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ABSTRACT
These notes offer an unusual perspective on democracy by interpreting key categories of political science through the lens of economics, specifically drawing from the ‘theory of the firm’ literature. Due to incomplete contracts, political power is conceptualized as a variable quantum that balances power resources with constitutional and electoral constraints. Accordingly, the proposed model is used to explain how the amount of power can vary over time, what its determinants are, and what mechanisms can lead to political regime change in an era of world polarized by democracies and autocracies.
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Additional information
Notes on contributors
Claudio Balestri
Claudio Balestri is a Research Officer at the Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena (FMps). He was recently appointed Director General of a newly established foundation with FMps, the University of Siena, and other local institutions as founding members. Having earned a PhD in Law and Economics at the University of Siena, his research activities are predominantly based on the economics of the public and non-profit sector. From an interdisciplinary perspective, he focuses specifically on the role of political and civil society organizations in making democracy work compared with other political regimes. His previous articles appeared in, among others, Public Organization Review and The Foundation Review.