Editorial: thoughts on resistance, alienation, exchange and universal aspects of humanity

In the special section on Rosa’s concept of resonance, we focussed upon felicitous social relations. Alienation was theorized as the opposite of resonance. This section opens with an article by Kasbari and Vinthagen on resistance, where they explore how to measure the effectiveness of it. In some respects, resistance lies at the fault line between alienation and resonant social relations. Why do social subjects resist? In particular, why do they resist in the types of micro and semi-covert ways that interest Kasbari and Vinthagen? They resist because they are not content with social relations, which they judge not to be resonant with their desires. Further, rather than simply exercising agency by overt political acts (such as forming a political party) that would result in change, they engage in small everyday acts of resistance because they believe that they do not have the possibility of effecting direct political change. In some sense, this speaks to the core of alienation, as the alienated social subject reproduces social structures that they have no control over. It is the social structures (the social object) that determine the life chances and form of the social subject. In the language of classic Marxism, workers create capital, which dominates the conditions of possibility for the workers – they must be exploited, to create profit, as ‘demanded’ by capital. Extending this more widely, when a social group finds themselves dominated (colonized, serfs in a semi-feudal social system and so on) their everyday activities contribute to the reproduction of the social relations that dominate them, which they must reproduce, while the only possibility for agency leading to social change is through resistance.

Democracy can be theorized as a set of political institutions that makes social change possible for all the social subjects – they can mobilize, form political parties and influence agendas. In contrast, in dominating social relations, the social subject does not have the possibility of changing social relations through direct action. Furthermore, their everyday actions contribute to the reproduction of these alienating structures. So, what do they do? They engage in everyday actions that are dysfunctional to the reproduction of the oppressive social structures. They try to sever the intolerable link between their own everyday behaviour and the reproduction of the social relations that are oppressive. The question then arises, how effective is this? Is everyday resistance simply symbolic or can it lead to changes in social structure? In their nuanced article Kaspari and Vinthagen argue that the effectiveness of resistance is scalar. Resistance is on a scale from acts of resistance that are only symbolic (with few transformative structural effects) to acts of resistance that change social relations.

In his manual for revolution, Sharp (2010) suggests that revolutionary resistance is inherently democratic. If alienation is a state of the world where the social object (structures and system) dominates the social subject (the social actor or agent), then successful resistance means overcoming alienation, thus gaining control of the social object. Success means that the actors have control over the social structures that they reproduce. If democracy is about people shaping the society in which they live, then successful resistance is indeed a moment of democracy. Interestingly, Kaspari and Vinthagen note that successful resistance is most likely to occur when those who benefit from the relations of domination are dependant upon the dominated (for instance, in a semi-feudal situation, when the landowning elite are dependant upon the labour of the oppressed). This goes to the core of agency and structure, in the sense that the more easily structure is undermined by the withdrawal of the agency, the more vulnerable those structures are to transformation. Hence, the reversal of alienation hinges around exploiting the sociological fact that it is the social subject, or social actors, who reproduce social relations, not the other way around – even if it often appears that way to the relatively powerless.

The types of alienating social relations that beget everyday resistance are at the opposite end of the scale from social relations that are based upon fair exchange. In his article TenHouten explores the cognitive aspects of power relations, within the theoretical framework of exchange theory. The contrast between Kaspari and Vinthagen and TenHouten’s articles mirrors the longstanding division between theories of power that are mainly about oppression, and theories of power that, to use Arendt’s (1970, p. 44) felicitous phrase, conceptualize power in terms of the capacity of social actors to act in concert. Yet, even in Kaspari and Vinthagen’s account of successful resistance, we still see aspects of the type of exchange theory of power that TenHouten describes. To be successful resistance presupposes the withdrawal of exchange, albeit a coerced exchange. At the core of power, even in highly asymmetric power relations, there is a movement of something from the less powerful to the more powerful, which the less powerful has the potential to withdraw.

Underpinning even the most dominating social relations there is a level of cooperation. Sharp (2010, p. 17) tells the fable of the monkey master, where the monkeys stage a revolt once they understand that their oppressive master is actually dependant upon them for his dominating power. This realisation is analogous to the classic Marxist distinction between a class-in-itself and a class-for-itself; a theory that hinges upon social consciousness. As persuasively documented by TenHouten, all social relations are premised upon a cognitive event, whereby the social subject interprets interaction with other as, essentially, an exchange. The ease and level of coercion of interaction is related to equity judgements on the part of the less powerful. If interactive exchange is perceived of as mutually beneficial the interaction flows easily, therefore coercion is not required. In contrast, when the exchange is cognized as unfair resistance will be the result and added ‘incentives’ are required, including threats and sanctions. Thus, collaboration versus conflict hinges around cognitive computational calculations surrounding rewards-versus-cost. Individuals who become cognitively aware that their social relations involve only unfair benefit-to-cost-ratios become motivated to disrupt and undermine a social exchange in order to obtain terms more consonant with their equity judgements. Political acts are overt ways of challenging unfavourable exchanges, while everyday resistance undermines exchange more covertly.

Social exchange is universal across all societies, while its particular form varies – whether it takes the form of material exchange (labour for money) or the exchange of symbolic tokens (gifts or greetings). This issue of the Journal concludes with a paper by Chernilo, who responds to an article by Susen (2020). In the latter article, Susen critiques Chernilo’s (2017) Debating Humanity: Towards a Philosophical Sociology. In that work, Chernilo develops a philosophical sociology for the purposes of uncovering universal aspects of humanity. In his critique, Susen criticizes Chernilo for universalising the particular, which includes the accusation of being Euro-, ethno- and male-centric. This charge is based upon the fact that the thinkers with whom Chernilo dialogues with are largely European and male. In defence, Chernilo responds by pointing out that it would be a performative contradiction for a theorist who is looking for universal markers of humanity to choose thinkers by their socially particular markers (gender, ethnicity and so on). This is not to say that the particular is not important, because it is in the particulars of social relations that domination are rooted. However, in order to critique these particulars, it is necessary to have a sense of human well-being and flourishing. As we saw with TenHouten, a generalized sense of fairness transcends particular exchanges. Consequently, critique of particular domination is premised upon universal conceptions of fairness. This, in turn, is invariably tied to a theory of humanity. Similarly, it was a quest for universal measure of human flourishing that lay at the core of Rosa’s concept of resonance, while Rosa also argues that the institutional forms that lead to resonance are particular.

In conclusion, while these three articles are not part of the preceding special section on Rosa’s concept of resonance, common fundamental themes of social theory run through this whole issue of the Journal of Political Power.