![Sample our Environment & Sustainability journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5935/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Environment-Sustainability.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
A new movement in conservation biology called ‘compassionate conservation’ questions the traditional hierarchy of moral values in conservation. Compassionate conservationists search for ‘win-win’ solutions that allow species and populations to be saved without killing or causing excessive suffering to sentient creatures. In this paper, I argue that these compassionate conservationists have a moral obligation to support the investigation and development of genetic modification technologies because of their potential to minimize suffering and eliminate killing in conservation. Furthermore, I will end the paper by suggesting that these genetic technologies can help avoid actions that could be damaging to one’s moral character.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the participants of the 2018 meeting of the International Society for Environmental Ethics (especially Marion Hourdequin) for helpful comments and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. This obligation should be thought of as a pro tonto obligation, especially considering the reasons given for the obligation. All things considered, conservationists have this obligation; however, new discoveries could override this obligation. For the rest of the paper, the reader should think of the obligation as a pro tonto obligation.
2. Soulé focuses on anthropogenic extinction rather than ‘natural’ extinction because the latter could also involve speciation, which would make up for the loss in biodiversity. Leopold (Citation1989) makes a similar claim about human intervention in nature. If one species evolves into another, there is no net loss of kinds of organisms. Of course, many non-anthropogenic extinctions were caused by climate changes or asteroids rather than gradual evolution.
3. For a summary of these projects and teaching methods employed see Rohwer (Citation2018).
4. I should note that not all animal advocates are consequentialists (e.g., Regan, Citation1983).
5. Some ‘win-win’ approaches have been informally proposed in these cases, including using birth control on the Gough Island mice or using dingoes to suppress cats and foxes around release sites for marsupials. I am unconvinced that these would be effective. The birth control approach in particular seems unworkable in the steep, difficult terrain of Gough, given that success would have to be 100%. But certainly, these alternatives should be explored further.
6. Philosophers have long wrestled with the difficulty of cases where individual interests are pitted against those of those who call for saving species. Sagoff has said Animal Liberation and conservation are irreconcilable (Citation1984). Callicott disagrees (Citation1988). Regan clearly privileges individuals, as subjects of a life (Citation1983). Singer might disagree – if millions of humans would be heartbroken to see a species go extinct, some suffering might be justifiable to prevent it (Citation1995). The fact that actual conservationists are beginning to wrestle with these questions is an excellent opportunity for philosophers to assist and build an interdisciplinary conversation about decisions with real-world consequences.
7. My analysis on animal interest has been mainly framed in terms of thinking about their suffering and wellbeing. Some might think that what makes killing these animals so wrong is rather that they are ‘subjects of a life’ (Regan, Citation1983) and that gives them intrinsic worth. If this is why one thinks it is wrong to kill animals for conservation purposes, then one should also be in favor of these genetic technologies, since the modified animals would still get to live their lives and not have them cut short by a poison, trap, or bullet.
8. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine put out a report about this emerging technology with recommendations for responsible conduct (Citation2016).
9. Given the thought that some minimal harm is inevitable when we intervene with wild animals perhaps we should conceive of compassionate conservationist solutions as win-“lose-only-a-little “ solutions instead of win-win solutions as the compassionate conservationists dub them. I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
10. Interestingly, cats, which are also beloved house pets, are not on the kill list in New Zealand, even though they are very enthusiastic predators of native animals.