An efficacious remedy for status inequality? Indigenous policies in Norway and Sweden

ABSTRACT

Most states publicly support the recognition of Indigenous rights. Nevertheless, their domestic policies to address Indigenous rights issues vary considerably across countries. So far, research has not committed itself to investigating the consequences of different Indigenous policies on the peoples concerned and their social status. Do policy contexts that accommodate Indigenous rights firmly contribute to status equality between Indigenous people and the ethnic majority? I study this question in the case of Norway and Sweden. These countries host one Indigenous people – the Sámi – but pursue diverging Indigenous policies. Using new survey data, I show that, despite the absence of material inequalities, there is a clear gap in the social status perceptions between Indigenous and majority respondents in Sweden. In Norway, I do not find that Sámi’s perception of their social position is lower than the majority's. The results suggest that the Swedish policies governing the recognition of Sámi rights are less effective in resolving unequal status perceptions.

KEYWORDS:

• Indigenous policies
• social status
• perceptions of inequality
• Sámi people
• Norway
• Sweden

Introduction

Most states recognize that Indigenous people have inherent collective rights. They support the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) and have constitutional provisions for recognizing Indigenous rights (Holzinger et al. 2019). But what does this recognition mean in practice for the status of Indigenous people within society? From a normative perspective of participatory parity, “it is not simply the recognition of personal equality that is important, but the recognition of group values and aspirations and their colonial context in the ways that public institutions operate” (O'Sullivan 2020, 1079). In this sense, recognition aims to overcome status subordination (Fraser 2000) to enable Indigenous people to participate in society on a par with the majority population.

Empirically, however, we know little about the nexus between Indigenous rights recognition and status (in-)equality. The few works concerned with Indigenous rights’ consequences focus mainly on specific measures’ effects on economic development and health outcomes (Cornell and Kalt 2010; Murphy 2014; Pollock and Cunsolo 2019). In particular, the perspective of Indigenous peoples themselves remains unexplored. Do Indigenous people perceive their social status as more equal vis-á-vis the dominant population when their rights are widely recognized? And do they perceive more inequalities if recognition is deficient? This neglect is remarkable, considering that perceptions of unequal group status play an essential role in forming and mobilizing group grievances (Langer and Brown 2008) and adversely affect social cohesion and thereby hamper economic growth (Van Staveren and Pervaiz 2017).

I aim to reduce this research gap by comparatively examining the case of the Sámi people in Norway and Sweden¹ using new survey data. Despite addressing the same Indigenous people, Norway’s and Sweden’s Sámi policies differ considerably (Henriksen 2008). There is a broad consensus that Norwegian policies facilitate Sámi rights recognition more assertively (e.g., Josefsen, Mörkenstam, and Saglie 2015; Lawrence and Mörkenstam 2016). In this study, I investigate whether these policy differences are mirrored in cross-country differences in status perceptions.

Besides adding to the state of knowledge about Sámi’s social status, this paper more generally contributes to the study of Indigenous rights recognition. Furthermore, regarding the voluminous literature on perceptions of inequality (e.g., Bartels 2005; Norton and Ariely 2011; Oesch and Vigna 2022; to name but a few), it shows that disparities in people’s social status perceptions can also exist in settings of relatively low material inequality. Finally, it contributes to the research on inequality between ethnic groups, i.e., horizontal inequalities (see Stewart 2002), which usually focuses on conflict-ridden countries (e.g., Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). To this, I add the case of perceived between-group inequalities in affluent societies devoid of violent ethnic conflict.

As opposed to vertical inequality, which expresses an unequal distribution of resources – e.g., wealth – between individuals in a society, horizontal inequalities describe situations in which disparities in the distribution of resources manifest between social groups. I operationalize perceived status in this paper from both angles. The results show that the recognition of Indigenous rights is not only linked to perceptions of horizontal status – expressed as evaluations of an Indigenous people’s collective cultural value – but also to whether or not perceptions of vertical status – individuals’ assessment of their position in the socioeconomic hierarchy – cluster around ethnic group membership.

Case selection

At first glance, investigating status inequalities in the social democratic welfare states of Norway and Sweden might seem like a vain endeavor. Studies about the welfare regimes–inequality nexus persistently show that their societies are comparatively egalitarian in material terms (e.g., Huber and Stephens 2014; Iversen and Stephens 2008). In addition, besides classical redistributive policies, their social investment policies (c.f. Garritzmann et al. 2016), such as education, childcare, or active labor market policies, also contribute to higher levels of social equality (e.g., Busemeyer 2014; Cantillon 2011).

Consequently, Norway’s and Sweden’s social policy contexts mitigate vertical material inequality effectively. Can we expect that their Sámi policies do the same regarding horizontal inequality? Even though there do not seem to be material inequalities – as measured by household income levels – between the Sámi and ethnic majority populations (Yasar et al. 2024), this view might be too short-sighted. First, in both countries, the Sámi historically faced harsh discriminatory policies lasting well into the twentieth century and severely affecting Sámi identity and culture (c.f. Kvist 1994; Minde 2003; Nilsen 2003). As inequalities tend to be quite durable (Tilly 1998), the question of whether the current Sámi policy context actually manages to rectify all historically rooted inequality is pending.

Second, there is empirical evidence of feelings of ethnic discrimination still being prevalent among Norwegian and Swedish Sámi (e.g., Hansen et al. 2016; Yasar et al. 2024). Hence, they might not perceive their societal position as truly equal to the majority. Yet, prior research has neither compared Sámi’s status perceptions across countries nor linked them to the policies addressing Sámi rights issues.

Sámi policies and Indigenous rights

The key policy areas that govern the recognition of Sámi’s Indigenous rights pertain to Sámi self-governance, territorial, and language rights (c.f. Anaya 2011; Tauli-Corpuz 2016). For example, the arrangements of Sámi’s collective political representation set the bounds within which Sámi can exercise their right to self-determination (e.g., Lawrence and Mörkenstam 2016). The opportunities to perform many traditional Sámi economic and cultural practices depend on recognizing Sámi territorial rights in land use policies (e.g., Allard 2011). Eventually, the vitality of the Sámi languages, which are essential Sámi-culture elements, is affected by policies determining their official status and education policies shaping Sámi language acquisition and transmission opportunities (Lloyd-Smith et al. 2023).

Self-governance

Most political science research about Sámi rights centers on the so-called Sámi Parliaments,² which are the key institutions for Sámi self-governance (e.g., Broderstad 2011; Falch, Selle, and Strømsnes 2016; Lawrence and Mörkenstam 2016). Comparative cross-country assessments show distinctive differences in the political power and influence of the Norwegian and Swedish Sámi Parliaments (e.g., Josefsen, Mörkenstam, and Saglie 2015). The former is relatively independent with a broad mandate, while the latter has a limited area of responsibility, emphasizing reindeer herding matters.

Another branch of this research focuses on the electorates. It draws on surveys among respondents who voluntarily registered with the Sámi Parliament electoral roll. These studies find that the Norwegian Sámi Parliament electorate is more integrated into national politics than its Swedish counterpart and shows higher levels of institutional trust (Bergh et al. 2018). Furthermore, whereas Sámi self-determination is an important cleavage in Norwegian Sámi Parliament politics, it is not a contested issue in Sweden, where the primary cleavage instead concerns the diverging interests of reindeer herders and the rest of the Sámi society (Bergh and Saglie 2016; Saglie, Mörkenstam, and Bergh 2020).

Territorial rights

Reindeer herding is also central to legislation on Sámi territorial rights. In Sweden, they apply even exclusively to members of reindeer herding communities (Strömgren 2017). Considered essential for Sámi culture (Torp 2013), reindeer herding enjoys a certain level of protection from obstruction by other land-use activities (see, e.g., the Swedish Environmental Code, 1999). However, other traditional Sámi land- and natural resource-use practices, for example, small-game hunting and fishing, are not recognized as deserving of particular protection. Since less than 20 percent of Swedish Sámi practice reindeer herding (Axelsson and Sköld 2006), most Swedish Sámi lack the recognition of their rights to cultural practices connected to land and nature (Nilsson 2020).

The Norwegian policy context of Sámi territorial rights is very different. Even though here, too, reindeer herding is a crucial part of Sámi identity and thus important for territorial rights policies (Selle and Wilson 2022), legislation emphasizes nature’s importance for Sámi culture in general (see, e.g., the Minerals Act, 2009; or the Nature Diversity Act, 2009). Other land use activities must not obstruct the prevailing social and cultural practices of the entire Sámi community, including and exceeding reindeer herders (Allard 2017; Riseth 2003). Moreover, the Finnmark Act (2005) transferred ownership of all previously state-owned land of Norway's northernmost Finnmark area to a legal body co-governed by representatives of the Sámi Parliament and local administration. Although the design and implementation of the Finnmark Act is not free of criticism from a land-claims settlement perspective (e.g., Spitzer and Selle 2023), the influence it gives Norwegian Sámi in administrating this area’s land and natural resources is much more significant than the influence Swedish Sámi have in any part of their country.

Language and education

When comparing Sámi language and education policies, varying levels of importance ascribed to Sámi culture become apparent, too. For example, Sweden considers Sámi national minority languages deserving of protection and promotion (see the Law on national minorities and minority languages, 2009). In contrast, the Norwegian Sámi Act (1987) states, “Sami and Norwegian are languages of equal worth.”

The practical implications of this difference in official status can be seen, for instance, in the so-called administrative areas for the Sámi languages. In both countries, these are designated areas where extended language rights apply (c.f. the Sámi Act, 1987; Law on national minorities and minority languages, 2009). In Sweden, they essentially constitute a right to use Sámi in communication with public institutions. In the Norwegian areas, Sámi languages are virtually additional official languages (Lloyd-Smith et al. 2023).

The Norwegian administrative area is also critical when assessing Sámi education policies. In principle, every pupil has a right from primary to upper secondary education to receive education following the Sámi education plan (see the Education Act, 1998). This plan provides curricula over the entire range from having Sámi as the general language of instruction to receiving 2 hours of Sámi language education per week, depending on whether children speak Sámi as a first or second language or whether they acquire it as a foreign language (Vangsnes 2022). However, outside the administrative areas, schools are only obligated to offer this education if enough pupils demand it (Hermansen and Olsen 2020).

Swedish policies, by contrast, do not provide for Sámi education throughout all school stages. Instead, five designated Sámi Schools offer education according to a Sámi syllabus throughout grades 1 to 6 (c.f. the School Act, 2010; the School Ordinance, 2011). This syllabus focuses not so much on the Indigenous languages’ value in itself but on developing pupils’ bilingualism (Cabau 2014). Outside the Sámi schools, mother tongue education for Sámi pupils is conditioned on the scarce availability of qualified teaching staff (Anaya 2011).

To sum up, a consistent picture emerges from these comparative accounts: Norwegian policies are closer to the concept of participatory parity. The Norwegian Sámi Parliament is a more effective self-governance institution. Norwegian policies make more allowances for the territorial rights and land use practices of the entire Sámi community, and they entail more provisions for the Sámi to exercise their right to use and maintain their Indigenous languages.

Theory and hypothesis

Yet, before speculating what these differences might imply for Norwegian and Swedish Sámi’s social status perceptions, there are two theoretical questions to answer. First, how is the recognition of Indigenous rights linked to social status? In her “status model of recognition,” Fraser (2000, 29) argues that recognition means assigning equal cultural value to different social groups so that they are “capable of participating on a par with one another in social life.” In the case of Indigenous peoples, recognition allows them, for example, “the right to difference in cultural expression, but sameness in political opportunities; difference in forms of land tenure, but sameness in the capacity to make decisions about how land will be used; the difference in the way one is taught at school but sameness in terms of educational quality” (O'Sullivan 2020, 1079). Policies that govern the extent to which Indigenous people’s rights are recognized hence reflect the institutionalized respect and social esteem – i.e., the social status (c.f. Ridgeway 2014) – they receive.

Second, and tying in with the former, how do individuals learn about the cultural value conveyed by Indigenous policies, and how do they form their subjective perceptions of Indigenous people’s social status to that effect? Here, policy-feedback theory offers an answer – particularly the subfield concerning policies’ effects on public attitudes and behavior.³ In this realm, Pierson (1993) was one of the first to describe that besides providing resources and incentives for certain behaviors, policies serve as sources of information that influence the public’s awareness of political acts and processes.

Based on this proposition, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram established a conceptual framework that plays a vital role in research on how policies affect the views among the groups they target and how the overall public views these groups (see also Mettler and Sorelle 2018; Pierce et al. 2014). Its basic idea is that the kinds of benefits a policy bestows upon its target group – real, symbolic, hidden, or rather burdens – are determined by this group’s political power and whether or not it is framed as deserving of policy benefits (Ingram and Schneider 1993; 2015; Schneider and Ingram 1993). The policy conveys this very framing to its target group and the wider public, signaling the group’s status within the citizenship. Svallfors (2007; 2010) amends this idea by adding that besides shaping perceptions of actual conditions, policies⁴ likewise affect perceptions of nominal conditions. They influence the public’s perception “of the desirable state of affairs” by impacting its normative attitudes (Svallfors 2010, 120).

The common denominator of these policy-feedback theories is that the policy context people are exposed to influences what they think about the existing distributions of resources, power, and the status order. Historically, most Indigenous peoples were at the lower end of that order and faced quite adverse policy contexts. One of the defining commonalities of Indigenous peoples is that they were ignored in the state formation processes of modern nations (Kymlicka 1999), meaning that the cultural value assigned to them as distinct social groups was particularly low. I therefore assume that, generally, an Indigenous people and an ethnic majority would have perceived the former’s social status as subordinated to the latter’s. Progressing recognition of Indigenous rights should remedy this perceived status gap. Accordingly, this paper’s general hypothesis expects the following:

H: The more a country’s Indigenous policies context recognizes Indigenous rights, the less inequality in subjective status perceptions will there be between the Indigenous and ethnic majority populations.

Combining this theorizing with the previous section’s insights into Sámi policies, I thus suppose that status perceptions are more unequal in Sweden than in Norway. Studies of the discriminatory historical assimilation and segregation policies (e.g., Henriksen 2008; Kvist 1994; Minde 2003; Nilsen 2003) provide good reasons for the assumption that in the past, the Sámi populations in both countries faced an inferior institutionalized social status. Since then, the countries have made clear progress in recognizing Sámi rights. When comparing their current Sámi policies, Norway appears to act even more resolutely in this respect. Potential remaining inequalities in status perceptions should hence be more pronounced in Sweden.

Data and method

Until now, there has been a lack of empirical data to inspect this proposition. Official statistics do not record Sámi ethnicity (Axelsson and Storm Mienna 2021), and the Sámi Parliament voter surveys focus exclusively on the part of the Sámi population registered with the respective electoral rolls.⁵ I therefore use data from the Nordic Peoples Survey, an original full-population survey of adult residents from 20 northern Norwegian and Swedish municipalities, collected by Yasar et al. (2024).⁶ The data collection took place between April and September 2021 in two stages – a short telephone interview and a more extensive follow-up questionnaire. Table 1 shows the number of participants by country in each stage.

Table 1. Participation numbers by country and survey stage.

	Norway	Sweden
Available telephone numbers	17,096	22,073
Individuals reached via telephone	11,135 (65.13%)	6265 (28.38%)
Participants telephone interview	2396 (21.52%)	3020 (48.20%)
Participants questionnaire	502 (20.95%)	918 (30.40%)

Note: Percentages in parentheses relate to the preceding row.

The country differences in response rates might be due to two different companies conducting the telephone interviews. Additionally, survey fatigue might have been higher in Norway, where surveys about Sámi issues are generally more common. For instance, the SAMINOR project (see Brustad et al. 2014; Lund et al. 2007) targets a similar group of potential respondents. Moreover, the data collection coincided with the run-up to the Norwegian parliamentary elections, a time of heightened opinion polling.

Independent and dependent variables

The independent variable in this analysis is whether a respondent is Sámi. However, there is no general objective indicator for Sámi population membership (see also Pettersen and Brustad 2013). Instead, it is necessary to carefully consider who constitutes the group whose status perceptions might be affected by the Sámi policy context.

Self-identification

I argue that it is the group of people self-identifying as Sámi because they should be most likely to pick up signals and messages conveyed by Sámi policies. For those who do not identify with the policy target group, these policies are much less salient and tangible, hence less likely to influence status perceptions (c.f. Campbell 2012; Larsen 2019).

Consequently, I operationalize Sámi population membership according to respondents’ answers to the question, “Overall, do you consider yourself to be Sámi?” Being a matter of personal identity, though, there is a risk that the independent variable is, in turn, affected by the outcome of interest. It might be that Sámi self-identification depends on perceptions of societal positions if individuals with low status perceptions are potentially more likely to abandon their Sámi identity. This would imply that status perceptions among those (still) identifying as Sámi are not that low after all because those with lower perceptions stopped self-identifying.

Even though research from Norway suggests that self-identifying Sámi rarely abandon their Sámi identity over time (Pettersen and Brustad 2015), I use a descent-based variable as an alternative independent variable for a robustness check. It allows inspecting whether respondents with Sámi ancestry who do not identify as Sámi differ from the majority in their perceptions.

Subjective status perceptions

Concerning the dependent variable, i.e., social status perceptions, the questionnaire offers two items that approach the issue from different angles. The first follows the so-called MacArthur Scale of subjective social status created by (Adler et al. 2000). It asks:

Imagine a ladder with 10 rungs. At the top of the ladder (10th rung) are the people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most education, and best jobs. At the bottom (1st rung) are the people who are the worst off, those who have the least money, least education, worst jobs, or no job. Please choose the rung that best represents where you think you stand on the ladder.

This item is a standard measurement of subjective social status. Yet, it captures perceived status in essentially vertical socioeconomic terms. It strongly draws on individual-related properties of status formation, such as merit, which are not directly related to ethnicity and cultural value. To additionally cover status aspects from a horizontal sociocultural angle, I employ a second, similarly constructed survey item:

Now, please think about different groups in society, imagining the same ladder as before. At the top of the ladder (10th rung) are the groups for which the overall society shows the most appreciation and whose cultural traditions and norms are the most accepted. At the bottom (1st rung) are the groups for which the overall society shows the least appreciation and whose cultural traditions and norms are the most rejected. Please choose the rung that best represents how much [the Sámi are] appreciated in society as a whole.

Control variables

To determine the extent to which these perceptions are associated with Sámi self-identification, I use a set of further variables as controls.⁷ These serve two purposes. On the one hand, they help to identify the link between Sámi identity and subjective status perceptions independently of factors from the sociodemographic and socioeconomic context. On the other hand, they reduce the risk that any observed association is essentially due to third-variable explanators. That is, they control for factors that might be associated both with identifying as Sámi and perceptions of social status.

For the first purpose, I use respondents’ age, gender, and household size to monitor the influence of general demographic characteristics. In addition, as measures of objective socioeconomic status and subjective assessments of one’s financial situation carry considerable weight in predicting social status perceptions (c.f. Singh-Manoux, Adler, and Marmot 2003), I include reports of household income, educational attainment, welfare benefits dependency, and an item asking how well respondents cope with their financial situation as further covariates. Finally, sociological research shows that class imagery – that is, how (un-)equal individuals perceive society to be in general – affects their subjective assessment of where they stand in this society (e.g., Evans, Kelley, and Kolosi 1992; Oddsson 2018). As respondents were not directly asked about how unequal or egalitarian they think the Norwegian and Swedish societies are, I use a question about how fair they assess the distribution of wealth to be in their country as a proxy for class imagery.

The second control aspect requires considering which factors could be simultaneously associated with Sámi identity and status perceptions. First of all, there is the possibility that status perceptions are not linked to Sámi identity per se but rather to belonging to an ethnic minority in general. To control for this alternative, I employ an indicator of whether respondents have ancestral links with other national minorities or immigrant groups.

In addition, evidence from Sweden suggests that Sámi Parliament voters have, on average, a more left-leaning political ideology than the general Swedish electorate (Nilsson, Dahlberg, and Mörkenstam 2022). At the same time, comparative research on the support of right-wing ideology shows that political ideology and perceptions of status decline are correlated (e.g., Engler and Weisstanner 2021; Im et al. 2023). I thus include a variable expressing respondents’ self-placement on a political left-right scale as a control for the possibility that differences in political ideology and not ethnic identities in themselves account for potential differences in status perceptions between Sámi and ethnic majority respondents.

Eventually, in the theory section above, I hypothesize that due to the countries’ Sámi policies conveying different messages about the Sámi’s social status, there are differences between Norway and Sweden regarding the association of Sámi identity with status perceptions. However, an alternative mechanism could potentially be responsible for such country differences. Research on the Latin American case shows a positive correlation between the recognition of collective Indigenous rights and satisfaction with democracy (e.g., Fierro 2020; Schmid 2023). The latter, in turn, is well known to be associated with individuals’ socioeconomic status (e.g., Kölln and Aarts 2021), and social-psychology work shows that there is also a link between subjective status and perceptions of regime legitimacy (Brandt et al. 2020). Given the above-presented differences between Norway and Sweden in recognizing Indigenous rights, it is conceivable that levels of satisfaction with democracy vary between the countries. These levels might additionally moderate the association between the dependent and independent variables. To account for the possibility that this constitutes the mechanism behind potential country differences in the relationship between Sámi identity and status perceptions, I control for respondents’ satisfaction with how democracy works in their country.

Models

The dependent variables’ ladder image has ten rungs, so their values are distributed over ten-point scales. I treat these variables numerically in the analysis and run linear regression models. Furthermore, since the survey was conducted in pre-selected municipalities, I cluster standard errors on the municipal level to account for potential clustering effects.

The units of observation are the respondents who participated in both survey stages. However, the partitioning into several stages might have increased selection bias by offering respondents an additional opportunity to drop out after the telephone interview. To expand the analysis’ validity to the entire survey population, I apply weights based on the distribution of explanatory variables from the interview stage.⁸

Results

Descriptive statistics

Table 2 lists the independent and control variables and their mean values or ratios, differentiated by country and Sámi self-identification. It becomes evident that perceptions of individual socioeconomic and Sámi’s sociocultural status are generally lower in Sweden, particularly among the Sámi. Furthermore, household income and average education levels are also somewhat lower among Swedish respondents. In accordance with previous research, though, these socioeconomic factors do not differ much within the countries between Sámi and non-Sámi respondents (e.g., Yasar et al. 2024).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of dependent and control variables.

		Norway		Sweden
		Sámi self-identification
		Yes	No	Yes	No
Individual socioeconomic status perception(10-point scale)^2	Mean	6.20	6.03	5.57	5.93
	n	114	317	91	717
Sámi’s sociocultural status perception (10-point scale)^2	Mean	6.01	6.56	5.18	6.34
	n	117	310	91	694
Other minority roots: Yes (base level: No)^1	Ratio	36.26%	37.19%	27.14%	39.98%
	n, total	524	1839	350	2579
Household income decile (10-point scale)^1	Mean	6.41	6.49	4.88	5.05
	n	439	1532	299	2221
Education level (5-point scale)^2	Mean	3.46	3.47	2.84	2.91
	n	119	321	92	720
Welfare benefits: Yes (base level: No)^2	Ratio	31.09%	31.33%	1.09%	1.81%
	n, total	119	316	92	718
Fairness wealth distribution (10-point scale)^2	Mean	5.74	5.76	3.56	3.99
	n	119	324	87	693
Financial situation: Positive (base level: Negative)^1	Ratio	95.58%	96.83%	92.26%	94.74%
	n, total	497	1832	349	2565
Left-right self-placement (10-point scale)^2	Mean	4.58	4.70	4.63	4.76
	n	108	305	90	686
Satisfaction with democracy (10-point scale)^2	Mean	6.29	6.53	5.30	5.77
	n	120	321	93	725
Gender: Male (base level: Female)^1	Ratio	51.81%	44.99%	42.36%	45.73%
	n, total	272	1845	147	2589
Age^1	Mean	52.34	54.91	52.83	53.56
	N	524	1845	350	2604
Household size^1	Mean	2.61	2.53	2.53	2.35
	n	525	1845	342	2508

¹ Variables based on survey items from telephone interview.

² Variables based on survey items from questionnaire.

There is a remarkable cross-country difference regarding whether or not respondents receive or have previously received welfare benefits. The underlying survey question refers rather broadly to social security and might thus be understood differently in particular country contexts. In any case, this difference highlights the importance of running the models separately for each country. Further country differences, albeit on a smaller scale, are also apparent regarding how fair wealth is perceived to be distributed, the assessment of one’s financial situation, and how satisfied respondents are with how democracy works. Sámi’s views on all three issues are – again especially in Sweden – somewhat less optimistic compared to respondents who do not identify as Sámi.

Overall, these descriptive results are in line with the hypothesis. Inequalities in status perceptions between the Indigenous and majority populations are more pronounced in Sweden. However, it is unclear yet to what extent additional explanatory factors might be responsible.

Linear regression

To get to the bottom of this, I present the regression results in a stepwise fashion. Table 3 contains the models with individual socioeconomic status perceptions as the dependent variable. The basic models (1 and 4) show the coefficients of Sámi identity without controlling for any other factors. Sámi identity is statistically significantly correlated with the dependent variable in both cases. Yet, crucially, while this association is positive in Norway (1), it is negative in Sweden (4). This trend persists when the models include objective socioeconomic and demographic controls (2 and 5). In Norway, however, Sámi identity’s coefficient is now only marginally statistically significant. The same is true for the full models (3 and 6), which additionally include subjective controls.

Table 3. Linear regression on perceptions of individual socioeconomic status.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Norway	Norway	Norway	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
Sámi identity	0.2353*	0.2331^†	0.1933^†	–0.4526*	–0.4041*	–0.4349**
	(0.1050)	(0.1110)	(0.1057)	(0.1579)	(0.1203)	(0.0908)
Minority roots		–0.0233	–0.0384		0.1063	0.1036
		(0.1311)	(0.1340)		(0.1750)	(0.1436)
Household income decile		0.1851***	0.1598***		0.1114***	0.0855***
		(0.0243)	(0.0272)		(0.0151)	(0.0094)
Education level (Base level: Not exceeding compulsory education)
Upper secondary		0.3465	0.2810		0.6307***	0.2728
		(0.2889)	(0.2609)		(0.0860)	(0.2057)
Advanced vocational		0.6826^†	0.6178		0.9106***	0.5419*
		(0.3770)	(0.3529)		(0.1218)	(0.1938)
Bachelor's-degree		1.1183**	0.9200**		1.2137***	0.7812**
		(0.2904)	(0.2920)		(0.0734)	(0.1685)
Master's-degree or higher		1.8457***	1.5506***		1.6644***	1.2283**
		(0.2351)	(0.2428)		(0.1518)	(0.2066)
Welfare benefits: Yes		–0.6371***	–0.4551***		–1.4621*	–0.9619
		(0.0775)	(0.0823)		(0.4653)	(0.4954)
Fairness wealth distribution			0.1815***			0.0319
			(0.0253)			(0.0394)
Financial situation: Positive			0.7307^†			1.4715**
			(0.3495)			(0.3472)
Political left-right self-placement			–0.0236			0.0450^†
			(0.0282)			(0.0194)
Satisfaction with democracy			0.0495^†			0.0889*
			(0.0245)			(0.0221)
Gender: Male		–0.4309***	–0.3356*		0.3500*	0.2693^†
		(0.0961)	(0.1130)		(0.1192)	(0.1109)
Age		0.0112*	0.0123*		0.0069^†	0.0034
		(0.0044)	(0.0056)		(0.0031)	(0.0033)
Household size		0.0117	0.0166		0.0720	0.0989
		(0.0308)	(0.0253)		(0.0495)	(0.0498)
Constant	5.9869***	3.5085***	1.7210**	6.0000***	3.7939***	2.1954**
	(0.0855)	(0.3635)	(0.5235)	(0.1035)	(0.2444)	(0.4246)
Observations	401	392	369	673	661	610
R^2	0.0037	0.3763	0.4327	0.0094	0.2112	0.2895

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on municipal-level; ^†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Turning toward perceptions of Sámi’s sociocultural status as the dependent variable, Table 4 presents a slightly different picture. The coefficients of Sámi identity are consistently negative throughout all models in both countries. However, they are not statistically significant in any model in Norway. In Sweden, they are always below the 5% threshold of statistical significance.

Table 4. Linear regression on perceptions of Sámi’s sociocultural status.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Norway	Norway	Norway	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
Sámi identity	–0.4604	–0.3670	–0.3169	–1.1037*	–1.0378*	–0.8529*
	(0.2673)	(0.2368)	(0.2804)	(0.2757)	(0.2714)	(0.3315)
Minority roots		0.4144*	0.4482**		0.5301**	0.4214*
		(0.1437)	(0.1356)		(0.1139)	(0.1362)
Household income decile		0.0769	0.0681		0.0307	0.0324
		(0.0445)	(0.0496)		(0.0271)	(0.0224)
Education level (Base level: Not exceeding compulsory education)
Upper secondary		0.3469	0.2703		0.6903	0.7509
		(0.4124)	(0.3930)		(0.4171)	(0.5022)
Advanced vocational		0.7317*	0.6793^†		0.8719	0.7471
		(0.2704)	(0.3315)		(0.4708)	(0.5227)
Bachelor's degree		0.4218	0.2489		0.6701	0.7042
		(0.3206)	(0.3213)		(0.4878)	(0.5946)
Master's-degree or higher		0.7104^†	0.3504		0.3014	0.3123
		(0.3709)	(0.3887)		(0.6513)	(0.6795)
Welfare benefits: Yes		0.2263	0.4150^†		0.2543	0.6022
		(0.2080)	(0.2096)		(0.9987)	(1.0743)
Fairness wealth distribution			0.2152**			–0.0153
			(0.0580)			(0.0576)
Financial situation: Positive			–0.1240			0.1150
			(0.8293)			(0.3433)
Political left-right self-placement			0.0040			0.1267*
			(0.0441)			(0.0366)
Satisfaction with democracy			0.0077			0.0695
			(0.0532)			(0.0804)
Gender: Male		0.0885	0.2563*		0.1477	0.0832
		(0.1073)	(0.1015)		(0.0850)	(0.0685)
Age		0.0211^†	0.0225*		0.0166*	0.0186**
		(0.0101)	(0.0095)		(0.0049)	(0.0027)
Household size		0.0315	0.0227		0.1486*	0.1344*
		(0.0355)	(0.0440)		(0.0570)	(0.0579)
Constant	6.5114***	3.9693***	2.8288**	6.3370***	4.0131***	2.9094**
	(0.1875)	(0.5443)	(0.8981)	(0.1230)	(0.3014)	(0.4477)
Observations	397	388	366	654	643	600
R^2	0.0103	0.0597	0.1055	0.0292	0.0769	0.0921

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on municipal level; ^†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

By and large, the control variable’s coefficients align with the theoretical expectations in the case of individual socioeconomic status perceptions and – apart from a few exceptions, such as assessing the fairness of the wealth distribution and the gender variable – show similar patterns across countries. They are, however, less predictive of perceptions of Sámi’s sociocultural status. Likewise, comparing the R²-statistics in Table 3 with those of Table 4 shows that the models are more successful in explaining perceptions of individual socioeconomic status. Moreover, compared between countries, they explain more of the dependent variables’ variances in Norway.

Interpretation and robustness

On the whole, the results of the empirical analysis support the theoretical hypothesis: Sámi respondents report lower subjective social status perceptions than majority respondents in Sweden. In Norway, levels of perceived status do not differ between these groups or – in the case of socioeconomic status – might even be higher among the Sámi. In this vein, the results mirror the countries’ different Sámi policy contexts. They indicate that Norway has so far been more successful in establishing equality in status perceptions between the Sámi and the majority.

The substantial intensity of inequality in socioeconomic status perceptions in Sweden is best illustrated by comparing its magnitude with that of household income. All else being equal, having a Sámi identity is comparable to moving down five income deciles. Even though the measurement captures perceptions of vertical status inequality, its distribution in Sweden is thus strongly partitioned along horizontal group-identity lines.

Regarding perceptions of Sámi’s sociocultural status, being a Swedish Sámi has even the largest coefficient-magnitude of all explanatory variables. However, it is impossible to infer whether Swedish Sámi’s low perception of their collective sociocultural status drives this finding or whether non-Sámi respondents rank the Sámi relatively high because of, for example, social desirability biases.

The statistically significant and positive coefficient of having ancestral links to another minority stands out, too. In both countries, those respondents are more likely to think that Sámi’s cultural norms and practices are respected and appreciated. Although enlarging on this is beyond the scope of this paper, it indicates a further dimension of group differences in status perceptions between the Sámi and members of other minority groups.

At this point, however, it is worth inspecting how robust the results are. To check whether the decision to treat the dependent variables as numeric distorts the results, I employ ordered logistic models as a comparison. In addition, to test whether membership in the Sámi population can viably be defined through self-identification, I use an alternative operationalization of Sámi ancestry. The results of both checks, described in detail in Appendix D, attest that the analysis above is plausible and robust.

Discussion

According to this analysis, rectifying between-group inequalities in status perceptions is less successful in Sweden, where the Sámi rights policy context is less corroborative. But what statements about Indigenous policies do these findings allow? What are their limits, and how could future research deal with them?

The policy–perceptions nexus

With the data used – or any other data currently available – it is impossible to test the policy–perceptions nexus formally. Being observational cross-sectional data, they naturally do not allow for inspections of causality. Nevertheless, the results show status perceptions diverging between respondents with and without a Sámi identity in Sweden. Here, the Sámi policies accommodate Sámi rights to a lesser extent. Thus, the results provide good reasons to believe that policies and status perceptions are interlinked after all.

Likewise, the analysis’s ability to discern the relationship’s direction is limited. Regression coefficients’ signs are not meaningful here because they only show the direction of the divergence of Sámi’s status perceptions from the majority's. However, the situation before current policies were enacted is unclear. Therefore, the analysis cannot diagnose whether the policy context influences status perceptions or whether it merely reflects how the Sámi see their position in society. Yet, under the conclusive assumption that status perceptions were low before recognizing Sámi rights became an actual policy goal, the finding of pronounced differences in perceived status in Sweden today indicates that full equality in perceptions has not yet been realized.

Future research could try approximating further diagnoses of policies’ impact on such perceptions. For example, examining attitudes towards Sámi policies could shed more light on the issue. If the Swedish policy context leads to lower social status perceptions among the Swedish Sámi, one could expect this group to be skeptical about current policies.

Furthermore, investigating Sámi’s political status could produce additional insights. Policy-feedback theory’s primary focus is how policies feed back into politics by affecting people’s political status. Therefore, comparing Sámi and non-Sámi perceptions of their political efficacy and satisfaction with government output seems worthwhile.

Generalizability and transferability

After localizing the results’ informative value, the inevitable follow-up question is about generalizability. Due to the survey’s focus on northern municipalities, the findings are not by implication transferable to the whole Norwegian and Swedish population, let alone the Sámi people in its entirety. Sámi policy contexts vary across regions because many Sámi policies have an explicit geographical focus – illustrated, for example, by the aforementioned administrative areas for the Sámi languages, the territorial rights regime in Finnmark, or the substantial role of the Norwegian Sámi Parliament in governing economic development in the country’s north (c.f. Angell, Eikeland, and Selle 2023). Naturally, this also pertains to Sámi policies in Finland and Russia, which is why potential regional and cross-country differences need to be considered when carrying over the findings from this study.

In addition, not only policies might be different in other settings but also the meaning of Sámi identity. The municipalities covered in this study predominantly belong to regions where Sámi have been living since immemorial. Today, Sámi naturally also live in many other, especially southern metropolitan regions and have distinct preferences and expectations toward Sámi politics (e.g., Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes 2020). Their Sámi identities might differ from that of Sámi living in less urban settings (c.f. Nyseth and Pedersen 2014) and thus relate differently to status perceptions.

Conclusion

This paper investigated the relationship between policies governing the recognition of Indigenous rights and how a concerned Indigenous people perceives its position in society. The analysis based on the case of the Sámi people in Norway and Sweden finds more inequality in status perceptions between the Indigenous population and ethnic majority where the policy context accommodates Indigenous rights less firmly. When policies pave narrower avenues for Indigenous people to exercise their rights, rectifying inequalities is more likely to fall by the wayside.

Even though the results are pretty case-specific, they make for a strong argument why research should double down on studying how Indigenous rights are recognized – or not – and the corresponding consequences. Compared to the Sámi in Norway and Sweden, many other Indigenous peoples live in countries with lower levels of economic wealth and higher levels of material inequality (e.g., Anderson et al. 2016). It hence stands to reason that in many other cases, too, Indigenous peoples perceive themselves as occupying an inferior position in society. When investigating the effectiveness of Indigenous policy efforts to rectify such inequalities, a sole focus on resource effects, i.e., increases in Indigenous peoples’ material situation, cannot provide the whole story. Instead, as this paper makes clear, the policy context’s interpretive and normative feedback mechanism should be considered, too.

The case of Sweden as a welfare state with comparatively low levels of economic inequality exemplifies that even when an Indigenous people is structurally on a material par with the dominant population, inequalities between groups can persist in people’s minds. Perceptions of horizontal inequalities in sociocultural status are quite pronounced among the Sámi there. Furthermore, perceptions of individual socioeconomic status, which are technically assessments of vertical inequality, are also horizontally unequal as they are observably lower among the Sámi. Accordingly, the findings show that there are still relatively uncharted areas in the research on perceptions of inequality. Other forms of inequality might still be perceived beyond and independently of material between-group disparities. In addition, their political causes and solutions might not be found in the policy areas of redistribution or social investment but rather in the policies governing the recognition of group rights. Solely creating horizontal material equality seems to be an insufficient remedy for historically rooted grievances in their entirety.

Ethics statement

This article reports results from a survey conducted in Norway and Sweden. In accordance with the respective national legislation, the survey project was reviewed and received approval by the Institutional Review Board of the author's university (University of Konstanz, IRB statement 21/2020) and the Swedish Ethical Review Authority (decision number Dnr 2020–06853). The principles of voluntary participation, informed consent, and respondents' right to withdraw were always upheld.

Acknowledgments

The research project “Ethnic Policies” - Remedy for Between-Group Inequalities? collected the data used in this paper. I am grateful to Katharina Holzinger, Tanja Kupisch, Anika Lloyd-Smith, Rusen Yasar, and Sven-Patrick Schmid for the successful collaboration. An earlier version of this article was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in April 2022. I want to thank all participants of the workshop on Indigenous Peoples' Self-Determination for their valuable comments and feedback. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for Politics, Groups, and Identities who provided excellent advice and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG - German Research Foundation) [grant number EXC-2035/1 – 390681379.

Notes

1 The Sámi are also indigenous to Finland and the Russian Kola peninsula. Although exact numbers are unclear, the communities in Norway and Sweden are estimated to be by far the biggest (e.g., Young and Bjerregaard 2019).

2 “Sámi Parliament” is the literal translation of the North Sámi term Sámediggi. The Norwegian Sámediggi has existed since 1989, and the Swedish since 1993. Their primary roles are twofold: popularly elected representative bodies for the national Sámi population and administrative authorities subordinated to the national government.

3 See also Larsen (2019) for a review.

4 Svallfors (2010) refers to public policies as well as institutions but at the same time states that he does not differentiate between the two terms.

5 Since the exact size of each country’s Sámi population is unknown, it is impossible to accurately state the percentage of Sámi registered with the respective electoral rolls in Norway and Sweden. Nevertheless, despite continuously increasing numbers of voters since the Sámi Parliaments’ establishments, the electoral rolls seem to encompass still less than half of the respective Sámi population (c.f. Bergh et al. 2018).

6 Drawing random population samples would not have been a reasonable strategy for collecting survey data from both Sámi and majority respondents, as even optimistic estimates conceive the total number of Sámi living in all of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia to be just about 120,000 (Axelsson and Storm Mienna 2021). To ensure a sufficient number of Sámi respondents, the survey instead focused on the municipalities with the assumedly highest Sámi population shares in each country. The municipalities were selected based on having the highest percentages of residents registered on the Sámi Parliaments’ electoral rolls. A list of these municipalities and a detailed description of the survey population can be found in Appendix A.

7 The exact question wording of the items on which the control variables are based can be found in Appendix B.

8 A detailed description of the survey population’s changes between the two stages and the corresponding construction of analysis weights can be found in Appendix C.

9 There were 20 respondents in Norway who should have received the extended version based on their telephone interview answers, but instead were provided with access to the standard questionnaire. However, this is not of concern for the analysis at hand, as it only relies on questions that appeared in both versions.

Appendices

Appendix A. Description of survey data collection

The interdisciplinary research project “Ethnic Policies” – Remedy for Between-Group Inequalities? at the University of Konstanz's Cluster of Excellence The Politics of Inequality collected the data through a multi-stage survey procedure between mid-April and mid-September 2021. The characteristics of the survey’s target population and the extensive question content posed several challenges. First, the share of people with a Sámi identity among the Norwegian and Swedish populations is assumedly relatively small. Drawing random population samples in each country would thus not have been purposive. Instead, to achieve a sufficiently high number of Sámi participants, we restricted the survey’s geographical scope to selected municipalities in the countries’ northern regions. We chose those municipalities with the highest shares of registered voters for the Sámi Parliaments elections of 2017 among their residents. Table A1 shows the areas covered by the survey, their adult population figures, and the percentage of adult residents registered on the Sámi Parliament electoral rolls in 2017.

Table A1. Survey municipalities’ adult population share thereof registered with Sámi Parliament electoral roll in 2017.

Municipality	Adult population	Sámi Parliament electoral roll share
Norway, total	37,767	20.9%
Alta	15,458	8.5%
Deatnu – Tana	2396	36.1%
Divtasvuodna – Tysfjord	1623	17.5%
Gáivuotna – Kåfjord – Kaivuono	1774	20.7%
Guovdageaidnu – Kautokeino	2290	68.6%
Kárásjohka – Karasjok	2175	64.0%
Kvænangen	1014	12.3%
Kvalsund	862	17.3%
Lebesby	1076	16.0%
Loabák – Lavangen	829	12.3%
Lyngen	2342	9.4%
Porsanger – Porsángu – Porsanki	3245	23.8%
Raarvihke – Røyrvik	382	10.2%
Storfjord - Omasvuotna – Omasvuono	1523	9.9%
Unjárga – Nesseby	778	47.3%
Sweden, total	32,205	9.1%
Arjeplog	2364	10.9%
Jokkmokk	4257	15.5%
Kiruna	18,637	7.5%
Sorsele	2068	9.8%
Storuman	4879	8.3%

Note: Norwegian municipalities’ classification as of 2017.

Sources: Sámediggi (Norway); Sámediggi (Sweden); Statistics Norway; Statistics Sweden; own calculations.

Second, the survey was split into several stages to reduce the deterrence of potential respondents with a tiringly long interview or lengthy questionnaire. At first, prospective respondents received calls for telephone interviews that lasted about 7 minutes. At the end of the interview, each participant was invited to proceed to the second stage, which consisted of a more extensive questionnaire that respondents could fill out online or on paper. After doing so, they could progress to two further linguistic measurements: a vocabulary task and a speech recording session. Participation was voluntary in any survey segment and based on informed consent. There was also the option to suspend the involvement after finishing one component and resuming at a later point. Respondents choosing this option would receive an email invitation for the next segment. If they did not continue within 1–2 weeks, they would receive up to four reminders.

After completing the questionnaire, and again after participating in the vocabulary task, respondents received a small thank-you gift worth about 5 euros. In Sweden, we used two Triss tickets for the national lottery, whereas in Norway, we offered multipurpose gift cards from GoGift. Furthermore, to increase the comparatively low response rates in Norway, respondents could enter a draw of 10 additional gift cards with values ranging from 1000 to 4000 NOK.

We tasked two local survey firms to conduct the telephone interviews and handle the printed questionnaires. They attempted to contact all adults with an allocable phone number residing in the selected municipalities. In Norway, 17,096 telephone numbers were available, and 22,073 in Sweden. Of the 11,153 eligible individuals reached in Norway, 21.5% participated in the interview. Although only 6265 potential respondents answered the call in Sweden, the participation rate was 48.2%. Table A2 lists the numbers of respondents to the telephone interview and questionnaire in both countries.

Table A2. Participation in survey stages by country.

	Norway	Sweden
Telephone interview	2396	3020
Questionnaire	502 (21.0%)	918 (30.4%)

Note: Response rates in parentheses refer to the percentage of respondents from the preceding stage who continued participating.

Trained interviewers conducted the interviews in the majority language, i.e., Norwegian and Swedish. The questionnaire was also available in North Sámi and English, yet few participants chose those. A total of 10 North Sámi and 1 English questionnaire were filled out in Norway, whereas in Sweden, the numbers were 6 and 2, respectively. Respondents also strongly favored filling out the questionnaire online. The printed version comprised 5.6% of the questionnaires filled out in Sweden. Twenty-three printed questionnaires were filled out and sent back.

Besides language and online and offline participation, questionnaire versions also differed regarding content. An extended version included additional questions about Sámi culture and language, which would not have applied to respondents without any personal relation to Sámi culture. Hence, participants stating in the telephone interview that they neither identify themselves as Sámi nor that they, their parents, or grandparents have/had any ethnic Sámi background received the standard version of the questionnaire. Respondents affirming at least one of these questions received the extended version, which comprised 30.9% of all filled-out questionnaires in Sweden and 46.6% in Norway.⁹

On the whole, online questionnaire participants seemed quite committed. Table A3 shows that the dropout rate – i.e., the proportion of surveys aborted before arriving at the last substantial question – is slightly lower in Sweden than in Norway. It is also about one percentage point smaller for the standard version in both cases. In addition, on average Norwegian participants spent a few more minutes completing the questionnaire. Unsurprisingly, it took respondents a little longer to fill out the extended than the standard version in both countries. However, these differences appear to be minor. Overall, they do not indicate any worrying patterns of deviant answer behavior, neither between countries nor questionnaire versions.

Table A3. Online survey answering time and dropout rate by country and questionnaire version.

	Norway		Sweden
	Standard	Extended	Standard	Extended
Median duration (minutes) for completed questionnaires	22	25	20	24
Dropout rate	13.4%	14.5%	11.0%	12.0%

Appendix B. List of variables and operationalization

All variables used in the paper’s empirical analysis stem from the Nordic Peoples Survey dataset. In the following, Table A4 lists the variables and related survey questions and explains the operationalization. Most variables are created from single survey items, taking over the answer scale. Yet, slight adjustments were necessary for some variables.

Table A4. List of variables and operationalization.

Variable name	Original survey question wording and operationalization
Individual social status perception	Imagine a ladder with 10 rungs. At the top of the ladder (10th rung) are the people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most education, and best jobs. At the bottom (1st rung) are the people who are the worst off, those who have the least money, least education, worst jobs, or no job. Please choose the rung that best represents where you think you stand on the ladder
	The answer was recorded on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 = the lowest rung to 10 = the highest rung
Collective social status perception	Now please think about different groups in society, imagining the same ladder as before. At the top of the ladder (10th rung) are the groups for which the overall society shows the most appreciation and whose cultural traditions and norms are the most accepted. At the bottom (1st rung) are the groups for which the overall society shows the least appreciation and whose cultural traditions and norms are the most rejected. Please choose the rung that best represents how much each of the following ethnic groups is appreciated in society as a whole: Norwegians/Swedes – Sámi – Kven/Swedish Finns
	Tornedalians [only asked in Sweden] – Immigrants
	Respondents could answer on a ten-point scale for each of these groups. The variable at hand is exclusively concerned with answers given about the Sámi. Again, it is recorded on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 = the lowest rung to 10 = the highest rung
Sámi identity	Overall, do you consider yourself to be Sámi?
	The variable takes on value 0 = majority of respondents answered in the negative. If they answered in the affirmative, the variable takes on value 1 = Sámi
Minority roots	People of different ethnic backgrounds live in Northern [Norway/Sweden]. Could you please tell me if you have an ethnic background from one or several of the following groups?
	The variable is coded 1 = yes if respondents chose any of the following categories: [Kven/Swedish Finn] Tornedalian [only available in Sweden] Immigrant Other minority The variable is coded 0 = no if respondents chose none of the categories above
Household income decile	This variable is based on two survey questions:
	What is your household's monthly net income? Counting all wages, salaries, other sources of income, and benefits of all members of the household, after taxes and deductions, please state an approximate value
	If you prefer, could you select one of the categories where your household's monthly net income falls?
	Respondents could only answer one of these questions. The minimum valid value for answers given to (a) was 1000 NOK and 1000 SEK, respectively. For question (b) answer categories follow, in essence, the national household income deciles of 2018 published by Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden
	For constructing this variable, answers from (a) are classified according to which decile of (b) they pertain
	The income categories thus are as follows:
	Decile	Upper and lower bounds
		Norway (NOK)	Sweden (SEK)
	1st	1,000–256,000	1,000–185,000
	2nd	256,001–351,000	185,001–279,000
	3rd	351,001–452,000	279,001–350,000
	4th	452,001–551,000	350,001–431,000
	5th	551,001–666,000	431,001–513,000
	6th	666,001–813,000	513,001–589,000
	7th	813,001–986,000	589,001–670,000
	8th	986,001–1194,000	670,001–780,000
	9th	1194,001–1526,000	780,001–971,000
	10th	more than 1526,000	more than 971,000
Education level	What is the highest educational level you have attained?
	Respondents were given six levels as answer categories and country-specific examples for each
	Very few respondents chose the first category (no completed compulsory education). Therefore, I recoded the answer categories as follows:
	1 = No completed compulsory education or completed compulsory education
	2 = upper secondary education
	3 = Advanced vocational education / tertiary education without academic degree
	4 = Lower tertiary education (BA level)
	5 = Upper tertiary education (MA level or higher)
Welfare benefits	During the last five years, have you been dependent on social security at any time?
	Binary variable: 0 = no; 1 = yes
Fairness wealth distribution	In terms of fairness, how do you evaluate the distribution of wealth in [Norway/Sweden]?
	The answer was recorded on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 = completely unfair to 10 = completely fair
Financial situation	How well do you cope with your current financial situation?
	In the survey, respondents could choose one of four answer categories (not good at all; not so good; good; very good). For the purpose of this paper, the categories were aggregated into a binary variable:
	0 = negative (not good at all & not so good)
	1 = positive (good & very good)
Political left-right self-placement	In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
	The answer was recorded on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 = left to 10 = right.
Satisfaction with democracy	How satisfied are you with the state of democracy in [Norway/Sweden]?
	The answer was recorded on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 = completely dissatisfied to 10 = completely satisfied
Gender	What is your gender?
	In the survey, respondents could choose between three answer categories (female; male; diverse)
	Only one of the respondents choosing diverse subsequently filled out the questionnaire. However, they did not answer all of the other questions that are components of the analysis. Hence, this variable is practically also binary in this case: 1 = female; 2 = male
Age	Which year were you born in?
	I calculated the respondent’s approximate age by subtracting the reported year of birth from 2021 (the year in which the survey was conducted)
Household size	Including yourself, how many people – counting all adults and children – live in your household?
	Numerical variable, valid range: 1–10

Appendix C. Construction of analysis weights

By breaking down the survey into several stages, we aimed to prevent vast numbers of potential respondents from refusing to participate at the outset. The decent response rates achieved concede a point to that strategy. Nevertheless, at the same time, the decision to continue or terminate participation after the telephone interview offered additional avenues for self-selection biases among survey participants. The distribution of explanatory variables used in this paper’s analysis depends on participants’ choices of whether or not to proceed to the questionnaire stage, as Table A5 shows. It lists the means and ratios of the variables stemming from the telephone interviews split between respondents who did and did not continue with the questionnaire.

Table A5. Variable means and ratios by respondents’ choice to proceed after interview.

	Norway		Sweden
	Proceeded	Not proceeded	Proceeded	Not proceeded
Sámi identity: Yes	26.7%	20.9%	11.9%	11.7%
Minority roots: Yes	40.3%	36.2%	41.1%	37.3%
Household income decile	6.76	6.38	5.45	4.82
Gender: Female	52.8%	53.4%	56.3%	53.8%
Age	53.17	54.67	52.14	54.04
Household size	2.64	2.52	2.40	2.36

The magnitude of differences in means and ratios varies across variables and the two countries. Therefore, the group of respondents that filled out the questionnaire cannot be considered a random sample of the telephone interview participants. Hence, applying weights based on the distribution of these factors among the telephone interview population is necessary to transfer the analysis’ findings to the latter group. To construct these weights, I run a logistic regression on the choice of proceeding with the study after the telephone interview. I use the coefficients to predict each individual’s probability of participating in the questionnaire stage. The inverse of this probability constitutes the individual’s weight in the analysis. The weight w of an individual i can thus be expressed as $w_i={\displaystyle \frac{1}{\mathrm{P}(Y_i=1)}}$where Y is a binary indicator of participation in the questionnaire stage and $P(Y_i=1)={\displaystyle \frac{\exp (\alpha +X{1}_i\beta 1+X{2}_i\beta 2+\dots +X{v}_i\mathrm{\beta v})}{1+[\exp (\alpha +X{1}_i\beta 1+X{2}_i\beta 2+\dots +X{v}_i\mathrm{\beta v})]}}$where v is the number of variables used as predictors for participation in the questionnaire stage.

Table A6 reports the odds ratios of the logistic regression forming the weights’ basis. The third gender category (diverse) was dropped from the regression, as there would have been only two observations in this category. The only variable that reaches statistical significance in both countries is household income. Higher-income respondents were slightly more likely to participate in the second stage. Keeping everything else constant, in Norway, continuing after the telephone interview appealed more to respondents who self-identify as Sámi. In Sweden, by contrast, Sámi respondents were as likely as non-Sámi respondents to proceed to the next stage. Apart from gender in Norway, there seems to be no statistically significant relationship in both countries between the decision to continue participation and any other sociodemographic variable.

Table A6. Logistic regression on proceeding after telephone interview (odds ratios).

	Norway	Sweden
Sámi identity	1.3509**	1.0098
	(0.2050)	(0.0565)
Minority roots	1.1856*	1.0700
	(0.1225)	(0.0697)
Household income decile	1.0517***	1.0758***
	(0.0182)	(0.0114)
Gender: Male	1.1240**	0.8492
	(0.0539)	(0.1086)
Age	0.9976	1.0012
	(0.0058)	(0.0028)
Household size	1.0108	0.9804
	(0.0281)	(0.0205)
Constant	0.2007***	0.3926***
	(0.0568)	(0.0367)
Observations	1964	2079
Pseudo R^2	0.0082	0.0105

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on municipal level; ^†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D. Robustness checks

To test the robustness of the results, I run a series of checks. First, to rule out that the results are driven by the decision to treat the dependent variables as numeric, I run ordered logistic regression models, using the main analysis’s variables but treating the independent variables as categorical. Table A7 shows that the main findings persist when employing ordered logistic instead of linear models. The relationship between Sámi identity and both types of status perceptions is again negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, also conforming with the linear model, the Sámi identity coefficient in the socioeconomic status model in Norway is larger than one and moderately statistically significant.

Table A7. Ordered logistic regression on perceptions of subjective social status (odds ratios).

	Individual socioeconomic status		Sámi’s sociocultural status
	Norway	Sweden	Norway	Sweden
Sámi identity	1.3382^†	0.6176***	0.7493	0.4245*
	(0.2196)	(0.0848)	(0.1844)	(0.1428)
Minority roots	1.0096	1.1739	1.5450***	1.4439**
	(0.1842)	(0.2432)	(0.1826)	(0.1830)
Household income decile	1.2688***	1.1253***	1.0628	1.0376^†
	(0.0576)	(0.0212)	(0.0557)	(0.0198)
Education level (Base level: Not exceeding compulsory education)
Upper secondary	1.1578	1.4202	1.4596	1.8612
	(0.4719)	(0.3559)	(0.5552)	(0.9014)
Advanced vocational	2.0589	1.9961**	2.1151*	2.0102
	(1.1002)	(0.4838)	(0.7577)	(0.9671)
Bachelor's-degree	3.0230*	3.0160***	1.3962	1.8064
	(1.3525)	(0.8305)	(0.4133)	(0.9830)
Master's-degree or higher	8.1987***	5.6869***	1.6571	1.2622
	(3.1017)	(1.6360)	(0.6384)	(0.7913)
Welfare benefits: Yes	0.5549***	0.2491^†	1.6433**	1.6342
	(0.0661)	(0.1889)	(0.2596)	(1.4566)
Fairness wealth distribution	1.3475***	1.0692	1.2205**	0.9920
	(0.0538)	(0.0658)	(0.0743)	(0.0460)
Financial situation: Positive	3.0337*	6.8921***	0.7245	1.1479
	(1.6763)	(3.7429)	(0.4880)	(0.3061)
Political left-right self-placement	0.9709	1.0660*	1.0120	1.1168**
	(0.0341)	(0.0299)	(0.0412)	(0.0381)
Satisfaction with democracy	1.1118**	1.1258***	1.0309	1.0537
	(0.0433)	(0.0386)	(0.0541)	(0.0758)
Gender: Male	0.6070**	1.4669*	1.2208^†	1.1119
	(0.0957)	(0.2597)	(0.1253)	(0.0778)
Age	1.0159*	1.0050	1.0231*	1.0171***
	(0.0071)	(0.0041)	(0.0105)	(0.0022)
Household size	0.9997	1.1410*	1.0202	1.1192**
	(0.0358)	(0.0665)	(0.0455)	(0.0482)
Observations	369	610	366	600
Pseudo R^2	0.1469	0.0843	0.0291	0.0252

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on municipal-level; ^†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Eventually, as explained in the paper’s main part, it could be argued that self-identification was an improper operationalization of Sámi population membership because of potential reciprocal effects between identity and status perceptions. As an alternative operationalization of Sámi population membership, I employ a variable expressing whether a respondent has Sámi ancestral links but, for some reason or another, does not self-identify as Sámi. This variable is based on a survey item that asked respondents – separately from the self-identification question – whether they or any of their parents or grandparents have/had an ethnic Sámi background. If low subjective status perceptions were one of the reasons why someone of Sámi descent does not identify as Sámi, a correlation between status perceptions and this descent-based Sámi-population operationalization could be expected.

Accordingly, I run the same linear models as in the main analysis but use the descent-based definition as the independent variable. Table A8 lists the coefficients of the full models. It becomes apparent that in both countries, there is no statistically significant association between the measurements of status perception and being of Sámi descent but not identifying as Sámi.

Table A8. Linear regression with alternative independent variable operationalization.

	Individual socioeconomic status		Sámi’s sociocultural status
	Norway	Sweden	Norway	Sweden
Sámi identity	0.0250	–0.1296	–0.1229	–0.4796
	(0.1085)	(0.1167)	(0.2184)	(0.2995)
Minority roots	–0.0014	0.1162	0.5029*	0.4986*
	(0.1400)	(0.1579)	(0.2076)	(0.1369)
Household income decile	0.1617***	0.0880***	0.0701	0.0360
	(0.0276)	(0.0099)	(0.0476)	(0.0244)
Education level (Base level: Not exceeding compulsory education)
Upper secondary	0.3503	0.2481	0.5670	0.7299
	(0.2192)	(0.1989)	(0.4062)	(0.5135)
Advanced vocational	0.7082*	0.5342*	0.9327*	0.7135
	(0.2834)	(0.2041)	(0.4013)	(0.5340)
Bachelor's-degree	1.0106**	0.7541**	0.5239	0.6324
	(0.2521)	(0.1729)	(0.3725)	(0.5978)
Master's-degree or higher	1.6213***	1.2077**	0.6025	0.2577
	(0.2095)	(0.2017)	(0.4612)	(0.6933)
Welfare benefits: Yes	–0.4488***	–0.9346	0.4655*	0.7499
	(0.0823)	(0.4959)	(0.2136)	(1.1217)
Fairness wealth distribution	0.1886***	0.0336	0.2276**	–0.0130
	(0.0262)	(0.0377)	(0.0554)	(0.0552)
Financial situation: Positive	0.9160*	1.5262**	0.1011	0.1672
	(0.3241)	(0.3084)	(0.8098)	(0.3582)
Political left-right self-placement	–0.0214	0.0472^†	–0.0001	0.1369*
	(0.0280)	(0.0187)	(0.0443)	(0.0398)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.0505^†	0.0924**	0.0192	0.0714
	(0.0258)	(0.0222)	(0.0557)	(0.0817)
Gender: Male	–0.2959*	0.2737*	0.2726*	0.0900
	(0.1102)	(0.1033)	(0.0964)	(0.0778)
Age	0.0107^†	0.0037	0.0235*	0.0195***
	(0.0054)	(0.0035)	(0.0098)	(0.0026)
Household size	0.0160	0.0960^†	0.0185	0.1413^†
	(0.0252)	(0.0393)	(0.0409)	(0.0640)
Constant	1.4821*	2.0837**	2.0839*	2.7542**
	(0.5001)	(0.4393)	(0.9682)	(0.4737)
Observations	371	617	368	606
R^2	0.4436	0.2903	0.1136	0.0907

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on municipal-level; ^†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

These additional checks consistently indicate that the main analysis results are robust. The findings are not driven by the decision to use linear models. Furthermore, operationalizing Sámi population membership through self-identification is a reasonable approach.