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Abstract
Change in the social organization of markets involves the state, economic actors, and civil society in a mutually conditioning and dynamic relation. While much is known about this relation, the processes and mechanisms used by economic actors to influence regulatory institutions to shape their economic spaces over time remain insufficiently specified. Based on a most-different case approach of wine in California and Pennsylvania across time, we explain why and how these states adopted very different regulatory frameworks for alcohol governance: a license and state control system, respectively. Our findings indicate that winemakers who created and effectively deployed ‘institutional footholds’ during periods of ‘regulatory ambiguity’ were better positioned to exert influence over regulatory outcomes. Here we define ‘institutional footholds’ as mechanisms used to create spaces of political traction within the state apparatus. A form of critical juncture, ‘regulatory ambiguity’ refers to moments of uncertainty that precede a shift in the existing norms and rules governing particular economic spaces. We find that over time, this mutually conditioning process generates what we term ‘institutional sedimentation’, where the rules governing particular economic spaces become part of more permanent institutional architectures. The results of a recent survey with Pennsylvania winemakers conducted by the authors serve to further underscore divergence in the micro-foundations of collectivities and their strategic actions.
Extracto
En el cambio de la organización social de los mercados participan el Estado, protagonistas económicos y la sociedad civil en una relación dinámica mutuamente condicionada. Aunque esta relación es bastante conocida, siguen estando insuficientemente especificados los procesos y los mecanismos utilizados por los actores económicos que influyen en los organismos reguladores para desarrollar sus espacios económicos con el paso del tiempo. A partir de un método de los casos más diferentes del vino en California y Pensilvania a través del tiempo, explicamos por qué y cómo estos Estados adoptaron estructuras regulatorias muy diferentes para gestionar el alcohol: un sistema de licencias y uno de control estatal respectivamente. Nuestros resultados indican que los vinicultores que crearon y desarrollaron eficazmente ‘bases institucionales’ durante los periodos de ‘ambigüedad normativa’ tenían una mejor posición para influir en los resultados en materia de regulación. Aquí definimos ‘bases institucionales’ como mecanismos utilizados para crear espacios de tracción política dentro del aparato del Estado. Una forma de coyuntura crítica, la ‘ambigüedad normativa’ se refiere a momentos de incertidumbre que preceden a un cambio en las normas y legislaciones existentes que gobiernan espacios económicos determinados. Observamos que con el tiempo, este proceso de condicionamiento mutuo genera lo que denominamos una ‘sedimentación institucional’ donde las normas que gobiernan espacios económicos determinados llegan a formar parte de arquitecturas institucionales más permanentes. Los resultados de un estudio reciente con vinicultores de Pensilvania llevado a cabo por los autores sirven para destacar aún más la divergencia en las microfundaciones de colectivos y sus acciones estratégicas.
摘要
市场的社会组织变迁，涉及国家、经济行动者与市民社会之间互为条件的动态关係。儘管此一关係已众所週知，但经济行动者影响规范制度，以随着时间形塑其经济空间的过程，却仍缺乏充分的解释。我们根据最为不同的案例方法，随着时间的推移，研究加州与宾州的酒，解释这两州为何、以及如何对酒精管制採取相当不同的规范架构：一为发放执照，另一则为州政府的控制系统。我们的发现指出，在 “管制模煳” 期间创造并有效部署 “制度立足点” 的製酒商，位于更佳的位置对规范结果发挥影响力。于此，我们将 “制度立足点” 定义为用以在州的机构中创造政治牵引空间的机制。做为一个关键的连结形式， “管制模煳” 指涉在管理特定经济空间的既存规范与常规转变之前的不确定时机。我们发现，随着时间的推移，此一互为条件的过程产生了我们所谓的 “制度沉淀” ，其中管理特定经济空间的规则，成为更为持久的制度架构中的一部分。我们对宾州製酒商的晚近调查结果，进一步强调了集体性的微观基础及其策略行动中的差异。
Résumé
Le développement de l'organisation sociale des marchés implique l’État, les agents économiques, et la société civile dans un rapport dynamique de renforcement réciproque. Bien que l'on en sache beaucoup sur ce rapport, les processus et les mécanismes employés par les agents économiques afin d'influencer les institutions réglementaires dans le but de façonner leurs espaces économiques sur le temps sont toujours insuffisamment précisés. Fondé sur l'application sur le temps de la ‘most-different cases approach’ dans le secteur viticole en Californie et en Pennsylvanie, on explique pourquoi et comment ces états-là ont adopté des cadres réglemenetaires très différents quant à la gouvernance de l'alcool: un système de permis d'alcool et un système de contrôle par l’État respectivement. Les résultats indiquent que les vinificateurs qui ont établi et déployé en effet des ‘positions avantageuses institutionnelles’ pendant des périodes ‘d'ambiguité réglementaire’ étaient mieux placés pour influer sur les résultats réglementaires. Ce présent article définit ‘les positions avantageuses institutionnelles’ comme des mécanismes employés pour créer des espaces de force politique au sein de l'appareil de l’État. Étant une étape décisive, ‘l'ambiguité réglementaire’ concerne les moments d'incertitude qui précèdent une modification des normes et des règles en vigueur qui régissent des espaces économiques particuliers. Il s'avère que, sur le temps, ce processus de renforcement réciproque entraîne ce que l'on appelle ici ‘la sédimentation institutionnelle,’ où les règles qui régissent des espaces économiques particuliers deviennent partie intégrante des ossatures institutionnelles permanentes. Les résultats d'une enquête récente auprès des vinificateurs en Pennsylvanie menée par les auteurs soulignent davantage la divergence des micro-fondements des collectivités et de leurs actions stratégiques.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Pennsylvania winemakers that took the time to fill out our survey and the Horace T. Woodward Faculty Development Fund in Agricultural Sciences at The Pennsylvania State University for providing the funds to conduct our survey.
Notes
1. This refers to a research design whereby the dependent variable and one independent variable covary, and all other possible independent variables show different values (Seawright and Gerring, Citation2008, p. 306).
2. It is important to note that the term ‘sedimentation’ has been used in organizational analyses. From this perspective, sedimentation relates to individual, intra-organizational, and inter-organizational relations that produce particular structures, and the ways organizational structures are reiterated, diffused, and naturalized (Berger and Luckmann, Citation1967; Tolbert and Zucker, Citation1996). Here, the adoption of organizational structures emerges from the need of an organization to respond to specific problems. These responses are shaped by types of individuals (i.e. decision-makers), the degree of socially constructed legitimation associated with newly created organizational structures, their potential for diffusion, and permanence across time. From this perspective, there are three stages involving the institutionalization of organizational structures, namely habituation (present in the pre-organizational stage), objectification (semi-institutionalization), and the final stage of sedimentation (full institutionalization). A key difference in our use of the term ‘institutional sedimentation’ compared to the above conceptualization is the scope of analysis. Our formulation of institutional sedimentation does not focus on the individual, intra or inter-organizational structures as responses to particular organizational problems. Rather, we emphasize the broader relations wherein economic actors (in this case at the industry level) and government (at various scales) mutually condition the regulatory milieus governing particular economic spaces. In addition, from our perspective, the process of institutional sedimentation does not entail ‘stages’ nor does it reach an ‘end-stage’. Rather, it is a dynamic political economic process that morphs across time. Rather than stages of institutionalization, we point to mechanisms available to economic actors to influence their regulatory milieus while emphasizing that not all economic actors are in the position to deploy such mechanisms.
3. Here we refer broadly to alcohol control because the wine, spirits, and beer industries were largely undifferentiated historically and the regulatory frameworks governing the wine industry are entangled with the broader alcohol industry.
4. The survey was carried out by the Survey Research Center at the Pennsylvania State University using a list obtained from the PWA and online searches. A 3-contact mailing was implemented in this study: an initial mailing of the survey, a reminder postcard, then a second mailing of the survey. The first survey mailing was 2 June 2011, and was sent to 142 wineries. The packet contained a cover letter, the survey, and a business reply envelope. A reminder postcard was sent to all of the addresses on 14 June 2011. To increase the response rate, an additional mailing of the survey was mailed to all non-respondents on 21 June 2011. The follow-up mailing included 118 wineries. This second mailing of the survey was composed of a cover letter, another copy of the survey, and a business reply envelope. The survey achieved a 50% response rate, with 71 useable responses representative of both the regional and American Viticultural Area (AVA) distribution of winemakers in PA. Of the 71 respondents, 49 (69%) were both wine and wine grape producers, and 22 (31%) produced wine only. The responding wineries are generally small, both in terms of acreage of wine grapes and gallons produced, which is representative of how the industry is constituted in PA.
5. The Wine Institute, http://www.wineinstitute.org/resources/statistics/article86 (28 September 2011)
6. The survey was based on a population list of 142 wineries. In Pennsylvania small wineries comprise 88% of wineries and produce approximately 41% of total state wine production while large wineries or 12% of wineries produce 59% (MKF Research, Citation2006, p. 8).
7. A committee was established to help states analyze their options for liquor control found that the control system was a better means not only to control alcohol consumption but also to increase state revenue.
8. A ‘limited winery’ has an annual production of less than 200,000 gallons as defined by section 102 of the code (47 P. S. § 1–102).