A cultural theory and model of power relations

ABSTRACT

Power is a central but frequently implicit and rarely modeled concept in political science. We integrate several diverse and seemingly incommensurate conceptions of power into a model classifying network ties between dyads along the dimensions of asymmetry and probability of compliance. We argue that this model mirrors the relational dimensions and patterns in Douglasian cultural theory (CT) and illustrate these varying configurations of power with examples from US presidencies. By integrating conflicting conceptions of power into a single theory-based and generalizable model, we seek to advance the study of power, networks, and culture.

KEYWORDS:

• Power
• networks
• dyads
• culture
• cultural theory (CT)
• grid-group cultural theory (GGCT)

Acknowledgments

For helpful discussions and suggestions related to this article, we thank Perri 6, Raul Acosta, Alexandru Babeanu, Janina Beiser-McGrath, Michael Bernhard, Paul Bou-Habib, Christian Breunig, Ulrik Brandes and the Social Networks Group at ETH Zurich, Mary G. Dietz, Richard Ellis, Manuel Fischer, Sean Gailmard, James Hollway, Clement Hongler, Branden Johnson, Konstantin Kaeppner, Thomas Koenig, Jennifer Larson, Dirk Leuffen, Constantinos Mammassis, Stephane Moyson, Eero Olli, Petra C. Schmid, Sebastian Schutte, Aernout Schmidt, Peeter Selg, Chandra Hunter Swedlow, Sebastian Tillmann, Steven Wilson, Stephane Wolton, editor Mark Haugaard and the anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Political Power, and participants in the 2016 Mary Douglas Seminar at University College London; the 2017 European Consortium for Political Research and 2017 and 2018 Midwest Political Science Association annual meetings, including the Cultural Theory Working Group; and the ongoing University of Konstanz Zukunftskolleg. For formatting and research assistance we thank Lei Tong and for editing in production Sindhya Iroudayaraj.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. ‘Power over’ may involve coercion, result from A’s legitimate role (e.g. policeman or teacher), A’s ability to mediate rewards for B, B’s admiration for A, or A’s expertise recognized by B (French and Raven. 1959). Power over may rely on coercion as well as intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (Etzioni 1961). Another ‘face’ of power consists in suppressing issues from the decision agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). An even more invisible form of power consists in influencing people’s wishes and beliefs (Lukes 1974), as in ‘nudging’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).

2. Here we depart from Selg’s (2016a, 2018) view that structuralism is a form of self-actionalism.

3. CT also hypothesizes that the interaction of these two relational dimensions will generate an asocial ‘hermit’ who withdraws from active social involvement and consequently resides at the zero point where the dimensions intersect.

4. In CT, fatalism is characterized by high levels of selfishness, distrust of the government and fellow humans, and wealth and power inequality as well as other forms of stratification. As a result, Coyle (1994b), Mars (2008), and Hollway and Pardo Enrico (2012) argue that CT’s notion of fatalism should be understood (and relabeled) as ‘despotism’, ‘tyranny’, or ‘cynicism’, respectively.

5. By serving one’s self-interest we mean pursuing personal gain, often material, without regard to the interests or preferences of others. Actors need not think in these terms or be aware of their own interests or preferences. Stating that A has these options is like saying that drivers have the option to drive on the left or right side of the road. As we are embedded in a certain driving culture, we do not think of the side of the road on which to drive as a personal choice for us to make. Similarly, A’s options exist analytically.

6. Haugaard (2015b) seeks to counter this common view by suggesting that A may act in ways that empower B. For example, A as parent may tell child B what to do so that B can grow into an adult equal in power to A. Or A and B may both support democratic elections even though A beats B when they campaign against each other because B retains the possibility of beating A in the next election.

7. Or successful individualistic businesses unregulated by hierarchical or egalitarian governments may leverage their market power to create oligopolies and monopolies, transforming individualistic markets into hierarchies.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Maroussia Favre

Maroussia Favre is a postdoctoral student at ETH Zurich. She holds a PhD from ETH Zurich in the Department of Management, Technology and Economics (MTEC), and a Master and Bachelor in Physics from EPFL. She conducts research at the intersections of social science, mathematics, physics, and computer science.

Brendon Swedlow

Brendon Swedlow, Ph.D., J.D., is a professor in the Department of Political Science in the School of Public and Global Affairs and a faculty associate of the College of Law and Institute for the Study of the Environment, Sustainability, and Energy at Northern Illinois University. His research is directed toward developing theory, concepts, methods, and evidence that advance the study of American politics, public law, public policy, public opinion, and the politics of science.

Marco Verweij

Marco Verweij is Professor of Political Science at Jacobs University in Bremen, Germany. Before that he earned his keep at the Singapore Management University and the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, Germany. In his research, he tries to understand how ‘wicked’ or ‘ill-structured’ environmental and social problems can be successfully resolved, and attempts to combine social and political theory with affective and social neuroscience.