Power to and power over: two distinct concepts of power?

Abstract

In this article, I analyze the relations between the concepts of power to and power over. The distinction between these two interpretations of power is commonly based on the assumed relational nature of attributions of power over as opposed to the dispositional nature of attributions of power to. I argue, by contrast, that power to refers to social relations as well, and I suggest, accordingly, to consider power to and power over as describing the same category of social facts. As a consequence, they should not be thought of as two distinct concepts of power, but as representing two analytically distinguishable aspects of a single and unified concept of social power.

Keywords:

• power to
• power over
• social power
• conceptual analysis
• ability and ableness

Acknowledgments

I thank Ian Carter, Peter Morriss and Daniele Porello for their support and their insightful comments and suggestions. I also thank Mark Haugaard, editor of the Journal of Political Power, and two anonymous reviewers for their challenging remarks. I owe a special intellectual debt to Giorgio Fedel, to whose memory this article is dedicated.

Notes

1. The distinction between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions’ is proposed by Rawls (1971, p. 5).

2. See, for example, Dahl (1957, 1961), Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Lukes (1974), Wrong (1979), Oppenheim (1981), and Stoppino (2007).

3. The distinction between exercise and opportunity concepts comes from Taylor (1979).

4. It is worth noting, however, that in the second edition of Power: A Radical View, Lukes (2005, p. 84) partially revises his interpretation of power, concluding that some cases of power over can be beneficial or at least non-detrimental to the interests of the power-subjects.

5. According to Allen (1999, p. 127), power with consists in ‘the ability of a collectivity to act together for the attainment of an agreed-upon end or series of ends’. However, for reasons of relevance, Allen’s conception of power with will not be analyzed in detail here.

6. However, while these other scholars expressly refer to their interpretation of power as power to, she endorses a different position, reserving the usage of the expression power to only a normatively defined subfield of ‘being able’: specifically, to the power acquired by a subordinate individual or group through the process of empowerment.

7. Arguments in favor of a relational interpretation of power to have been already proposed, though based on a critical realist epistemology, by Isaac (1987).

8. The distinction between ability and ableness has nothing to do with the traditional distinction between potential and actual power (Wrong 1968, p. 677), although it may recall it. It identifies two distinct meanings of potential power: the first referring to all the possible outcomes we could bring about if certain conditions occurred, the second referring to the narrower set of outcomes we are actually able to bring about under actual conditions.

9. Example proposed by Dowding (1991, p. 50).

10. Example proposed by Morriss (2002, p. 32).

11. But this would be true also in reference to other non-evaluative definitions of power over, such as Dahl’s (1957, pp. 202–203), and Allen’s (1999, p. 123).

12. On this point, see Hohfeld (1919).

13. As a consequence, I propose abandoning Morriss’ notion of ‘ableness’: as ableness corresponds entirely to the definition of power just proposed, no need remains to introduce a different term to indicate the same concept.

14. And this is the case, even more significantly, in virtue of Dowding’s endorsement of Barry’s (1980a, 1980b) distinction between luck and power, according to which luck is defined as ‘the probability of getting what you want without trying’ (Dowding 1996, p. 52) and power as ‘the probability of getting what you want if you act in all possible worlds which are the same as the actual one with the exception of the preferences of all other actors’ (1996, p. 52). Accordingly, if the preferences of other actors are significant for the attribution to someone of (outcome) power, what is at stake is the power-holder’s capacity to obtain the desired outcome through an overriding of their preferences, implying that ‘having outcome power’ is equivalent of ‘having social power’.

15. Even more significantly, certain cases of ‘resistance’ may be consistent with Allen’s own definition of ‘domination’ (Allen 1999, p. 124), consisting in posing constraints on other individuals’ action in a way which is detrimental to the latter’s interests.

16. Unless, of course, the two expressions were used precisely as labels signifying, respectively, legitimate and illegitimate power.

17. See, for example, Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Lukes (1972), Gaventa (1980).