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Articles

Political opposition in Russia: the challenges of mobilisation and the political–civil society nexus

Pages 314-325 | Received 09 Jul 2014, Accepted 15 Nov 2014, Published online: 18 Aug 2015
 

Abstract

Russia witnessed an unprecedented wave of large-scale street protests during the winter of 2011–2012, following the parliamentary elections of December 2011. The protests provided further evidence of an emerging trend in Russian political opposition politics: collaboration between political and civil society. Drawing on the work of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, this article analyses the dynamic between political and civil society within the broad opposition movement in Russia and concludes that close collaboration between the two may be a crucial factor in any effective challenge to the electoral authoritarian regime in Russia.

Notes on contributor

David White is Lecturer in Politics in the Department of Political Studies and International Relations at the University of Birmingham. He is also a member of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at Birmingham. His research focuses on political opposition and protest in Russia, a subject on which he has published a number of articles. His book, The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko: Opposition in a Managed Democracy, was published by Ashgate in 2006. The author acknowledges the support of the British Academy for providing funding to support fieldwork in Russia and the opportunity to disseminate the research findings at a range of UK and international conferences.

Notes

1. In an interview with the author (4 November 2010), Vsevolod Chernozub, a member of the Solidarity movement's political council had outlined the strategy of creating a broad coalition to protest against the falsification of elections to be known as “For Fair Elections”, which became the slogan most closely associated with the protests (see White Citation2013, 590).

2. An electoral authoritarian regime may hold multiparty elections but violates liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness to such a degree as to negate the democratic nature of electoral politics, instead making elections instruments of authoritarian rule. Such a regime aims to “reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty” (Schedler Citation2002, 37).

3. Oleg Kozlovsky, interview with the author, 21 September 2013.

4. Oleg Kozlovsky, interview with the author, 21 September 2013.

5. These included protests in the far eastern city of Vladivostok against the introduction of taxes on imported cars which threatened the lucrative trade in Japanese vehicles, an important part of the local economy. In the Siberian city of Irkutsk, a campaign by environmental activists in mobilised large-scale demonstrations against the dumping of waste into Lake Baikal by a company owned by the Kremlin-loyal oligarch, Oleg Deripaska.

6. Strategy 31 was based on the concept of holding peaceful protests, normally in Triumfalnaya Ploschchad’ (Triumphal Square) in central Moscow on the 31st day of the month, thereby highlighting Article 31 of the Russian constitution upholding the right to free assembly. Protests were not sanctioned by the authorities and were often brutally broken up by OMON (Special Operations State Militia).

7. The forum's name derived from the fact that it was established as an alternative to the annual summer Seliger Camp organised by the pro-Putin youth movement, Nashi. Verzilov, along with his partner, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, better known for her involvement in Pussy Riot, were both members of the radical performance art group, Voina. The December 5th Party takes its name from the date immediately after the parliamentary elections of 4 December 2011 when several thousand people took to the streets of Moscow to protest at the conduct of the elections.

8. Denis Bilunov, interview with the author, 24 September 2013.

9. Sergei Grushko, interview with the author, 20 September 2013.

10. Oleg Kozlovsky, interview with the author, 21 September 2013.

11. It has been widely argued that the violence which erupted at the rally was largely the work of agents provocateurs, whose objective was to discredit the opposition. The author has spoken to a number of people who attended the rally and confirm this view. A number of protesters were arrested and eight were finally found guilty of rioting in February 2014 and given prison sentences of up to four years.

12. The “Days of Wrath” protests were co-ordinated by Sergei Udaltsov of the Left Front and focused on local and regional issues as well as having a clear anti-regime agenda. The March of the Discontented (Marsh nesoglasnykh) were organised by the Other Russia movement and most closely associated with Eduard Limonov and Garry Kasparov.

13. Ilya Yashin, member of the federal political council of RPR-PARNAS and of Solidarity's political bureau, interview with the author, Moscow, 2 November 2010.

14. For an analysis of how best to conceptualise the Russian party system, see White (Citation2013).

15. Mikhail Shneider, member of the Solidarity political bureau, interview with the author, 19 September 2013.

16. Vladimir Ryzhkov, leader of the Republican Party of Russia and former co-leader of PARNAS, interview with the author, Moscow, 8 November 2010.

17. Vladimir Ashurkov, interview with the author, 20 September 2013.

18. The cubes were self-assembled promotional units which served as focal points for street campaigning.

19. A phenomenon confirmed in a number of meetings with the author during September 2013 among people close to Navalny's campaign.

20. As of March 2014 the Justice Ministry was still refusing registration for the party and Navalny himself was under house arrest for violating the terms of his previously suspended sentence.

21. Vladimir Ashurkov, interview with the author, 20 September 2013.

22. In the event, although the opposition Coalition for Moscow agreed on a roster of candidates, all were ruled out of the elections having failed to submit the required number of signatures (three per cent of residents in the candidate's electoral district – between 4,200 and 5,500 signatures depending on the population of the district).

23. Dmitry Gudkov, interview with the author, 18 September 2013.

24. This was emphasised as being the key challenge by a number of interviewees during the author's research trip to Moscow in September 2013.

Additional information

Funding

The author would like to acknowledge the support of the British Academy and Leverhulme Trust whose joint small grant (SG122486) helped to support this study.

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