EU normative performance: a critical theory perspective on the EU’s response to the massacre in Andijon, Uzbekistan

ABSTRACT

This article introduces a new analytical framework - EU Normative Performance - to examine the European Union’s (EU) policy towards autocratic regimes in its wider Eastern neighbourhood. Drawing on critical theory and the writings of Jürgen Habermas, EU Normative Performance does not define measures of a (cost-) efficient conduct of foreign policy, but develops benchmarks of an ideal-type emancipatory policy constrained by normative principles (Normative Performance as output) and derived from undistorted argumentative reasoning (Normative Performance as a process). The case study assesses the EU’s response to the Andijon massacre in Uzbekistan in May 2005.

KEYWORDS:

• EU performance
• EU neighbourhood policy
• EU normative power
• EU foreign policy
• EU arms embargo
• Uzbekistan

1. Introduction

The relations of the European Union (EU) with its closer and wider neighbourhoods in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have become the focus of a lively scholarly debate throughout the past decades. Many works examine the effectiveness of the EU in its neighbourhood countries in light of its role as a promoter of democracy and Europeanisation (e.g. Wetzel and Orbie 2015; Grimm 2015; Börzel and Risse 2012; Börzel and Van Hüllen 2014) or as exporter of EU governance (Lavenex 2004, 2014; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). The pronounced focus on the effectiveness of the EU’s impact and performance in Eastern Europe and Central Asia has, however, by and large prevented a focus on the normative dimension of the EU’s engagement with the countries in the region. With most scholars asking how effective the EU’s policies are in the neighbourhood countries, explicitly normative questions pertaining to the morality and ethics of the policies (e.g. in how far the foreign policy of the EU is derived from fair, inclusive and truth-based decision finding and making) are hardly raised.

Many central elements of the EU’s Eastern policy, such as the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), Visa-Facilitation or Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) may indeed appear to be “technical” and uncontroversial from a normative point of view. However, the EU’s engagement with autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia does raise normative questions, for example as regards the EU’s arms exports policy.¹ Because arms trade involves products that can inflict serious bodily harm on and bring death to large numbers of humans, the trade often provokes public debates on whether it is ethically good or morally right for the EU to export arms to highly repressive and heavily militarised autocratic regimes.

In this article, I assess the EU’s foreign policy performance from a normative point of view. More specifically, I ask in how far the EU’s engagement with autocratic regimes in its (wider) neighbourhood can be considered an instance of “EU Normative Performance”.

“EU Normative Performance” – a new concept which I am introducing in this article -complements the notion of EU Performance presented in this Special Issue. EU Performance as defined by Papadimitriou, Baltag, and Surubaru (2017) is broadly based on what Robert Cox famously termed “problem-solving theory” (Cox 1981, 128–129). In contrast, my concept of EU Normative Performance is inspired by critical theory and the writings of sociologist Jürgen Habermas. EU Normative Performance provides measures not for a more efficient conduct of existing policy, but for an emancipatory policy based on the principles of normative constraint, fair procedure (e.g. not dominated exclusively by strategic interests), inclusion and the readiness to agree on “what is best” for all affected (based on consensus and the “force of the better argument” rather than coercion).

I draw on Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and his works on Discourse Ethics to develop the parameters of EU Normative Performance (essentially an ideal-type of EU performance). These indicators help us to assess how far the EU’s policy towards an autocratic regime reflects and complies with ethical and/or moral principles (Normative Performance as output) and whether the processes leading to decisions on arms export policies at the EU level are reflective of a fair, inclusive and “truthful” process (Normative Performance as a process).

My case study is the EU’s response to the 2005 massacre in Andijon, Uzbekistan. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan is continuously ranked as “most autocratic regime” among the countries in the EU’s closer and wider Eastern neighbourhood (Freedom House 2015). In May 2005, troops associated with the Uzbek Interior Ministry and National Security Service fired into a crowd of protesters in the city of Andijon, killing between 200 and 1000 protesters. The EU reacted by imposing, amongst other measures, an arms embargo on the Uzbek regime. In 2009 the EU lifted the embargo, despite little evidence that the regime had fulfilled any of the conditions set out by the EU. The EU’s contradictory stance towards Uzbekistan point to the necessity to examine in how far the EU’s policy was informed by normative principles (normative output), and through which processes the EU had come to reach its decisions (normative process).

2. Measures of EU normative performance

To date, the concept of “Normative Power Europe” (Manners 2002) has dominated scholarly works on the values and norms informing the EU as an actor in its wider Eastern neighbourhood (e.g. Kelley 2006; Bosse 2007; Grimm and Leininger 2012; Simão 2012; Börzel and Van Hüllen 2014; Ghazaryan 2014; Burlyuk 2015), including assessments to what extent the EU can be considered a normative or a strategic actor (e.g. Johansson-Nogués 2007; Haukkala 2008; Seeberg 2009).

However, the existing literature all too often assumes the standpoint of the EU as a measure or benchmark for assessing the presence or absence of normative policy. That is, normative actorness is measured in terms of whether or not the EU has achieved its own stated normative policy objectives (cf Papadimitriou, Baltag, and Surubaru 2017, 5). Some scholarly works have also measured the EU’s normative credentials in relation to other international actors’ expectations or perceptions of the EU as a normative actor (Lucarelli 2008; 2007; see also Papadimitriou, Baltag, and Surubaru 2017, 6). Common to both approaches is that they measure the EU’s Normative Performance against what the EU – or those interacting with the EU – subjectively declare to be a normative actor.

The definition of EU Normative Performance presented here differs from the concept of EU normative power. The indicators of Normative Performance are not based on the EU’s own declared normative policy objectives. Rather, they are derived from critical theory. The critical theory posits an emancipatory research agenda, which directs analysis at examining and “overcoming coercive or oppressive social and political relations” (Devetak, George, and Weber 2012, 70). In his Theory of Communicative Action (1987), the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas offers one of the most comprehensive accounts of the role and influence of normative principles in society and politics from a critical theory perspective. Three aspects of Habermas’s work, in particular, are relevant for the definition and measures of EU Normative Performance. First, Habermas develops a definition of normative principles, distinguishing between ethical principles (what is good for us as a community?) and moral principles (what is good for all involved?). Second, Habermas defines to what extent – in an ideal-type scenario – normative principles ought to influence policy (the idea of “normative constraint” as a measure of Normative Performance as Output). Third and finally, Habermas elaborates the ideal-type procedural conditions for Normative Performance (the “ideal-speech situation”), which in turn help assess the EU’s Normative Performance as a Process. In the following section, I will explain each of the three aspects of Habermas’ work in view of developing indicators of EU Normative Performance.

2.1. The parameters of normative performance as output: discourse and practice

2.1.1. Output at the level of discourse

Papadimitriou et al. define EU output-driven performance in terms of “whether an EU goal or objective was achieved” (2017, 4). If adapted to measuring Normative Performance, this definition assumes that we readily accept that the EU’s declared goals are simultaneously “good”, “right” and “just” from a normative point of view. Habermas offers a definition of normative principles,² which transcends the narrow (and self-declared) perspective of any particular individual or group. To that end, he distinguishes between normative principles based on ethical reason and normative principles based on moral reason on which policy-makers draw to justify political choices (Habermas 1993, 2).

Ethical normative principles: Habermas’s notion of ethical reason recognises that actors act on the basis of social identities. According to Habermas, the ethical reason is based on a particular conception of “us” and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community (Habermas 1993, 11–12). In the context of the EU, ethical normative principles are used as justifications for policy based on norms and values associated with the European liberal community and identity, as for example elaborated in the Copenhagen criteria.³

Moral normative principles: According to Habermas, moral reason assumes that actors act out of a sense of (collectively agreed upon) duty towards fellow human beings, which is not conditional upon the values held by any particular community (Habermas 1993, 12–14). This type of normative principle relates to the “duty” to protect, to defend the dignity of mankind and to uphold and commit to (cosmopolitan) international law. In the field of EU arms exports to autocratic regimes, for example, moral normative principles pertain to justifying policy based on a breach of human rights by the recipient country government, human development in the recipient country or its failure to comply with (cosmopolitan) international law.

Habermas contrasts normative reason (ethical and moral) with pragmatic reason, which he regards as the form of rationality most common to and dominant in the realms of the government and the market (Habermas 1993, 10–11). Pragmatic reason is based on calculations of the consequences for the actors’ own utility/welfare (cost–benefit analysis). From this angle, the EU’s policy on arms exports to an autocratic regimes is, for example, justified exclusively by economic and/or security interests, such as the demand for arms in the recipient country, the protection or creation of economic growth, wealth and/or employment in the EU/its member states and/or the extent to which the recipient country poses an economic or security threat to the EU.

2.1.2. Output at the level of practice

Having distinguished the different types of normative principles upon which the EU can justify its policies (the level of discourse), I now turn to the indicators of Normative Performance as output at the level of practice. Normative output as practice is measured in terms of the extent to which an EU policy – originally justified by moral/ethical reason – is likely to have been influenced by underlying pragmatic strategic considerations.

With regard to the extent to which normative principles ought to matter in decision-making practice, Habermas contends that a (foreign) policy should be based on both strategic and normative considerations, whereby neither normative nor strategic goals ought to fully dominate a policy. In the words of Habermas, normative principles “affect the administrative system by cultivating the pool of reasons on which administrative decisions (…) must draw” and as a result “not everything may be done that could be done by the administration” (Habermas 1993, 170). In other words, normative principles should inform and/or constrain policy choices that are otherwise exclusively aimed at strategic goals (i.e. security or economic gains/ profit).⁴ Habermas does not specify further in how far normative principles ought to affect strategic considerations, though at least three types of Normative Performance (output at the level of practice) can be distinguished based on Habermas’s assumption that neither normative nor strategic considerations should dominate in the making of public policy:

1. Normative pragmatic performance is present if the EU/member states decide on a policy action (in light of a normative principle) that coincides with the advancement of their economic and security gains.

2. Normative engaged performance is present if the EU/member states decide on a policy action (in light of a normative principle) that neither advances nor reduces their economic and security gains.

3. Normative altruistic performance is present if the EU/member states decide on a policy action (in light of a normative principle) that results in the (limited) reduction of economic and security gains.

Normative pragmatic performance is present, for example, if the EU restricts arms exports to an autocratic regime (in light of human rights violations), whose actions not only pose a threat to its own population but also to the EU’s (regional) security interests. Engaged performance is present if the EU restricts arms exports to an autocratic regime (in light of human rights violations), which is neither a significant importer of arms exports, nor an important trade partner or security ally of or security threat to the EU. By contrast, normative altruistic performance is present if the EU restricts arms exports to an autocratic regime that is either a major buyer of its arms and/or to whom the EU maintains close economic and/or security ties.

2.2. Normative performance as process: the “ideal-speech situation”

Habermas’s writings offer a means of normative critique in relation to EU decision-making processes. According to Habermas, especially decisions hinging on ethical and moral questions – such as whether it is “morally right” or “ethically good” to sell arms to highly repressive and militarised autocratic regimes – must be arrived at through dialogue and argumentation. All concerned parties can present, justify and defend their particular claims on “what is right” in order to eventually agree on “the better argument”. Habermas defines an ideal process of fair communication – the ideal-speech situation – which is dependent on “prior argumentation (only justified decisions are accepted); they are inclusive (all affected parties can participate); and they compel the participants to adopt each other’s perspectives (a fair assessment of all affected interests is possible)” (Habermas 2006, 185).

These general principles can be specified further into three concrete indicators of Normative Performance in respect to the decision-making process on EU policy towards autocratic regimes at the EU/member state levels (c.f. Bjola 2005, 280):

1. The postulate of factual correctness: facts on the basis of which decisions on arms exports/deals are taken are truthful and complete (denying actors opportunities to engage in acts of political manipulation and deception).

2. The postulate of equal participation and openness: All participants in the argumentative discourse⁵ should have equal rights concerning making or challenging arguments (to reduce the influence of power relationships, coercion and intimidation during the decision-making process);

3. The postulate of seriousness and authenticity: The participating actors show genuine interest in using argumentative reasoning for reaching a consensus on arms exports/deals.

The process-related measures of Normative Performance presented above do not concern the effectiveness of EU decision-making procedures or the “capabilities and mechanisms” used by the EU in order to pursue its stated objective (Papadimitriou, Baltag, and Surubaru 2017). Rather, EU normative process performance measures the openness, fairness and “truthfulness” of the processes through which the EU arrives at decisions on arms exports policy.

In the section above, I have outlined the main measures of EU Normative Performance, which include indicators of the levels of normative output performance (presence of ethical/moral norms in policy discourse; varying levels of normative constraint on policy in practice) as well as for normative process performance (presence of the “ideal-speech situation”).

In the empirical analysis, which follows, I examine the EU’s (and its member states’) reaction to the 2005 Andijon massacre in Uzbekistan. The goal is to identify the degree to which the policy reflects the ideal-types of EU Normative Performance described above. In the first part, I focus on Normative Performance as output and examine the extent to which ethical and/or moral principles have featured in the EU’s political discourse and what type of normative constraint (if any) these principles had on the EU’s policy towards the country. The second part examines the level of EU Normative Performance as process. Here I evaluate in how far the EU’s decision-making processes on imposing and lifting the arms embargo against Uzbekistan reflected the “ideal-speech situation”.

3. The EU’s response to the Andijon massacre: normative performance as output

In response to the Andijon massacre in May 2005, the Council of the EU strongly condemned the “excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force” by the Uzbek security forces during events in Andijon and expressed its deep regret regarding the failure of the Uzbek authorities to respond adequately to the UN’s call for an independent international inquiry into these events (Council Common Position 2005, 1). The Council imposed an embargo on exports of arms, military equipment and other equipment to Uzbekistan that might be used for internal repression (Council Common Position 2005). In October 2009, the Council decided not to renew the arms embargo against Uzbekistan on the grounds that it “welcomes the commitment of Uzbekistan to work with the EU on a range of questions relating to human rights and the rule of law” and because of the “positive steps taken in Uzbekistan over the last years” such as the “release of some human rights defenders” (Council of the European Union 2009, 2). The EU thus grounded its justification of the arms embargo against Uzbekistan in moral reason (excessive use of force by the government against civilians). The justifications to lift the embargo were partly based on moral reason (progress on human rights) but partly also on ethical reason (reforms in the fields of democratisation and the rule of law). From the outset, the EU’s official justification for the decision to impose an arms embargo against Uzbekistan, therefore, suggests a high level of Normative Performance as output.

3.1. Normative constraints on strategic considerations

EU Normative Performance can only be considered normative if moral and ethical principles actually constrain the pursuit of pragmatic strategic goals. In the following section, I evaluate the extent to which the EU’s arms embargo against Uzbekistan has impacted on the EU’s (and its member states’) economic and security gains.

Prior to 2005, the total value of licences issued for EU arms exports to Uzbekistan was comparatively small. In 2001, exports amounted to little more than €118.000, and the value of licences issued for arms exports in 2004 and 2005 was €3.6 million and €2.9 million, respectively (EU Arms Export Reports 2005–2010). The main supplier of arms to Uzbekistan has traditionally been France (explosives, engineering and electronic equipment, aircraft), followed by the UK and Germany (manufacturing equipment, imaging equipment) as well as the Czech Republic (aircraft). After the arms embargo was lifted in 2009, France remained the leading EU arms exporter to Uzbekistan, issuing arms export licences worth €225 million between 2010 and 2013 (EU Arms Export Reports 2005–2010). The total economic losses of EU member states from the arms embargo against Uzbekistan were nevertheless negligible. The value of French arms exports (licences issued) in 2005 was €12.1 million. Likewise, Germany and the UK in 2005 exported arms worth €4 million and €3 million, respectively. In other words, the decision in favour of the arms embargo against Uzbekistan had a very little impact on the economic interest/gains of the EU’s main arms exporting countries.

In contrast to their limited economic interests in Uzbekistan, several EU member states did, however, have a significant geopolitical interest in the country. Uzbekistan was of central strategic importance for NATO in the intervention in Afghanistan. NATO, and Germany in particular, relied on the Uzbek government’s consent to operate a military base and logistics hub in the southeast of the country, close to the border with Afghanistan. As a consequence, sanctions against the Uzbek government were perceived by some EU member states as a significant risk, which could result in considerable strategic costs. Some governments were ready to accept a limited strategic loss in favour of an arms embargo. A representative of the Spanish government, for example, explained in July 2005 that “the Spanish are concerned because they use an Uzbek military base for their operations in Afghanistan’ but if necessary, the government “would seek other options in the region” (US Cable 2005a, 1). Other governments, including Germany, were not inclined to accept any normative constraints on their position. Thus, the main reason for the EU’s initial decision not to impose an arms embargo at the GAERC in July 2005 was because of the “concern of the impact of an embargo” on how “some states operate military bases in Uzbekistan to support operations in Afghanistan” (US Cable 2005b, 1).

The Council’s decision to impose an arms embargo in November 2005 was partly a result of “those within the EU calling for a harder line gaining momentum”.⁶ At the same time, the EU had increasingly come under pressure to react to the Uzbek government’s refusal to its request to allow an independent inquiry into the events in Andijon as more and more detail on the scale and brutality of the massacre emerged in international media. Overall, the EU’s decision to impose an arms embargo (in addition to a visa-ban on those held responsible for the Andijon massacre and those obstructing an independent inquiry) entailed limited costs for the EU and the Uzbek government, which points to the presence of EU normative engaged performance. The arms embargo had no practical ramifications for Tashkent, which obtained the bulk of its arms from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and the German government was allowed to keep its military base after the arms embargo had come into force. Only more drastic EU actions, such as the suspension of the PCA with Uzbekistan resulting in significantly higher geopolitical and economic costs, would have demonstrated the presence of EU normative altruistic performance.

The importance of normative principles in EU policy towards Uzbekistan did, however, fade away quickly as the EU’s geopolitical stakes in the country increased. The EU decided to lift the arms embargo in October 2009. At the level of political discourse, the EU justified the move based on a number of “positive steps taken by the Uzbek government towards considering reforms” (Council of the European Union 2009, 2). Yet, in practice, the Uzbek government continued to block an independent inquiry into the Andijon massacre and the level of human rights violations remained high. Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group and Reporters Without Borders all confirmed that none of the steps taken by the Uzbek government, which were characterised by EU ministers as “positive” had taken place during the year under review (Human Rights Watch 2009, (1). A key factor influencing the EU’s decision to remove the arms embargo was the increasing relevance of Uzbekistan not only as a transit base for military operations in neighbouring Afghanistan, but also the EU’s efforts to enhance its strategic relationship with Central Asia in an attempt to diversify future energy supplies and improve trade relations. In other words, the indirect geopolitical and geo-economic costs from upholding the arms embargo against Uzbekistan had risen following the launch of the EU’s new Strategy for Central Asia in June 2007. Upholding normative principles in this context would have presented a step towards altruistic Normative Performance, which the EU was unwilling to make.

4. Imposing and lifting the EU’s arms embargo against Uzbekistan: normative performance as a process

In the following section, I will evaluate the extent to which the processes leading to the decisions to impose and then lift the EU’s arms embargo against Uzbekistan meet the parameters of Normative Performance as a process.

4.1. The postulate of factual correctness

The first indicator of normative process performance is that the facts on the basis of which decisions on arms exports (restrictions) are taken are truthful and complete. The EU member states’ decision on imposing an arms embargo against Uzbekistan in 2005 was justified on grounds of information provided by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as a report on the event in Andijon prepared by the OSCE/ODIR in June 2005. Estimates of how many people were killed by Uzbek security forces on 13–14 May in Andijon varied between 187, the official count of the Uzbek government, to several hundred. ODIR considered as realistic estimates that between 300 and 500 people were killed (OSCE/ODIR 2005, 8). Based on these accounts, there is little doubt that Uzbek security forces used force against large numbers of protesters, and much of the available evidence – especially the personal accounts of Uzbek refugees who fled after the violent crackdown – confirmed that the security forces had indeed used “excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate” force during the Andijon events.

However, a fully fledged authoritative international inquiry by the UN or the OSCE into the events in Andijon never took place because of the Uzbek government’s refusal to accept such an inquiry. At the time of writing (October 2016), many facts of what happened in Andijon on 13–14 May remain unknown. In June 2006, Carnegie Endowment released video footage taken by two cameramen in the Babur Square in Andijon on 13 May. Uzbek authorities had seized the material before it was passed on to a scholar affiliated with the Endowment. The film was substantially edited with the purpose of showing the protests in the worst possible light, presenting evidence that the organisers meant to overthrow the government, that the protests were religiously inspired and that some demonstrators were armed. Carnegie concluded that the footage can evidently only be considered “suggestive rather than conclusive” but that “the motivations of those who came to the square that day were certainly varied” and that the “search for ‘truth’ in the events of May 13, 2005, cannot be a simple one” (Carnegie 2006). Yet, Carnegie also found that “nothing in this film” suggests, “why there should have been hundreds of civilian casualties sustained in the retaking of downtown Andijon” (Carnegie 2006). The EU Council’s decision to impose an arms embargo against Uzbekistan was thus justified based on truthful and (largely) complete facts as regards the use of excessive and disproportionate force by Uzbek security forces. Yet, many facts on the events in Andijon remained (and still remain) incomplete, such as the motivation of (some) protesters and the question as to whether a proportionate use of force by the Uzbek security forces could or could not have been justified.

In contrast, the EU’s decision to remove the arms embargo was not based on true and complete facts. As mentioned earlier, the grounds upon which the EU had imposed the arms embargo against Uzbekistan – failure by the Uzbek authorities to respond adequately to the UN’s call for an independent international inquiry into the Andijon events and the risk of internal repression – remained unchanged. Uzbek authorities continued to refuse an international inquiry into Andijon, and the level of internal repression had in fact intensified in the years following the uprising.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Council of the EU never offered an official justification for lifting the arms embargo in its conclusions of October 2009 (Council of the European Union 2009). The EU foreign ministers only made a short statement during that meeting in October explaining that “to encourage the Uzbek authorities to take further substantive steps to improve the rule of law and the human rights situation { … } and taking into account their commitments, the council decides not to renew the remaining restrictive measures” (RFERL 2009, 1). The truth-claim of the statements can hardly be verified. The justification for lifting the sanctions is not based on the actual (and measurable) behaviour of the Kazakh government, but on its (possible) future behaviour.

At the same time, the justification deflects from the actual topic of the discussion because it suggests that the sanctions had been linked to broader concerns about human rights and the rule of law (commitments to which are more difficult to measure) rather than the Andijon massacre and the level of internal repression. EU officials were also cited saying that the decision to lift the embargo “followed the release of some political prisoners and the abolition of the death penalty” (Castle 2009, 1). This statement also moves the discussion away from the Andijon inquiry, towards other, exclusively positive, actions taken by the Uzbek government.

The key argument brought forward by the EU member states in favour of lifting the arms embargo, most prominently advanced by the German government, was that “the sanctions are not working and may be counter-productive” (Traynor 2007, 1). This statement attempts to negate the very basis for discussion on the arms embargo. Rather than allowing a factual check on whether the Uzbek government had complied with the EU’s demands, the statement shifts the discussion towards a very different question, namely whether the EU’s sanctions are effective or not. The statements issued by the EU and those member states in favour of lifting the embargo were, therefore, attempts to avoid engaging in a truthful and fact-based communication on whether the demands by the EU – as clearly set out in the initial decision to impose the arms embargo – had been met by the Uzbek government or not.

The EU’s decision to impose the arms embargo on the Uzbek government was therefore in line with the first indicator of Normative Performance as a process. The decision was taken on the basis of facts that were truthful and (broadly) complete. The decision to lift the arms embargo in 2009, however, was the result of a distorted communication process, which effectively avoided references to the events in Andijon, the issue of the refusal of the Uzbek government to allow an international inquiry into these events, as well as the topic of internal repression.

4.2. The postulate of equal participation and openness

The second indicator of EU Normative Performance as a process is that all affected parties must be allowed to participate in the argumentative discourse and should have equal rights concerning making or challenging arguments. As specified earlier, these parties include the EU member states, the European Parliament and transnational civil society.

The imposition of sanctions falls under the CFSP domain. Any member state (and since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty also the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) has the right to propose sanctions. The proposal is discussed in greater detail by the Political and Security Committee and the geographical working groups of the Council where member states delegates negotiate and decide by consensus who is to be listed and on the basis of what reasons. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II) and the Council vote by unanimity for the adoption of decisions. The European Parliament has always been and remains excluded from the decision-making process on arms embargos. Yet, the European Parliament has often emphasised that – as a democratic channel legitimising EU foreign policy – it should be included in the argumentative discourse on the EU’s sanctions, and it has underlined this stance with regard to decisions on the EU’s arms embargo against Uzbekistan. In its Resolution of 27 October 2005, the Parliament confirms that it

welcomes and supports the decision taken at the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting on 3 October 2005 to impose an embargo on the export to Uzbekistan of arms and military equipment and other equipment that might be used for internal repression. (European Parliament 2005, 1)

One year later in 2006, the Parliament reiterated that it “insists that the embargo on arms sales and military transfers be continued” because “Uzbekistan has not addressed the conditions which the Council set out when sanctions were applied” and because “there has been no fundamental change in the widespread use of torture or in policies and practices that could effectively combat it” (European Parliament 2006, 1). In February 2008, the Parliament adopted a resolution on an EU Strategy for Central Asia, in which it again recalls that “the EU imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan after the Andijon massacre in May 2005, but the Uzbek government keeps blocking an independent international investigation into the events” and “confirms its support for the sanctions against Uzbekistan” (European Parliament 2008a).

Although the Parliament never openly contested the Council’s decision to remove the arms embargo against Uzbekistan, it indirectly challenged the justifications offered by the Council and the EU member states in favour of lifting the sanction. In a report on EU sanctions adopted in September 2008, Parliament states that “the argument of the ‘ineffectiveness’ of sanctions cannot be used in favour of lifting them” and that “the continuation or not of sanctions should depend solely on whether their objectives have been achieved” (European Parliament 2008b, 8). The report cites the arms embargo against China as a “best practice example” of an embargo that was established following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, and which had not been lifted because the EU had not received “any explanations about that massacre” (European Parliament 2008b, 11). In the same report, the Parliament also underlines its interests in participating in the argumentative discourse on EU sanctions on a more equal basis. It requests to “be associated in all the stages of a sanctions process: the decision-making process leading to sanctions, the selection of the sanctions most appropriate to the situation, and also the definition of benchmarks and the evaluation of their implementation” (European Parliament 2008b, 11).

As regards the argumentative process among the member states, decisions on the imposition and the removal of sanctions have to be taken unanimously. Accounts of how the decisions on the arms embargo against Uzbekistan were taken differ. Many observers concluded that the German government had actively lobbied for and pushed hard for minimising the severity of the sanctions, and then imposed its argument that sanctions –including the arms embargo – were not effective and should, therefore, be lifted (Cronin 2009, 1). Yet others, including the German government, claimed that the Dutch government was “the only country to voice reluctance” (Rettman 2009, 1), and that the lifting of measures was “supported by most European governments”, including Britain, Sweden and Ireland, which had previously opposed the move but did not actively block the German initiative (Castle 2009, 1). Despite the differing accounts, it is evident that the principle of unanimity did not encourage consensual decision-making in “search for the better argument”. Rather, it allowed the powerful German government to enforce its position on others, making “it clear early on in the sanctions review process that it would not support a prolongation of the embargo” (Rettman 2009, 1).

The second indicator of Normative Performance as a process – the ability of all affected parties to participate in the argumentative process leading towards decisions on the EU’s arms embargo on Uzbekistan – was insufficiently met. The European Parliament was excluded from the process, and Germany used its influence as a powerful EU member state to emphasise its preferred outcome (the lifting of sanctions) over less powerful member states, such as the Netherlands.

4.3. The postulate of seriousness and authenticity

The third and final indicator of Normative Performance as process is that actors participating in the decision-making process on the EU’s arms embargo against Uzbekistan showed a genuine interest in using argumentative reasoning for reaching a consensus. As discussed previously, the decision to impose an arms embargo on Uzbekistan reflected a compromise on the lowest common denominator between member states pushing for a tough reaction to the Andijon massacre and member states wanting to avoid sanctions that would result in significant geopolitical costs. Accordingly, the member states – and in particular those not in favour of the sanction – did not enter the discussions on imposing an arms embargo against Uzbekistan with a genuine interest in argumentative reasoning. Rather, their aim was to advance their specific national geopolitical interest.

This dynamic was evident in the decision-making process on lifting the arms embargo. Had there been a genuine interest among the member states to engage in argumentative reasoning, there would have been no reason to avoid or distort the genuine communication on whether or not the Uzbek government had met the EU’s demands. However, it was only the European Parliament which repeatedly asked for a genuine and evidence-based discussion on whether the Uzbek government had complied with the demands or not. Moreover, the German government openly admitted that it had communicated its intention to block the prolongation of the arms embargo early on in the sanction review process. This move clearly indicates that the German government was neither inclined to engage in a process of argumentative reasoning during the review nor that it was willing to accept any alternative or “better” argument leading (potentially) to the prolongation of sanctions.

The EU’s decision-making processes on the arms embargo against Uzbekistan thus scores rather low on the third indicator of Normative Performance as process: Many EU member states and in particular those not in favour of the embargo showed no genuine interest in using argumentative reasoning for reaching a consensus on whether to impose (or lift) the embargo against Uzbekistan.

5. Conclusion

In this article, I introduced the new concept of “EU Normative Performance” to analyse the extent to which normative principles influence the EU’s policy towards its wider Eastern Neighbourhood. EU Normative Performance differs from and complements the analytical framework of EU performance developed in this special issue. EU Normative Performance is inspired by critical theory and the writings of Jürgen Habermas. Normative Performance does not define measures for a more efficient or effective conduct of existing policy, but for an ideal-type emancipatory policy constrained by normative principles (Normative Performance as output) and based on fair procedure, inclusion and the readiness to agree on “what is best” for all stakeholders affected (Normative Performance as a process).

I applied the framework of EU Normative Performance to the case study of the EU’s response to Uzbekistan after the brutal crackdown of anti-government protests in the city of Andijon in May 2005. I found that the EU’s decision to impose an arms embargo against Uzbekistan was justified based on moral and ethical reason. The EU was willing to impose the embargo even though it did not expect any significant economic or security gains from this decision (an indicator of normative engaged performance). When the EU member states’ security stakes in the country increased, however, support for the embargo decreased. The EU was not inclined to suffer any security losses from the embargo (an indicator of normative altruistic performance). Normative output was thus clearly present in the EU’s policy discourse but normative output in practice depended on the intensity of the EU’s security interests. The decision-making process leading to the imposition of the arms embargo met the benchmarks of EU Normative Performance as a process: despite the lack of an independent inquiry into the events in Andijon, decision-makers made sincere efforts to derive their judgments from the (few) available facts about the massacre. The decision to lift the arms embargo in 2009, however, was the result of a communication process deliberately distorted by a group of powerful member states in favour of lifting the embargo.

As I demonstrated in this article, the concept and framework of “EU Normative Performance” opens a new important pathway to examine the EU’s engagement with autocratic regimes in its (wider) neighbourhood. An assessment of EU policy in terms of its (cost-) effectiveness can be applied to uncontroversial or technical aspects of EU foreign policy. However, some aspects of EU foreign policy (e.g. decisions on whether to supply arms to an autocratic regime that has reportedly massacred its own people) certainly raise profound moral and ethical. The parameters of EU Normative Performance provide measurements independent of how the EU defines the right or just principles guiding its foreign policy, which in turn allows a critical reflection on the very essence of what is (and should be) normative EU foreign policy. At the same time, the framework facilitates a differentiated analysis of EU normative output (pragmatic, engaged, altruistic) and of the normative process (the postulates of correctness, inclusion and authenticity), upon which to assess and critique the performance of the EU as an actor in its neighbourhood and elsewhere in the world.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the guest editors of this special issue and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments that contributed to improving the final version of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Dr Giselle Bosse is Assistant Professor and Co-Director of the MSc European Studies at Maastricht University (NL), Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges and Research Associate at the Martens Centre for European Studies (Brussels). Her research focuses on the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) and policy towards autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. She is currently the principal investigator of a VENI research project funded by Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) on “Explaining Europe’s failure to deal with autocratic regimes’ (Ref. 451-12-015). Giselle Bosse has published her research inter alia in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Geopolitics, Europe-Asia Studies and Cooperation and Conflict and frequently presents her work at leading think tanks in Europe.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO) under VENI Research Grant Ref. 451-12-015.

Notes

1 The EU’s trade in arms and arms control, in general, has received little scholarly attention. Notable exceptions include Bauer (2003), Holm (2006), Bromley (2007), Bromley and Brzoska (2008), and Erickson (2013).

2 The Theory of Communicative Action and Habermas’ works on discourse ethics (Habermas 1987, 1988, 1993) are based on the assumption that all social actors have to justify their positions, decisions and actions in a process of argumentation with others. It is a collective argumentation process through which norms and values are defined and it is also a collective argumentation process, which determines what (and if) norms or values should guide a particular course of action (Habermas 1993, 52–53).

3 The Copenhagen criteria of 1993 are conditions elaborated by the EU that define when a country is eligible to join the EU. These include, inter alia, that a country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and the existence of a functioning market economy (European Council 1993, 12–16).

4 As regards economic security gains, Habermas implicitly distinguishes between gains for states that thereby ensure or maximise “the security of their citizens” (Habermas 2006, 118) and profits, which are generated by the global market but which are no longer distributed “back” to the citizens. When assessing the extent to which arms exports to a country (and restrictions thereof) yield economic and security gains for the EU or a member state, a distinction should thus be made between (a) gains for the majority of citizens of the EU or a member state (public gains) and (b) gains/ profits of multinational corporations (private gains).

5 According to Habermas, “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas 1990, 66). The inclusion of all does, however, pose practical problems to a multi-level polity like the EU, which only partially meets the conditions of a state-like democracy and whose foreign policy operates in the absence of global democratic institutions capable of transmitting the will of “all affected”. To specify a more realistic boundary of the inclusion criterion, I draw on Buchanan and Keohane (2006), who highlight the critical role of transnational civil society and (national) legislatures for the accountability and legitimacy of global governance institutions. The inclusion criterion is therefore limited to EU member state governments and the European Parliament (the “democratic channels of accountability”) and international NGOs such as Transparency International or Human Rights Watch (the “transnational civil society channel of accountability”) (c.f. Buchanan and Keohoane 2006, 415–416; 432–433).

6 Interview by the author with an EU Official, Brussels, September 2008.