Rethinking the four dimensions of power: domination and empowerment

Abstract

In the literature, there have been two essentially contrasting views of power: one of power as domination, largely characterized as power over, and the other of power as empowerment, frequently theorized as power to. To date, the four (Lukes and Foucault) dimensions of power have been considered forms of domination. In this article it is argued that the processes of four-dimensional power also constitute the process of normatively desirable power, as emancipation. Key is the realization that structured power over has the potential to be positive-sum, rather than zero-sum; furthermore, that the exclusions of two-dimensional power also constitute the conditions of possibility for justice. The fact that normatively desirable power and domination are constituted through the same processes is not chance: the effectiveness of power as domination is parasitic upon power as emancipation.

Keywords:

• political power
• domination
• empowerment
• democracy
• justice

Notes

1. In the second edition of Power: A Radical View, in response to Morriss, Lukes acknowledges that he did not provide conceptual space for power that does not concern domination. In particular, he acknowledges that in some instances power can be exercised over an actor in his or her interests. Instances would include paternalism. However, as argued by Morriss (2006), despite this acknowledgment, Lukes does not develop a wider analysis of ‘power to’ which has anything approaching the depth of his analysis of ‘power over’. As acknowledged by Lukes in his exchange with Hayward (2008), Lukes is primarily interested in power as domination.

2. Weber famously defined legitimate power in terms of a belief in legitimate power on the part of those subject to that power (Weber 1947, pp. 324–326). Many have disputed the coherence of this definition, including Beetham (1991, p. 9) and Pitkin (1972, p. 283), because it would appear to render critique impossible. In contrast, I would argue that Weber is using an empirical sociological perspective that refers to the social subject, which contrasts with a normative language game of social critique. Thus, the belief is particular to the empirical language game, not the normative one.

3. In a well-known critique of Parsons, Giddens argued that what disappears from view in Parsons’ perspective is that power is exercised over someone (Giddens 1968). While this criticism is widely accepted, it is not borne out by the substance of Parsons’ article as is evidenced by his definition of power in terms of the ‘generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system …’ (Parsons 2002, p. 78, italics not original), which is a point that is partially conceded by Giddens in his later writings (1984, p. 257).

4. Garfinkel instructed his student participants to break minor social conventions, such as interpreting ‘Hello, how are you?’ as a literal request concerning their well-being. What was remarkable in the experiments was the strength of the negative reactions of others to these minor deviations from convention and, also, how traumatic and difficult the students found it to break established conventions in the first place.

5. This has implications for Sandel’s (1993) well-known critique of Rawls as being un-sociological and de-ontological. However, developing this would take me outside the scope of this article.