Why the psychology of collective action requires qualitative transformation as well as quantitative change

Abstract

The argument of this paper is that social psychological models of collective action do not (and cannot) adequately explain social change and collective action through models based on shared variance between variables. Over and above the questions of why and how collective action and social change occur, such models do not adequately address the question of when they occur: at what point on a measure of perceived illegitimacy – or any other predictor – does a person decide that enough is enough, and at what point do shared grievances transform into mass protest? Instead, it is argued that the transition from inaction to action at the level of both the individual and the group is better conceptualised as a qualitative transformation. A key agenda for the social psychology of collective action should therefore be to conceptualise the link between quantitative variation in predictors of action and the actual emergence of action.

Keywords:

• protest
• collective participation
• group dynamics

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Colin W. Leach for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to two anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Notes on contributor

Andrew G. Livingstone is Senior Lecturer in Social Psychology at the University of Exeter, having previously held positions at the University of Stirling and Cardiff University. His research interests focus on social identity, intergroup relations and emotion. He is currently an Associate Editor of the British Journal of Social Psychology.