Play as activism? Early childhood and (inter)generational politics

ABSTRACT

Both young children and imaginative play are often considered to be fundamentally apolitical. Such views have been increasingly challenged, however, as both ‘the political’ and activism are being reconceptualised in more expansive ways. In seeking to critically build upon these efforts, I draw on ethnographic data generated in an early years setting in a super-diverse low-income community in London to highlight the space of imaginative play as a resonant site for investigations of the political. However, whether or not something is considered a ‘political’ matter is a political struggle in itself, and one that players may neither desire nor achieve. I make a case for both distinguishing between play and activism, and considering ways to foster connections between them. Imaginative play has the potential to enrich an intergenerational politics where adults and children engage together for a more just future.

KEYWORDS:

• Activism
• childhood
• generation
• imaginative play
• political theory
• young children

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the SI editors, independent reviewers, and participants in the ‘Activism on the edge of age’ workshop (organised by the editors) for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributor

Rachel Rosen is a lecturer in the sociology of childhood at University College London. Her research focuses on the politics of children and childhood. She is currently co-editing two collections: Reimagining childhood studies (Bloomsbury) and Feminism and the politics of childhood: Friends or foes? (UCL Press).

ORCID

Rachel Rosen http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9916-5910

Notes

1. This ‘critical moment’ happened during an 18-month ethnographic study investigating socio-dramatic and fantastical play about themes of imaginary death and pretend physical violence. I spent one day a week at Westside Nursery as a semi-participant observer, joining as a co-player when invited and taking field notes either during or just immediately after observing a session. These ‘scribbles’ – with all the omissions and imprecisions this term implies (Jones, Holmes, MacRae, MacLure, 2010) – were turned into longer fieldnotes at the end of each day. I also conducted formal and informal ethnographic interviews with children and adults. Thematic coding was complemented by in-depth analysis of ‘critical moments’ such as the one in this article. Critical moments are not chosen because they are repeated events: even if a phenomenon is observed only once, it can still be interrogated in relation to the conditions of its production and the effects of its existence (Sayer, 2000). Analytically, the use of critical moments which either ‘disturb or jar’ or ‘are so mundane that we may miss their presence’ allows for analysis of ‘entrenched assumptions’ (Albon & Rosen, 2014, p. 6).

2. The term ‘generational order’ refers to ‘a system of social ordering’ which positions certain people as ‘children’ and others as ‘adults’ (Alanen, 2011, p. 161). Rather than reflecting a natural division, these categories are inherited and remade through human activity. Certain activities, behaviours, needs, and capacities become associated with each generational position, affecting possibilities for action.

3. I am using this age distinction somewhat rhetorically. Age is neither the only way to understand the processes whereby some humans are made into children. As a growing ‘legal fetishism’ (Vitterbo, 2012), age has, however, become a dominant way of defining childhood.

4. The use of such emotive terms perhaps sounds unbelievable, and I myself was surprised by the force of my responses. However, if it is accepted that fiction and images can produce emotional investments and interpellations in adults, I would argue that it is only ‘adultism’ which makes children's play seem so inconsequential that it cannot produce such sentiments. It goes without saying, however, that these embodied emotions are not transparently knowable and are more than likely bound up with adult anxieties of childhood.