Rethinking Responsibility for Mitigating Climate Change Harm: Advocating Remedial Responsibility

ABSTRACT

Global climate change poses an urgent crisis that requires immediate action. However, conceptualizing human responsibility for mitigating the harm caused by climate change has proved challenging. I assess traditional concepts of moral responsibility and political responsibility for structural injustice and demonstrate that both have notable shortcomings. Building upon the limitations of these concepts, I establish five criteria that a responsibility concept must fulfill to be both effective and fair in mitigating the harm of climate change. Guided by these criteria, I propose remedial responsibility as a more appropriate concept that better meets these requirements.

KEYWORDS:

• Global climate change
• climate harm
• remedial responsibility
• political responsibility for structural injustice
• moral responsibility

1. Introduction

Even though climate change causes urgent, morally unacceptable harm for countless living beings, the problem has not yet been sufficiently addressed to minimize this harm (IPCC, 2021; Peeters et al., 2015). The reasons for this failure are certainly manifold. However, the lack of a clear and adequate understanding of responsibility for mitigating the harm caused by climate change has probably contributed to the slow pace at which actors are accepting responsibility. A comprehensive understanding of responsibility is crucial for determining what one should accept responsibility for and for clarifying based on which justification actors should take responsibility. Such an understanding also facilitates burden-sharing and has the potential to enhance the motivation of actors to fulfill their respective obligations. I argue that hitherto frequently used responsibility concepts, such as moral responsibility or political responsibility for structural injustice, are not fully suitable for this purpose. The objective of this paper is to systematically outline what is missing and to fill this gap by exploring and advocating remedial responsibility as a better suited framework.

The current scientific consensus is that the harm brought about by climate change is a threat to human and planetary health and must be urgently addressed (IPCC, 2023). Mitigating climate change has primarily been attempted through burden-sharing principles, which propose justifications for allocating and distributing the burden of paying for the necessary tasks. Well-known principles include ‘Polluter pays’ and ‘Ability to pay’: agents who have contributed to the problem through pollution, and agents who have sufficient resources, respectively, should bear the burden in proportion to their contribution or means. Although these (and other) principles seem to offer plausible justifications for burden allocation, each of them is limited when considered in isolation, and there is no agreement on which principle provides the best justification. For example, some principles are constrained in their ability to capture the responsibility for all climate change harm and justify remedial action, or they face fairness issues. These limitations potentially hinder effective burden-sharing and consequently the fully successful mitigation of climate change harm (see also Caney, 2010).

One of the reasons for these difficulties seems to be that it is not sufficiently clear what kind of responsibility underlies all these principles. It is true that the scientific community largely agrees that climate change must be addressed. But what exactly this means in concrete terms is interpreted in relatively diverse ways. For example, some seem to be primarily concerned with reducing emissions, others emphasize the need for punishing the polluters, and still others advocate for compensating the victims. While all these agendas are certainly related, they have rather different implications for our responsibility. For example, compensating the victims may not necessarily be best achieved by reducing emissions. So, where should the focus of our responsibility lie? How should this responsibility be defined, and how is it reflected in these principles, all of which have their own merits but also weaknesses? These questions have not yet been conclusively answered within climate ethics and justice.

I argue that responsibility can be better implemented by actors if it is sufficiently clear what kind of responsibility we can mainly rely on to underpin the principles. To do this, it is necessary to know what requirements such responsibility should fulfill. Once this responsibility has been clarified, the principles can be more easily organized and hierarchized within it, which in turn should increase the practical applicability of the individual principles.

Some scholars have focused on, and sought to establish as authoritative, one of the notions of responsibility that underlie a single burden-sharing principle. For example, the ‘Polluter pays’ principle relies on the polluters’ contribution, which has frequently been suggested to translate to moral responsibility (Caney, 2020; García-Portela, 2020). A significant literature has developed on moral responsibility and its use to justify remedial action.¹ However, although moral responsibility can plausibly justify remedial action in paradigmatic harm cases, some have argued that it reaches its limits in the case of global and multifaceted problems such as climate change (Jamieson, 2015; Moore, 2008). A first problem arises because climate change can be seen as a gigantic collective action problem which gives rise to the problem of inconsequentialism: while the problem of harmful climate change is caused by the collective actions of many actors, a single polluter contributes only an inconsequential quantity (Jamieson, 2015; Sandler, 2010; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010). To hold individual actors morally responsible and blameworthy for their GHG emissions then seems overly demanding and not useful. A second problem is that even if morally responsible polluters could be identified, some of the original polluters may no longer exist due to the intergenerational nature of climate change. Consequently, some of the present-day harm they have caused will remain unaddressed (Brooks, 2020, p. 55).

In response, recent discussions increasingly revolve around another understanding of responsibility: political responsibility for structural injustice (Eckersley, 2016; Rodiero, 2022; Sardo, 2020). This mainly forward-looking responsibility is not dependent on finding culprits, but rather seeks to address the structural (unintended) injustice seen as underlying climate change harm. However, although accepting political responsibility for structural injustice is certainly crucial to successfully mitigating climate change harm, it too has important limitations. First, not all climate change harm arises from structural injustice and thus this concept cannot provide a justification to address this non-structural harm. Second, the concept traditionally refrains from a backward-looking approach such as blaming or punishing individual actors (Young, 2011, p. 105). However, for fairness reasons, it seems morally problematic not to demand any compensation from historically strong emitters.

For these reasons, an appropriate and comprehensive concept of responsibility for mitigating climate change harm is required under which various principles can be subsumed to become applicable. Here, I identify five criteria that such a concept of responsibility should meet. These criteria are mainly based on the pragmatic assumption that a suitable understanding of responsibility should have practical and action-guiding implications that permit the problem to be mitigated as effectively as possible (see also Isaac et al., 2022; Kitcher, 2012, p. 84). Thus, I suggest that such a concept of responsibility should (1) capture our primary concern, i.e. mitigating maximum harm caused by climate change²; (2) consider forward- and backward-looking temporality; (3) respect applicability to multiple responsibility bearers (4) ensure maximum fairness³ for victims and responsibility bearers; and (5) include non-human species and ecosystems. Subsequently, I assess the concept of remedial responsibility in relation to these criteria. Remedial responsibility has primarily been discussed by Miller (2007, 2004) in the context of other large-scale global problems, such as global poverty. Remedial responsibility starts from a harmful situation that urgently needs to be remedied and assigns the necessary remedial duties to the appropriate actors. While remedial responsibility can be assigned based on different principles, the focus is always on ensuring that the remedy can be provided. I argue that remedial responsibility succeeds in meeting the five criteria.

While the notion of some form of remedy is implicit in the burden-sharing principles, the concept of remedial responsibility has so far only rarely been explicitly and comprehensively discussed in relation to climate change. Margaret Moore (2008) is one of the exceptions who has suggested remedial responsibility as more suited to climate change than moral responsibility. My main aim in this paper is to outline the claims for a concept of responsibility that is appropriate in the context of climate change, and to elucidate how understanding climate responsibility as remedial responsibility can address some shortcomings in the current discourse on responsibility.

To achieve my aim, I first develop Moore’s critique of moral responsibility by discussing a more current understanding of moral responsibility. Second, I examine the concept of political responsibility for structural injustice and discuss some of its limitations. Third, I derive from these discussions five criteria that an appropriate and comprehensive concept of responsibility for mitigating climate change harm should fulfill. Fourth, I consider remedial responsibility, and argue that it better fulfills these criteria. Fifth, I address three objections against my proposal.

2. Moral Responsibility⁴

Moral responsibility is a useful concept to capture responsibility for paradigmatic harm.⁵ It generally helps to understand when to hold agents blameworthy and, to some extent, which actions are morally legitimate, and which are not. Blaming someone is not usually done lightly. It means singling out someone in a way that sheds a negative light on them, and thus, we should exercise caution in blaming someone who does not fully meet the criteria for moral responsibility (Young, 2011, p. 77).

I relate the following discussion to List and Pettit’s (2011) concept of moral responsibility because they have to my knowledge proposed the most comprehensive understanding of this concept. They identify three criteria that agents need to meet in order to be justifiably regarded as morally responsible.⁶ The first is normative significance, which means that an agent has done something good or bad (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 155). Thus, the agent alone must have produced an outcome that noticeably changes a state in the world for the better or worse. This criterion also entails that what is assessed is usually something an agent did instead of merely failed to do.⁷ The second criterion is judgmental capacity, which means that the agent must have been equipped with the evidence and mental capacity necessary to make an informed choice about the action.⁸ The third criterion states that the agent needs to have relevant control such that they could have chosen another action with a different outcome. In sum, justifiably holding an agent morally responsible presupposes that they have caused a normatively significant outcome for which they are additionally blameworthy.

Now consider how well humans’ actions in relation to climate change meet these criteria. An individual’s personal GHG emissions resulting from a single act do not produce any significant climate change harm. For example, a single car journey only seems to generate an inconsequential quantity of emissions (Sandler, 2010; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010). This observation violates the first criterion of List and Pettit’s understanding of moral responsibility. It seems counterintuitive to claim that an individual brings about a normatively significant outcome (as described above) if their emissions are inconsequential. Because no immoral intention is involved when individuals produce emissions mainly as a byproduct of their actions, they cannot plausibly be held morally blameworthy. Sometimes individuals are blameworthy for things they did not intend, such as when they cause harmful outcomes by acting culpably ignorantly or negligently (FitzPatrick, 2017). However, if an unintentional outcome has no consequential impact, it seems difficult to uphold this intuition. Second, individuals’ actions with respect to climate change do not satisfy the second criterion. Indeed, today most actors do have judgmental capacity about the existence of climate change and the harmful impact of collective emissions. However, if individuals’ personal emissions have no consequential impact, it is bizarre to claim that they knew what the consequences of their action would be. Third, the control criterion is also not fulfilled. While in theory, individuals have control over most personal emissions except those essential for subsistence, many personal emissions fall between the two extremes of luxury and subsistence. In practice, control over emissions is therefore often limited. Contemporary capitalist society requires individuals to engage in various activities such as commuting to work, owning a computer, and traveling for business that individuals cannot easily forgo without causing serious impairments to their well-being (see also Moore, 2008).

In addition to these conceptual weaknesses, moral responsibility has only very limited pragmatic potential to promote the acceptance of all necessary remedial measures to reduce harmful climate change. This is because moral responsibility is mainly backward-looking. It justifies remedial action for all climate change harm for which someone is blameworthy. However, for a considerable proportion of the harm, no one would qualify as morally responsible. First, many emissions occurred before the potentially harmful effects of climate change were widely known, and it would therefore be unfair to hold these polluters morally responsible if they do not satisfy the criterion of judgmental capacity.⁹ Second, there is the problem that some polluters may no longer exist or may not have the means to take the remedial action required (Sardo, 2020). Thus, if moral responsibility alone were relied upon, a significant proportion of climate change harm that need to be addressed would remain unaddressed. Given the severity of climate change harm, this is morally unacceptable.¹⁰

In sum, these reasons should convince us that conceptualizing climate change responsibility mainly as moral responsibility is unsatisfactory.¹¹ I reach a similar conclusion as Moore (2008), but the concerns I raise relate to a more current understanding of moral responsibility, and I note a distinct pragmatic limitation.

3. Political Responsibility for Structural Injustice

Political responsibility for structural injustice is increasingly being discussed as a more adequate concept of responsibility for addressing climate change harm. This concept has been significantly popularized by Iris Marion Young (2011). In Young’s prototypical example of structural injustice, Sandy, a single mother, is forced to leave her apartment due to renovation and can afford neither the newly renovated apartment nor one that satisfies her requirements for size, safety, and proximity to her workplace (Young, 2011, p. 43). Despite Sandy’s fate to become homeless, none of the agents involved can be blamed, according to Young, because they all behaved within a legally accepted framework and had only limited control over their actions. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that what is happening to Sandy is unjust and harmful. Young refers to this type of harm as structural harm: it results from unjust social structures, such as the distribution of wealth and power dynamics, and disproportionately affects vulnerable people (Young, 2011, pp. 45–52).

To address structural harm and ultimately the structural injustice that underlies it, Young suggests, individuals should accept a forward-looking political responsibility that is fundamentally shared (Young, 2011, p. 105). This political responsibility acknowledges that numerous agents are socially connected and contribute, often unintentionally, to unjust social structures by participating in certain activities. Consequently, they should engage politically by organizing with others to work jointly toward replacing unjust background structures with more just ones. Although Young grants that certain particularly powerful or well-situated agents might have more or special political responsibilities (Young, 2011, pp. 144–145), she rejects the idea that agents are blameworthy to different degrees for causing the injustice.¹² A blame-focused language of responsibility obscures how many agents play a role in perpetuating injustice, and we should therefore not waste our limited time and resources on often unproductive discussions of blame but instead focus all our efforts on creating a more just world (Young, 2011, p. 172).

Climate change has recently been conceptualized as a structural injustice (Eckersley, 2016; Godoy, 2017; Sardo, 2020). I assess Sardo’s (2020) account of political responsibility for structural injustice, which seems to me the most comprehensive such account for climate change to date. Sardo describes the structural injustice as threefold: first, the world’s most vulnerable suffer disproportionately from climate change harm because they more frequently live in areas that are prone to climate hazards; second, the most vulnerable contribute the least to climate change; and third, they hold fewer material and social means for mitigation and adaptation. This triple injustice emerges from the unequal distribution of resources between affluent and less affluent countries, which can be seen as the result of colonialism and unjust political and economic power structures. Moreover, this injustice is likely to exacerbate the poverty of those who are already suffering. Following Young’s critique of moral responsibility, Sardo (2020) argues that the focus of actors should not be on shouldering direct burdens for mitigation, adaptation, or compensation, as these are difficult to allocate in cases of structural injustice. Instead, actors should take forward-looking political action, for example by electing green politicians, advocating for climate-friendly policies and infrastructure, and helping to shape public discourse through communication and demonstrations.

Is this concept of political responsibility better suited to understanding our responsibility for mitigating climate change harm? While this concept offers many advantages, I argue that on closer inspection, it also does not fully encompass what we should expect from a concept of responsibility for effectively addressing climate change harm. Here, I identify four limitations of political responsibility for structural injustice, primarily with respect to its potential to meet the pragmatic assumption.

The first limitation arises because the concept does not encompass all climate change harm: namely, it leaves out that proportion of the harm that is not the result of structural injustice. That is, even if sufficient action were taken to alleviate the injustice, some harm may remain. This limitation becomes visible in at least two areas: The first area concerns humans who cannot be seen as victims of structural injustice as traditionally understood but nevertheless suffer climate change harm. In the last three decades, 37% of all heat deaths from over 700 locations in 43 countries in Europe, North America, South America, and Southeast Asia can be attributed to climate change (Vicedo-Cabrera et al., 2021). A significant proportion of those who died were not financially vulnerable people but were for example elderly individuals or individuals who suffer from cardiovascular disease (Kakaei et al., 2021). This should in no way obscure the fact that heat-related and other climate-related deaths and harm primarily impact the less privileged and that overall, the privileged have many more resources at their disposal to adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, it shows that the assumption that the more privileged always have the necessary means for adaptation is flawed (see also Gardiner, 2011a). This suggests that while assuming political responsibility for structural injustice is crucial to address injustice in the long term, it is doubtful that achieving justice will eliminate all climate change harm. The second area concerns non-human animals, plants, and ecosystems. Unlike humans, these entities do not typically seem to be considered as subjects who can be affected by structural injustice. If this is the case, they are likely to continue to suffer harm even if the elimination of structural injustice is achieved. Certainly, everyone would benefit from remedial actions – such as GHG emission reductions – that are implemented also as part of addressing structural injustice. However, once justice is achieved, there would be little to be said for taking further climate action.¹³

The problem that the concept of political responsibility for structural injustice cannot capture all climate change harm seems to stem from the fact that there is at least one fundamental difference between paradigmatic cases of structural injustice and climate change. Paradigmatic cases of structural injustice (such as world poverty or gender inequality) are inherent social injustices, so that the harm they capture would likely fade with the disappearance of the underlying injustice. Climate change, however, is a physical phenomenon which is worse for the disadvantaged because of structural injustice, but which in principle can also occur independently of these. Structural injustice is not constitutive of climate change harm. To put it the other way: A perfectly just world does not necessarily prevent climate change and the harm it brings about.¹⁴ Even in such a world, climate change harm can occur if the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases is depleted. However, in a just world, people would be harmed more evenly. This is certainly a much better situation than the current one in which climate change disproportionately affects the most disadvantaged. While taking political responsibility for structural injustice is crucial for addressing structural injustice and thus also for addressing climate change harm, this concept nevertheless has limitations in relation to the overall harm caused by climate change. Thus, it is deceptive to assume that harmful climate change is a problem that would fully vanish once structural injustice has been successfully addressed.

A second limitation of political responsibility for structural injustice concerns its feature of being mainly forward-looking. Although I agree that relying exclusively on backward-looking responsibility is not politically productive, neither is a primary focus on forward-looking responsibility. Some collective actors, such as wealthy nation states, have heavily polluted and benefitted (at least in part) knowingly from the environment at the expense of the less wealthy, whose burdens have included, among others, forced migration and significant financial losses (Wewerinke-Singh & Hinge Salili, 2019). Allowing polluters to evade this historical responsibility for compensation by touting a wholly forward-looking political responsibility seems grossly unfair considering the enormous harm suffered by the most vulnerable (see also Caney, 2010). The importance of such compensation is also reflected in increasing litigation related to climate change, whereby, for example, small island states and other particularly affected actors seek compensation from wealthy polluter countries before local and international courts (Peel and Osofsky 2020).¹⁵ According to the Sabin Center’s US and Global Climate Change Litigation Databases, the number of climate-change related lawsuits filed worldwide has increased from 884 cases in 2017 to 2180 cases in 2022 (Sabin Center 2023). Ignoring this historical responsibility perpetuates the injustice done to the most vulnerable. Moreover, some particularly heavy historical polluters should provide compensation for more pragmatic reasons: first, because they usually have more means to pay than nonpolluters; and second, because these polluters would be incentivized to continue polluting if they never have to pay for their pollution. (see also Nussbaum, 2011, p. xxi)

In the climate ethics literature, no principle so far reflects the idea of political responsibility for structural injustice. It might be similar to the forward-looking ‘Ability to pay’ principle, which incorporates the idea that the agents with most means to pay for remedial action should pay, independently of whether they also contributed to the problem (Caney, 2010). Thus, political responsibility faces similar problems to ‘Ability to pay’. By focusing on forward-looking tasks, it ignores a discrimination between high-emitting, and thus more likely blameworthy, wealthy agents and low-emitting wealthy agents (Eckersley, 2016). If such distinctions are not considered at all, the risk increases that the willingness to pay of those who are able to pay but are not among the heaviest polluters will be reduced. While ‘Ability to pay’ at least includes the idea of payments for past harm, this is not true of political responsibility for structural injustice. The greatest advantage of ‘Ability to pay’, to remedy as much harm as possible by assigning duties to those who can actually pay, is thus lost in political responsibility, because it contains no element that justifies the compensation for past harm.¹⁶

A third limitation of political responsibility for structural injustice concerns the pace at which the acceptance of responsibility leads to the desired improvements. Fundamental structural change is a slow process. However, tackling climate change is urgent, and approaches that allow more rapid and effective remedial action should be welcomed (see also Ostrom, 2014). Political responsibility for structural injustice alone is limited in achieving this goal. The slowness of fundamental structural change becomes clear when looking at paradigmatic cases of structural injustice, such as gender inequality, and the pace at which they are remedied. In many countries where the situation for women is relatively good today, it took decades, even centuries, for basic women’s rights to be enforced and the underlying unjust structures to be changed so that the official exploitation of women and the denial of their basic rights became illegal. Despite important global progress, such as an increase in women’s education, basic women’s right are still not recognized in many places and women all over the globe continue to suffer more or less high levels of structural violence and discrimination (Carnevale et al., 2018). Progress is slow despite internationally defined gender equality and empowerment goals (Drechsler & Jütting, 2010; UN, 2022b). Therefore, it is generally uncertain how long it will take for policy initiatives to impact deeper structures. The urgent threat to life posed by climate change leaves insufficient time for fundamental structural change. Large-scale structural reform that is so far-reaching as to require changes across the entire global economic distribution of power, resources, and wealth and a transformation of fundamental economic, social, and technological processes would likely be associated with even more inertia.¹⁷ Thus, while structural change is without doubt crucial for long-term change, we currently need a concept of responsibility that can better capture this element of urgency.

A fourth limitation is that quantifying the harm that needs to be remedied is not part of political responsibility for structural injustice. In paradigmatic structural harm cases, this need not be a problem, as here successfully addressing the structural injustice may automatically eradicate the harm associated with it.¹⁸ In a world in which all genders are guaranteed equal status, equal rights, and equal treatment, it would seem strange if gender-related structural harm were still present. However, as I have argued, addressing climate change through political responsibility for structural injustice alone will likely not alleviate all related harm. Without quantifying the full harm that needs to be remedied, there remains a risk that a significant proportion of the harm will go unaddressed.

In sum, accepting political responsibility allows structural injustice to be addressed and thus at least partially to alleviate some of the disproportionate suffering of the most vulnerable. However, political responsibility for structural injustice alone is not a comprehensive concept of responsibility for climate change.

4. Five Criteria for a Concept of Responsibility for Mitigating Climate Change Harm

The preceding discussions of moral responsibility and political responsibility for structural injustice and their strengths and weaknesses for climate change have revealed a clearer picture of the criteria that a concept of responsibility for mitigating climate change harm should fulfill. I now make these explicit by suggesting a list of five criteria. The reason for my approach is that discussions about climate change responsibility have often started from an established concept of responsibility, such as moral responsibility or political responsibility for structural injustice, which is then transferred to climate change and made to fit (Darr, 2017; Peeters et al., 2015; Sardo, 2020). In my view, this approach is less suitable for climate change, as the threat it poses requires a quick and practicable solution. I therefore anticipate that a reverse approach, starting from the idea of what exactly we should expect from a concept of climate change responsibility to address the issue, may lead to more fruitful results (see also Isaac et al., 2022). After outlining these criteria, I employ them to evaluate the concept of remedial responsibility and demonstrate its potential.

I would not go so far as to assert that the criteria I propose should be considered strictly necessary or sufficient. However, I suggest that a concept that meets these criteria is overall better-suited for our case. The criteria I present are independent of remedial responsibility and could also be useful for assessing other concepts of responsibility.

4.1. Mitigating Maximum Climate Change Harm as the Primary Concern

All other things being equal, a concept of responsibility is better-suited if its primary responsibility is to mitigate the maximum harm caused by climate change (and if this harm is actually remedied when the corresponding responsibility is taken). I derive the focus on harm mitigation from the growing scientific literature on climate change harm, particularly on the most vulnerable individuals, communities, species, and ecosystems. The most widely reported harm results from steady climatic changes and more frequent extreme weather events which lead, among other things, to reduced availability of farmland, crop losses, reduced water supply, increased disease, and forced migration (IPCC, 2023; Kakaei et al., 2021). The severity and urgency of addressing this harm is further reflected in the growing number of climate-change-related lawsuits (Sabin Center 2023).

This criterion requires a quantification of the harm. Only when we know the extent of harm and the amount that needs to be remedied can we determine how to allocate responsibility and specific duties more concretely. Additionally, it is through this quantification that we can assess whether a particular harm mitigation strategy has achieved its goal. Determining this harm – and exactly what assistance and support is needed – requires scientific research, but also direct discourse with affected communities and individuals where possible (Schlosberg, 2012).

Furthermore, this criterion implies that responsibility in the form of mitigation, adaptation, and compensation efforts (IPCC, 2021; Vicedo-Cabrera et al., 2021) only needs to be undertaken when there is harm to be mitigated. If climate change existed but caused no harm, there would be no reason to place responsibility for these measures on anyone. From this, it also follows that emitting is not inherently bad or unjust, but only becomes so in a world impacted by climate change.¹⁹

4.2. Combining Forward- and Backward-Looking Temporality

Recall that moral responsibility focuses primarily on past actions and cannot justify the assignment of purely forward-looking remedial tasks to agents. Political responsibility for structural injustice, in contrast, typically focuses forward on contributing to the alleviation of a harmful state of affairs that those affected did not bring about, or at least were not solely responsible for bringing about. Relying on one temporality is insufficient to address climate change harm.²⁰ To comprehensively tackle climate change harm, it is crucial to combine both temporalities in a way that provides justice to particularly hard-hit actors seeking to restore equity, while ensuring that current and future harm is addressed in a timely manner. Moreover, a concept of responsibility that incorporates both backward- and forward-looking temporality is more likely to cover the maximum burden and is therefore more conducive to mitigate as much climate change harm as possible (criterion 1).

4.3. Respecting Applicability to Multiple Responsibility Bearers

Different actors have different kinds and degrees of responsibility for mitigating climate change harm due to their different power, means, and contribution to the problem.²¹ However, an overall concept of responsibility for harmful climate change must be applicable to multiple agents as responsibility bearers. Harmful climate change is a collective phenomenon, and no single agent caused the harm or can solve the problem (Ostrom, 2014). Instead, it can potentially be addressed by all kinds of actors: individuals, states, corporations, organizations, small communities, and local governments, among others (Peeters et al., 2015, p. 48). Furthermore, all these actors will ultimately be affected by whichever policies are implemented. It is therefore plausible that no actor should be exempt from assuming responsibility.

One objection to this idea is that states should be the primary responsibility bearers, as they have more power and resources and thus more capacity to address the problem successfully.²² I do not think that a pure statist approach is fruitful. First, the decisions of states are typically implemented by individuals (Lichtenberg, 2014, p. 17). Furthermore, individuals are personally affected by many policy changes. Especially in democracies, it is therefore unlikely that states can successfully enforce policies without widespread support. This support, in turn, is more likely to come from people who are willing to accept some responsibility themselves. For example, someone who already sparingly produces GHG emissions will likely be more willing to accept a law that aims to restrict air travel than someone who does not. Last and more generally, singling out specific agents, while absolving others, is also likely unproductive in a collective action problem setting, as this may exacerbate the free-rider problem (Ostrom, 2014). For all these reasons, responsibility for climate change is best conceptualized as a responsibility shared by multiple actors.

4.4. Guaranteeing Fairness for Both Victims and Responsibility Bearers

The fourth criterion I propose is that a successful concept of responsibility for mitigating climate change harm should integrate fairness considerations as much as possible. First, fairness should be respected for its own sake; it does not seem right to ignore the immense historical injustice suffered by the most vulnerable due to the polluting activities of the most affluent. Compensation for this harm must be covered by a suitable concept of responsibility (see also Caney, 2020). However, fairness should also be respected for the responsibility bearers (Peeters et al., 2015, p. 23). It should be transparent to the responsibility bearers what is expected from them, and the corresponding responsibilities should be perceived by them as fair and not overly demanding. Second, respecting fairness considerations is also crucial for meeting the pragmatic assumption. If responsibility is perceived as unfairly distributed among actors or too much is demanded of them, their reaction may be defensive, and they may reject responsibility or pass it to others (Vanderheiden, 2011; Young, 2011, p. 100). Such defense mechanisms are likely to result in a refusal to take the remedial action needed. Therefore, most likely, agents will be more willing to go along with the measures if they feel that the demands placed on them are reasonable and fair.

4.5. Including Non-Human Species and Ecosystems

Finally, the suffering of non-human species and ecosystems must be considered. This criterion overlaps with the first and fourth criteria. However, since non-human species and ecosystems are frequently overlooked in the literature, I list them separately. Harm that unjustifiably affects the lives or functioning of these subjects is morally unacceptable and must be remedied as much as possible. Ignoring the needs of these subjects would further exacerbate fairness problems, as they themselves have not contributed to climate change, they are particularly vulnerable because they cannot speak for themselves, and it is often especially difficult for them to successfully adapt to climate change (Hofmeister et al., 2022). Moreover, considering non-human species and ecosystems is also crucial for meeting the first criterion in relation to humans because, for example, non-intact ecosystems lack essential ecosystem services that are vital to human well-being (Wang et al., 2021).²³

In summary, I have suggested that a successful concept of responsibility for mitigating climate change harm should meet five interrelated criteria. These criteria are not necessarily limited to a concept of responsibility for climate change. Any problem with similar characteristics, and especially one that demands an urgent and effective remedy, might require a concept of responsibility that meets these criteria.

5. Remedial Responsibility and the Five Criteria

I next assess remedial responsibility as a viable alternative concept, particularly with regard to its potential to meet the five criteria presented. First, I briefly introduce the general idea of remedial responsibility proposed by Miller (2007, 2004Miller, 2004; Wewerinke-Singh & Hinge Salili, 2019) and then argue that remedial responsibility fulfills all five criteria better than moral responsibility and political responsibility for structural injustice. However, I show that remedial responsibility can be framed in such a way that these other responsibilities can become incorporated into it.

If a child in daycare drops a glass, and broken glass is scattered everywhere, causing other children to hurt themselves, there is no doubt that the broken glass must be cleared away as quickly as possible. Certain situations are so harmful that it would be morally unacceptable to leave humans or other living creatures in them, especially if they have done nothing to justify their condition (Miller, 2007, p. 98). Remedial responsibility is this specific forward-looking responsibility to undo such harmful situations (Miller, 2007, p. 100). These situations can be local, such as in the child’s case, or they can occur on a larger scale, such as with global poverty. Crucial to remedial responsibility is that it starts not from a responsible actor but from a harmful situation that needs to be resolved. Only from there can we identify who can remedy the harmful situation (Miller, 2007, p. 98). It is thus an essentially pragmatic responsibility. Neither moral nor causal or outcome responsibility for the harmful situation is necessary to have this kind of responsibility. Instead, it can be assigned to any agent if there is a reasonable justification for it. For example, if a hiker is injured by a falling stone without anyone’s fault, a passerby who witnesses the accident could be held remedially responsible for providing immediate assistance. Miller proposes six principles that demonstrate some connection between the harmed and those who are to provide remedy, and these justify adopting remedial responsibility: (1) moral responsibility, (2) outcome responsibility, (3) causal responsibility, (4) benefit, (5) community, and (6) capacity (Miller, 2007, pp. 100–104). The first three principles can be considered mainly backward-looking: an agent can be assigned remedial responsibility because they are morally responsible (1) for the situation to be remedied, or (2) have produced the situation but are not morally responsible, or (3) have caused the state without having themselves performed an action.²⁴ The last three principles are mainly forward-looking: an actor can be assigned remedial responsibility if (4) they have benefitted from someone else’s bringing about the harmful situation, or (5) because they belong to the same community as those suffering from the situation, or (6) because they possess the capacity, such as certain resources, to provide the remedy. Of course, any remedially responsible actor seeking to provide a remedy must have at least some capacity if any of the other principles are to become useful.

Why is it natural to consider remedial responsibility as a potentially useful concept for mitigating climate change harm? First, there is sufficient evidence that climate change is an emergency that causes severe harm and needs urgent remedy (IPCC, 2021; UN, 2022a). Second, some of the ongoing discussion on burden-sharing principles, such as the ‘Polluter pays’, ‘Ability to pay’, and ‘Beneficiary pays’ principles, seems to fall within the realm of remedial responsibility (von Allmen 2022). For example, the ‘Polluter pays’ idea that agents bear responsibility for adaptation, mitigation, and compensation in proportion to their contribution to climate change, potentially corresponds to the backward-looking principles of moral, causal, and outcome responsibility in remedial responsibility. Third, remedial responsibility has been suggested for addressing other global problems that are comparably large and complex to solve, such as global poverty (Miller, 2007, pp. 231–261; Tomalty, 2017). Fourth and finally, remedial responsibility has been shown to have several important advantages over moral responsibility (Moore, 2008).

I now analyze more systematically whether remedial responsibility meets the five proposed criteria and is thus suitable for the climate case.

5.1. Mitigating Maximum Climate Change Harm as the Primary Concern

By definition, the concept of remedial responsibility focuses on the mitigation of harm. Who is suitable to provide the remedy, and via which principle the assignment of remedial responsibility can be justified, is deduced from the need to undo the harm. Because the focus of the concept lies on undoing the harm, this prioritizes the application of the most suitable principle. Let us look again at the child and the broken glass: it would be unproductive to apply moral or causal responsibility and expect the child who broke the glass to clean up the mess. The child could hurt themselves, and it would take much longer to clean up, which in turn would increase the risk of further injury. Instead, remedial responsibility recommends that someone with the appropriate skills, such as a day-care worker, be entrusted with this task. Something similar applies to climate change: if states or transnational corporations have better means to undertake the necessary remedial actions, this provides a rationale to focus more on these actors than on others. Against this, it could be objected that states and other relevant actors often disagree on the exact distribution of the burden, such as by how much GHG emissions must be reduced, where, and by whom, which might hinder effective mitigation of climate change harm (Ostrom, 2014). However, this need not speak against remedial responsibility, but rather suggests that further efforts are required to develop equitable burden sharing. What is mainly offered here by the conceptualization of climate change responsibility primarily as remedial responsibility is the creation of a strong commitment to addressing climate change predominantly by mitigating its harm.²⁵

In terms of quantification and maximum harm reduction, recall that neither moral responsibility nor political responsibility for structural injustice can cover the entire harm because they each primarily consider one temporality. Furthermore, these responsibility concepts do not define an end-state of the total harm that needs to be addressed. Remedial responsibility does better justice to this element. First, to provide successful remedy of the harm, the quantity of harm must be specified so that responsibility can be assigned, and the necessary actions taken. If one must actively deal with the extent of the harm to be repaired, there is a higher likelihood of mitigating a larger portion of the harm. Consider again the case of the child: Here, the agreement that the broken glass needs to be removed is the focus and prompts surrounding actors to remedy the situation accordingly. If the focus were instead on the culpable actor or changing background structures, it would then be diverted from the immediate harm, in addition to causing possible delays in remediation. Second, remedial responsibility is a multi-principle concept in which principles can compensate for each other’s weaknesses; if one principle does not apply, perhaps another can (Miller, 2007, pp. 100–104). For example, backward-looking principles such as causal and outcome responsibility can compensate for moral responsibility’s weakness in assigning responsibility to polluters who do not qualify as morally responsible, such as in cases where they polluted before the harm of climate change was commonly known (see also Moore, 2008). Thus, while ‘Polluter pays’ is traditionally equated with moral responsibility, I argue that it should be a principle that can be divided into these three types of responsibility depending on the degree of agency and blameworthiness involved in the production of emissions.²⁶ Moreover, undoing any remaining harm can always ultimately be assigned via a principle of capacity alone when all other principles are exhausted.

5.2. Combining Forward-and Backward-Looking Temporalities

Although remedial responsibility is itself a mainly forward-looking responsibility that aims to correct a morally unacceptable and harmful situation, the rationale for who should do what can emerge from both forward- and backward-looking principles. The principles of moral, outcome, and causal responsibility are backward-looking, and the principles of benefit, capacity, and community responsibility are primarily forward-looking (see also Peeters et al., 2015, p. 22). This broad coverage helps first to warrant the maximum remedy of harm, as required by the first criterion. Second, remedial responsibility respects the backward-looking fairness assumption. The three backward-looking principles ensure that whenever it is appropriate and possible to hold agents morally, outcome, or causally responsible, the corresponding actors can also be assigned duties to redress historical wrongs. Thus, remedial responsibility ensures the forward-looking necessity of accepting urgent remedial tasks while respecting the backward-looking demand for fairness.

Because of this two-sided nature, remedial responsibility seems to serve to some extent as a balancing account between positive and negative duties. This raises the question of whether remedial responsibility can also provide a solution to the limitations of positive and negative duties accounts. While I cannot discuss this question in detail in the limited space available, it is worth noting that remedial responsibility contains elements of a negative duty not to harm. It requires those who have caused harm to pay or otherwise make amends, and morally responsible wrongdoers may also be blamed or punished. This sends a clear signal to avoid harming. Furthermore, the benefits of a positive duty to assist, i.e. to comprehensively and effectively address harm are also included in remedial responsibility. This means that agents should compensate for harm they have not caused themselves or that no one has caused. Moreover, a common objection against positive duties – that they can quickly become overly demanding as there is no borderline that draws an end to them (Lichtenberg 2010) – may not apply in the case of remedial responsibility. The extent of unacceptable harm that must be remedied is predetermined in a deliberative, science-based process from which duties are derived. By determining such a quantum of harm, the demands placed on assisting parties should therefore not increase endlessly.

5.3. Respecting Applicability to Multiple Responsibility Bearers

Because the focus of remedial responsibility is the mitigation of harm, it seems natural that the concept does not per se prioritize one actor or group of actors over another. Instead, the situation requiring remedy suggests which actors can best provide that remedy. Thus, remedial responsibility respects this third criterion, crucial for climate change, where different kinds of actors, such as nation-states, communities, corporations, and individuals, can and should help. Because various individual and collective actors can provide relief from harm, the concept seems more effective in actually providing remedy (Moore, 2008) and thus also meets the first criterion.

However, the combination of backward-looking and forward-looking principles and the pragmatic assumption make it likely that the primary remedial responsibility in the climate case lies with states.²⁷ Not only do states bear most of the historical responsibility, but they also have more capacity than, for example, individuals. Moreover, the collective action required by climate change shifts the focus away from individuals and supports collective political solutions that can use policies, regulations, and financial incentives to steer the behavior of individual actors more effectively and more fairly (Ostrom, 2014). However, this does not imply that other agents are off the hook (see also Brooks, 2014). For example, individuals should be expected to reduce their personal GHG emissions whenever it does not limit their own flourishing, or to speak publicly about the need for climate action (Sardo, 2020; von Allmen 2023). These individual and political responsibilities can be grouped under remedial responsibility.

5.4. Guaranteeing Fairness for Both Victims and Responsibility Bearers

It seems that remedial responsibility respects fairness for all involved parties better than other responsibility concepts. First, remedial responsibility requires that remedial duties for historical harm and injustice to victims are accepted, and thus warrants that the demands of climate plaintiffs for justice to be restored can be addressed as much as possible. The urgency of taking remedial responsibility furthermore requires that remedial action is taken by those with capacity. Since this capacity is usually found among the wealthy, this approach additionally ensures that the poorest do not have to bear the brunt of the remedial costs.

Remedial responsibility further respects fairness toward responsibility bearers. First, assigning remedial duties primarily to those who also have capacity helps to avoid placing burdens primarily on those who have no or limited capacity to bring about changes. Second, in traditional debates on climate justice, the capacity principle has occasionally been criticized when applied in isolation because it leads to fairness problems for responsibility bearers. This is because the principle does not discriminate between the capable responsibility bearers who polluted a lot and the capable responsibility bearers who polluted little (Page, 2008). However, this problem does not arise in a multi-principle concept of remedial responsibility, as capable polluters can be required to remediate before capable non-polluters via one of the backward-looking contribution principles. Thus, accepting the co-existence of multiple principles in remedial responsibility meets the demands of fairness for both victims and responsibility bearers.

5.5 Including Non-Human Subjects, Species and Ecosystems

Originally, remedial responsibility was described as a responsibility that humans have toward one or several individuals who are harmed or disadvantaged (Miller, 2007, p. 98). However, there is no reason not to extend this approach to include non-human subjects, species and ecosystems which also suffer from climate change harm. On the contrary, because the focus of remedial responsibility is precisely to undo harm, it would be a mistake not to broaden the concept to include the harm of these subjects. Although the debate on remedial responsibility in relation to non-human subjects, species and ecosystems is vastly underdeveloped to date, it has been argued, for example, that since wild animals are endangered by anthropogenic destruction of their habitats, humans must be held responsible for remedying this harm (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011, p. 207). One might wonder how to address harms and wrongs that result in permanent losses, such as when a species becomes extinct. In such scenarios, no remedy in the traditional sense can be provided as the harm cannot be undone (Brooks, 2020, p. 59). However, in these cases, the remedy could be reconceptualized as reparation or rehabilitation (Sandler, 2013). For example, Sandler suggests minimizing the negative effects of species extinction on other organisms and ecosystems and to adapt our practices and institutions to limit future extinctions.

To summarize, I have argued that successful remediation seems more likely when a concept of remedial responsibility is applied than when only moral responsibility or political responsibility for structural injustice is applied. Before moving on to the section on objections, I would like to clarify two points with regard to the functioning of remedial responsibility. A first point concerns the ordering of the principles. In Miller’s view, all connecting principles are of equal weight, and none is inherently stronger than another or should be prioritized (Miller, 2007, p. 100). However, if all principles are equal, it raises doubts how remedial responsibility can effectively promote actual remediation. Furthermore, it has been criticized that a ‘Capacity’ or ‘Ability to pay’ principle should be the most important principle, as without capacity it is questionable how remediation can be achieved. For example, actors who simply lack the necessary resources cannot provide a remedy (Brooks, 2011). Elsewhere I have argued that the principles should not be treated equally in specific harm cases such as climate change. For reasons of fairness, we should favor the ‘Polluter pays’ principle based on moral responsibility, since these actors have not only caused the problem but are also at fault. To solve the problem of lack of capacity, I have proposed treating capacity as a hybrid principle. On the one hand, this means that in order to apply a principle such as ‘Polluter pays’ or ‘Beneficiary pays’, capacity must also be present in addition. In practical terms, this means that we first consider the morally responsible actors, then examine their capacity and, if capacity is lacking or insufficient, move on to the next principle (in my proposal, outcome responsibility).²⁸ On the other hand, ‘Ability to pay’ can also stand alone and be applied when all other principles (+ ability) are exhausted.²⁹

A second point is that the ‘Polluter pays’ principle plays a crucial role within the framework of remedial responsibility. However, this principle has been heavily criticized; for instance, it has been argued that ‘Polluter pays’ is not an appropriate principle because polluters can continue to pollute as long as they are able to pay. Therefore, if the polluters are wealthy enough, they could pollute and pay indefinitely, which would not ensure a sustainable future (Brooks, 2020, p. 63). I only see this as a problem if the ‘Polluter pays’ principle is interpreted narrowly, in the sense that polluters should primarily be deterred from polluting through financial incentives. Within the framework of remedial responsibility, however, the principle can be construed more broadly. First, remedial responsibility establishes a quantum of harm that must be remedied. Various measures to address the harm can then be derived from this. This includes adaptation measures or compensation for significant damage that can no longer be reversed by reducing emissions, for which polluters would be responsible. In addition, emissions can be reduced not only through direct payments for pollution, but through various methods such as government interventions like laws that restrict individuals or companies from polluting beyond a certain threshold, automatic energy-saving measures such as automatically turning off lights and other energy sources when not in use (Lee & Cheng 2016), changes of norms and values, or educational campaigns on how emissions can be reduced at minimal cost. Polluters can also be required to contribute to some of these measures.

6. Objections

I will now respond to three objections that could be directed against my proposal to conceptualize the responsibility for mitigating climate harm as remedial responsibility: (1) the objection of the weak normative power of remedial responsibility, (2) the objection of conceptual overlap, and (3) the objection of ignorance of future harm.

The first objection questions whether the normative power of remedial responsibility is strong enough to impose remedial duties. More precisely, the objection suggests that in practice, certain principles, such as causal and outcome responsibility, lack the normative weight to justify remedial responsibility (Eckersley, 2016; Moore, 2008). If this objection holds true, remedial responsibility would have limited potential to advance the mitigation of climate change harm, as the proportion of the harm for which actors are solely causally and/or outcome responsible would remain unaddressed. Moore (2008) discusses the examples of companies driving others out of business through accepted competitive market behavior and athletes defeating opponents in fair sports competitions. In neither case does unjust conduct occur by advantaged actors, according to Moore. Therefore, she argues that winners cannot reasonably be expected to provide any form of compensation to the losers. The objection gains support in the context of climate change with the argument of excusable ignorance (Caney, 2020): agents who were purely causal- and/or outcome-responsible for their pollution were not aware that climate change was a problem, for example if their activities occurred before 1990. Therefore, it seems unfair and unjustified to attribute remedial responsibility to those actors. In other words, mere intentional agency or causation is considered insufficient to justify the assignment of remedial responsibilities; moral responsibility on the part of the actors would also have to be present.

I agree with Moore (2008) that in the business and athletics scenarios, outcome responsibility does not entail remedial duties toward the disadvantaged. However, this is less because the advantaged did not act unjustly, but rather because no comparable unacceptable harm was caused in these cases. Individuals who compete in a sport competition typically accept the possibility of losing as part of the rules of the game. Yet, more generally, if harm is unjustified and bad enough, causal and outcome responsibility can become applicable principles (see also Miller, 2007, p. 101). Imagine a first scenario that I call ‘rich pan owner’: A, a well-off person, visits their wealthy neighbor B to cook a meal together. Through no fault of their own, A drops B’s pan, which shatters into many pieces. Perhaps this event would not impose any remedial obligations on A: it was not A’s fault, and more importantly, B can easily afford a new pan. Now imagine a second scenario, the ‘poor pan owner’. In this scenario, everything is the same as in the first, except that B is extremely poor, and the broken pan was the only pan they owned. Moreover, B has no chance of being able to buy a new pan any time soon. This single pan is necessary, indeed essential, for B’s survival. In this case, A should offer, or might indeed be obliged, to buy B a new pan. Thus, although the principle of causal responsibility does not entail remedial responsibility for the rich pan owner, similar to Moore’s examples, it does for the poor pan owner. Climate change harm is more akin to this second scenario, and there are therefore reasons to suppose that the excusable ignorance objection does not apply. If climate change harm is severe enough, as I have argued, this may justify the acceptance of remedial responsibility by those who bear only causal and outcome responsibility. This seems particularly pertinent when those who bear moral responsibility have already met their responsibility, leaving some remaining harm which will not otherwise be addressed.

The second objection is that the remedial responsibility framework is not a new and valuable way to describe responsibility for mitigating climate harm. This objection is based on the idea that remedial responsibility has considerable overlaps with existing concepts and approaches. For example, most discussions of climate responsibility seem to be based on the idea that climate harm must be remedied. Furthermore, many similar, or analogous principles to those of Miller are already used in the discussion on climate responsibility (e.g. ‘Ability to pay’ instead of ‘Capacity’ in Miller). According to this objection, a central assumption of the paper, namely that climate responsibility has rarely been approached using a framework of remedial responsibility and that the use of such a framework adds value, is therefore incorrect.

I agree that burden-sharing principles are implicitly based on the idea of wanting to remedy climate harm. However, it does follow that these principles are comparable to or fulfill the same conceptual role as remedial responsibility. An important distinction lies in the fact that burden-sharing principles are fundamentally conceived as individual entities, whereas remedial responsibility, as presented here, serves as a framework under which various principles can be subsumed. Furthermore, the terminology of remedial responsibility explicitly emphasizes a focus on remediation and highlights its prioritization. I will now elaborate in more detail how this distinct conceptualization and terminology of remedial responsibility offer advantages beyond the mere principles. First, in the existing literature, there has frequently been a focus on strengthening and justifying individual principles. As I have argued, no single principle alone can cover the entire harm, but a combination of principles is required. Remedial responsibility overarches principles useful for remedy and thus makes a combination of principles natural. One might object that sometimes a combination of principles has been proposed, such as a combination of versions of the ‘Polluter pays’ and the ‘Ability to pay’ principles (Caney, 2010). Such approaches have important advantages over single principles. However, utilizing the framework of remedial responsibility is still advantageous over a combination of individual principles. As a framework, remedial responsibility not only sets out the objective of responsibility—the remedy—but also, by making this objective explicit and a priority, enables the principles to be operationalized in a more systematic manner so that this remedy can be provided in the best possible way. If we know that remediation is the overarching objective, this guides us to apply those principles that can overall most effectively remedy the situation. For example, if a ‘Polluter pays’ principle is ineffective because polluters are unable to pay, the framework of remedial responsibility would lead to a more effective principle, such as ‘Outcome responsibility’ ‘Causal responsibility’ or a mere ‘Ability to pay’ principle. Furthermore, remedial responsibility is an umbrella concept encompassing numerous principles, thereby facilitating responsibility to be allocated in a more nuanced and equitable manner. For example, if polluters are unable to pay, assigning responsibility to outcome-responsible actors who also possess ability, rather than solely to able actors, allows for the differentiating of their contribution responsibility, which potentially enhances the acceptance of responsibility among responsibility-bearers.

Second, using the framework of remedial responsibility also prevents us from confusing one of the burden-sharing principles with the primary responsibility. This is the case, for example, when moral responsibility, or more generally a ‘Polluter pays’ principle, is adopted as primary (Darr, 2017; Peeters et al., 2015). This may weaken the principal goal of mitigating climate harm and instead mainly focus on other projects such as assigning blame or punishing polluters. Burden-sharing principles are outlined in terms of different actors, such as polluters, beneficiaries, or those capable, and therefore burden-sharing principles also focus on issues related to these actors, such as who should pay and what can be expected of them (Caney, 2020), rather than on what and how much should be remedied. The importance of this difference in terminology and focus is also evident in discussions about the tasks associated with these burdens. For example, there is often debate surrounding emission reductions for which polluters or other parties should bear responsibility. However, in these discussions, the extent of necessary emission reductions and whether emission reductions indeed constitute the most effective and pressing strategy for mitigating climate harm often remains blurred.

Third, it makes a significant difference to the range of potentially applicable principles that remedy is explicitly at the center of remedial responsibility. As I argued in my response to the first objection, outcome and causal responsibility can become normatively significant principles within the framework of remedial responsibility because the urgency of the remedy can legitimize them. In practice, the inclusion of these principles expands the circle of potential actors who can provide a remedy and thus increases the likelihood that a remedy will actually be provided.

The third objection is that remedial responsibility seems to focus strongly on undoing harm that has already occurred and therefore says little about preventing future harm. Future harm, however, should not be ignored; the actions of today may have serious negative impacts on future generations, even more so because the people currently living have an incentive to discount the future (Gardiner, 2011b, pp. 35–36; Rendall, 2019). This objection could gain support from the proponents of sole political responsibility for structural injustice because sustainable elimination of current and future climate change harm seems unattainable unless the underlying unjust structures are substantially and sustainably improved. If these structures are not addressed, there is a danger that symptoms will be addressed but the root of the problem will not, so that climate harm will recur.

In my view, this third objection assumes a one-sided and narrow understanding of remedial responsibility. First, the concept of remedial responsibility also contains a preventive element. Recall the example of the child and imagine that the child had obtained the glass because all the glasses were stored too low and thus could be reached by small children. Remedial responsibility involves not only cleaning up the broken glass but also storing the rest of the glasses in a safer place so that future accidents can be prevented. Forgoing this preventive element of remedial responsibility would be short-sighted and would not reflect the way we intuitively understand and approach remedial projects. Similar reasoning can apply to climate change. It seems plausible to assume that once current climate harm is taken seriously and sufficient action is taken to address it, this action would not stop at current generations. The primary problem seems to be that no sufficient action is undertaken for current harm. Understanding climate change responsibility as remedial responsibility helps to understand this harm as urgently in need of remedy. In addition, remedying current climate harm is likely beneficial to mitigating future harm. For example, a reduction in global average temperature now increases the likelihood of a lower temperature in the future.

Second, there is no reason why a concept of remedial responsibility applicable to climate change should not contain a principle of political responsibility for structural injustice. Indeed, if sustainable mitigation of climate harm is better ensured when this political responsibility is also exercised, a principle of political responsibility for structural injustice should become an integral part of the concept of remedial responsibility. Thus, this supposed objection ultimately demonstrates once again the advantage of a multi-principle framework of remedial responsibility, which transcends both single principles as well as Miller’s six principles.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, I have advocated the concept of remedial responsibility as a plausible framework of responsibility for mitigating the harm caused by climate change. I have first demonstrated why the widely discussed concepts of moral responsibility and political responsibility for structural injustice do not capture the full responsibility required by this context. Drawing from this analysis, I have established five interrelated criteria that a concept of responsibility should satisfy to be suitable for the climate context. Subsequently, I have argued that remedial responsibility better meets these criteria and is thus a more promising concept of responsibility for this context. Remedial responsibility encompasses the primary goal of mitigating climate change harm while exhibiting features that are also practically conducive to this goal. In particular, remedial responsibility can be understood as a multi-principle framework that includes backward- and forward-looking principles. As a result, remedial responsibility can incorporate moral responsibility and political responsibility for structural injustice, compensating for their weaknesses while maintaining their strengths. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that remedial responsibility successfully captures the urgency of addressing climate change harm, promoting the implementation of concrete remedial actions by a diverse range of actors.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. See, among others (Darr, 2017; Hohl, 2017), and (Peeters et al., 2015).

2. I use ‘mitigation of climate change harm’ as an umbrella term for activities aimed at reducing climate change harm. These activities can fall into various categories, such as mitigation of GHG emissions, adaptation to the existing effects of climate change, and compensation for loss and damage (see also Caney, 2020).

3. By fairness, I mean specifically that no one should bear an unfair or disproportionate burden, nor should anyone be left uncompensated for historical injustices.

4. Related conceptions of responsibility include the common-sense view of responsibility (Scheffler, 1995) and the liability model of responsibility (Young, 2011) and). Although Young draws her liability model from legal discussions, the fundamental idea is similar to moral responsibility (Young, 2011, pp. 97–98).

5. A paradigmatic harm here means, for example, when one person directly and intentionally injures another.

6. Moore (2008) has discussed some of the difficulties I examine in this section in relation to Samuel Scheffler’s (1995) common-sense view of responsibility. Scheffler suggests that humans believe their responsibility is greater if, first, they alone have produced an outcome than if the outcome is the result of collective action to which they merely contributed; second, if the responsibility concerns something they did instead of something they failed to do; and third, if what they did has impacts in their immediate environment instead of far away. I think Scheffler’s understanding is helpful in many ways but not the most straightforward to fully capture what is problematic about holding individuals morally responsible for causing climate change harm. For example, simply because individuals cause harm far away and therefore feel less responsible does not necessarily absolve them of moral responsibility.

7. Exceptions exist if an agent fails to do something that they clearly should have done, such as fulfilling professional or parental duties that undoubtedly fall within their scope of responsibility.

8. This criterion is also frequently discussed under the term ‘knowledge’ (Talbert, 2019).

9. It has been argued that the existence of climate change and its potentially harmful effects have been common knowledge since 1990 (Zellentin, 2015).

10. These problems have also been discussed in the context of the ‘Polluter pays’ principle (Brooks, 2020; Neumayer, 2000; Shue, 1999). Because scholars frequently argue that mere causal or outcome responsibility of polluters is not a sufficient basis for assigning remedial duties, ‘Polluter pays’ can be understood as a principle similar to moral responsibility (see also Eckersley, 2016).

11. See also Jamieson (2015); Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018); Moore (2008); Sardo (2020); Sinnott-Armstrong (2010).

12. Young’s view of the relationship between moral responsibility and political responsibility remains a bit vague (see also McKeown, 2021). However, I derive my interpretation from a passage in which she describes how even if agents admit their guilt, they should still focus on future actions and solving the problem; otherwise, they risk becoming preoccupied with personal shame or with restoring their own integrity (Young, 2011, p. 118).

13. Whether this is true depends, of course, on the exact understanding of justice. Environmental justice could be understood more broadly as securing healthy living conditions and rights for all people (EPA, 2022). However, I use here an understanding of structural justice as an equal distribution of resources, burdens, and benefits among people (Young, 2011, p. 52). Once achieved, there might still be justice problems, but they would no longer fall under structural injustice, at least not in the sense presented here.

14. Furthermore, in paradigmatic cases of structural injustice, the more advantaged usually suffer no harm from the problem. However, this is not the case with climate change, as evidenced by the number of heat-related deaths.

15. An exemplary case that underlines this urgency is the complaint initiated by six Portuguese children against 33 countries. These children see their future threatened by ongoing forest fires and heatwaves (Bacchi, 2020).

16. Perhaps a concept of political responsibility for structural injustice could be extended by an element that captures repayments for past harm and holds individual actors liable (Hohl, 2017, p. 45). This, however, does not fit the traditional understanding in which the idea is precisely that there are no identifiable perpetrators (McKeown, 2021; Sardo, 2020; Young, 2011, p. 105). But even if one accepts this extension, the concept would still not capture harm caused by historical injustice that is not considered a consequence of structural injustice.

17. A reason for this slowness seems to be that there is usually an inverse relationship between power and privilege: those who benefit most from unjust structures have the most power and the least interest in changing these structures, and vice versa. For example, those states most threatened by climate change are reluctant to sue and hold wealthier states accountable because they lack the means and/or would have to fear being further disadvantaged by the wealthier states, for example by the restriction of development aid payments.

18. This applies under the abstract assumption that a full eradication of structural harm is possible.

19. For a counter position, see Eckersley (2016).

20. This dilemma has overlaps with the broader debate on negative duties not to harm (Pogge, 2002) and positive duties to assist (Singer, 1972), which has been extensively discussed in relation to global poverty.

21. So far, I have not discussed any limitations on the applicability of moral responsibility or political responsibility for structural injustice to multiple actors. The reason is that both concepts have sometimes been discussed with an individualistic focus and sometimes with a collectivistic focus. Although I have argued with others (Moore, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010) that an individualistic focus on moral responsibility is largely inappropriate, others disagree or find a collectivist focus more appropriate (Godoy, 2017; Hohl, 2017; Peeters et al., 2015). Political responsibility for structural injustice was originally discussed as a responsibility that individuals take to push collective actors to do the right thing (Young, 2011, p. 105). However, some have argued that the concept theoretically allows for collective agents to shoulder political responsibility too (Godoy, 2017; Sardo, 2020).

22. This statist approach is reflected in international climate treaties that primarily assume state-parties to be the responsibility bearers (UN, 1992; UNFCCC, 2015).

23. For example, the number of insect pollinators has declined dramatically due to climate change and other human-induced environmental changes. The decline of this ecosystem service poses a significant threat to food security and economic stability, as more than 80% of food crops and wild plants depend on insect pollination for reproduction (Wagner, 2020).

24. The latter would be the case, for example, if someone injures a person through no action of their own, e.g. if they themselves are pushed or startled by someone or something they cannot control.

25. The ideas in this paragraph overlap to some extent with the principle of ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) articulated in global climate change treaties (UNFCCC, 2015). The overlap concerns the thought that states that polluted more and have more resources should bear more responsibility. However, the concept of remedial responsibility, as I present it here, has at least two advantages over CBDR: first, it is not limited to wealthy states but is applicable to multiple actors (including non-state actors) who can take some responsibility within their means. Second, the goal of CBDR is vaguely stated as ‘all parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies’ (UNFCCC, 2015). While reducing GHG emissions is an important element, understanding responsibility primarily as remedial responsibility to undo harm can capture precisely how much emission reduction is needed and, beyond that, how much adaptation and compensation must be ensured to achieve the set goal of harm mitigation.

26. Since polluters can be considered blameworthy under a ‘Polluter pays’ principle based on moral responsibility, their payments can be seen similar to a fine, indicating that they have done something wrong (see also Sandel, 2012, pp. 92–101): In contrast, those who are only causally or outcome responsible for pollution would still be required to pay a certain share. However, due to the absence of blameworthiness, their payments should not be viewed as fines.

27. Miller (2007, 2004Miller, 2004; Wewerinke-Singh & Hinge Salili, 2019) focuses mainly on nations when discussing remedial responsibility for solving global problems, as he considers them to be more historically stable than states, which sometimes change their borders. I focus more on states as relevant actors, as they are currently the ones signing the climate treaties and are frequently seen as the most important international actors in mitigating the harm caused by climate change (UNFCCC, 2015; Wallimann-Helmer, 2017).

28. Lichtenberg (2010) has argued that actors who have an additional connection to the deprived than merely capacity should have a greater responsibility.

29. See von Allmen 2022 for more details on weighing the principles.