Global fertility and the future of religion: addressing empirical and theoretical challenges

Fertility and Faith (Jenkins, 2020) provides a fresh perspective on the relationships between demography and religion. In this book, Philip Jenkins suggests that the near global fall in fertility rates over the past decades has been an important driver of religious decline or, at the very least, that these are parallel processes, which mutually influence one another. This approach is quite different from classic demographic theories of fertility change, as in the example of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory. Proponents of the SDT theory argue that a shift in norms and values orientation, including secularization and individualization processes, have led to the transformations in family arrangements and to the drop in fertility below replacement level in many industrialized societies (Lesthaeghe, 2010). Thus, fertility is more often viewed as the result of ideational and societal developments, rather than the other way around.

However, Jenkins is not alone in highlighting the potential consequences of a dramatic drop in fertility on social norms and attitudes. For example, according to the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis (Lutz et al., 2006), which is also mentioned in the book, once fertility falls below a certain threshold, it becomes very difficult to bring it back up again. The explanations for that involve both population dynamics and societal implications. At the population level, low fertility can transform the population age structure in a way that leads to a decreasing number of women entering reproductive age, which brings the number of births further down. At the societal level, undergoing socialization in a low-fertility setting, can shape both fertility preferences as well as economic and lifestyle aspirations. In other words, the lower the number of children in one’s close environment, the more they are likely to perceive having fewer children as both normative and desirable.

According to Jenkins, not only fertility preferences can change as a result of fertility decline, but it is also expected to lead to an erosion in the importance of religion in everyday lives; for instance, by having fewer children, families’ interaction with organized religious institutions (e.g., religious schools, etc.) is much more limited. In addition, it is argued that the shrinkage of families means that women are able to increase their participation in the labor force and are no longer confined to traditional religious-based family roles. This in turn reduces ties to institutional religion and encourages the adoption of more individualistic and liberal worldviews.

Some of these suggested mechanisms may be more pronounced in countries where religious institutions also fulfill various welfare functions and are highly family-oriented, as in the case of the United States. Indeed, several studies from the USA found that individuals tend to increase their church attendance following major family cycle events, such as marriage or childbirth, as well as when there are school-aged children in the house (Becker & Hofmeister, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 1995). On the other hand, similar studies that were conducted in Europe, found little or no evidence for increased religious involvement following these family transitions (Berghammer, 2012; Tilley, 2003). For example, in a study based on longitudinal data from the Netherlands, Berghammer (2012) found that higher religiosity is a significant predictor of higher fertility in subsequent years, though a reverse effect of childbearing on religiosity was not supported by the findings.

Jenkins maintains that the causal direction of the relationship between fertility and faith is of lesser importance, as the correlation between the two is highly robust: “Fertile societies tend to be more religious; religious societies are more fertile” (p. 163). While this is true in many cases, it is also important to consider the level of analysis in which this relationship is observed. When the link between religion and fertility is examined empirically, it is often found to be more consistent at the individual level (i.e., within countries) than at the cross-national level. If we look at Europe for example, some of the countries that are considered to have the most secularized societies, including France, the Netherlands and Sweden, have had consistently higher fertility rates over the past decades compared to countries where religious indicators are considerably higher, such as Italy and Poland. However, this is not the only puzzling aspect about fertility in Europe; other studies have also documented a positive correlation between female labor force participation and fertility across European nations, meaning that countries with a higher proportion of women in paid employment also have higher fertility rates (De Laat & Sevilla-Sanz, 2011). How can these counter-intuitive findings be explained?

While both religion and female employment are important predictors of childbearing patterns, many other country-level forces are at work here, including family policies, labor market conditions, housing opportunities and gender norms. These forces influence overall fertility levels, regardless of individual religiosity.

According to McDonald (2000), fertility in developed societies is lower in countries where there is greater incoherence between gender equity in the public and in the private spheres. Thus, in many high-income societies, women enjoy more equal opportunities in education and employment, though they still carry the main burden of housework and childcare since men’s contribution to home production has increased at a much slower rate. This results in increased dual burden for women and intensified conflict between work and family responsibilities (Hochschild, 1989). It should be noted, that this conflict appears to be particularly pronounced in societies where religion plays a relatively important role, and which demonstrate more traditional gender norms (McDonald, 2000).

Interestingly, models based on McDonald’s theory of gender equity and fertility predict that as the gender revolution progresses and men will gradually increase their involvement in child rearing and other household tasks, this would lead to a rise in fertility, by alleviating women’s double burden and increasing union stability (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015). Therefore, moving towards greater gender egalitarianism does not necessarily push fertility downward, while stronger religious influence in a given society is not always conducive to higher fertility.

Another problematic generalization, which is occasionally implied in Jenkins’ work, is the association between poverty and religiosity. Several studies have examined the relationship between religion and socioeconomic status, though findings are often mixed. The American economist, Laurence Iannaccone, has noted that there is no evidence for an inverse correlation between income and religious belief or practice and that religiosity is often positively correlated with education. Based on these empirical analyses, he concluded that “Religion is not the province of the poor or uninformed” (1998, p. 1470).

Despite these shortcomings, one of the main strengths in Jenkins’ account of religion and fertility is by extending his analysis to regions beyond the Global North, as well as addressing the unique cultural and political context in each of these regions. Furthermore, he adopts what could be described as a cultural relativist approach to religion, by pointing out that not only there is substantial variation in how religion is measured, but also the ways in which we define and perceive religion and the sacred, tend to differ across societies and over time.

Acknowledging the dynamic nature of religion adds further complexity to the secularization debate; if researchers are struggling to agree on a standard definition of religion and what it means to be religious, it is no surprise that secularization has become such a contentious concept. While some scholars argue that religion is in a constant decline (Bruce, 2011; Voas, 2008), others contend that this decline is not consistent across different societies and that in many respects, religion continues to maintain high, if not increasing, public and political importance (Davie, 2002, 2007; Kaufmann, 2010). In any case, Jenkins does not situate himself firmly on any side of the secularization debate. Instead, he puts a question mark on whether the secularization process can only go in one direction and suggests that processes of “rescralization” or “reenchantment” may well be happening if the circumstances are right.

One of the examples brought forward to challenges the idea of a unidirectional secularization process, is the case of ultra-Orthodox Jews. This is an illuminating example, since the ultra-Orthodox population in Israel has undergone what can be described as a reverse demographic transition; while the general population of Jewish and Muslim women in Israel experienced a fertility decline during the latter half of the twentieth century, the total fertility rate of the ultra-Orthodox increased by about one child per woman (Berman, 2000). Furthermore, during the same period, religious practices within that group have become increasingly more stringent (ibid.). While this is a rather unique case of a relatively small population group, it demonstrates that both fertility and religious trends can change direction.

Projecting the religious landscape in future years is a particularly challenging task, since not only demographic factors of natural increase should be taken into account, but also changes to religious adherence over the life course. For example, people who are born into a particular religion may become disaffiliated or switch to another religion during adulthood, while religiously unaffiliated individuals may switch to become affiliated.

By analyzing current demographic trends and switching patterns of religiously affiliated and unaffiliated populations, Hackett et al. (2015) show that the share of religiously affiliated populations is expected to grow in the next decades. This is due to the earlier and higher childbearing patterns of religiously affiliated groups, which more than offset the increase in disaffiliation through religious switching. Another important insight that arises from this analysis is that secularization is largely a matter of geography. While in Europe and North America, religion is projected to continue declining, other parts of the world are expected to show either stability or increase in the proportion of those identifying with a religion (ibid.).

Apart from these trends, there are other reasons to be skeptic about the prospect of a secular world; first, as societies are undergoing vast changes, due to cultural, economic and technological developments, religious institutions are also evolving and religious norms and values are being adjusted to the new ways of living. Thus, instead of diminishing, in many cases religious adherence is becoming increasingly personalized and with greater emphasis on individual values of happiness and self-fulfillment (Davie, 2007; Martin, 2005).

Second, religious identification is often intertwined with other markers of identity, including ethnicity and nationality. Therefore, identifying with a particular religion is not only a matter of adherence to religious beliefs, but also a symbol of a shared cultural heritage. In addition, the role of religious identity may become more pronounced in the context of globalization and increasing cultural diversity, as it nurtures a sense of belonging and strengthens the identity of self versus others (Day, 2011; Pace, 2007). While this form of identification may not necessarily reflect commitment to religious teachings, it does contribute to the persistence of religion in everyday life.

In regard to fertility trends, there is greater agreement among scholars that total fertility rates around the world will continue to drop as a result of increased access to contraception and other social and economic developments, although the speed and extent of this decline are uncertain (United Nations, 2020). As more countries are moving toward replacement or sub-replacement fertility levels, this transition is likely to have some implications on religious attitudes and behaviors in one way or another. However, the ways in which fertility and religion interact and influence one another, largely depend on the wider social context.

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