way of elevating or authenticating one’s social status.⁶¹

Foreign relations between Gulf states and their neighbours in the Middle East have also changed the character of tribal ideology. Often, this has meant the sharpening of religious sectarian components of tribal identity. For example, the most intensely anti-Shia party in Kuwait is the Islamic Salafi Alliance, drawn largely from the Bedouin Salafi tribe.⁶² In the 2000s, they pressured the Kuwaiti government to help Sunnis in Iraq and criticised the government for being too pro-American, pro-Iranian, and pro-Shia. When tribal identities overlap with Sunni sectarian identities in this way, they become closely associated with regional inter-state dynamics of both integration and interventionism. The KSA’s tense relations with non-tribal Shiite Iran have historically heightened Saudi’s efforts to project its role as a protector not just of tribal identity in general but Sunni tribes in particular. This was particularly the case once the KSA and Iran became pitted against one another as regional powers through their interventions in the Yemen civil war.⁶³ Saudi tribal support in Syria was also part of a wider strategy to counter the formation of a “Shiite Crescent” running through Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.⁶⁴ The KSA has competed with Qatar in Syria, supporting Ahmad Al-Jarba as an election candidate based on kinship connections because he belongs to Shammar, which is one of the biggest tribes in the Kingdom. He became president of the National Coalition in Syria in July 2013, winning over the Qatar-backed candidate.

The GCC states that opposed Qatar and adopted a tribalized NRC were attempting to draw upon identities that had been formed and re-formed through such inter-state relations. This international element to the tribal factor of the Gulf Crisis is unsurprising given that the formation of the GCC itself in 1981 was driven by a regional front against Iranian threats. Several GCC states had significant or majority Shiite populations. This demographic factor became particularly troubling after 1979 because a major principle of the Iranian revolution was the spread of Shiite Islam beyond its borders. In this security context, sharp national distinctions between the six nations of the GCC were a security liability.⁶⁵ Weakened regionalism and the division of the Sunni Arab peninsula into a multitude of small autonomous states would only aid the interest of Iran. The tribal NRCs cultivated by the anti-Qatari states thus reflects this historical background. Tribal NRCs gave a means of legitimating individual Gulf governments in a way that nonetheless retained regional solidarity through cross-border Sunni tribal affiliations, kinship ties, and the mutual security obligations that arise from them.

4.2 Tribalism and regime security

Qatar’s first reaction to the GCC sanctions was to dissolve sub-state divisions and unite internally against external threats. Tribal identity was quickly relegated to a subordinate position in the regime’s depictions of its state role. The Qatari state became a progressive new space where parochial divisions of tribal life would be overcome. The state was now a single tribe responsible for defending a socially unified nation. The cultivation of this new solidarity was designed to buttress the legitimacy of the Qatari state, reinforce its foreign policy independence, and challenge the regional sway of Saudi Arabia. Above all, Qatar defined and enacted an NRC that would allow it to negotiate a new regional security landscape, one that posed an existential threat to the regime.

This was a significant departure from the Qatari state’s previous policies. Its national heritage work privileged a particular form of tribal identity. Although national unity was a concern for the young state before the crisis, previous efforts to cultivate a national identity turned around tribal groupings and their histories often in socially divisive and exclusionary ways. Heritage curation by the Qatari state associated the Qatari people as a whole with historical nomadic groups that combined oases settlement and agriculture with desert nomadism (the semi-Bedouin/Hadar community). Linking Qatari identity to this mixed settled-nomadic community alone obscured the historical importance of two other distinct groups that pursued either a settled (Hadhar) or a nomadic existence (Bedouin or Badu).⁶⁶ After the crisis, a new form of asabiyyah or social solidarity emerged in Qatar. This was based not on the tribe or tribal versus non-tribal identities, but around the nation personified by the figure of the Amir.

This shift from sub-state to state identity discourse is evidenced by comparing pre-crisis National Day celebrations to those after the crisis. In 2009, the government encouraged feelings of tribal pride at the National Day, which was made up of displays of multiple tribal identities. Each tribe held celebrations on the sidewalk of a major road in Doha. However, once the crisis began the tribal parades stopped. Instead, the government urged all tribes to assemble in one place under the slogan of Qabilati Qatar (Qatar is my tribe). Tribes were invited to participate in sword dancing (arda) in a place known as Ardat Ahl Qatar (sword dancing of people of Qatar) to dissipate tribal identity.⁶⁷ The government’s goal was to weaken the tribal identity to undermine any pockets of anti-regime resistance that may give other GCC states a political foothold within Qatar’s borders. The diplomatic crisis dramatically intensified pre-existing moves by the government to craft an inclusive nationalism among Qatari citizens.⁶⁸

The shift towards cultivating a national identity was also evident among non-state actors. An upsurge in traditional and social media in music, song, dance and poetry expressed state support for national leaders.⁶⁹ A ubiquitous drawing of Tamim al-Majd (Tamim the Glorious) produced by Ahmed bin Majed Al-Maadheed was mobilised as a symbol of support for Amir Tamim.⁷⁰ This was a society-generated initiative that was ultimately supported by the government. A One Nation anthem emerged which concludes with the following lines: “We stand tall, above it all. Rain will fall, to plant the seeds that feed us all. We stand united, behind our leader with all our might.”⁷¹ A national movement emerged that lauded Amir Tamim through social media while citizens posted his pictures on cars and used Qatari flags with his image. The act of covering cars with photos is typically considered illegal, however, the government has exercised leniency in its enforcement, effectively encouraging individuals to demonstrate their support for the government through this indirect means. The small population also helped the government maintain social cohesion by managing social behaviour, adhering to a new ideology of nationhood, and altering the flow and content of information to support this new ideology.⁷² Qatari people on social media began introducing themselves as descending from the one tribe of Qatar, replacing their family or tribal name with the appellation “Al-Qatari”.⁷³

Due to the small number of Qataris, the government sought to maintain tribes’ loyalty by improving relations with almost all tribe members and aligning them with the government. The government set up meetings with the local majlises of notables to sustain the regime’s resilience.⁷⁴ Majlis, a communal place of gathering to socialise and discuss local issues, predates the sovereign state. The absence of well-defined civil society institutions in certain contexts necessitates a rethinking of the traditional notion of civil society. Instead, attention should be directed towards identifying societal groups that perform the functions of civil society.⁷⁵ One such example can be found in the majalis, which serve as a prime illustration of this phenomenon. It still plays a big role in aligning citizens with the government. It provides people with a platform to express their opinions that are not necessarily political. Majlis can be about everything related to their state and the world. By inserting itself into a public space that is so embedded in the culture of the Qatari people, the state sent a message that it wanted to build stronger ties between the populace and the government.

Yet Qatar’s new NRC of national unifier did not solely originate from within its internal political culture, nor from the sole agency of the Qatari government. It was profoundly shaped by historical regional interactions with other members of the GCC. Qatar is a small state bordering powerful Iran in the North and the KSA in the South. At independence, it was due to be subsumed by the British under a new Federation of Arab States. However, Qataris were not fully interested in the new federation and decided to act alone and announce independence in 1971. Ever since, Qatar was in the shadow of the KSA and mirrored the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Even by 1995, Qatar did not compete with the oil wealth of KSA or Abu Dhabi. It is this regional context that explains Qatar’s choice to reach out to international neighbours in the Middle East and the West even before the crisis. Qatar’s globalist objectives had been evidenced by “the nation’s acquisitions of property, media outlets, sports teams, and other investments that conferred it with soft power in global affairs.”⁷⁶ Qatar had therefore diverged from the cooperative strategies of the bloc in favour of an individualistic approach. This independent foreign policy expressed the Qatari state’s desire to escape the orbit of the Gulf hegemon, the KSA.

Qatar’s actions raise a significant question for IR theory as they appear to be irrational under a traditional realist reading of state behaviour. A neo-realist perspective would emphasise as the primary driver of state behaviour is the need for material security. If the solidification of national identity and regime autonomy are mutually reinforcing, then an NRC that reinforces national cohesion will undercut regional integration. Qatar’s new NRC intensified its regional isolationism, undermining its alliances with stronger neighbours. Significant motivating factors must underlie the decision of a country that is small, militarily weak, geographically isolated, and surrounded by hostile actors to eschew the strategic benefits of regional cooperation and integration within GCC. Qatar’s decision to adopt an isolationist stance and reject the traditional Khaleeji bonds that have historically underpinned GCC ties resulted in the relinquishment of some of its ability to share security costs with its neighbours. Nevertheless, Qatar has broadened its network of allies to include larger regional nations, such as Turkey, as well as neutral GCC members Oman and Kuwait.

Role identity theory is better able to make sense of Qatar’s crisis response. While in contrast to realist theories, it highlights the role of non-material factors, it nonetheless accounts for how the international structure gives rise to these. Qatar’s new NRC was a means of resisting the limitations placed upon its sovereignty by its status as a small power within the GCC.⁷⁷ This NRC then generated a new set of security interests: preserving regime survival in a way that protected its sovereign autonomy from Saudi influence. The NRC achieved this in two ways: first, by offering the state a new category of belonging that the Qatari populace could extend their loyalties to, the NRC secured the Qatari regime’s popular legitimacy. Second, the new NRC also gave the state’s longstanding overtures to its international partners a coherent logic, both in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics. Qatar’s new NRC as a modern sovereign state presiding over a populace that pleads loyalty to the Amir and the nation gives Qatar a discursive framework within which it can legitimately conduct its foreign affairs as an autonomous entity. It gives normative weight and narrative coherence to its longstanding opposition to Saudi regional dominance.

If Qatar’s NRC as the protector of a unified sovereign entity led it to redefine its security interests, these new security interests gave rise to new foreign policy practices. This can also be understood within the role theory framework, in particular Holsti’s notion of role performance. To be recognised as legitimately occupying a particular role identity by other states, a state must live up to the norms and expectations attached to their desired role. Accordingly, Doha has become more energetic in nurturing relations with non-Arab partners since the crisis. These include member states of the European Union including France and Germany.⁷⁸ Qatar’s newly adopted NRC is set to facilitate similar overtures to the West into the future. This is because the Qatari regime now draws its legitimacy in a way that is more legible to Western norms. After the crisis, Qatar’s government conformed closely to Weber’s typology of charismatic authority where the head of state’s legitimacy is tied to their role as charismatic leader.⁷⁹ Hence, although it is not a democratic liberal state, Qatar now conforms to Western norms of a strong state underpinned by the abstract unity of nationhood rather than a patron of divided tribes. This contrasts with the governance strategy of the Saudi royal family, which domestically presents itself as a tribal leader, enacting the paternalistic functions of a tribal leader for all its people.

5 Conclusion

During the crisis, tribalism transformed from a form of identity into an ideology that drove political mobilisation, especially to meet foreign policy objectives. This transformation from identity to ideology meant that tribalism became a source of unrest. As a consequence, Qatar has embarked on a concerted effort to re-write its role, embracing the narrative of a national collective at the expense of regional collaborationism. The national identity construct is oriented around a logic of unification based on political borders rather than blood ties. This ensured a more stable domestic situation to steel the nation against any future attempts by regional players to contain or destabilise the Qatari regime.

Tribes still preserve their position in the region and re-emerge as a significant political force when central authority weakens. This is because tribes have not been fully subsumed into the architecture of the modern state, as has occurred in Europe. The Gulf crisis demonstrated that tribalism still can serve as a transnational ideology that facilitates the mobilisation of pre-colonial identities which challenge the nation-state and national identity. As the case study has shown in the context of Qatar, the transnational nature of tribalism is also a weakness as it presents an opening via which other Gulf states can attempt to leverage to destabilise the regime. Therefore, domestically, national identity offers a safe space for dismantling the parochial divisions associated with tribalism and for safeguarding stability where competing tribal identities have the potential to create frictions.

Acknowledgement

Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Abdulla Al-Etaibi

Abdulla Al-Etaibi is a Research Scholar at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia and a Lecturer at Qatar University, Doha, Qatar, [email protected], [email protected].

Notes

1 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (2000), p. 126.

2 Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison”, European Journal of International Relations 7.3 (2001), p. 322.

3 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999), p. 21. 

4 Levine and Hogg, Encyclopedia of Group Processes and Intergroup Relations (2010), p. 710.

5 Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions”, In­ternational Studies Quarterly 24.4 (1980), pp. 532–554.

6 Hollis and Smith, “Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making”, British Journal of Political Science 16.3 (1986), pp. 269–286.

7 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, International Studies Quarterly 14.3 (1970), p. 249.

8 Ibid.

9 Breuning, Role Research: Genesis and Blind Spots (2011), p. 21.

10 Ibid., p. 26.

11 Ibid.

12 Cantir and Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory”, Foreign Policy Analysis 8.1 (2012), p. 1.

13 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (2016), p. 89; Evren, McSparren and Olender, “The Perpetuation of Regime Security in Gulf Cooperation Council States: A Multi-Lens Approach”, Digest of Middle East Studies 26.1 (2017), p. 154; Nonneman, “Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy: Omnibalancing and Relative Autonomy in Multiple Environments”, in Nonneman and Aarts (eds), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (2005), p. 317.

14 Alshawi and Gardner, “Tribalism, Identity and Citizenship in Contemporary Qatar”, Anthropology of the Middle East 8.2 (2013), p. 50; Salzman, Culture and Conflict in the Middle East (2008), p. 208.

15 Heard-Bey, “The Tribal Society of the UAE and its Traditional Economy”, in Abed and Hellyer (eds), United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective (2001), p. 103.

16 Ibid., p. 110. 

17 Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in The Middle East (1991), p.15.

18 Ahmed and Hart, Islam in Tribal Societies: From the Atlas to the Indus (2013), p. 72.

19 Ugarriza and Craig, “The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 57.3 (2012), pp. 445–477; Maynard, “A Map of the Field of Ideological Analysis”, Journal of Political Ideologies 18.3 (2013), pp. 299–327.

20 Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East”, in Khoury and Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (1990), p. 52; Crone, “The Tribe and the State”, in Hall (ed.), States in History (1986), p. 448.

21 Alon, The Shaykh of Shaykhs: Mithqal Al-Fayiz and Tribal Leadership in Modern Jordan (2016), p. 8.

22 Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective (1990), p. 102.

23 Patrick, “Nationalism in Gulf States”, in Held and Ulrichsen (eds), The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (2012).

24 Bowen, The History of Saudi Arabia (2015), p. 93.

25 Due-Gunderson, “Nationalism in Joran: King, Tribe, or Country? Part One”, OpenDmoecracy.net (2017).

26 Valeri, “Identity Politics and Nation-Building under Saltan Qaboos”, in Potter (ed.), Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf (2014), p. 189.

27 Fattah, “Yemen: Sectarianism and the Politics of Regime Survival”, in Potter (ed.), Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf (2014), p. 220.

28 Gellner, “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East”, in Khoury and Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (1990), p. 137.

29 Ibid., p. 109.

30 Al-Najjar, Tribe and State in Kuwait and Arabian Peninsula (1996) p. 4.

31 Al-Kuwari, “Tribe and Tribalism: The Trojan Horse of GCC States?”, in Krieg (ed.), Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (2019), p. 131.

32 Khoury and Kostiner, “Tribes and the Complexities”, p. 18.

33 Diwan, “Royal Factions, Ruling Strategies, and Sectarianism in Bahrain”, in Potter (ed.), Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf (2014), p. 189.

34 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (2010), p. 110.

35 Diwan, “Royal Factions, Ruling Strategies, and Sectarianism in Bahrain”, p. 151.

36 Peterson, “Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia”, Middle East Journal 31.3 (1977), pp. 1–2.

37 Heard-Bey, “The Tribal Society of the UAE”, p. 100.

38 Patrick, “Nationalism in Gulf States”, p. 52.

39 Heard-Bey, “The Tribal Society of the UAE”, p. 100.

40 Dukhan, State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns (2018), p. 76.

41 Gause, “Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East”, Journal of International Affairs 45.2 (1992), p. 441.

42 Tawfeeq et al., “Qatar Rift: Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt Cut Diplomatic Ties”, CNN, 27 July 2017.

43 Solomon, “The $1bn Hostage Deal that Enraged Qatar’s Gulf Rivals”, Financial Times, 5 June 2017.

44 Ibid.

45 Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring (2014), p. 1.

46 El Berni, “The Perceptual Shock of Qatar Foreign Policy in 2017 Crisis: Systemic Factors, Regional Struggles Versus Domestic Variables”, Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8.1 ­­­(2020), p. 7.

47 Bouoiyour and Selmi, The Changing Geopolitics in the Arab World: Implications of the 2017 Gulf Crisis for Business (2019), p. 1.

48 Sanders, “What is the Qatar Crisis?”, DW, 21 July 2017.

49 Alshawi and Gardner, “Tribalism, Identity and Citizenship in Contemporary Qatar”, pp. 46–59.

50 Alshawi, The Al-Murrah Tribe in Qatar: Political Impact, MA thesis (1994), p. 12.

51 Elbalad, “ʾAbnāʾ «Qaḥṭān» wa «Banī Hājir» yaʿlanūn thawrat al-ghaḍab ʿalā al-niẓām al-Qaṭarī.. ʾAḥrār Āl Thānī fī al-Saʿūdiyya yarfaʿūn rāyat al-ʿuḍyān fī wajh «Tamīm»”, Elbalad, 18 November 2018.

52 Alshawi, The Al-Murrah Tribe in Qatar: Political Impact, p. 12.

53 Elbalad, “ʾAbnāʾ «Qaḥṭān» wa «Banī Hājir» yaʿlanūn thawrat al-ghaḍab ʿalā al-niẓām al-Qaṭarī”.

54 Bianco and Stansfield, “The Intra-GCC Crises: Mapping GCC Fragmentation after 2011”, International Affairs 94.3 (2018), p. 615.

55 Abdulla, Khalid, “Muʾtamar al-muʿāraḍa al-Qaṭarīya: yajib al-naẓar fī taʿzīz al-niẓām” (14 September 2017).

56 Albayan, “Qabīlat al-Ghufrān tuṭālib majlis ḥuqūq al-insān al-taḥarruk ḍidda jazāʾim niẓām al-Ḥamadayn”, Albayan, 18 September 2018.

57 Al-Sulami, “‘The Unforgiven’: Qatar’s Al-Ghufran Tribe Fights for Justice – and Right to Citizenship”, Arab News, 6 October 2019.

58 Dorsey, “Saudi-UAE Push to Mobilize Tribes against Qatari Emir”, Modern Diplomacy, 19 November 2017.

59 Herb, All in the Family: Absolution, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (1999), p. 10.

60 Al-Etaibi, “Identity and Globalisation: Tribal Identity in the Age of Social Media”, in Mizanur Rahman and Al-Azm (eds), Social Change in the Gulf Region: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2023), p. 47.

61 Samin, Of Sand or Soil: Genealogy and Tribal Belonging in Saudi Arabia (2019), p. 77.

62 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf from the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (2013), p. 216.

63 Darwich, “The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status”, Insight Turkey 20.2 (2018), pp. 125–142.

64 Dukhan, “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising”, Syria Studies 6.2 (2014), pp. 1–28.

65 Cooke, Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf (2014), p. 65.

66 Al-Hammadi, “Presentation of Qatari Identity at National Museum of Qatar: Between Imagination and Reality”, Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies 16.1 (2018), p. 2.

67 Murad, “ʿArḍat ʾahl Qaṭar: al-ḥiṣār yalimm shaml al-qabāʾil”, Aljazeera, 18 December 2018.

68 Mitchell, Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar, PhD diss. (2013), p. 7.

69 Freer, “Social Effects of the Qatar Crisis”, Gulf State Analytics, 10 October 2017.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Leroy, Population and World Politics: The Interrelationships Between Demographic Factors and International Relations (2012), p. 1959.

73 Al-Hammadi, “Presentation of Qatari Identity at National Museum of Qatar”, p. 7.

74 Al-Obaidly, “Qabīlatī Qaṭar.. Mā ʾajmalik al-yaum”, Al-Watan, 17 December 2017.

75 Moritz, “Re-Conceptualizing Civil Society in Rentier States”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 47.1 (2020), p. 138. 

76 Elliot, The English Premier League: A Socio-Cultural Analysis (2017), p. 176.

77 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (2015), p. 5.

78 Cafiero, “A Growing Partnership: Gulf Crisis Fosters Qatar-Mexico Ties”, Middle East Institute (2019).

79 Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building (1968).