Backdoor politics: politicisation through restructuring in the Bulgarian civil service

ABSTRACT

The article examines politicisation in the Bulgarian public administration by looking at the restructuring of administrative bodies. The article makes a case for adopting restructuring as an additional proxy measurement of politicisation next to already existing methods. Using this approach, the article examines variations in the level of politicisation across sectors and across time. The article argues that politicisation in the Bulgarian civil service is pervasive, legal restrictions often prove ineffective in uprooting politicisation, while external monitoring and control contribute to lower levels of politicisation.

KEYWORDS:

• Civil service reform
• politicisation
• bureaucratic restructuring
• Central and Eastern Europe
• Bulgaria

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science at the American University in Bulgaria. She holds a Ph.D. in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines democratisation and elite transformation in Eastern Europe, populism, civil service reform, and gender political representation. In the past, Zankina has served as Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies, and Editor-in-Chief of the Newsletter of the Bulgarian Studies Association. Her work has appeared in Problems of Post-communism, Representation, East European Politics, as well as in several edited book volumes.

Notes

1. The number of civil servants in the central administration rose from 15,912 in 1990 to 30,950 in 1995 (Verheijen and Kotchegura 1999, 126).

2. The so-called Panev law was upheld by the Constitutional Court in contradiction to previous rulings. The law restricted former Communist Party functionaries from holding leading positions in academic institutions for a period of time. For more on constitutional court rulings, see Kostadinova and Salokar (2013).

3. See Country Data Report for Bulgaria, 1996–2012, Worldwide Governance Indicators. Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports.

4. For more on the party patronage index, the Party Patronage Project, comparative data and measurement techniques, see http://www.socialsciences.leiden.edu/politicalscience/research/research-data/party-patronage.html.

5. The coalition government of BSP, NDSV, and MRF included 10 ministerial seats for BSP, including that of the Prime Minister, 5 ministerial seats for NDSV, and 3 ministerial seats for MRF, corresponding to the votes and received and the mandates in parliament – 31% (82 seats) for BSP, 20% (53 seats) for NDSV, and 13% (34 seats) for MRF.

6. “Приватизацията на БТК – далаверата на века” [The Privatization of the Bulgarian Telecommunication Company – the Scheme of the Centruy], Nonivanar, 2 February 2009, available at: http://novinar.bg/news/privatizatciiata-na-btk---dalaverata-na-veka_Mjg2Mzs0Nw==html (accessed 29 October 2015).

7. Приходите от туризъм към БВП са 11.4% [Revenues from Tourism at 11.4%], Novini.bg, 11 September 2012, available at: http://www.novini.bg/news/86520-приходите-от-туризъм-към-бвп-са-11-4.html (accessed 16 May 2014).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the American Research Center in Sofia, America for Bulgaria Foundation (Travel Grant for Conference Presentation).