Persistence and decline of political parties: the case of Estonia

Abstract

The article explores the factors contributing to the decline and persistence of the political parties in Estonia, while proposing a more systematic framework for tackling the problem. The case study is focused on three Estonian parties (Res Publica, People's Union, and the Centre Party). The article puts forward an empirical framework in which three central dimensions are explored: (1) system-level variables; (2) external-dynamic variables; and (3) internal-organisational-level variables. The results of the analysis indicate that the quality of party leadership and the parties’ attachment with the major cleavages in a given society are crucial factors in explaining the parties’ persistence or demise.

Keywords:

• Estonia
• Central and Eastern Europe
• political parties
• cleavages

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Leif Kalev, Ott Lumi, Raivo Vetik, Peeter Selg, Matthew Crandall, George Jiglau, Tim Haughton, Tarvo Sarmet, and Küllo Arjakas for their comments on earlier drafts and useful empirical insights.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Tõnis Saarts is a lecturer and Ph.D. student of political science at Tallinn University. He has recently published about the party systems in the Baltic States. His research interests include political parties, party systems, cleavages, comparative politics, and the politics of Central and Eastern European countries.

Notes

1 ECPP could be classified even as an extreme-right party, because of its anti-EU, anti-immigrant, racist, and anti-Russian nationalistic rhetoric. The People's Union was a conservative-agrarian party, carefully avoiding any extreme-right inclinations.

2 Nowadays, state subsidies make up to 80–90% of revenues of the parliamentary parties. For party financing data, see: The Committee of Surveillance of the Party and Campaign Funding, http://www.erjk.ee/et.

3 However, since 2003 extra-parliamentary parties which have obtained at least 1% of votes have also received state funding, but the amount of this assistance is very small and not comparable with financial support for parliamentary parties (Sikk and Kangur 2008).

4 The regulations were changed in 2014. Now, 500 members are needed to register a new party.

5 The average aggregate electoral volatility index for older Western European democracies in the past decade was around 11.0 (Gallagher, Mair, and Laver 2005).

6 Reiljan was initially found guilty not because of the Land Swap Scandal, but because of a bribe received during the privatisation of a state-owned housing plot. However, the following investigation uncovered his involvement into land swapping as well, and the Supreme Court found Reiljan guilty in 2014.