The natural resource management in Nunavut and Greenland – a perspective through historical institutionalism

ABSTRACT

This article compares the self-government system in Greenland in Denmark and territorial governance in Nunavut, Canada in relation to the management of natural resources through the perspective of historical institutionalism. Both territories have undergone processes of re-empowerment, and possess major assets of natural resources, and the struggle for self-determination has triggered their metropolitan states (Denmark and Finland) and regional governments to consider some form of self-government. However, two different solutions have appeared due to gradual development through path dependency as legislation and form of government. Nunavut is a territory within the Canadian federal construction, based on Indigenous claims, while Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Danish unitary state. The land claims in Canada have given Nunavut some influence in the management of its natural resources, while Greenland has taken control of its subterranean resources through extended self-government implemented in 2009. This article will highlight the resource policy similarities and differences of the two territories via three potential explanatory factors: historical background, self-government, and the management of natural resources as a point of departure. The findings show that both regions have similarities in historical background and the management of natural resources, but there are also significant differences in how local authorities have addressed mining projects.

KEYWORDS:

• Greenland
• Nunavut
• natural resources
• legislation
• management

Introduction

Extractive industries have structured human interaction, and identities, for thousands of years. What has recently changed, however is that the digital revolution has created a situation whereby we are dependent on electronic devices, which are built with specific minerals and metals.¹ The Arctic region is no exception to this, and it is seen as a last resource frontier both in terms of fossil fuels but also strategic materials. The question of mineral resources has become a dominant strand of the discourse around the Polar Regions over the past four decades. Therefore, it is expected that the extractive industries will play a significant role in the economies and politics of Arctic states and regions in the future. The issue of mitigating climate change, while at the same time pursuing access to fossil-fuels, will still be in conflict amongst states. Economic expansion and consumerism go hand in hand and the transition towards more climate friendly economies will take a long time, even though major efforts are made by various states.²

Mining activities are often seen as both a successful enterprise as well as a curse for Arctic societies. For Arctic communities, they can open the possibility of new jobs and financial growth, while meeting a society’s demands for minerals. At the same time, mining poses a risk for the environment, and may lack a long-term perspective for developing local projects without acknowledging local and Indigenous knowledge, and thus be accused of poor information sharing and communication.³ The most formidable challenge for the industry is to be able to meet the demands of environmental protection and sustainable development at the same time.⁴

All eight Arctic states, which are members of the Arctic Council, have been engaged in prospecting and exploiting both renewable and non-renewable resources in their northern regions. The major obstacle for the industry has been the transportation to outside markets. The Arctic Council has produced guidelines on how to perform environmental impact assessments in Arctic conditions, how to conduct mining in Arctic environments and how to regulate offshore oil and gas activities. However, these guidelines are voluntary. And even though mutual understanding exists of minimum actions needed to protect the far north’s fragile nature among the Arctic Eight, it is up to the national states to implement the rules and legislation within this policy area.⁵

Another issue that has arisen in the debate surrounding the extractive industry is the principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). This principle has been developed through the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 (UNDRIP). The principle is used in many contexts, but in this article, it is only referred to in relation to the extractive industries. However, not all governments have implemented the principle.⁶ Danish and Greenlandic governments have, for example, taken the view that the Self-Government Act of Greenland from 2009 constitutes full implementation of UNDRIP, since it includes matters on extractive industries. However, various perspectives remain, and few government officials found that FPIC is not relevant for Greenland because the Inuit are not a minority. The ‘consent’ part in Greenland refers to the government as the legitimate elected representative of the people. The Self-Government Act allows the government of Greenland a way of de facto Inuit government. It only requires a political will to legislate and implement FPIC in full.⁷

This article will highlight two Arctic regions within two various jurisdictions. Nunavut is part of the Canadian federal state, and Greenland is a component of the unitary state of the Kingdom of Denmark. Nunavut and Greenland are two self-governing regions with huge endowments of natural resources. This article seeks to explain how these territories cope with the management of natural resources and how their respective forms of self-governance operate in relation to extractive industries. How can these territories cope with the management of natural resources, and what are the mechanisms behind the forms of management they have implemented? Can we detect similar rules between these two cases, or are these regions too diverse for successful comparisons? The perspective of historical institutionalism will provide explanations to how the development of self-governance has evolved, as well as how the development of the extractive industries has progressed. This comparison will thus highlight the similarities and differences between the two cases.

The initial hypothesis is that both regions are distinct in how their self-governance is organised and structured, since we have one case coming from a federal state (Nunavut) and one deriving from a unitary state (Greenland). However, there are also similarities regarding the colonial background, and re-empowerment and legislation around extractive industries. It is expected that we will find some common ground in relation to the management of natural resources, because both national states Canada and Denmark are both members of the Arctic Council and hence might follow similar domestic laws, and the same international principles, in the regulation of extractive industries, including from an environmental standpoint. The focus will therefore be on three major explanatory factors, i.e. the historical background, the self-governance, and the management of natural resources.

The following section of the article will explain the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, secondly a description of the system of government in both regions is used as a background with the most important institutions at play. Thirdly the cases are explained according to the overall development of legislation around natural resources, and then the management of natural resources is outlined and how it is structured with examples of the handling of the proposal of a uranium mine in Greenland and the management of the Baffinland mines in Nunavut, followed by a comparison between the cases as a discussion, and finally some concluding remarks complete this article.

The theoretical framework of historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is nothing new within political science, but it has evolved distinctively during recent decades.⁸ Historical institutionalism can be seen as a branch of new institutionalist theory, where the central argument is that institutions matter.⁹ Usually, historical institutionalists start with empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons. The analysis then uses these events or comparisons to test hypotheses that can account for the observed differences.¹⁰ Politics involves elements of uncertainties, but once a specific path is taken, then it can be ‘locked-in’ and this led to new strategies and adjustments within the political and/or social sphere. Change in one area affects other ongoing processes, and this is what drives institutional evolvement.¹¹ Concepts used to explain the development of institutions over time are critical junctures and path dependency. Critical junctures are seen as crucial moments or sudden events, which are catalysts for certain policy paths. The paths taken are then dependent on past trajectories and thereby constrained even though institutions continue to evolve.¹² As institutions have become established, critical junctures can lead to new institutional frameworks and even new institutions. In other words, historical institutionalism highlights the ways in which an institutional configuration, at a certain point in time, influences interaction of social and political actors so that institutional change, of varying scope and intensity, or institutional stability is achieved at a later stage.¹³

Critical junctures are, however, hard to define. When do we have a situation of structural influence (political, economic, cultural, ideological, organisational), that is significant only for a short period? The timeframe for a critical juncture can vary from a year to decades or centuries. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) have tried to define critical junctures as ‘relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect outcome of interest’. The relatively short period of time means that the critical juncture should in theory be brief in relation to the path dependent process it initiates. The substantially heightened probability should be seen in the light of the agents’ probability to affect the outcome of interest before and after the critical juncture.¹⁴ Critical junctures should be seen as rare events in the development of an institution. The normal state of an institution is usually stable or one of constrained, adaptive change. During a critical juncture, change is more flexible than it is during the phases of path dependence that precede or follow it.¹⁵

Institutions are often seen as arenas of conflict in which decision-makers (rule-makers) defined as the actors set and modify the formal rules that constitute an institution, and where the actors affected by the rules (rule-takers) are expected to comply with said rules, can struggle to adapt the institution to their needs and agendas.¹⁶ This is a notably straightforward process, but imagine the following scenario in which two actors, A (decision-makers, rule-makers) and B (the rule-takers), interact over an institutional reform. At the first point in time, B can force A to put institutional reform on the agenda. However, it will become difficult for B to sustain mobilisation for reform over a longer time, and so A can decide when an institutional reform will be enacted. This means that A can wait until later to implement a reform, and this will affect the outcome on the longer term.¹⁷ This affect the discussion about the critical junctures, since they can only be done ex post, that is, once a new institutional arrangement is in place, it can display the path dependent characteristics over the medium to long term.¹⁸

In the two cases investigated in this context we can draw from earlier experiences of critical junctures, such as, the re-empowerment period of both Nunavut and Greenland. The re-empowerment has led to land claims in Nunavut, and later self-government in 1999, and for Greenland Home Rule implemented in 1979 due to a county period and then an extension of self-government in 2009, which both can be seen as reactions towards the colonial past. However, external events have also triggered the development of the two regions, such as the debate around Indigenous rights and climate change from a more international/global level. Since both regions have now adopted self-government, this can be seen as a path dependent process towards institutionalising other spheres of policies, where natural resources might be seen as a natural path towards even more self-government. To own its own lands and assets would then be important to enhance the region’s own economic resources and wealth. Since both regions have established their own legislative and executive powers, establishment of other institutions become a natural, evolutionary process, where management of natural resources can be seen as an example of such.

This article has no ambition to either test historical institutionalism or contribute to the theoretical debate around the theme. Instead, this study should be viewed as an empirical, comparative oriented contribution where two different entities are compared in a specific sphere of politics. The concept of historical institutionalism is only used as a reference framework to give a different perspective in the field of extractive industries.

The Governments of Nunavut and Greenland

Nunavut and Greenland are two territories belonging to different states Canada, and Denmark respectively. Both territories do have self-government in relation to the national level, but their development have taken place in both similar and different contexts. Both territories have a majority Indigenous population. The Canadian federal state consists of ten provinces and three territories, one of which is Nunavut, which was made a distinct political entity from the Northwest Territories in 1999. The Kingdom of Denmark is a unitary state but has two autonomous territories in form of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, and therefore the Danish state is sometimes seen as a semi-federal state. According to a study undertaken by Trinn and Schulte (2020) the territorial self-governance captures three attributes: ‘self-rule, constitutional protection, and territorial quality’.¹⁹ This self-rule promises the degree of authority that the subnational territory enjoys. Constitutional protection reflects the recognition of the national level that the region has, and gives the territorial entity guarantees to exist while the territorial quality refers to the context where not all subnational entities in every country enjoy the same constitutional status. For example, Greenland has a special status in relation to the regions of mainland Denmark, while Nunavut enjoys less self-rule than the Canadian provinces.²⁰

Self-governance in Nunavut

Nunavut is governed by two institutions: the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) and the Government of Nunavut. The Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. as an entity ensures that promises made under the Nunavut Agreement is carried out. NTI coordinates and manages Inuit responsibilities set out in the Nunavut Agreement, and NTI functions as a link between the federal and the regional governments to fulfil their obligations.²¹ The governance of NTI consists of eight board members, five of which are appointed by each regional Inuit organisation, and three members which are directly appointed by NTI. The three latter members should represent one female, one elder and one youth (sixteen years or older). Each member should be an Inuk. NTI also has a president and a vice-president and occasionally a member appointed by the Qikiqtani Inuit Association in a non-voting capacity. An annual meeting is held whenever appropriate.²²

Regarding extractive industries, the principles follow a form of co-management between the federal and the regional level since Nunavut does not have full control over public lands and resource management. The Government of Nunavut has sought to reach a devolution agreement with the federal government to seek more control over its own resources.²³ At the time of writing, this process remains ongoing and will probably have positive consequences for further self-governance in the area.²⁴ The decision-making process over lands and resources in Nunavut is distributed among four co-management boards: the Nunavut Impact Review Board, Planning Commission, Water Board, and the Surface Rights Tribunal.²⁵

The Government of Nunavut consists of a Commissioner, the Premier of Nunavut, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Assembly with twenty-two constituencies. There are no fixed number of seats in the legislative assembly. The Commissioner’s role is like a Lieutenant-Governor of a province and is appointed by the federal government via an Order in Council. The Commissioner may not appoint a majority of Members to the legislative assembly to the Cabinet. This is to ensure the accountability of the executive branch to the legislature.²⁶ Nunavut follows the parliamentarian principle, which means that the Executive Council retains power with a majority support from the Legislative Assembly. The Commissioner acts as a symbol of the territory and supports the values of the citizens. Bills passed by the legislative assembly need the Commissioner’s assent.²⁷ The Legislative Assembly of Nunavut includes the speaker, the Premier of Nunavut, the Executive Council, and the members of the Legislative Assembly. All members of the Legislative Assembly are elected as independent candidates, with no party affiliation, and therefore Nunavut has a consensus-style government. However, unanimous agreement is not necessary in every matter since a single majority consent is permitted. Consensus is, however, the preferable outcome.²⁸ The Premier has the prerogative to assign minister portfolios, but no right to dismiss ministers.²⁹

Self-governance in Greenland

The Danish Realm, or the Kingdom of Denmark, constitutes Denmark with the two autonomous regions of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The constitution of Denmark does not mention the two autonomous regions as being such, only in reference to the national elections to the Danish Parliament. The 1948 Home Rule Act of the Faroe Islands and the 2009 Self-Government Act of Greenland are considered as separate laws within the Danish jurisdiction, which are based on a delegation model where negotiations between the two regional governments and the national government have taken place.³⁰

The Parliament or the legislative assembly in Greenland is called Inatsisartut and the executive body is called Naalakkersuisut. Inatsisartut has thirty-one members, which are elected to four-year terms. Greenlandic political parties compete for the seats in the Parliament. The Greenlandic parties are regional parties separate from the Danish counterparts.³¹ Currently, there are five political parties available in the assembly: Inuit Ataqatigiit (a left-wing, pro-independence party), Siumut (a social democratic, pro-independence party), Atassut (a conservative, unionist party), Demokraatit (social-liberal, pro-independence party), and Naleraq (a centrist party with independence on the agenda).³² The parties which form governments vary from election to election, but the largest parties Inuit Ataqatigiit, Siumut and Demokraatit usually dominating governing coalitions. The elections follow international standards of general, free, and secret ballots. The decision-making in the parliament is based on the majority-rule principle. Legislation or new acts require three readings before they can be accepted. The executive body or Naalakkersuisut is appointed by Inatsisartut and is following the parliamentarian principle, where the government must have the parliament’s confidence. The elected Premier then appoints ministers to the various portfolios.³³ Greenland has also a court system at the first and second instance, which are connected to the Danish court system. The courts are funded by the annual block grant from Denmark (which also covers the whole self-government system).

Overall, Greenland has an extended autonomy and can be seen as a state within a state or as a partially independent territory.³⁴ Some authors have even argued that Greenland can be seen as a part of a commonwealth. Comparisons to commonwealth areas are based on the financial relationship between Greenland and Denmark, small size regarding the population, the context of an Indigenous population and economic interests, including mining, from foreign interests.³⁵

The cases of Nunavut and Greenland

Nunavut

Nunavut is Canada’s largest and most dispersed populated territory. The population is about 32 000 whereby eighty-five percent are Inuit. Nunavummiut live in twenty-five settlements scattered across about 2.1 million km². Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) submitted their first land claims to the Canadian Government in 1976, following the 1973 case in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of Aboriginal title to the land.³⁶ The land claims in Canada included some aims to establish a mechanism for equal participation in Canadian society; achievement of fair compensation and benefits of Inuit lands; and preservation of the Arctic ecology.³⁷ ITC also claimed to create a public territory in form of Nunavut. The federal government rejected this idea at first. Following the creation of the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut in 1982, which was established to handle the negotiations with the federal government, it was agreed that some governing bodies and advisory boards would be established, which would give the Inuit a degree of self-governance over the development and resource management of their land claims areas.³⁸

In 1982, a plebiscite was organised to give the federal government a view on the issue of Northwest Territories (NWT). The matter was to divide NWT into two different parts. 56.5% of the voters were in favour of such a development.³⁹ The result of the plebiscite gave the NWT opportunity to divide the territory, but under certain conditions. The conditions were that all settlement claims should be solved; a territory-wide agreement on a new boundary should be established; and a clear distribution of power between the territorial, regional, and local levels of government was to be in place.⁴⁰ In 1993, a new plebiscite was held for the NWT, where the outcome of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement was signed. On 10 June 1993, the House of Commons passed the Nunavut Act, and this realised the Nunavut territory. The Nunavut Act was swiftly passed, with only one day of debate in the House of Commons and two days debate in the Senate.⁴¹ The jurisdiction covers education, language, wildlife, culture, and the Government of Nunavut as a public institution with similar functions as the Government of NWT.⁴²

The Nunavut Act regulates the Government of Nunavut. Nunavut has a legislative assembly with elected members from each electoral district in the territory. The legislative assembly sits for a period of no more than five years. The executive power consists of the Commissioner who is appointed by the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council and the Minister of Northern Affairs are giving instructions to the Commissioner.⁴³ There are no political parties in Nunavut, so the elected members are sitting as independent members, as already mentioned above.

Nunavut is de facto governed by two institutions: the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. and the Government of Nunavut. The Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. manages land and wildlife and protects the Inuit according to the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) and is funded through land claims compensations and resource royalties, while the Government of Nunavut manages health, education, culture, language, and intergovernmental relations and is funded through the federal government.⁴⁴ The relationship between Nunavut and the Canadian federal state is quite unique. Nunavut represents the outcome of a political agreement between an Indigenous people (Inuit) and the federal government. Despite the similarities between the Nunavut Act and the NWT Act there are some innovative aspects of affirming Inuit interests and setting Nunavut apart from the provinces.⁴⁵

Greenland

Greenland is the largest island in the world, with an area of about 2.1 million km². The island is sparsely populated with approximately 56 000 inhabitants where about 89% of the population is Inuit. The population is scattered around the major towns and settlements mostly on the west coast, but there are also some towns and settlements on the east coast. The capital of Nuuk hosts about 19 000 inhabitants. About sixty percent of the population live in the five largest towns of Nuuk, Sisimiut, Ilulissat, Aasiaat and Qaqortoq.⁴⁶

Greenland has a long history as a Danish territory. In 1721, the Norwegian-Danish missionary Hans Egede arrived in the island and Greenland was subject to colonisation. In 1953, Denmark integrated Greenland as a county amongst other Danish counties at the time. It took until 1979, when Greenland became a self-governing territory according to the Faroese model. The triggering issue became the membership to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. The Danish membership towards the EEC had made two referendums possible, one in Denmark and one in Greenland simultaneously. The Greenlandic referendum gave a negative outcome, but the Danish state considered that this result was invalid due to the county status of Greenland at the time. However, intellectuals and professionals in Greenland became more politically active and new political parties were formed. Negotiations with the Danish state began, and the outcome became a solution where Greenland received its own Home Rule. A new referendum regarding the EEC-membership was therefore established in 1982, where Greenlanders voted against such a membership. Greenland withdrew from the EEC in 1985.⁴⁷

The 1979 Home Rule Act gave Greenland a legislative assembly and an executive government. A timetable for when areas of competences were to become transferred from the Danish state was negotiated. By 1980, most of these competences were already transferred to Greenland.⁴⁸ In the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, some new discussions took place regarding the evaluation of the Home Rule agreement. A commission was working with a new draft to a Self-Government Act. A referendum was eventually held on 25 November 2008, with 75.5% of the electorate in favour of the new Act. The Self-Government Act has given Greenland further competencies and an extended self-government.⁴⁹

The 2009 Self-Government Act regulates Greenland, and in this new agreement, Greenlanders are acknowledged as a people according to international law. This means that Greenland can also decide its own destiny with the right to self-determination in the future, hence opening the possibility of independence as the major goal. The Act also gives Greenland more room to manoeuvre in developing its own international affairs.⁵⁰

Canada and natural resources

In Canada, new land claims agreements (such as Nunavut), impact-benefit agreements, and co-management boards are all affecting the potential for the development of natural resources in Northern Canada that increases the benefits of these developments for local communities and helps ensure that development is done in an environmentally sound manner.⁵¹ In the past, mining activities escalated after the Klondike Gold Rush of the late nineteenth century. Deposits of gold were found at Yellowknife, hard-rock mineral properties such as the lead-zinc was found in the Yukon, copper was found near Whitehorse, and uranium at the NWT’s Great Bear Lake.⁵² Mineral exploration increased heavily again during the Second World War, when demand for base minerals rose for defence and construction projects.⁵³

The legislation regarding the management of natural resources is stipulated by the federal government, however, some decentralised issues are the matters of the provinces and territories especially regarding land claim acts. The land claim acts give the Canadian Territories shared revenues between Indigenous organisations, based on various treaties. Indigenous groups also control development where they own subsurface rights.⁵⁴ In the past all matters in relation to natural resources were in the hands of the federal government in Canada. During the 1980s, another development has taken its toll. The provinces and territories have been given more competencies to handle also their own natural assets, because of new environmental and social preoccupations and laws. These issues have been linked to the idea of sustainable development and the increasing acknowledgement of Indigenous rights through environmental impact assessments.⁵⁵ The oil and gas development in Nunavut, for example, is the responsibility of the Northern Oil and Gas Branch of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada.⁵⁶

Regarding the environmental assessments in relation to mining projects in Nunavut, the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) from 1993 and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) from 2012 are applicable. The CEAA includes assessments where impacts on the health and socio-economic conditions of Aboriginal peoples; physical and cultural heritage; current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes and structures; sites or things of historical, archaeological, palaeontological, or architectural significance are all taken into consideration.⁵⁷ Article 12 of the NLCA sets out the environmental assessment process for the Nunavut Settlement Area and Outer Land Fast Ice Zone. There is a Nunavut Impact Review Board established to conduct the environmental assessment. The primary objective is to protect the existing and wellbeing of the residents and communities in the region and to preserve the ecosystem of the region. The NLCA also allows for the establishment of a Federal environmental assessment panel. The federal government still has an overriding authority on environmental assessments.⁵⁸ The Canadian government holds decision-making power over non-renewable resources in Crown lands, those lands not included in the NLCA. Furthermore, the minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada has the final say in approval of progress of projects.⁵⁹

Environmental impact assessments can be conducted either by a responsible authority or review panel to understand the cumulative effects of a resource activity. ‘Environmental assessment is broadly defined as a process of identifying, predicting, evaluating, and mitigating the biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made’.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) are mandatory in Nunavut, while these can be voluntary in other areas in Canada. The IBAs are usually handled behind closed doors and their content is made confidential to NTI and the regional Inuit organisations. Once they are concluded it is only the Canadian government, which has access to the content of the IBAs, and not the Government of Nunavut or the public.⁶¹ IBAs have their origin in a Canadian and Australian context and have also travelled to Greenland as part of the process within extractive industries.⁶²

The federal construction of Canada makes the governance complex, since it is a web of diverse authorities involved at different levels of government. In Nunavut we have four main layers: the federal government, territorial structures, land claim organisations, and municipalities. The Government of Nunavut can only exercise those powers which have been delegated from the federal government. The federal government allocates transfer payments and programme funding to the territory and its institutions. The Canadian government has therefore a lot to say of the operations taken place in Nunavut. The Government of Nunavut is taken care of the day-to-day tasks for the three territories that constitute Nunavut (Kitikmeot, Kivalliq, and Qikiqtaaluk/Baffin), which organises the operations on the local level. There are also Nunavut territorial regulatory boards which help ensure the compliance with the resource and co-management agreements within the NLCA. The Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) is the organisation representing the Inuit under the NLCA and is therefore in a sense the Inuit Government of Nunavut. NTI also includes several other organisations, which are important for the Inuit, such as, Inuit regional development corporations, Inuit economic development corporations, Inuit investment corporations, and Inuit wildlife organisations. The municipal level is responsible for the day-to-day work in each village.⁶³

The Baffinland Mines as an example

The management of the Baffinland Mines will be used as an example to explain how the management of natural resources is executed in Nunavut. The Baffinland Mines is an ore mine owned by a Canadian company, Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation. The mine is situated at the Mary River in the Qikiqtani region of North Baffin in Nunavut and is jointly owned by the Energy and Minerals Group (USA/CAN) and ArcelorMittal (Luxembourg).⁶⁴ Mining is usually undertaken in joint ventures with different international companies.

In Nunavut companies must conclude an Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement (IIBA) with the Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), which collects royalties and other benefits on behalf of the NLCA. NTI also administers mineral exploration agreements in the territory.⁶⁵ The production of the Baffinland Mines started in 2014 after it had received the project certificate from the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) back in December 2012. The project cost CAD$740 million to construct. The estimated lifespan of the project is twenty-one years. Even though the Qikiqtani Inuit Association signed an IIBA on 6 September 2013, criticism against the project has been addressed. Many Inuit are worried about the environmental impacts and the effects the mine will have in relation to the lifestyle and culture in the region.⁶⁶

Nunavummiut mining is seen as a key element to increased self-determination. Inuit traditions and knowledge are vital components in the contracts before mining can take place. The assessment of a project is in the hands of local representatives at the local hearings of any project.⁶⁷ The federal government has only had an indirect role in the Baffinland Mines project and is therefore accepted by the inhabitants of Nunavut. Furthermore, the mine has economically gained the local community with education, training opportunities, and jobs.⁶⁸

The extension of the mine has been experiencing some setbacks from the communities in the region. There have been protests done in form of films, artwork and lately from the NIRB and the Minister of Northern Affairs.⁶⁹ The second phase of the Baffinland Mines would have doubled the annual output of tonnes of ore and constructed a 110-kilometre railway to the Milne Inlet Port, but these plans have now been rejected.⁷⁰ Further negotiations will therefore be made in order to expand the mine in the future. For now, the priority is to keep the mine running.⁷¹

Greenland and natural resources

Mining projects have been part of Greenland’s history since the 19^th century. Cryolite, a raw material once important to the aluminium smelting process, was mined until resources were depleted in 1987. The Cryolite mine in Ivittuut was crucial during the Second World War, as it was used to produce aluminium for the North American aircraft industry.

In 1964 the Greenlandic Council was established to undertake the industrial development in Greenland. The Council consisted of five members from Denmark and an equal number of members from Greenland. In 1975, local administration was transferred from the Danish state to the municipalities in Greenland.⁷² During the 1970s, discussions about the management of natural resources were on the agenda in relation to the development path towards Home Rule, which Greenland gained in 1979. However, at this time only a joint administration between Denmark and Greenland was implemented.⁷³ The principles were set out in the Home Rule Act from 1978 and the Mineral Resources Act from the same year. The regime was based on the fundamental principle of joint decision making, mutual veto rights and equality between Danish and Greenlandic authorities. A Joint Commission was established comprising of six to ten members, one half representing the Home Rule Government and the second half by the Danish government. The Joint Committee office was in Copenhagen until 1998, but from 1 July 1998 it was based in Nuuk as the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP). The BMP became responsible for the management of all mineral and energy resource activities in Greenland, as well as the promotion of Greenland as an international mining nation. The BMP and the Danish government still had joint authority over the licencing for prospecting, exploration, and exploitation of mineral resources.⁷⁴

Since the Greenland Self-Government Act came into force in 2009, economic development and the right to utilise natural resources in Greenland is in Nuuk’s hands. The Greenland Self-Government Act also regulates the revenues coming from the mining sector. It states that the Danish block grant will be reduced by an amount equal to half of the revenue over and above 75 million DKK (approximately US$10.6 million). In subsequent years, these subsidies would be regulated in accordance with the increase in the general price and wage index of the budget that year.⁷⁵ The current Mineral Resources Act from 2010 regulates onshore and subsoil activities. The Act also states that all activities should take social (health and safety), environmental and sustainability considerations in mind. Furthermore, international practices and best practices are acknowledged.⁷⁶ In 2013, the Mineral License and Safety Authority (MLSA) was established replacing the BMP. The MLSA is currently the overall administrative authority for mineral resource activities, including power generation, pipeline construction, and underground storage.

The Greenland’s Mineral and Resources Act states all the applications underneath which any project is going to be realised. This includes offshore hydrocarbon activities, as well as mineral exploration and exploitation. All projects require an environmental assessment as well as a social impact assessment. Prior to opening new offshore areas for hydrocarbon exploration and licencing, a strategic environmental impact assessment is also necessary, and is prepared by the National Environmental Institute, the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources and the Mineral License and Safety Authority.⁷⁷ According to the Mineral Resources Act, the Government of Greenland may also carry out scientific and practical studies and mapping mineral resources. The Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) and the Natural Environmental Research Institute of Denmark (NERI) may conduct research of particular interest to mining activities in Greenland.⁷⁸

Mining and energy extractive development in Greenland are guided by four essential factors: 1) recruitment of Greenlandic labour force; 2) engaging relevant Greenlandic companies; 3) focusing on knowledge transfer, hereunder, education of staff; and 4) preserving socio-cultural values and traditions. The idea of social impact assessments (SIAs) are to engage relevant stakeholders in public hearings and consultations; provide descriptions and analyses of the social pre-project baseline, usually delivered as a report; mitigate any negative aspects; monitor for future endeavours; provide assessment based on data; identify both negative and positive social impacts at local and national levels; optimise positive impacts and mitigate negative impacts throughout the project’s lifetime; and to develop a Benefit and Impact Plan for the implementation of the Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA).⁷⁹ These principles derive from the fact that Greenland complies with EU protocols on Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments (SEA). Such assessments have been in the pipeline for the EU since 1996 and the protocol was approved in 2001 by the EU Council with its Directive 2001/42EC. It became binding for EU members in 2004. Greenland is not part of the EU as such, but as part of the member state of Denmark, Greenland has been approved to comply with these rules.⁸⁰ Greenland has developed its own guidelines for Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) as mentioned above.

There is also an important document, Act No. 6 of 5 December 2008 on the Greenland Mining Fund, which is important for MLSA as it underpins long-term considerations in the use of mining revenues. The Fund has been used for covering further investments in mining and raw materials. The long-term aim is to benefit the Greenlandic society more widely. This mechanism has its roots in the Norwegian example of their oil fund.⁸¹ Nunavut has a similar Trust Fund.

The example of the Kvanefjeld project

International companies have begun to explore the prospects and opportunities for uranium mining, either directly or as a by-product of rare earth elements extraction in southern Greenland. The Australian-owned company, then-Greenland Minerals and Energy (GME), now known as Energy Transition Minerals (ETM) Ltd.,⁸² is focusing on potential development of both uranium and rare earth elements at Kuannersuit (known as Kvanefjeld in Danish), a plateau near the south Greenland town of Narsaq, which has a population of about 1500.⁸³

The debate over uranium has been sporadic in Greenlandic politics since 1955 and onwards. The first discovery of uranium was in 1955 in southern Greenland. In the Law on Mineral Resources in Greenland from 1965, the first mention of uranium and thorium is stated as these were resources of a different kind, accompanied by international conventions.⁸⁴ The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) declared Arctic as a nuclear-free zone back in 1983.⁸⁵ In the 2000s, the discourse in Denmark of ‘zero-tolerance’ was coined in relation to extraction of uranium. However, there has never been any official document stating this matter. There is clearly a division in favour and against extraction of uranium in Greenlandic politics amongst the political parties and population. Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) and Naleraq are against uranium mining, while Siumut and other parties are in favour of limited extraction. Furthermore, some compromises have been made between the Danish and Greenlandic authorities, as uranium is seen as a dual-use product, with implications for foreign- and security policy under Danish sovereignty. In January 2016, the Greenlandic and the Danish governments signed an agreement on exploitation and export of uranium and other radioactive substances. This agreement consists of an overall agreement regarding specific foreign-, defence- and security political relations, related to the exploitation and export of uranium from Greenland.⁸⁶

The mining project has been underway since 2007 but is still not realised and for now ETM has filed a complaint with an arbitral tribunal located in Copenhagen. The claim pertains to its dispute with the Governments of Greenland and Denmark regarding the Company’s rights under its current exploration licence for the Kvanefjeld project.⁸⁷ There have been numerous debates around this mine and the local people of Narsaq is afraid that the mining will affect the sheep farms, hunting, and the fresh water supply in the community. Furthermore, there were concerns that the tourism sector might also be negatively affected. The region is known for its beautiful hiking trails.

Comparison between the cases

This discussion is trying to combine the historical institutionalism with the logic of comparison. First, we will discuss the historical evolution of the two territories into more and more self-government and thereafter we will highlight the differences within the management of natural resources. The cases of Nunavut and Greenland have some similarities and differences in relation to each other. Both territories have undergone a legislative and political development in the direction towards more self-government. This has been a gradual process, according to path dependency to borrow some terminology from the historical institutionalism.⁸⁸ This also means that the self-government has become ‘locked-in’, and therefore the territories can develop further with their own institutions in place. The constraint being that Greenland for example cannot overrule the Danish constitution and Nunavut is constrained by the rules implemented by the federal state. More and more competencies have been gradually transferred to the self-governed territories. However, there is the impression that the Government of Nunavut is merely an administrative and more limited authority, while Greenland’s government is more independent and has an extensive degree of autonomy. Nunavut is at the time of writing devolving towards more self-government and can thus soon be in line with Greenland in this matter. The historical trajectories are also similar in relation to colonial background, Inuit majority population, vast land areas and small populations with similar challenges for development. The financial dependency on the metropolitan state is also a similar factor. Both Nunavut and Greenland are dependent on subsidies from their respective core state. The different institutional outcomes seem to be shaped by on the one hand Greenland’s efforts to become more independent in the future, while Nunavut seem to try to navigate in a more complex state structure where various forms of self-governance take place. The study by Trinn & Schulte shows that the Canadian model is highly asymmetrical.⁸⁹ There are different layers of autonomy in form of provinces, territories, and municipalities within the same state structure. The example with Nunavut shows that it must navigate through four different layers of authority in relation to the management of natural resources: ‘the federal government, territorial structures, land claim organizations, and municipalities’.

The regulations regarding the management of natural resources are based on similar principles with environmental assessments, social impact assessments, benefit impact agreements and the like. The structure is clearly a hierarchical organisation with top-down steering from the federal state in the Nunavut case and the Government of Greenland in the Greenlandic case. Both regions have established funds for more long-term aims to benefit their own societies. The Nunavut case is thus co-managed in relation to its natural resources, which was the case in Greenland before the implementation of the Self-Government Act from 2009. There seems to be a mismatch between the parallel public/Inuit governance in Nunavut regarding the responsibilities and financial situation in relation to extractive industries. The NTI has the overall power regarding the management of natural resources, which is a co-management organisation. All revenues from extractive industries fall under the aegis of the NTI. This means that the Government of Nunavut is fully dependent on the subsidies from the federal government. Greenland has more leeway since all management of natural resources is lying in the hands of its own regional government. However, if Greenland is not able to receive incomes from the extractive industries, the block grant will still be an obstacle for more financial independence. The block grant will be reduced according to the model described in the 2009 Self-Government Act, and the aim is to phase out the block grant totally in the end making Greenland less dependent on Denmark in the future. We must remember that mining is an international affair, as the two examples show of Baffinland Mines and the Kvanefjeld project. It seems from these examples that Nunavut seem to be better off when it comes to handle issues on the local level, while Greenland is in a more complex situation especially regarding uranium mining. The two examples are very different, but it gives us some ideas of how mining can become very complex and where multiple actors are involved at the same time.

As more attention is directed towards the Arctic due to climate change and where assets are seen as a last resort other external factors as state competition over natural resources might come into play. Therefore, it is essential for the two territories in question to be able to also navigate within international relations. Greenland has developed its own para-diplomatic features in establishing ‘mini embassies’ abroad in a way to overcome and be able to sit at the negotiation tables as an own nation. Nunavut does not have the same powers, but there are opportunities for Canadian provinces and territories to be part in international agreements. So far Nunavut has only been able to sign Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with other territories (including Greenland). In the future there may be further relevant critical junctures, which cannot be predicted but which will probably set the two territories on other distinct paths. For the present, the institutionalisation of the management of natural resources follows both international, national, and regional legislation.

Concluding remarks

Self-government is perhaps a ‘locked-in’ situation for now for both territories, but things can change over time. Greenland is trying to become an independent state in the future, according to the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, while Nunavut remains on the path of evolution towards a form of self-government which Greenland now has. The examples of mining seen in this article are of very different characteristics, but one point in common is that the mining industry is regulated by international companies, and this can be problematic to handle for small political entities such as Greenland and Nunavut. Therefore, it is of outmost importance to have the right legislation and procedures in place to address the challenges of developing extractive industries under these conditions. Greenland could thus learn from Nunavut about best practices from a local perspective.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the special issue’s editors and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article. Furthermore, I would like to thank Professor Marc Lanteigne for the language check. All remaining errors are my own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Bay-Larsen and others, “Mining and Arctic Communities,” 1–2.

² Hemmings and Koivurova, “International Regulation of Mineral Resources Activities in the Polar Regions,” 303.

³ Skorstad and others, “Governing Complexity”; Coates, ‘The history and historiography of natural resource development in the Arctic’; Jacobsen, “Digging sustainability: Scaling and sectoring of sovereignty in Greenland and Nunavut mining discourses,” 52.

⁴ Skorstad and others, “Governing Complexity,” 14.

⁵ Hemmings and Koivurova, “International Regulation of Mineral Resources Activities in the Polar Regions,” 306–308.

⁶ Johnstone,”What is required for free, prior and informed consent and where does it apply?”

⁷ Ibid., 58–59, 67.

⁸ See for example Farrell, “The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories: Rational Choice, Historical Institutionalism, and Sociological Institutionalism”; Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism’; Thélen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’; Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures – Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism”.

⁹ Bursens and Deforche, “Going Beyond Paradiplomacy,” 158.

¹⁰ Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” 373–374.

¹¹ Ibid., 383–85.

¹² Ibid., 387; Bursens and Deforche, op.cit., 159.

¹³ Capoccia, “When Do Institutions ‘Bite?’,”2.

¹⁴ Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 343, 348.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Capoccia, op.cit., 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 18.

¹⁸ Ibid., 22.

¹⁹ Trinn & Schulte,”Untangling territorial self-governance – new typology and data”.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Nunavut Tunngavik.

²² Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated Consolidated By-Laws.

²³ Hunter Tootoo, “Nunavut: An Example of Consensus Government in the Canadian Arctic,” 2.

²⁴ See Prime Minister of Canada, “Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and the Premier of Nunavut.”

²⁵ Mifflin, “The Prince and the Pauper – Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated and the Government of Nunavut,” 95.

²⁶ Tootoo, “Nunavut: An Example of Consensus Government in the Canadian Arctic,” 3.

²⁷ Commissioner of Nunavut.

²⁸ Consensus Government.

²⁹ Tootoo, “Nunavut: An Example of Consensus Government in the Canadian Arctic,” 3.

³⁰ Ackrén, “Development of Autonomy in Greenland – From Home Rule to Self-Government.”

³¹ Ibid.

³² Inatsisartut, “Årsberetning for Inatsisartut 2022.”

³³ Ackrén, “Development of Autonomy in Greenland – From Home Rule to Self-Government.”

³⁴ See for example Hannum, “Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination”; Rezvani, “Surpassing the Sovereign State.”

³⁵ McDougall, “Greenland from a Commonwealth Perspective.”

³⁶ Lévesque, “Revisiting Inuit Quajimajatuqangit.”

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Cameron and White, “Getting to Nunavut.”

⁴⁰ Lévesque, “Revisiting Inuit Quajimajatuqangit.”

⁴¹ Cameron and White, “Getting to Nunavut,” 89–115.

⁴² Lévesque, “Revisiting Inuit Quajimajatuqangit,” 115–136.

⁴³ Nunavut Act 1993.

⁴⁴ Lévesque, “Revisiting Inuit Quajimajatuqangit,” 115–136.

⁴⁵ Cameron and White, “Getting to Nunavut,”89–115.

⁴⁶ Greenland in figures 2022.

⁴⁷ Ackrén and Lindstrӧm, “Autonomy development, irredentism and secessionism in a Nordic context.”

⁴⁸ Ackrén, “The Political Parties in Greenland and Their Development.”

⁴⁹ Nuttall, “Self-rule in Greenland – Towards the World’s First Independent Inuit State?”

⁵⁰ Act on Greenland Self-Government 2009.

⁵¹ Southcott et al., “Introduction.”

⁵² Coates, “The history and historiography of natural resource development in the Arctic.”

⁵³ Rodon and Lévesque, “From narrative to evidence.”

⁵⁴ Huskey and Southcott, “Resource revenue regimes around the circumpolar north.”

⁵⁵ Rodon and Lévesque, op,cit.

⁵⁶ Huskey and Southcott, op.cit.

⁵⁷ Petrov et al., “Measuring impacts.”

⁵⁸ Noble et al., “Northern environmental assessment.”

⁵⁹ Ritsema et al., “Steering our own ship?,” 165.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 66.

⁶¹ Mifflin, “The Prince and the Pauper – Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated and the Government of Nunavut,” 94.

⁶² Bradshaw et al., “Impact and benefit agreements and northern resource governance”.

⁶³ Ritsema et al., “Steering our own ship?,” 167.

⁶⁴ Baffinland Mine.

⁶⁵ Cater et al., “Mining and Communities,” 496.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 498–499.

⁶⁷ Jacobsen, “Digging sustainability” (see note 3), 62.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 64–65.

⁶⁹ Hickey, “Visions of Consent,” 171–172; Tucker, “Baffinland CEO disappointed by rejection of company’s expansion project”.

⁷⁰ Tucker, “Baffinland CEO disappointed by rejection of company’s expansion project”; Tucker, “In wake of mine expansion rejection, Baffinland set to head back to communities for talks”.

⁷¹ Saunders, “Baffinland works to keep Nunavut mine open after feds deny expansion”.

⁷² Gjertsen et al., “Institutional Conditions in Arctic Frontiers: The Case of Mining in Greenland, Russia and Norway,” 35.

⁷³ Ackrén, “Public Consultation Processes in Greenland Regarding the Mining Industry.”

⁷⁴ Gjertsen and others, “Institutional Conditions in Arctic Frontiers,” 35–36.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁷⁶ Ackrén, “Public Consultation Processes in Greenland Regarding the Mining Industry.”

⁷⁷ Noble et al.

⁷⁸ Gjertsen et al., “nstitutional Conditions in Arctic Frontiers,” 39.

⁷⁹ Petrov et al.

⁸⁰ Gjertsen et al., “Institutional Conditions in Arctic Frontiers,” 52.

⁸¹ Ibid., 39–40.

^82. See Energy Transition Minerals Ltd., Kvanefjeld projektet.

⁸³ Nuttall, “Zero-Tolerance, uranium and Greenland’s mining future,” 368–383.

⁸⁴ Nielsen and Knudsen, “Too Hot to Handle: The Controversial Hunt for Uranium in Greenland in the Early Cold War.”

⁸⁵ Hickey, “Visions of Consent,” 182.

⁸⁶ Naalakkersuisut, Aftale med den danske regering om uran.

⁸⁷ Energy Transition Minerals Ltd., Kvanefjeld projektet.

⁸⁸ See introductory article in the same special issue.

⁸⁹ Trinn & Schulte, “Untangling territorial self-governance,” 17.