Assessing the performance of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe and in its neighbourhood

More than a decade after the big bang enlargement, it seems that the European Union (EU) and its Central and Eastern European member-states have mutually adapted to one another. The debates regarding the historical implications of enlargement have now reduced in tempo and much of Eastern Europe seems to be an integral part of the European integration project. After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (and Croatia in 2013), and in light of the EU’s internal troubles, enlargement has been sidelined from the EU agenda. The issue of the EU’s performance in the “wider Eastern Europe” remains poignant, not least because of current developments in its “neighbourhood” (such as the crisis in Ukraine or Moldova’s downturn from success story to a captured state), the uneven pattern of reform across some of the recently admitted states (such as the turmoil in Hungary and Poland or the ongoing monitoring of Bulgaria and Romania in the area of rule of law), and the evident slow pace of progress and even back-sliding in parts of the Western Balkans (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia). These cases, inter alia, illustrate that the EU’s performance in the area is neither linear nor uncontested. Thus, questions regarding EU performance reoccur frequently and very often, its “transformative power” can be called into question. What determines EU performance in Central and Eastern Europe and in its Neighbourhood? What are the conditions that influence it? This collective inquiry addresses some of these questions.

Much of the EU’s own discourse puts emphasis on “performance” as a key driver of its policies and engagement with its partners (European Commission 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015). In parallel, the scholarly literature generally questions the extent to which the EU addresses the most important challenges and (external and internal) pressures and whether its instruments are fit for purpose. Much of the literature has linked EU performance to EU effectiveness (a subset of the wider notion of performance), emphasising that increased effectiveness may render the EU more legitimate in the eyes of both, its member-states and its partners (Börzel and Risse 2007; Bouchard, Peterson, and Tocci 2013; Bretherton and Vogler 2013; Edwards 2013; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; Smith 2010, 2013). Externally, scholars have examined EU performance in major multilateral settings such as the United Nations, the World Bank or the International Labour Organisation (Oberthür, Jørgensen, and Shahin 2013; Oberthür and Groen 2015), during negotiations in different policy settings (Dee 2015; Romanyshyn 2015; Van Schaik 2013) or more recently investigated EU diplomatic performance (Baltag and Smith 2015). Internally, scholars have focused on assessing performance in relation to domestic processes. For instance, one can note a strong focus on various sectoral policies (e.g. cohesion policy) and their performance in Central and Eastern Europe (Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2013; Ferry and McMaster 2013). Others have sought to probe the domestic impact of the EU in CEE countries and how interaction with the European Union shapes institutional structures and policies both internally and externally (Börzel and Risse 2012; Dimitrova 2010; Grabbe 2001, 2014; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2008, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2008, 2012). Using concepts such as “diffusion”, “social learning” or “instrumental rationality” scholars have tried to explain the mechanisms behind these interactions and examine how the EU influences domestic configurations and developments in new member-states (MS) and in third countries (Börzel and Risse 2012; Bosse 2009; Casier 2011; Grabbe 2001). It is still widely assumed that the European Union has a strong impact on domestic settings. Yet, more clarity is called for with regard to the processes and factors that can mediate the EU’s performance internally or externally, in the region under examination.

Given the very little cross-fertilisation between the analytical bodies on external and internal EU performance, a suitable theoretical “niche” arises for this inquiry. One of the key contributions of this Special Issue is that it systematically examines the performance of EU policies and processes as well as their impact in the “wider” Eastern Europe. This is done by taking into account cases from the EU’s Eastern enlargement and from the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Conceptually, our key contribution is to link EU policy and its impact in “wider” Eastern Europe (enlargement + ENP) with the literature on performance. It allows us to study EU performance from two analytically distinct angles which provide for a more holistic understanding of the mediating factors of EU’s external projection. Drawing on these literatures, this Special Issue investigates what drives or impedes EU performance in countries from Central and Eastern Europe that are now part of the European Union and in countries from the Eastern neighbourhood.

This introductory piece introduces a working definition of “performance”, highlighting the distinction between “process-driven” (i.e. internal to the EU) and “outcome-driven” performance (i.e. the EU’s impact on the ground). Subsequently, we identify a number of common themes related to EU performance that have guided individual contributions and ensured an overall level of coherence for the arguments advanced in this Special Issue. Finally, the main findings of each individual contribution are introduced and briefly discussed throughout this introductory article. The main argument pursued here is that the performance of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe is shaped by a plethora of factors which, in recent years, questioned and limited the ability of the EU to reach a certain level of internal coherence and constrained its impact on the ground across the region.

1. A working definition of “performance”

To analyse and assess performance is, both in academic and in practical terms, a notoriously challenging task. The concept of performance has been widely used in public policy research to measure performance in public management (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Peters and Pierre 2006; Versluis, Van Keulen, and Stephenson 2010). Scholars, hence, define performance as “an organisation’s ability to achieve agreed-upon objectives” (Gutner and Thompson 2010, 231). These analyses most commonly associate performance with an organisation’s capacity to deliver its set tasks or functions in a successful manner: effectively, efficiently, in a relevant manner to its stakeholders, and within the context of financial viability (Lusthaus et al. 2002). Political science scholars have also discussed performance in their study of political systems and have defined it in relation to the capacity of the system to act and evaluate its outputs and processes (Almond and Powell 1996; Eckstein 1971; Roller 2005). Whether defined as a way to measure the performance of political institutions in Western democracies (Eckstein 1971; Keman 2002; Roller 2005) or the management of governments (IIngraham, Joyce, and Kneedler Donahue 2003), analysing performance entails assessing the process – the effort, efficiency and capabilities – as well as the outcome produced by any given action. We use this broader understanding of performance in the case of the European Union which we examine as a political and as a policy-oriented entity.

Several important distinctions require further attention. First, one significant distinction is that the existing scholarship engages in both policy and political analysis. While policy analysis assesses the policy content in order to understand the political process and behaviour, political analysis reflects on the outcome (Rossell 1993). A second distinction refers to defining what the EU is. On the one hand, the EU reflects “the way in which the EU has dealt with its own international relations internally” (Hill and Smith 2011, 9). This shapes its capacity to act as a collective actor and its ability to coordinate its actions, including for international purposes. On the other hand, the EU is a major actor that has an impact via its policies on its member-states as well as on its neighbours which implies that Brussels can shape its internal and external environment (Hill and Smith 2011, 9). Hence, EU performance can be measured not only by accounting for EU processes (e.g. negotiations, conditionality or external trade) but also by establishing a clear-cut outcome at the level at which policies or European actions are themselves being implemented. In this context, the final distinction we apply is that between process-driven performance and outcome-driven performance. Although in real life “process” and “outcome” are inextricably linked, we have opted to keep these two stages analytically distinct as a means of structuring our empirical inquiry and to fine-tune our assessment. Thus, EU performance becomes the difference between the desired effect of Brussels-designed policies and the real outcome they have at the internal and external level.

Under process-driven performance, we evaluate the nature of the capabilities and the mechanisms and procedures used by the European Union. This dimension examines intra-EU processes and deliverables that refer to EU’s capacity to act as a collective actor and the ability to coordinate common interests and preferences internally. Any political system refers to a set of institutions concerned with formulating and implementing the collective goals of those they represent (Almond and Powell 1996). Hence, the focus is on producing political goods such as security, welfare, justice or freedom for its members (Pennock 1966). Others explain that this can refer to narrow benchmarks such as statements or m/s decisions within the Council to broader ones that examine EU actions and efforts to carry out those internally agreed positions (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Portela 2015). From these standpoints, process-driven performance will reflect primarily on the internal decision-making processes and policies of the EU, and how these may reflect on outcomes and outputs not only at the wider, supranational level, but also equally on the ground.

Under outcome-driven performance, we examined whether or not EU self-proclaimed goals or objectives have been achieved. This dimension deals with the causal link between the EU’s actions and its environment. In its international dimension (i.e. the ENP), outcome-driven performance encapsulates the relationship between a political system and its environment: “systems are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and adaptively, but structurally, and they cannot exist without an environment” (Luhmann 1995, 16–17). In this respect, this dimension evaluates the extent to which the EU interacts with its external environment and how it impacts it (Allen and Smith 1990; Elgström and Smith 2006 and others). Outcome-driven performance reflects namely on the EU’s ability to link (policy) means and ends, that is, resources and capabilities that the EU can mobilise in order to achieve a goal (Börzel and Risse 2007 and others). Outcome-driven performance thus concentrates on the impact that European Union actions and policies have on the ground both in its own member-states and in its enlargement and ENP partners.

Drawing on insights from enlargement, post-enlargement and ENP partner countries, the empirical contributions to this volume have examined both the process-driven and outcome-driven performance of the EU. Therefore, this Special Issue evaluates EU performance not by looking at the domestic effects it may have on different branches of national policies or institutions, but by isolating the difference between the established and expected outcome of EU interventions in the area. Explaining the factors that constrain this performance is therefore one of the key aims of this Special Issue and has been dealt with across different internal policy areas (Enlargement policy, Energy and Climate change policy, Cohesion Policy), as well as with regard to several external policy areas (the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine and Moldova, export and arms control, Twinning policies and foreign aid instruments).

2. “Measuring” EU performance in CEE and the ENP space

From a methodological point of view, as a collective endeavour, this Special Issue has addressed problems in variation on the independent variables, which often affected Europeanisation research (Haverland 2006). It did so by scrutinising both member- and non-member-states in order to understand how EU performance varied in each of them. This enhanced the possibility of comparing the effects of European Union actions across different cases and has potentially strengthened the validity of the conclusions drawn. The unpacking of the analytical and methodological problems of understanding EU performance forms a key objective of our undertaking. The measurement of EU performance, inevitably, involves a degree of contestation in relation to the vast and empirically rich field of inquiry looking at the relationship between the EU, CEECs and ENP countries. Specifically, borrowing from frameworks used in the organisational and Europeanisation-related literatures, we propose three possible modes of operationalisation.

2.1. An assessment of performance based on the EU’s own stated policy objectives

As suggested by the literature on organisational management literature (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Gutner and Thompson 2010; Zahra and George 2002), analysing an actor’s performance can be based on an evaluation of their specific tasks, policies and procedures. This allows the examination of how narrow functions are performed and whether these have been successfully executed. Performance remains a critical issue across EU policies and Treaty reforms. In order to exert and reach this performance, the EU has at its disposal various policy instruments. These instruments define “how, who and within which organizational structures to do things in order to attain the defined goals and objectives” (Lenschow, Liefferink, and Sietske 2005, 805) as well as the ability to adapt to change, assimilate new information and use this for (policy) innovation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002). Hence, such an operationalisation of performance can be defined as the ability of European and national institutions to implement EU-set policy goals. Notably, such an operationalisation is an established benchmark enforcing many policy evaluation research designs (Vedung 2007). For instance, the EU’s own “horizontal” strategies and/or country-specific agreements (European Neighbourhood Policy, Enlargement, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, etc.) often contain a set of objectives whose fulfilment can be used as a measure of its performance. These are officially presented in declarations of the European Council and/or key policy announcements by senior EU officials.

2.2. An assessment based on expectations of EU actorness by its partners

An assessment of performance based exclusively on the EU’s own perceptions may offer a rather narrow view on this issue. Very often in public discourse, and in the academic literature, the EU’s performance gets criticised on the premise of its limited ambition; of what it chooses not to do. In this sense, the expectations that third countries attach to the EU, and the extent to which the EU matches them, tell a very important story about its performance. The EU’s actions or inactions trigger political effects in partner countries, some desirable and some less desirable; to a similar extent, it may cause stability as well as instability (Ginsberg 2001; Tonra 2009). The expectation of the EU to perform in its assumed international role as a conflict-manager or promoter of good governance is linked to the EU’s ability to agree internally, combined with the availability of resources and instruments. This is the dimension of presence articulated by the literature on EU actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 2006; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). The way in which the EU acts on the international arena and how it presents itself to its partners also discloses EU credibility concerns (Duke 1999; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Tulmets 2008).

2.3. An assessment based on the severity of the constraining (to EU action) factors on the ground (time pressures, strength of veto players-international, EU and domestic agency)

The EU’s outcome-driven performance cannot be isolated from local and international factors that mediate its engagement with its partners. Neither can EU level veto points be ignored in the process-driven performance (e.g. member-states preferences or the role of the European Parliament). More and more, it has been widely acknowledged that the EU may not be regarded as the single causal explanatory factor for domestic changes (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009; Grabbe 2006). Not only the literature on Europeanisation, but also studies of international relations using “second image reversed” research designs (Gourevitch 1978), provide a wealth of empirical evidence on the significance of local specificities (ranging from dysfunctional institutional constellations, policy “misfits”, agency and culture) in accommodating/annulling/resisting international pressure. Similarly, the timing and tempo of the EU’s engagement with third countries are an important determinant of its performance, affecting processes of policy learning and conditioning its response during crisis management. Also important is the acknowledgement of significant international “veto players” who may limit the scope for EU actorness and/or compromise its outcome-driven performance. Although such international constraints were less pronounced during the 2004–2007 enlargement process, their significance for future rounds of enlargement and, particularly ENP is hard to overestimate.

The above conceptual and methodological considerations go beyond exploring goal attainment, but rather combine an assessment of performance specifically vis-à-vis implementation of goals and in a broader sense, as suggested by Eckstein (1971), the overall performance of a system. Through embracing such an approach, we link the discussion about the implementation of the EU’s stated objectives with its overall relevance, in relation to its partners, and with the factors that may influence its capabilities. To achieve this analytically, we reflect in the following two sections on two main questions, which build on distinct, but occasionally, overlapping bodies of literature, and which have driven the contributions of this Special Issue.

3. What is the correlation between the EU’s outcome-driven performance and its internal processes of preference formation (process-driven performance)?

For this broad question, the lens of our empirical enquiry shifts onto the internal workings of the European Union. The clarity and plausibility of the EU’s own preferences are inextricably linked to its performance. A more intuitive reading of this relationship would posit that the more coherent the EU’s preferences are, the more robust its external performance is likely to be. However, we urge caution on attributing a linear causal relationship between process-driven performance and outcome-driven performance. The former may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the latter. The literature on “two-level games” (Putman 1988) has also highlighted how actors’ internal weaknesses (i.e. their difficulty to forge internal consensus, the small size of their “win sets”, etc.) can often be used as a bargaining tool in international negotiations. Against this background, contributors to this Special Issue reflected on three distinct themes.

Firstly, the correlation between EU performance and divergence of member-state interests represents a significant area of empirical scrutiny. The divergence of member-states’ interests is one of the most cited reasons for the dysfunctionalities of the EU’s strategy in international politics. The literature emphasises the importance of EU collective international action for the “European states to make an effective impact on the shaping of global politics” (Whitman and Juncos 2009, 6). This brings forward evidence regarding the EU’s potential for collective action and success in maintaining solidarity (Smith 2006; Stewart 2010; White 2001). Nevertheless, cases of crisis management in both the context of EU enlargement (i.e. Cyprus, Kosovo) and the ENP (i.e. Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine) have highlighted the predicament of collective action based on unanimity (Ker-Lindsay 2015; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). As such, the interrogation of the relationship between intergovernmentalism and EU performance (in terms of both process and outcome) is an important undertaking of the Special Issue.

Yet, the causal relationship between consensus and performance is not taken for granted. In this sense, we are open to interpretations that highlight “alternative” paths to EU performance. These may include constellations such as “coalitions of the willing”, policy entrepreneurship by individual member-states or, indeed, the mobilisation of internal discord as a bargaining tool against third countries. The case study presented by Bosse (2017) on EU’s arms-export policy towards Uzbekistan emphasises this correlation, especially when EU decided to remove the arms embargo in relation to EU’s interest in diversifying future energy supplies in Central Asia. Similarly, empirical evidence presented by Burlyuk and Shapovalova (2017) highlights the internal discord among member-states vis-à-vis the conditionality attached to the conclusion of the Association Agreement with Ukraine. Furthermore, the contribution of Bocquillon and Maltby (2017) underlined both the conflicting preferences of member-states when it comes to energy and climate change policy, and the assertiveness of CEECs (e.g. the entrepreneurship of the Visegrad group) with regard to these policy areas. Lastly, Surubaru (2017) argues that the EU faces a conundrum and, due to its diverging interests and internal preferences, it cannot counteract domestic political factors which affect its own internal development and Cohesion Policy.

Secondly, the correlation between EU performance and the level of institutionalisation of EU policy formation is of interest. The case studies of this Special Issue represent a diverse sample of the EU’s policy repertoire. For instance, many of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)-related EU activities in the ENP (or, indeed, its arms-export control) have been pursued against a backdrop of intergovernmental cooperation and in the context of relatively thin institutionalisation. Other cases related to its enlargement policy involve more consolidated decision-making structures and certainly much greater involvement of the EU’s supranational institutions (the European Commission and the European Parliament). Similarly, the clarity and “depth” of the EU’s acquis communautaire varies significantly across the case studies examined here. More widely, the literature on “compliance” in the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement returns rich, if somewhat inconclusive, evidence (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009; Falkner and Treib 2008; Hille and Knill 2006; Sedelmeier 2008). The extent to which the institutionalisation of the EU’s decision-making process and the nature of its acquis form important determinants of its performance (in terms of both process and outcome) were the subject of our empirical investigation across this Special Issue. Moreover, while internal division and multiplicity of voices resulted in a vague Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, Burlyuk and Shapovalova (2017) highlight its potentially positive effects for societal mobilisation in the country. Examining EU democratic conditionality in the wider neighbourhood, Börzel and Lebanidze (2017) conclude that neither the lack of EU membership prospects nor the EU’s incoherence is a significant condition for EU performance, but rather the absence of a stability–democratisation dilemma and the presence of the pro-democratic local reform coalitions. By contrast, Roch (2017) shows how EU instruments, such as Twinning, have not been adjusted to the particularities of ENP countries such as Moldova, which in turn hamper their performance.

And thirdly, the correlation between EU performance and its degree of supranational activism is explored. The importance of institutional agency, particularly from the EU Commission, for the delivery of European policies, (e.g. Enlargement policy), has been well documented in the literature (Balint, Bauer, and Knill 2008; Kassim et al. 2013; Nugent 2000; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2008). Yet, in recent years, the momentum behind enlargement has slowed down considerably, both as a result of changing EU priorities and the “complexity” of the remaining accession candidates. At the same time, the external institutional capacity of the Union, in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has improved. The process has accelerated further since the Treaty of Lisbon with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and an increased role for the European Parliament (EP). The EU leadership has also singled out the ENP as one of the three priorities for the EU’s international relations (Ashton 2010). Yet, the way in which this evolving institutional ecosystem has affected the articulation and execution of EU policy in wider Eastern Europe has not been clear-cut. On the one hand, pre-existing institutional routines have been disrupted. Yet, the recalibration of the EU’s external services and the increasingly volatile environment in its neighbourhood opens up space for innovation and agenda capture (see Baltag and Smith 2015; Helwig, Ivan, and Kostanyan 2013; Kostanyan 2013; Sęk 2013). Both these interesting empirical puzzles are addressed by a number of contributions in this Special Issue. On the one hand, the empirical evidence presented by Börzel and Lebanidze (2017) suggests that whenever the EU applied democratic conditionality, a progress or democratic breakthrough followed both to the East and to the South. In Ukraine, as Burluyk and Shapovalova (2017, this Special Issue) explain, the EU leverage to the mobilisation of the Ukrainian civil society and opposition made a significant contribution via numerous visits of EU officials and the EP monitoring Cox-Kwasniewski mission. On the other hand, in the process that led to deciding on the EU’s arms embargo on Uzbekistan, the European Parliament was excluded, as Bosse (2017) shows. In addition, by assessing the performance of the pre-accession PHARE funds for civil society development in Bulgaria, Hristova (2017) points out that policy transfers were incomplete. One of the reasons for this was that the use of pre-accession funds followed a hybrid path of performance and were affected by a mix of political factors and, specifically, by ambivalent objectives on civil society development from the EU’s side.

4. What is the relationship between the EU’s outcome-driven performance and the context of rewards/threats through which the EU engages with its partners?

Our analytical lens for this second question shifts onto the interplay between the EU’s conditionality principle and its outcome-driven performance in wider Eastern Europe. Here, we hypothesise that clarity over the content of conditionality and the intensity/consistency of its application are conducive to better EU (outcome-driven) performance. Indeed, the importance of conditionality as a tool of economic, political, judicial and social transformation in Eastern Europe has been well documented in the literature (Epstein and Jacoby 2014; Fagan et al. 2015; Grabbe 2001; Lavenex 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). However, the properties of EU conditionality vary significantly across the different “policy frameworks” (i.e. enlargement, ENP), individual policies (e.g. regional policy, energy or crisis management) and time (i.e. pre/after accession). Processes of policy learning and the need to address delicate internal (for the EU) and external (i.e. the specificities of each partner) concerns also affect the articulation and application of EU conditionality. In terms of candidate and potential candidate countries, the EU has sought to refine the focus of conditionality in light of the experience of Bulgaria’s, Romania’s and Croatia’s accession process so as to prioritise so-called “fundamentals” (rule of law, judicial reform and minority rights). It has also introduced new mechanisms (e.g. structured dialogue; Compact for Growth and Jobs) to break the deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the EU has demonstrated a degree of pragmatism and flexibility throughout its recent enlargements in terms, for instance, of which outcomes it seeks to achieve in particular countries. This has certainly intensified in the context of the Western Balkans. Against this background, contributions in this Special Issue have reflected on three distinct themes.

The first theme considers the discrepancies of EU performance across the different policy frameworks related to enlargement and the ENP. These are examined in this Special Issue and, in essence, differ with regard to the mix of threats and rewards that the EU deploys towards its partners. The literature on enlargement has demonstrated that the EU-led process of rule transfer in CEE has been more effective when linked to concrete rewards in the form of assistance, association agreements and EU membership (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The lack of a credible EU membership perspective in the ENP introduces a different incentive structure for all parties involved whereby domestic sacrifices “in the name of Europe” are less likely to be tolerated. Yet, the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine and developments in Moldova demonstrate that the EU’s “pulling power” remains significant even in the absence of an explicit accession promise (see Baltag and Bosse 2016). We also note that the assessment of EU performance across the two policy frameworks involves different “yardsticks”. In the case of enlargement, the measure of EU success may be easier, identifiable by reference to the speed of concluding accession negotiations or the record of CEE compliance with the EU acquis thereafter. By contrast, the EU’s policy objectives in the context of the ENP are less precise and more variable across different countries in the region. Or, as Bosse (2017) emphasises, normative questions that address the ethics and morality of the ENP are hardly raised. Against the benchmarks of ethics, morality, fairness and truth derived from “normative performance” examined by the author, one may deduce how poorly EU policy scores.

ENP tools are designed in vaguer terms, with unclear finality or link between the EU conditions and rewards. In this respect, the record of meeting EU conditionalities across the ENP space has also been patchy (Casier 2011; Freyburg et al. 2009; Smith 2008). The empirical evidence collected by Roch (2017) emphasises how one of EU’s main institution-building instruments in the neighbourhood, Twinning, is constrained by the lack of flexibility to adapt to local institutional needs. Therefore, the comparative examination of the EU’s outcome-driven performance in the two domains (Enlargement and the ENP) forms an essential objective of this Special Issue. In this sense, Börzel and Lebanidze (2017) conduct an inquiry into why some of EU’s neighbours, both to the East and to the South, have democratised better than others. Furthermore, Hristova (2017) argues that there is a lack of clarity, especially in terms of political conditionality, embedded within the EU conditionality principle. This can directly affect the outcome-driven performance of various EU policies or negotiation frameworks.

The second theme explores the specific relationship between EU performance and the content and application of its conditionality principle. These go beyond the broad distinction regarding enlargement policy and the ENP, as well as the differential cleavage on EU membership they entail. In this respect, the relationship between conditionality and EU performance requires a more nuanced examination by reference to the content of the conditions set and the manner, on behalf of the EU, of their application. As noted above, the type of conditionality projected by the EU to its partners may vary from the very general (i.e. the Copenhagen criteria), to the very specific (i.e. by reference to compliance with highly specific aspects of the acquis communautaire). EU conditionality, however, is not confined solely to the enlargement process. It has been a consistent feature of EU strategy in Eastern Europe from the Association process in Central and Eastern Europe, the Stabilisation and Association process for Southeast Europe and, more recently, to the Association Agreements in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Unlike CEE countries, in the case of the ENP, the EU applies a “conditionality-lite” model which combines a mix of democratic and acquis conditionality (Sasse 2008; Cardwell 2011). While the EU applies similar methodology to ENP countries as to the enlargement ones, it does so with different degrees of intensity. Today, EU conditionality in wider Eastern Europe encroaches upon highly charged issues such as cooperation with the International Criminal Court, regional cooperation and peace-building measures in conflict-ridden countries.

Although the EU seems to be willing to offer more “tangible rewards” via the ENP’s Eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), financial support is limited or is not yet made available and the finality of it remains ambiguous (Casier 2011; Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut 2011). Börzel and Lebanidze (2017) emphasise that the inconsistency of the EU in applying democratic conditionality has been the result of a stability–democratisation dilemma, whereas Burlyuk and Shapovalova (2017) argue that it depends on the conceptualisation of conditionality as a rationalist intergovernmental bargaining model or as a tool for societal mobilisation. As EU conditions became more politically charged, the interpretation of their precise content is inevitably contested. The emphasis on the geopolitical and economic interests that prevail over the “shared values” of democracy and human rights, stipulated in the ENP further nuance the ratio between EU performance and the content (application) of EU conditionality (Belyi 2012; Bosse 2012, 2009; Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweickert 2010; Wetzel 2011). As Bosse (2017) argues, the pursuit of economic and security interests in the case of Uzbekistan influenced the EU’s decision in the case of arms export policy. This, in turn, suggests that the application of conditionality by the EU is more likely to be subjected to intricate diplomatic contingencies (see, e.g. Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). The relation between this contestation and the EU’s performance in the region is addressed by a number of contributors in the Special Issue.

Finally, the third theme takes into account the potential pre- and post-enlargement discrepancies in terms of EU performance. The examination of Brussels-related performance in Eastern Europe prior and after enlargement raises important methodological and empirical questions. For the 2004 entrants, enlargement-driven conditionality has been replaced, after accession, by the EU’s “normal” tools of monitoring member-state compliance (i.e. Commission oversight, ECJ jurisdiction and Council peer pressure). By contrast, the 2007 entrants have been subjected to additional post-accession conditionalities (e.g. the mechanism for cooperation and verification that seeks to ensure further judicial reforms and fighting corruption in Bulgaria and Romania). In terms of EU performance, this underlines a double concern. Firstly, that pre-accession conditionality may not be enough to deliver sustained reforms, particularly in areas where the EU acquis is relatively “thin”. Secondly, that the EU’s own internal coherence may be undermined by new member-states whose incomplete record of reform could create negative externalities for other members of the club. As noted by several scholarly contributions, internal processes of Europeanisation may weaken as stronger conditionality traits recede after accession (Dimitrova 2010; Gateva 2013; Sedelmeier 2012). For countries like Bulgaria and Romania, the internal accomplishments acquired during the push for accession may also prove reversible given the shifting approaches of domestic political elites (Ganev 2013; Tanasoiu 2012). In addition, the European Commission has found it more and more difficult to assert its influence in a post-accession setting and struggles to develop instruments that would prevent further democratic back-sliding in Central and Eastern European member-states (Iusmen 2015; Sedelmeier 2014).

Roch (2017) discusses how Twinning, used for pre-accession candidate states became an ENP tool meant to foster institution-building, internalising certain pre-designed features that are not adequate policy-learning tools for the new contexts it seeks to address. Moreover, Surubaru (2017) stresses that in the context of a shift from pre- to post-accession, the EC could not address elements of domestic politicisation which often interfered with the management and implementation of European Structural Funds. In this respect, the EU’s lack of ability or willingness to engage in an effective dialogue with domestic political and administrative elites may damage processes of socio-economic convergence between Western and Eastern Europe. EU performance remained uniform across its new member-states whilst Brussels-designed policies also had to adapt to national policy settings and to intense domestic resistance (Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel 2007). This is suggested by Bocquillon and Maltby (2017) who emphasise that there are still strong intergovernmental disagreements between EU member-states when it comes to devising a coherent climate and energy policy. Opposition from Poland has arguably played an extensive role in this respect. This may reveal the extent to which certain new member-states are becoming more and more active (rather than only reactive) within the EU policy-making process.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the editors and team at East European Politics, Petr Kopecký, Adam Fagan and Indraneel Sircar for their continuous support and interest in this Special Issue. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. Finally, we wish to thank all contributors for all their work and commitment to this project.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Dimitris Papadimitriou is Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester and Director of the Manchester Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. He has previously held visiting posts at Princeton University, the London School of Economics and Yale University. He has written extensively on the European Union’s enlargement policy and state-building activities in South East Europe. He has also published widely on Greek politics and modern Greek history. He is the (co)-author of six books, an edited volume and numerous articles in leading international journals. His last book, Prime Ministers in Greece: The Paradox of Power (with Kevin Featherstone) was published by Oxford University Press in 2015.

Dorina Baltag teaches European Studies at Maastricht University and is currently a PhD candidate at Loughborough University. Her current research for which she obtained a Marie Curie Fellowship in 2012 focuses on EU diplomatic performance in Eastern Europe with focus on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Recently she contributed to the “Routledge Handbook on the ENP” (Routledge, Oxford) and the “External Governance as Security Community Building” (Palgrave, London). Her work has been published, in among other, in SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) working papers (2011), INCOOP policy briefs (2013), NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) working papers (2014), and EIoP (European Integration Online) papers (2015).

Neculai-Cristian Surubaru is a PhD candidate in Political Science and European Studies at Loughborough University. His main research focuses on administrative capacity, politicisation and governance processes in Central and Eastern Europe. He has been a Teaching Assistant at Loughborough University and a Guest Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh. He has been published or is forthcoming in Regional Studies, Routledge in the Regions and Cities, Regional Studies/Regional Science and the Romanian Journal of European Affairs. Apart from his academic work, he has contributed to several policy reports that informed policy-makers in Brussels and Bucharest.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies [Small event grants] Manchester Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence [Seminar/workshop grants].