The Political Ecology of War in Maoist India

Abstract

War, business, and democracy can intersect in complex ways. In India, mining companies operate throughout a warzone between the government and a Maoist insurgency. Mining companies promised that their activities would benefit local populations, but over-reliance on the government to implement development initiatives eroded public faith. The Maoists used the implementation gap to recruit fighters and build public support through an anti-state and anti-corporate ideology. While traditional political ecology interpretations often blame corporations alone for negative mining consequences, this article explores how governance failures can also act as conflict triggers in mining districts. Understanding the interrelation effects between these actors can enable a broader understanding of not only the Maoist conflict in India but also how the political ecology of war influences business and conflict dynamics in resource-rich but war-ridden developing states.

Notes

¹United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Report (Geneva: United Nations, 2010).

²Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘At Least 650,000 People Displaced by Conflict in India’, online report, 2010, http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/90E174CA3D9CF14CC1257790002402F2?OpenDocument#22.2.1.

³Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Annual Report: 2011–2012, 2012, http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)1112.pdf.

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⁹A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Reader Press, 1969); I.M. Wallerstein, The Modern World-system (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

¹⁰M.J. Watts, Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); P. Blaikie and H. Brookfield (eds) Land Degradation and Society (London: Methuen, 1987).

¹¹See for example M.J. Watts, ‘Classics in Human Geography Revisited’, Progress in Human Geography, 25:4 (2001), pp. 621–628; D.S. Moore, ‘Contesting Terrain in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands’, Economic Geography, 69:4 (1993), pp. 380–401; P. Vayda and B. Walters, ‘Against Political Ecology’, Human Ecology 27 (1999), pp. 167–179.

¹²R.L. Bryant and S. Bailey, Third World Political Ecology (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 5.

¹³Forsyth, op. cit.

¹⁴P. Walker, ‘Political Ecology: Where is the Ecology?’, Progress in Human Geography, 29:1 (2005), pp. 73–82.

¹⁵R. Bryant and M. Goodman, ‘Consuming Narratives: the Political Ecology of “Alternative” Consumption’, Transactions, 29:3 (2004), pp. 344–366.

¹⁶P. le Billon, ‘The Political Ecology of War and Resource Exploitation’, Studies in Political Economy, 70 (2003), pp. 59–95 (p. 60).

¹⁷T. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

¹⁸H. Hegre and M. Nome, ‘Democracy, Development and Armed Conflict’, APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 2010.

¹⁹Note that while most scholars of rebel group motivations and the political economy of conflict have moved away from this dichotomy, the statements here generally hold true for both the original GG scholars and their progeny. Further, while most GG scholars may balk at considering their topic as within political ecology, the issues, dynamics and theories discussed all find a suitable home here.

²⁰P. le Billon, ‘The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, Political Geography, 20:5 (2001), pp. 561–584 (p. 565).

²¹W. Barnaby, ‘Do Nations go to War Over Water?,’ Nature, 458 (2009), pp. 282–283.

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²⁴Hoelscher et al., op. cit.

²⁵D. Kapur, K. Gawande and S. Satyanath, ‘Renewable Resource Shocks and Conflict in India's Maoist Belt’, Philadelphia: CASI Working Paper 12-02, 2012.

²⁶Le Billon 2003, op. cit., p. 67.

²⁷Le Billon, 2003, op. cit.

²⁸R. Reza, M.K. Jain and G. Singh, ‘Impact of Mining Activities on Surface Water Quality in Angul-Talcher Region of Orissa, India’, Mining Engineer's Journal, June (2009), pp. 2–28.

²⁹P.C. Mishra, B.K. Mishra, P.K. Tripathy, K. Meher and M.K. Pradhan, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case Study on Quality of Life of People Around Bargarh Cement Works of Orissa (India)’, Current Research Journal of Social Sciences, 1:3 (2009), pp. 93–110; P.C. Mishra, B.K. Mishra and P.K. Tripathy, ‘Socio-economic Profile and Quality of Life Index of Sample Households of Mining Areas in Talcher and Ib Valley Coal Mines in Orissa’, Journal of Human Ecology, 23:1 (2008), pp. 13–20.

³⁰J. Campbell, ‘The Political Economy of Natural Gas in Trinidad and Tobago’, United Nations Caribbean Development Report, 2007, pp. 273–286.

³¹M. Berdal and N. Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace: The Private Sector and the Challenges of Peacebuilding’, Survival, 52:2 (2010), pp. 37–58.

³²A. Kolk and F. Lenfant, ‘MNC Reporting on CSR and Conflict in Central Africa’, Journal of Business Ethics, 93:2 (2010), pp. 241–255.

³³N. Yakovleva and D. Vazquez-Brust, ‘Stakeholder Perspectives on CSR of Mining MNCs in Argentina’, Journal of Business Ethics 106:2 (2011), pp. 191–211.

³⁴D. Jamali and R. Mirshak, ‘Business–conflict linkages: Revising MNCs, CSRs and Conflict’, Journal of Business Ethics, 93:3 (2010), pp. 443–464.

³⁵See J. Oetzel, M. Westermann-Behaylo, C. Koerber, T. Fort and J. Rivera, ‘Business and Peace: Sketching the Terrain’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89:4 (2009), pp. 351–373 for a comprehensive literature review. Also A. Rettberg, ‘The Business of Peace in Colombia: Assessing the Role of the Business Community in the Colombian Peacebuilding Process’, Latin American Studies Association Paper, 2003; A. Rettberg, ‘The Private Sector, Peacebuilding, and Economic Recovery’, Ottawa, CIPS Working Paper, 2010; O. Williams (ed) Peace Through Commerce: Responsible Corporate Citizenship and the Ideals of the United Nations Global Compact (Geneva: United Nations, 2008); V. Boege, C. Fitzpatrick, W. Jaspers and W.C. Paes, ‘Who's Minding the Store? The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict’, Bonn International Centre for Conversion Brief 32, 2005; U. Joras, ‘Motivating and Impeding Factors for Corporate Engagement in Peacebuilding’, Geneva, Swisspeace Working Paper 1, 2009; D. Sweetman, Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Contributions from the Private Sector to Reduce Violent Conflict (London: Routledge, 2009).

³⁶T. Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-conflict Peacebuilding Processes’, Peace and Change, 34:1 (2009), pp. 3–26.

³⁷N. Peluso and M. Watts, ‘Violent Environments’ in N. Peluso and M. Watts (eds) Violent Environments (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 25.

³⁸Interviews for this section were conducted over several field visits in 2010 and interviews in early 2011. Interview materials are stored in an off site secure location due to issue sensitivity; exact dates and locations of interviews provided upon request. Methodology incorporated a multidisciplinary mixed methods case study approach, employing process tracing design with multiple field visits (snowball technique) to gain access with actors in several locations. For more on the advantages (and on mitigating potential drawbacks) of the single case study method on theory development, see A. Sumner and M. Tribe, International Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice (London: Sage, 2008); N. Sambanis, ‘Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War’, Perspectives on Politics, 2:2 (2004), pp. 257–279; J. Mahoney, ‘Particularizing Case Studies: A Critical Review of Gerring's Case Study Research’, Qualitative Methods, 5:3 (2007), pp. 6–8; J. Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); P. Hall, ‘Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics’ in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

³⁹D. Banaji, ‘The Ironies of Indian Maoism’, International Socialism, 128 (2010), pp. 129–148; A. Shah, ‘India Burning: The Maoist Revolution’ in I. Clark-Deeds (ed) A Companion to the Anthropology of India (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), pp. 332–352.

⁴⁰Note that while many who engage with the Naxal/Maoist issue conflate these two definitions, these terms describe distinct groups. Although there is substantial ideological and personnel overlap, one can be a Naxal (supporting the fundamental tenants of the agrarian movement which dates to the 1960s) without being a Maoist (a member of the Communist Party of India–Maoist armed group) and vice-versa. In practical terms, the distinction in support can mean the difference between being viewed as a ‘harmless old ideologue’ and being thrown in prison as an enemy of the state for active participation in a civil war. Although I discuss the Naxal foundations, the forward analysis in the paper regards the Maoist insurgency.

⁴¹The following two paragraphs adapted from S. Gates and J. Miklian, ‘Strategic Revolutionary Phases of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’ in K. Roy Warfare and Politics in South Asia from Ancient to Modern Times (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), pp. 415–438.

⁴²M. Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 138. Translated and introduction by Samuel B. Griffith II.

⁴³M. Tse-tung, ‘On Protracted War’ in T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), pp. 44–55.

⁴⁴K. Balagopal, ‘Andhra Pradesh: The End of Spring?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 25:34 (1990), p. 25.

⁴⁵Banaji, op. cit.

⁴⁶B. Roy (ed), War and Peace in Junglemahal (New Delhi: Setu Prakashani, 2012); J. Miklian, ‘Revolutionary Conflict in Federations: The Indian Case’, Conflict, Security and Development, 11:1 (2011), pp. 25–53.

⁴⁷The anti-corporate agenda is not the sole issue driving Maoist recruitment/support, but in terms of how local grievances are contextualized and relate to Mao's ideology, it is more flexible than land reform strategies. Other drivers for recruitment/support include both active (abuses of justice, police brutality, illegal annexation) and passive (lack of roads, schools, and hospitals) failures of the Indian government in peripheral areas.

⁴⁸Hoelscher et al., op. cit.

⁴⁹India's mining sector is grounded in colonial antecedents. Jewitt's (2008) comprehensive history of Jharkhand's natural resource and tribal community conflict history dates to the nineteenth century. Private mining firms predate India's independence, and state-run firms popped up during the run of industrial expansion in the 1970s. Throughout the period, environmental regulations were lax, laws restricting land grabs were neutered after the 44th Amendment to its constitution in 1978 permitted eminent domain, and environmental disasters were commonplace.

⁵⁰S. Corbridge, ‘The Continuing Struggle for India's Jharkhand: Democracy, Decentralisation and the Politics of Names and Numbers’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 40:3 (2002), pp. 55–71.

⁵¹M. Tiwari and M. Kumar, ‘Koda Empire from Africa to Mumbai’, Hindustan Times, 3 November 2009.

⁵²Miklian, ‘The Purification Hunt’, op. cit.; M. Bahree, ‘The Forever War: Inside India's Maoist Conflict’, World Policy Journal, 27:2 (2009), pp. 83–89.

⁵³Communist Party of India–Maoist, ‘People's March’, 9:2, 2008; Communist Party of India–Maoist, ‘People's March’, 12:3, 2011.

⁵⁴Shah, op. cit., p. 343.

⁵⁵Author interview, Gopal, February 2011.

⁵⁶Miklian, ‘The Purification Hunt’, op. cit.

⁵⁷South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), ‘Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism 2005–2012’, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_ sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05-11.htm.

⁵⁸New Indian Express, ‘We Don't Want Another K-Nagar: India Chief’, New Indian Express, 18 September 2006.

⁵⁹Author interview, Das, February 2011.

⁶²Author interview, Paikra, February 2011.

⁶⁰Times of India, ‘Maoists (sic) Posters Found at POSCO’, Times of India, March 7.

⁶¹Author interview, Mohapatra, February 2011.

⁶⁴U. Pingle, D. Pandey and V. Suresh, Majority Report of the Committee Constituted to Investigate into the proposal submitted by POSCO India Pvt. Limited (New Delhi: Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, 18 October 2010), pp. 5–6.

⁶³M. Gupta, Report of the Committee Constituted to Investigate into the Proposal Submitted by POSCO India Pvt. Limited for Establishment of an Integrated Steel Plant and Captive Port in Jagatsinghpur District, Orissa (New Delhi: Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, 18 October 2010).

⁶⁶ POSCO, Sustainability Report 2010: Towards Four Greats (Seoul: POSCO, 2010).

⁶⁵Gupta, op. cit., pp. 22.

⁶⁷Indian Express, ‘Maoists Express Solidarity with POSCO Movement’, Indian Express, 28 June 2011.

⁶⁸J. Miklian, ‘The General's Luck Runs Out’, Foreign Policy, 30 November 2011.

⁶⁹G. Bridge, ‘Global Production Networks and the Extractive Sector: Governing Resource-based Development’, Journal of Economic Geography, 8:3 (2008), pp. 389–419.

⁷⁰B. Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁷¹S. Jewitt, ‘Political Ecology of Jharkhand Conflicts’, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 49:1 (2008), pp. 68–82.

⁷²Yakovleva and Vasquez-Brust, op. cit.

⁷³M. Guidi, ‘Rethinking Social Corporate Responsibility: A Case in Argentina from the Point of View of Civil Society’, Nomadas. Revista Critica de Ciencias Sociales y Juridicas, 19:3 (2008), http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/181/18101919.pdf.

⁷⁴Press Trust of India (PTI), ‘Suspension of Green Nod to POSCO a Conspiracy’, Press Trust of India, 31 March 2012.

⁷⁵Despite the political securitization of these programs as essential for ‘development’ that will discourage Maoist recruitment, they do not yet have a significant negative influence on the Maoist conflict. See Hoelscher et al., op. cit.; J. Miklian and Å. Kolås, 'Development-as-Security: India's Internal Conflict Management–Development Nexus' in P. Upadhyaya and J. Miklian (eds) Global Perspectives on Peace and Conflict (Geneva: UNESCO, forthcoming 2013).

⁷⁶Tata's experiences in Noamundi district of Jharkhand are instructive of a corporation that followed protocol but still faces local resentment due to its operation and profit in an area where buyout benefits have long since been spent.

⁷⁷Author interviews, several areas of central India, 2007–2011.

⁷⁸J. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council: A/HRC/8/, 2008).

⁷⁹J. Miklian, ‘Price Volatility, Information Flows and the Norwegian Experience: Managing Expectations in a Globalized Market’, New Delhi, Tata Energy Resources Institute (TERI) Working Paper.

⁸⁰V. Boege, C. Fitzpatrick, W. Jaspers and W.C. Paes, Who's Minding the Store? The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict (Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion Brief 32, 2005).

⁸¹Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), ‘Final Report: International Advisory Group’, 2010.