Emotions and power: reconciling conceptual twins

Abstract

While the existence of an ‘emotional turn’ within the social sciences is now widely acknowledged, some areas have garnered less specific attention than others. Perhaps the most significant absence within this literature is an explicit exploration of the relationship between emotions and relations of power and domination. This article will attempt such an endeavour. In doing so, I will draw on some key work from within the sociology of emotions, such as Barbalet, Collins, Kemper and Turner, and from the power literature within social theory more generally, including Dahl, Elias, Foucault, Giddens, Gramsci and Lukes. The main thrust of the argument is that power and emotion are conceptual twins in need of a serious theoretical reunion, and that emotions have played a largely unacknowledged, ‘under-labouring’ role within most theories of power. The need for a more unified approach to these two concepts is highlighted.

Keywords:

• emotions
• power
• sociology of emotion
• constitutive power

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Dr Mark Haugaard, Dr Kevin Ryan, Mr Daniel Savery, Dr Kate Kenny and Dr Siniša Malešević, and to the members of the IPSA Research Network on Political Power and members of the Power, Conflict and Ideologies Cluster at NUI Galway, for commenting on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments.

Notes

1. The phrase borrowed from Margaret Somers (Somers 1994).

2. The end of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of such a proliferation of different and often competing ‘turns’ within the social and human sciences (the linguistic, the historical, the biographical etc.) one is tempted speak in terms of the ‘turns’ turn. While such language may be figuratively appealing, it is semantically unfortunate. It fosters the impression that the changes taking place are in some way essential, or that the reified discipline in question has agentic intent of its own, rather than viewing such ‘turns’ as resulting from the political actions of groups and individuals who organize and inculcate such changes across academic networks. As such, it may be more accurate, if not more appropriate, to describe such ‘turns’ as ‘movements’.

3. The division of mind and body found in Descartes ([1641] 1996) and formulated with the Cogito is founded on a subversive view of emotion, in which individuals are not responsible for their feelings, as these are something ‘done’ to them by their bodies. This, for Barbalet, is ‘the other side of the cogito; namely that persons have no control over the emotions which subvert their thoughts and reason. If I am because I think, then I am undone if I feel’ (Barbalet 1998, p. 34).

4. Simmel also seems to be ambivalent toward emotion in social life and discusses it only rarely, for example, in the relation of shame to fashion (see [1904] 1957) or when the rational, ‘blasé’ outlook of the metropolitans is contrasted with the ‘emotional relationships’ of the rural dwellers ([1903] 1976). Flam (2009) offers a more positive interpretation of Simmel in this context.

5. For example, in Politics as a vocation ([1919] 1946) the three decisive qualities of the politician are ‘passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion’ (Weber 1946, p. 115). Note that passion here for Weber is meant in the sense of ‘matter-of-factness, of passionate devotion to a cause’, rather than in the sense of an ‘inner bearing… of “sterile excitation”’ (Ibid, see also Barbalet 2008, p. 61).

6. Fish (2004) offers an alternative reading of Parsons on emotion, particularly in the Structure of social action (1968), but does not, in my view, save Parsons from the charge.

7. In the US, sociology in general but particularly of the emotions is largely conducted within a social psychology framework. In Europe, work is concentrated in Germany in particular, and in the UK to a lesser extent. A recent publication from the ESA ‘emotions network’ is Hopkins et al. (2009). While they interpenetrate each other, they remain distinct approaches to emotions with different styles of engagement.

8. I have reviewed Turner’s book elsewhere, see Heaney (2008).

9. On resentment, see also Barbalet (1998, ch. 3).

10. See also Berezin (1994).

11. Ironically of course, the whole of rational choice theory is predicated on a conceptualization of action in which agents attempt to maximize the emotion of happiness, which, through some form of cognitive disavowal is transmuted into the de-emotionalized and much more scientific-sounding concept of utility.

12. Again, the phrases are borrowed from Somers and Gibson (1994) and Somers (1994).

13. Habermas’ theory may not be incommensurable with a theory of emotions, and Crossley (1998) has attempted such an endeavour.

14. With the possible exception of Floyd Hunter’s discussion of ‘elite fear’ in Community power structure: a study of decision makers (1953) (cited in Barbalet 1998, p. 163).

15. Becker et al., (2009) uses Foucault to critique the dominant modernization discourse surrounding emotions, for example. Burkitt (2002, p.165) also briefly discusses Foucault’s conception of power in a manner in line with the argument in this paper.

16. He writes: ‘In the Californian cult of the self, one is supposed to discover one’s true self, to separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to tell you what your true self is’ (Foucault 1984, p. 361). I am grateful to Dr. Kate Kenny for this quotation. What Foucault did not, and perhaps could not, consider was that a more relational conception of emotion was possible.

17. Elias’ work defies simple characterization but the ‘developmental’ nature of his sociology, coupled with his focus on very long term historical processes are among the reasons for his neglect. On the ‘patchy’ reception of Elias’ work in the US see Mennell (1998, pp. 278–284).

18. Wouters (1989) offers a valuable criticism of this approach, from an Eliasian perspective.

19. For now power considered as resources (e.g. wealth), which Morriss (2002) considers an example of the vehicle fallacy in any case, are omitted from the analysis.