Structural Power and International Regimes

ABSTRACT

This paper revisits the international relations approach to structural power. In particular, it stresses the influence of international regimes, institutions and international law, on current understandings of structural power. The new approach broadens conceptions that see structural power solely as constraints; structures not only reflect the capabilities of actors that created them, but also generate new capabilities. The institutional context and viewing the ‘structure’ through the prism of international regime theory enables us to resolve conceptual issues that eluded classic scholars such as Waltz and Strange; and allows a more pluralistic view of actors' interactions in the international system.

KEYWORDS:

• Power
• international relations
• structural power
• international regimes
• institutions

Acknowledgments

I am extremely thankful to Robert O. Keohane, for reading more than one version of this paper, and for giving me very valuable comments and feedback that improved this paper considerably. I am also grateful to Joseph Nye, Benjamin Cohen, Michael Barnett, Randall Germain, Phillip Lipscy, Kal Raustiala, and Randall Stone, for their comments on the later versions; and to the 2016-18 Global Leaders Fellows and audiences at the University of Oxford and Princeton University for helpful discussion after presenting earlier versions of this paper. My sincere thanks to Mark Haugaard, editor of this journal, and to the anonymous peer reviewers for their suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Hobbes presents the idea of instrumental powers (acquired by a natural power: faculties of the body or mind) that serves ‘to acquire more’ riches, reputation, etc. Hobbes [1651] 1985, p. 52.

2. See Hindess (1996).

3. Weber (1968, p. 53).

4. Dahl (1957, p. 202–203).

5. Dahl (1957, p. 203).

6. See, for example, Lukes’ references to Dahl’s works, and scholars in that camp which Lukes calls pluralists. Lukes states ‘So we have seen that the pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over key or important issues as involving actual, observable conflict.’ Lukes (2005 p.18–19; also p.5).

7. Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p. 947–52). Though Dahl (1957) mentions that the resources of power must be exploited through means. He refers to means in examples of conduct such as ‘promise of patronage, threat of veto, holding conference, threat of appeal, exercise of charm…’. This denotes an intentional behaviour rather than situations of agenda setting. In particular, Bachrach and Baratz refer to views of power which Dahl described in his 1961 book. See Dahl ([1961] 2005).

8. Bachrach and Baratz (1970, p. 21).

9. Lukes (2005).

10. Lukes (2005, p. 11); Lukes (2005) corrected his own view as expressed in his early work and later has expressly stated and clarified that ‘[i]t was a mistake to define power by “saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”’; see Lukes (2005, p. 12).

11. Lukes (2005, p. 1).

12. See, for example, Haugaard (2016) who also writes about a fourth dimension of power. It should be noted that theoretical work in sociology also contributed to the concept of power, and has not been sufficiently taken into account in the IR literature. For example, Giddens (1984, p. 26), in this theory of structuration, argues that ‘structure is not be equated with constraint but it is always both constraining and enabling.’ Similarly, Dowding et al. (1995, p. 268) writes that ‘people’s interest cannot simply be read off from or revealed by their behaviour, separate from the structure of the situation in which action occurs… .’ Foucault, Habermas, and Bourdieu, also contributed from a sociological perspective; see Hindess (1996).

13. In international relations, the focus on resources and capabilities has prompted different views of material power, in which the role of the state is preponderant and power is exercised intentionally, deliberately during a conflict; see Little (2007, p. 97); Claude (1962); Wallerstein (1984). Other scholars such as Caporaso (1978), Ashley (1986), and Guzzini (2000) had criticized a relational concept of power inter alia for being too narrow or not including unintended effects. Despite this, the international relations discipline still maintains a focus on relational power. For instance, Baldwin (2016) described how power evolved in international relations, but he understands power as being only relational. He states: ‘Both the concept of capability and the concept of resources imply actual or potential causal effects and are, therefore, relational concepts in the same sense that power is a relational concept’ Baldwin (2016, p. 114).

14. Lukes (1977, p. 3–29).

15. Young (1983, pp. 109–110) argues that though the meaning of ‘power’ is unprecise, it should nevertheless not be disregarded when one attempts to explain the transformations of international regimes.

16. Scholars such as Hirschman, Simon, Schelling, Harsanyi, Gramsci, Wallerstein, Galtung, Gilpin, Waltz, Cox, Strange, Keohane and Nye, Young and Krasner have referred to structural considerations affecting behaviour of actors.

17. Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 55; see also p. 52–53).

18. Gruber (2000) has discussed ‘go-it-alone power,’ and institutional power, concluding that ‘Whether one is talking about go-it-alone power or institutional power, the end result is the same: Without in any way being bullied or coerced, governments choose to participate in cooperative international arrangements they genuinely, and intensely, dislike.’ Gruber (2000, p. 10). Gruber’s idea here has affinities with structural power: it goes beyond autonomy to restricting the choice sets of others.

19. Cohen (1977) too foreshadowed some elements of our argument in 1977, claiming that power need not be exercised with conscious intent, and that others’ behaviour may be the by-product of powerful acts or potential acts. See Cohen (1977, p. 54). Many other scholars in international relations have referred to structures and power, see Hirschman (1945); Gilpin (1975), Keohane and Nye (1977), Krasner (1991), and Cohen (2016). We focus, however, on Strange and Waltz because only Susan Strange focused a substantial part of her work on the elaboration of the concept of ‘structural power,’ and Kenneth N. Waltz developed the most careful conceptualization of ‘structure.’

20. Susan Strange’s work on structural power particularly departed from Marxist or Gramscian traditions, she stressed the unintentionality and the difference with that of domination. See Strange (1988). The differentiation of domination as a concept different from power was also pointed out by Weber.

21. Keohane and Nye (1977); Krasner (1983). Keohane remarked on the role of institutions in modified structural research programmes. See Keohane (1986); For Strange's critique of international regimes, see Strange (1982).

22. Keohane (1984); Zürn (2018); Koremenos et al. (2001).

23. Clearly, the United States under Donald Trump is testing this proposition. If the proposition is correct, the United States will suffer significant costs from its violations of established rules and practices.

24. Cerny (2010); see also Cerny and Prichard (2017); for effects of network, centrality see also Hafner-Burton et al. (2009). We use the term ‘actors’ hereinafter, and take the term to include both states and non-state actors.

25. Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 45).

26. In other respects, our analysis is quite different from that of Barnett and Duvall. As noted above, they use an idiosyncratic definition of ‘structural power’ and only tangentially mention relatively minor contributions by Strange and Waltz. Furthermore, we do not assume that structural power always benefits materially strong states, whereas they emphasize ‘the ability of great powers to establish international institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions of advantage into the future’ Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 58).

27. Strange (1988). See also the discussion of asymmetrical constraints in Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 52).

28. Keohane and Nye (1977); Waltz (1979); Gilpin (1981); Krasner (1991).

29. Waltz (1979, p. 81).

30. Waltz (1979, p. 98). To protect his hardcore assumptions Waltz argued that capabilities were the attributes of units but that the distribution of capabilities were no longer attributes but were a system-wide concept, but in saying that power is estimated by comparing capabilities, his differentiation becomes unsuccessful.

31. Keohane and Nye (1977). Krasner (1985) also supports this view.

32. Waltz (1979, p. 79).

33. Waltz (1979, p. 97).

34. Oran Young (1983) understood this problem, and considered structures as belonging to the system but not to its constituents, although he expressed this thought in very abstract terms: ‘My emphasis here is on the idea that social systems have properties (e.g. centralization, interdependence, complexity) that are attributes of these systems per se rather than of their constituent elements.’ Young (1983, p. 104).

35. Material or ideational elements, or some combination of the two, may also be consisting to situations in which the institutional context shapes actor preferences, incentives, or both; and in turn their behaviour.

36. See Helleiner (2016) and Cohen (2016).

37. Schelling, when analysing bargaining points to something similar when he states ‘Just forming the matrix prejudices the choice’ Schelling (1960, p. 96).

38. Although Strange and Waltz took very different approaches to the study of world politics, they had in common a dismissive attitude toward international institutions. In our view, their lack of understanding of the importance of institutions was a blind spot, which prevented both of them from adequately conceptualizing structure, and structural power.

39. See Krasner’s classical definition. Krasner (1982).

40. For instance, the role of the US Federal Reserve System has influence on the international political economy as well as on the decisions of states.

41. North (1990, p. 3). North defines institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society,’ or in other words, ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.’

42. North (1990, p. 3 and 16), our highlights; Schout (1991) in regard to North’s work states: ‘Institutions provide stability and guidelines for action which are necessary because individuals lack information on the current position and on alternatives because people suffer from insufficient capacity to make rational choices under complex conditions.’ In Schout (1991, p. 1588).

43. Zürn (2018, p. 96).

44. Hurrell (2007, p. 14); See also Gruber (2000) for arguments in this line of thinking.

45. Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 58).

46. This conception, the ability to align one’s policies with prevailing institutional practices, is implicit in much work on power. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) saw power as ‘the process of affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended.’ Parsons adds the legitimation of such use of threat. See Lukes (1977, p. 5); Dahl [1963] 1970, p. 32); Burton (1965, p. 262). The practices form part of state’s interests and their behaviour will be in accordance with them. See Gilpin (1981, p. 50); Krasner (1985, p. 5). Note that in the text we stress that coercion is not necessary.

47. On the FATF, see Julia C. Morse, ‘Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing,’ unpublished paper, July 2018; More generally, see Kelley and Simmons (2015).

48. In his seminal article, Krasner emphasized the persistence of regimes and the resulting lags, enabling regimes to have an impact on behaviour distinct from the impact of contemporaneous patterns of material power. Keohane (1983). Contemporary Historical institutionalism makes similar claims about path-dependence and institutional persistence in a more comprehensive and systemic way. See Fioretos (2017). The difference is that while these scholars see institutions as impacting behaviour, they do not relate them to power, our claim is that institutions themselves, in the manner explained in this paper, can also be sources of structural power.

49. Zürn argues along similar lines when he states that powerful states that shaped an institution at the outset may lose ‘control over time because of institutional rules that, relatively speaking, empower weaker states.’ Zürn (2018, p. 97).

50. Barnett and Duvall make this point. Institutions, they say, can operate ‘over time and at a distance, and often in ways that were not intended or anticipated by the architects of the institutions.’ Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 48). In our view, Strange over-emphasized the extent to which structural power helps states that are also relationally powerful.

51. We are not claiming that institutions are the only source of non-relational power. As Barnett and Duvall emphasize, what they call ‘diffuse’ sources of power, emanating from ideas, ideologies, and discourses, can also be important; and as Nye (2004) has argued, soft power depends to a great extent on persuasion through ideas. See also Fulbright (1966).

52. Articles on Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) UN Doc A/56/10.

53. Strange (1988).

54. Krasner (1983); Keohane (2000).

55. As we noted in Section I, states in advantageous structural positions can also exercise relational power, intentionally reinforcing their structural advantages. Permanent members combine relational and structural power when they seek to influence other states’ behaviour by referring to their structural positions.

56. Mikulaschek (2017).

57. UN Security Council Resolution 2261 (2016) and 2307(2016); 2366 (2017) and 2377 (2017).

58. In UN Security Council resolution 2261 (2016).

59. Sergio Jamarillo, Richard L Pearson Inaugural Lecture, University of Chicago, 24 April 2017.

60. NATO. Partnership for Peace (PFP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Founding Documents. In NATO’s Basic Texts. ‘A thematic overview of NATO’s most important official texts from the Treaty and its protocols to the Partnership for Peace documents’; Bluth (1995); Asmus (1990); McGeorge et al. (1982).

61. Helleiner (2014); Helleiner (2016). As of this writing, China has not sought to use its very large stock of dollar assets to destabilize the dollar’s value as a weapon in the trade conflict of 2018 with the United States.

62. Helleiner (2016, p. 97).

63. Helleiner (2016).

64. Helleiner (2016).

65. The treaties are called ‘Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Investments’. We do not claim that foreign investment (FDI) have increased as a consequence of BITs. For a summary of the many empirical analyses on the latter claim see Gwynn (2016).

66. Gwynn (2018).

67. Baccini and Urpelainen (2015) looked at Preferential Trade Agreements (Investment is included in them as a chapter of those agreements) and concluded that foreign aid increased more from the EU and the US after developing countries signed PTAs. They also mention that the US provided financial and technical support so that the parties can enter into these agreements. See Baccini and Urpelainen (2015).

68. Argentina, for example, is the country with most disputes in the investment regime; initially reluctant to comply with awards against the state, it has lately gone through great lengths to comply with them because not doing it meant a hindrance for obtaining financing from international institutions. We do not focus here on the criticisms of the system and we note, however, that international law does provide for the possibility of amending all of the BITs through a single multilateral reform. Transparency provisions, for instance, have been agreed in a multilateral convention that would act as a meta-treaty, amending former provisions of BITs in that area. Furthermore, the latest US BIT model (2012) and their chapters in other treaties with investment provisions have improved provisions when compared with BITs signed in the 1990s. See Gwynn (2018).

69. Foreign companies that had investment disputes with host countries had to recourse to their home countries, and their home countries would try to settle the claim. Due to the power asymmetries of this practice, this is known as gun-boat diplomacy. Bilateral Investment Treaties changed that practice, the home state is no longer involved in a claim between the foreign company and the host state; the foreign investor can act directly to submit an international claim against the home state.

70. Dolzer and Schreuer (2012); Gwynn (2016).

71. On ICANN, see Lipscy (2017, ch, p. 6).

72. ICANN Articles of Incorporation. Article 3. See also Article 1.1. (c) of the Bylaws.

73. See Submission by ICANN as input to the report of the UN Secretary-General on ‘Progress made in the implementation and follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society at the regional and international levels’ Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) 21^st Session, Geneva, 14–18 May 2018. 2018 Annual Report to UNCTAD.

74. Lipscy, however, compares ICANN to international organizations and refers to it as an institution when in fact it is a corporation. Although corporations and institutions are all actors of the international system, they are different and should not have the same label, even if one is a non-profit. In ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, the difference is clear, it states ‘the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations.’ Articles of Incorporation, Art.4.

75. Raustiala (2017, pp. 143–144).

76. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.

77. Shaw (2014, p. 8).

78. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case, ICJ Reports (1997).

79. Referring to Article 15 and 19 of the 1977 treaty. Idem ut supra. para 112 p 64 − 65 (author’s highlights).

80. Myriad of cases brought to the International Court of Justice or to domestic courts in these areas. For instance, state practices are also conditioned, for example, by the general obligation of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states. Affirmed by ICJ in ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ 1996; Rio declaration, principle 2; also mentioned in the Trail Smelter case.

81. WTO Doc WT/DS/379/R, 22 October 2010. It followed the definitions on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 5. See also Crawford (2012, p. 544).

82. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) request for the indication of Provisional Measures. 3 October 2018. pa 98.

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Notes on contributors

Maria A. Gwynn

Maria A. Gwynn, Institute of International Law, University of Bonn. International Arbitrator (CAS); Senior Research Associate, Global Economic Governance, BSG, University of Oxford. Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellow (2016-2018) at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (2016-17) and at University College and Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford (2017-2018). Dr.phil (Wuppertal, Germany), Magister Juris (Oxford, UK), LLB Honours (Asuncion, Paraguay). Directed Studies at The Hague Academy of International Law; Postgraduate Diplomas in International Arbitration and Mergers and Acquisitions; Academic Visitor and Researcher at UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT.