Differentiation through bargaining power in EU–Azerbaijan relations: Baku as a tough negotiator

ABSTRACT

Using the case of democracy and human rights promotion, this article examines the concept of “differentiation” in relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union (EU). Post-independence, Azerbaijan increasingly positions itself as a strong and influential actor, demanding more discretion from the EU, based on equal input and interest representation. This article argues that the EU approach remains too unilateral, causing the Azerbaijani government to resist and gain influence through different routes, including lobbying activities. The article concludes that EU policy-making mechanisms could become more differentiated to reflect the political reality of changing power dynamics between the EU and Azerbaijan.

KEYWORDS:

• Azerbaijan
• bargaining power
• democracy promotion
• differentiation
• Eastern Partnership
• European Union

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the two reviewers for their time and in-depth feedback on the first draft of this article. Further gratitude goes to participants of the workshop ‘Testing the boundaries of EU actorness in the Eastern Partnership’ at the University of Kent, 19–20 February 2015, for their very helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Eske van Gils is a Lecturer in East European Politics at the University of Kent, Canterbury, and research assistant at the Global Europe Centre at Kent. Her research focuses on bargaining power in EU–Azerbaijan relations, with case studies on value promotion, legal approximation, and security co-operation. Prior to her PhD research, Eske obtained her MA in European Union Studies at the University of Ghent. She contributed to the House of Lords’ inquiry on the EU Global Security Strategy (2015), CEPI and GEC policy papers (2015), published a working paper on EU actorness in the EaP (Global Europe Centre, 2013), an article on EU relations with Belarus (Internationale Spectator, 2012), and co-authored an article on the World Bank’s recommendations for transition countries (2016). Email: [email protected]

Notes

1. For reasons of confidentiality, all references to specific interviews are anonymised.

2. See the introduction to this volume.

3. Yet criticism can also be heard: opposition party members dubbed those released as “celebrity political prisoners”; external actors would not consider all cases equally and many others would not receive such international media attention, particularly not religious political prisoners (Safarova 2016).

4. For instance, the continued dialogue under the bilateral framework makes Azerbaijan different to Belarus, which presently does not have formal bilateral relations with the EU.

5. While Member States may have an independent and divergent policy towards Azerbaijan, in this analysis they are included to the extent that they contribute to the EU common policy in relations with Baku.

6. See Kostanyan’s (2017).

7. For a critical analysis of the EU’s support to Azerbaijani civil society, see also Böttger and Falkenhain (2011).

8. Even though the official EU policy states that civil society should be included in these discussions (expert interview 1, May 2014).

9. A more in-depth discussion of the concepts of “othering”, differentiation and normalisation can be found in the introduction to this special issue.

10. Please see the introduction in this volume for further explanation of the concept of positive othering and its various forms.

11. It should be noted here that generally, there appears to be a good level of understanding of Azerbaijan’s interests and a more realistic view on cooperation with the government, within the EU Delegation in Baku as well as in member states’ Embassies in Azerbaijan (interviews with Member State officials 2, May 2014; 7, May 2014; 3, May 2014). But this understanding does not always seem to be incorporated by the EEAS Headquarters and Member States’ representatives in Brussels, who eventually decide upon the policies (interview with EEAS official 1, April 2014).

Additional information

Funding

The fieldwork for this research has been made available through generous financial support of the School of Politics and IR at the University of Kent, BASEES (British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies) (Fieldwork Fund), and UACES (UACES Scholarship).