The International Context: Russia, Ukraine and the Drift to East-West Confrontation

ABSTRACT

President Putin is widely portrayed as a threat to peace and to the international order; and Russian intervention in Ukraine and Crimea is often taken as a measure of this aggressive external policy. It is contended that aggression in international affairs has different causes and consequences. The paper examines the crisis posed in Ukraine following the flight of President Yanukovich and the institution of a pro-NATO and pro-European Union government. Russia’s actions are considered in the wider context of the political transformation in Soviet space, the enlargement of the European Union and the expansion of NATO. Russia’s economic and military strengths and weaknesses are outlined against the background of the development of the Eurasian Economic Union. It is contended that Russian policy under President Putin has been defensive and reactive.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• European Union
• Ukraine
• war

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

David Lane is Emeritus Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge University, previously Professor of Sociology at Birmingham University. He is Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK). His recent publications include The Capitalist Transformation of State Socialism (2014) and, with V. Samokhvalov, The Eurasian Project and Europe (2015). He has published in a wide range of journals including Sociology, Political Studies, Europe-Asia Studies and in Russia, Mir Rossii, Alternativy and Polis. He has written extensively on development, particularly in state socialist societies. His recent writing has been on Eurasia, employment and unemployment and alternatives to capitalism.

Notes

1 Adolf Hitler said on 7 February 1945: “It is eastwards, only and always eastwards, that the veins of our race must expand. It is the direction which Nature herself has decreed for the expansion of the German peoples” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drang_nach_Osten).

2 However, as quoted in The Guardian of the same date (1 February 2015), “British officials said they could not confirm whether transponders were turned off on the planes flying close to the English coast on Wednesday.”

3 Eight joined in 2004, two in 2007 and one in 2013.

4 For a study of Yugoslavia see Lamont (2010).

5 Other writers have emphasised the role of international links, even considering the international element to be a fourth component of transformation. See Orenstein, Bloom, and Lindstrom (2008).

6 See http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/04/20140409297615.html#axzz4JafVkXqf.

7 See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/151109_factsheet_eu_ukraine_relations.pdf.

8 The survey included 1000 people, including those in Crimea.

9 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_status_referendum_2014.

10 See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry-idUSBREA210DG20140302.

11 See http://www.5.ua/ato-na-shodi/myjenko-ykrajna-ne-maye-dokaziv-masovoj-ychasti-zbroinih-sil-rf-y-boyah-na-donbasi-68687.html. Accessed 1 August 2015. A spokesman for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence later clarifies that regular Russian troops, numbering 6500 men, have been in the country since the New Year and are operating “in the second tier.” Individually they provide fire support, direct troops, provide intelligence and communications support, see http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/874055-V-Minoborony-ob-jasnili-slova-Muzhenko-o-tom--chto-Ukraina-ne-vojuet-s-armiej-RF.