ABSTRACT
Paternalism involves exercising power over others, for their own good, and without their consent. In this paper, I argue, first, if parents do act paternalistically towards their children, this is a prima facie moral wrong, even if in a given situation it is justified, all things considered, so as to promote the good of the children. Second, paternalistic power is exercised only over those capable of agency and, therefore, over those with rights of liberty. And third, paternalistic interference with children’s liberty is a prima facie moral wrong both when the children are competent and when they are incompetent.
Notes
1. When acting paternalistically, one can violate other moral rules, such as the rule forbidding deception. However, my focus here is on those cases where paternalistic parents interfere with their children’s liberty.
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Allyn Fives
Allyn Fives is a lecturer in political theory. He has published three monographs, Evaluating Parental Power (Manchester, 2017), Political Reason (Palgrave, 2013), and Political and Philosophical Debates in Welfare (Palgrave, 2008), and is co-editor with Keith Breen of Philosophy and Political Engagement (Palgrave, 2016).